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companies we find that CEOs’ explanations do cross-culturally vary,
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serving biases in accounting narratives.
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1 Introduction 
“In a century where society is marked by 
science and rationalism, by analysis and 
pragmatism, where symbol analysts hold the 
highest positions of society—this is precisely 
where the emotions, the stories and 
narratives, the values all return to the scene. 
The term Dream Society suggested itself” 
1
This study starts with a quotation from The Dream Society by Rolf Jensen (1999). 
Jensen is director of “The Copenhagen Institute for Future Studies”, a think tank 
that provides strategic advice with respect to future scenarios predominantly to 
multinationals. In this book Jensen deludes the reader with images of the world 
after the Information Society. He foresees a world in which stories will be 
important.2 According to Jensen stories relating to, for example, adventures, 
togetherness, convictions, and corporate ethical behaviour will determine whether 
consumers are persuaded to buy products. That is, in The Dream Society stories 
form the competitive edge. He refers to a number of cutting-edge companies that 
already have recognised the importance of a good story that appeals to consumers’ 
emotions. According to Jensen it is companies such as Nike, Disney, Rolex, 
Virgin, and McDonald’s that will be successful in The Dream Society. If Jensen is 
right, then this new society may also be reflected in a company’s financial report: 
the narrative part will become increasingly important. In this study we focus on 
this narrative part and on the letter to the shareholders in particular. Indeed, it has 
been suggested that these letters are similar to folktales or stories: “The stories told 
in letters to shareholders narrate the successes and failures of individuals (e.g. the 
CEOs), organisational subunits, and the entire company” (Fiol, 1989: 280). In this 
introductory chapter we will start with addressing some general characteristics of 
financial reporting (1.1). Then we move to the letter to the shareholders and 
previous research focusing on it (1.2). In section 1.3 we pay attention to the main 
1 From Jensen (1999: 4). 
2 A similar idea is expressed in The expressive organisation, a book edited by Schultz, 
Hatch, and Holten Larsen (2000). 
2research objectives of this study. The chapter ends with a short outline of the 
remainder of the study (1.4). 
1.1 The financial report 
As is prescribed by law or securities regulations each year a company has to issue 
a financial report. The issue of this financial report can be viewed as part of a 
communication process, with company management being the sender and 
institutional investors, financial analysts, shareholders, governmental authorities, 
and other interested parties the receivers (Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse, 
1992; Van der Tas, 1992a). The financial report seeks to inform shareholders, 
creditors and other stakeholders about a company’s business history, its present 
financial status, and its expected direction (Epstein and Pava, 1993; Courtis, 1995, 
1998). The issue of such a financial report has two main objectives. The first 
objective is to support (potential) investors in their decision-making process 
whether to invest in the company or not. The second objective is to enable 
stakeholders, and the shareholders in particular, to evaluate management’s use of 
the company’s resources, i.e. to evaluate management’s stewardship of business 
(Beaver, 1998). Increasingly, however, financial reports have become part of the 
company’s efforts to create and manage a certain corporate image (e.g. Lee, 1994; 
Hopwood, 1996; Preston, Wright and Young, 1996). Companies are prepared to 
invest a considerable amount of money in the design of their financial reports: 
Hyland (1998) reported that companies from the United States alone spent each 
year around $5 billion to produce their financial reports. Currently it is difficult if 
not impossible to find a single company issuing a financial report that is not 
printed on expensive paper and does not make extensive use of eye-catching charts 
and figures. It has even been suggested that the figures have become “a mere 
technical appendix to a highly sophisticated product of the corporate design 
environment” (Hopwood, 1996: 55) in which stories, pictures and graphs are more 
important. Indeed, in a study of financial reports of 25 large companies from the 
United Kingdom, Lee (1994) found a change in the form of the report between 
1965 and 1988. His results showed that the size of the financial report, i.e. number 
of pages, doubled in this period. The extra pages were largely devoted to voluntary 
information and to a large extent included narratives and pictures. Users of 
financial reports too seem to attach less importance to the pure financial data. 
Several surveys conducted in different countries reveal that they are more 
interested in the narrative sections of the financial report than in the pure financial 
data (e.g. Klaassen and Schreuder, 1980, 1981; Epstein and Pava, 1993; Bartlett 
3and Chandler, 1997; Hyland, 1998; Smith and Taffler, 2000). A possible reason 
for this preference may be that financial statements are beyond the comprehension 
of the vast majority of the private investors (e.g. Lee and Tweedie, 1976; Courtis, 
1982). Seemingly, individual shareholders prefer the more understandable 
narrative sections containing management’s analysis of the financial figures. 
Especially the letter to the shareholders, usually occupying a prominent position 
near the front of a financial report, is read by the majority of the recipients of the 
financial report. In addition, they perceive it as one of the most important elements 
of a financial report (Room, 1997 for an overview of the usefulness studies). The 
focus of this study will be on this letter to the shareholders. 
1.2 The letter to the shareholders 
Although there are some differences between countries, a typical financial report 
contains a quantitative part and a narrative part (e.g. Radebaugh and Gray, 1997; 
Nobes and Parker, 1998). The quantitative part includes the financial statements 
(balance sheet, income statement, cash flow statement, and comprehensive income 
statement) and the accompanying notes to it, in which the applied accounting 
principles are described. Both the format and content of this part of the financial 
report are to a large extent governed by law or other forms of regulation. In 
addition, independent auditors have to verify and state whether the financial 
statements give a true and fair view of the company’s results and financial 
position.  
However, the narrative part, and the letter to the shareholders in particular, is 
to a large extent unregulated.3 Furthermore, it is unaudited although auditors have 
to verify that the letter to the shareholders and the financial statements do not 
present conflicting views of the company’s results (Steinbart, 1989; Beattie and 
Jones, 1992; Neu, Warsame and Pedwell, 1998). Despite management’s discretion 
in drawing up a letter to the shareholders, a typical letter contains a summary of 
the company’s accomplishments in the fiscal year under review as well as some 
remarks concerning future expectations. In addition, management often provides 
3 In the United States and the United Kingdom, however, the Management Discussion and 
Analysis and the Operational and Financial Review, respectively, are regulated to a large 
extent. In these narrative sections management also discusses the financial results of the 
fiscal year following certain disclosure requirements. Recently, the European Accounting 
Study Group, comprised of representatives of the major European accounting bodies, 
proposed “a set of principles to guide the selection and presentation of management’s 
analysis of the business […] which are intended as a basis for the formulation of specific 
and internationally comparable reporting standards” (2000: 6). 
4explanations for the obtained results in the letter to the shareholders. Given 
management’s freedom in discussing and presenting the company’s results, the 
letter to the shareholders provides management with an excellent opportunity to 
interpret events to their own benefit (Ginzel, Kramer and Sutton, 1993). Indeed, it 
is said that letters to the shareholders “are notorious for adopting optimistic 
attitudes and presenting euphemistic descriptions of company’s results and 
prospects” (Bruce, 1987 as quoted in Limacher, 1997: 2). In addition, they are 
designed to send the right message, i.e. to enhance the story of corporate 
performance contained in the financial statements or to signal or, maybe more 
likely, to detract attention away from poor performance (Preston et al., 1996: 118). 
That is, management seems likely to accentuate the positive, whereas the negative 
is obscured or even eliminated (Baker and Kare, 1992). This selective way of 
presenting information may be seen as part of managers’ impression management. 
As is discussed more in detail in chapter 2, impression management refers to the 
process by which individuals, including managers, want to manipulate the images 
other people have or form of them (Tedeschi and Riess, 1981a,b). Managers, for 
example, may want to evoke an image of a leader that is in control (Salancik and 
Meindl, 1984), i.e. that they are competent and powerful (Leary, 1996). Not being 
in control of the circumstances could bring about negative consequences for the 
organisation. Ginzel et al. (1993: 245) have indicated that, as the audience consists 
of people who depend on the organisation for resources, the perception that top 
management is not really in control may threaten their security and increase their 
feelings of uncertainty. This may result in participants withdrawing their sources 
from the organisation (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Zajac and Westphal, 1995). 
Previous research within the organisational and accounting domains reveals 
that management uses different impression management techniques to present 
information in the financial report, including: 
1. Readability of financial reports: The readability4 of the financial report and the 
letter to the shareholders seems to depend on the company’s performance. 
Although the results are still inconclusive and further research is needed (Jones 
and Shoemaker, 1994) it seems that letters of poor-performing companies are 
less readable than those of companies that performed well (see Jones and 
Shoemaker, 1994; Courtis, 1995, 1998; Jones and Clatworthy, 2000a). 
4 Most readability studies used the so-called Flesch Reading Ease index to measure 
readability. This index uses a combination of sentence length and syllable count to express 
the extent of readability. Modern word processing packages include tools to calculate the 
Flesch Reading Ease index. 
52. Bias in conveyance of news: Irrespective of performance, management prefers 
to present “good news” rather than “bad news.” Research shows that the 
amount of space devoted to reporting favourable information, e.g. increases in 
sales or profits, is significantly larger than the space devoted to unfavourable 
information (Kohut and Segars, 1992; Jones and Clatworthy, 2000b). Such 
selective conveyance is also present in the provision of corporate social 
information (Deegan and Rankin, 1996). 
3. Manipulation of graphs: Research by Steinbart (1989) and Beattie and Jones 
(1992, 1997, 1999, 2000) shows that especially companies with good 
performance make more extensive use of graphs in their annual reports than 
companies with poor performance. Furthermore, graphics contain distortions, 
e.g. in scale, so that an increase in profits is accentuated while a decrease in 
profits is graphically understated. 
4. Attributional bias in management’s explanations: There is research indicating 
that managers often show a bias when they provide explanations for 
organisational outcomes (Bowman, 1976, 1978; Bettman and Weitz, 1983; 
Staw, McKechnie and Puffer, 1983; Salancik and Meindl, 1984; D’Aveni and 
MacMillan, 1990; Clapham and Schwenk, 1991; Aerts, 1991, 1994; Jones and 
Clatworthy, 2000b; Tsang, 2002). Managers tend to take credit for positive 
outcomes, e.g. increasing sales, a higher net income, etc.. However, the same 
managers deny taking responsibility for a deterioration in performance, e.g. 
reporting a loss, decreasing sales, etc. by blaming it on the environment. This 
so-called self-serving attributional bias is not characteristic for managers in 
particular. On the contrary, there is a large body of social-psychological 
research which indicates that people in general engage in self-serving 
attributional biases when they provide explanations (e.g. Miller and Ross, 
1975; Weary, 1978; Zuckerman, 1979; Arkin, Cooper and Kolditz, 1980; 
Mullen and Riordan, 1988; Ross and Nisbett, 1991; Ashkanasy and Gallois, 
1994; Johnston and Kim, 1994). 
1.3 Development of research questions  
Notwithstanding the interesting aspects of the other three forms of impression 
management briefly presented in the previous section, in this study we focus on 
the self-serving attributional bias in letters to the shareholders. As indicated, there 
is evidence that this bias often occurs when company management provides 
explanations for the financial results in the letter to the shareholders. Management 
is willing to take credit for successful results, whereas unsuccessful results are 
blamed on the environment. This study aims at replicating those previous studies. 
6In a recent contribution to a special issue of the Academy of Management Review
on organisational theory development, Tsang and Kwan (1999) noted that 
replications in social sciences, and organisational science in particular, have been 
lacking, partially because it “has not been adequately recognised as a valuable part 
of theory development” (1999: 759). Also Hubbard, Vetter and Little (1998) 
remarked that the management domain has been characterised by an absenteeism 
of replications. They found that very few replication studies were published in 
management and strategic journals, regardless of their prestige. However, just like 
Tsang and Kwan (1999) they consider replications to be valuable for theory 
development. To quote Hubbard et al. (1998: 244): “The principle of replicability 
plays a fundamental role in the research process. After all, replications serve to 
protect against the uncritical assimilation of erroneous empirical results into the 
literature. Replications with extensions also help to accomplish this, but more 
importantly go further by determining the scope and limits of initial findings by 
seeing if they can be generalised to other populations, time periods, organisations, 
geographical areas, measurement instruments, contexts, and so on. Thus 
replications with extensions are basic to empirical knowledge or knowledge 
development.” This study took up their call for more replication research in 
organisational science. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that self-
serving attributional biases in management’s explanations are not merely “single-
shot studies” and have been subject of several studies that may be considered as 
replications (e.g. Clapham and Schwenk, 1991; Aerts, 1994). Given these 
observations our first research question goes: 
Do managers show self-serving biases to explain organisational outcomes in 
the letter to the shareholders? And if so, what organisational and/or 
situational factors explain differences in the extent of self-serving biases? 
Financial reports are increasingly issued to an international audience. This is 
evidenced by, for example, the increasing number of listings on national stock 
markets that is of foreign origin (Roberts, Weetman and Gordon, 1998). Statistics 
reported by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the World 
Federation of Exchanges show that as of 2001 almost 20% of the companies listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange are of foreign origin. Other major stock 
exchanges as Frankfurt, London and Paris reported similar figures. In Amsterdam 
this figure is even higher at almost 40%.5 In Japan, however, only a small number 
5 For Paris and Amsterdam, who together with Brussels form Euronext, the figures are 
based on 1999 as no figures for Euronext are available yet. 
7is of foreign origin (2%). Given the international context in which the financial 
reporting process is taking place it seemed warranted to use a sample of companies 
from different countries. The countries included in this study are Japan, the 
Netherlands and the United States. Three considerations instigated the 
international dimension of this research.  
The first involves the harmonisation efforts of, for example, the European 
Union and the IASB with regard to financial reporting. The basic aim of these 
harmonisation efforts is to improve the comparability of financial reports of 
companies from different countries so that capital markets can operate more 
efficiently and effectively. Although some progress has been made (e.g. Van der 
Tas, 1988, 1992a,b; Archer, Delvaille and McLeay, 1995) complete harmonized 
accounting standards and practices have not yet been achieved (e.g. Emenyonu 
and Gray, 1996; Carlson, 1997). Furthermore, these efforts predominantly have 
concentrated on the financial statements and the notes to it. The narrative part, 
including the letter to the shareholders, however, is still unregulated, leaving it 
largely at management’s discretion. This discretion leaves room to make use of the 
impression management techniques described earlier. This has an important 
consequence: the true and fair view that financial reports should provide is 
endangered (Jones and Clatworthy, 2000b). As a significant part of the private 
investors find the financial statements less interesting and tend to focus on the 
letter to the shareholders, it might be important that accounting standard setting 
organisations extend their efforts to this narrative part of the financial report. If 
this research reveals that there are differences in the self-serving attributional bias 
in the letter to the shareholders of companies from different countries, a call for 
international regulation only seems more justified. 
The world has become more and more integrated. Globalisation, convergence, 
and growing internationalisation of business are oft-heared phrases in both the 
popular business press and more scientific-oriented readings as well. Some, such 
as IMF-director Stanley Fischer, even speak of a rise of a world that resembles 
McLuhan’s (1968) Global economic village. Evidence of this global village is 
noticeable in everyday life: McDonald’s, Nike, Coca Cola, and CNN—to name a 
few—have invaded every household. According to Schneider and Barsoux (2003: 
5) there are even some managerial researchers who believe “in the convergence of 
management practice”, reflecting the idea that management consists of a set of 
techniques and principles that can be universally applied. However, the number of 
opponents against the idea of the global village continues to grow. Naomi Klein 
and Noreena Hertz are only two outspoken and obvious advocates of the anti-
globalisation movement. Furthermore, the results of a large-scale survey 
conducted by Rosa Moss Kanter (1991: 25) suggest “that the idea of a corporate 
8global village where a common culture of management unifies the practice of 
business around the world is more a dream than reality.” In a similar vein, Javidan 
and House (2002: 1) have recently commented that “the fact that the business 
world is becoming increasingly global does not mean that cultural differences are 
disappearing or diminishing,” an idea that is shared by other scholars such as 
Hofstede (1980), Triandis (1983), Adler (1997), and Earley and Erez (1997). This 
suggests that management practices that work in one culture may be ineffective in 
another and, consequently, that “many aspects of organisational theories produced 
in one culture may be inadequate in other cultures” (Triandis, 1983: 139). “As a 
result there is a growing awareness of need for a better understanding of the way 
in which leadership is enacted in various cultures and a need for an empirically 
grounded theory to explain differential leader behaviour and effectiveness across 
cultures” (Den Hartog, House, Hanges, Ruiz-Quintanilla, Dorfman et al., 1999: 
228). Indeed, as “we are just beginning to understand how the role of culture 
influences leadership and organisational processes, numerous research questions 
remain unanswered” (House, Hanges, Ruiz-Quintanilla, Dorfman, Javidan, 
Dickson, Gupta et al., 1999: 5).6 This brings us to the third, related consideration.  
Since the beginning of the nineties researchers from the social-psychological 
field have a great interest in investigating whether there are cultural differences in 
this self-serving attributional bias. This growing body of research shows that there 
is a pervasive difference between western cultures (notably the United States) and 
eastern cultures (mostly Japan) (e.g. Morris and Peng, 1994; Yan and Gaier, 1994; 
Markus, Kitayama and Heiman, 1996; Meijer, 1996; Kitayama, Markus, 
Matsumoto and Norasakkunkit, 1997; Lee and Seligman, 1997; Semin and Zwier, 
1997; Zwier, 1998; Choi, Nisbett and Norenzayan, 1999; Menon, Morris, Chiu 
and Hong, 1999). Although people across cultures do generally show a self-
serving bias, it is more typical for people from western cultures than from eastern 
cultures. First, Americans are more than eastern subjects inclined to explain events 
in terms of dispositional factors, and typically when it involves successful 
6 A similar idea has been expressed by Lonner and Adamopoulos (1997) in their review of 
the impact of culture on behaviour in The handbook of cross-cultural psychology. Their 
conclusion is that their overview seems “to relegate culture to the status of a “third” 
variable. Ultimately, however, they all hold the possibility that culture can account 
completely for the relationship between individual dispositions and individual behaviour at 
some deep level of analysis. Of course, given the present state of knowledge, it would be 
both pretentious and overinclusive to maintain that either an “individualistic” or a 
“collectivistic” culture, or a culture that emphasises an “independent” as opposed to an 
“interdependent” construal of the self, can account for all thought and behaviour of its 
citizens” (Lonner and Adamopoulos, 1997: 76).  
9outcomes. On the other hand, people from eastern cultures are more inclined to 
assume personal responsibility for a failure than Americans do: especially 
Japanese, but Indian and Chinese as well, show a self-deprecating tendency (e.g. 
Kashima and Triandis, 1986; Yan and Gaier, 1994; Tuss, Zimmer and Ho, 1995; 
Meijer, 1996; Kitayama et al., 1997; Lee and Seligman, 1997). We wanted to 
explore whether managers with different cultural backgrounds show the same 
differences in self-serving attributional biases as were found in social-
psychological research. These considerations boil down to our second research 
question, which extends previous accounting and organisational research on this 
subject: 
Do differences exist in the self-serving attributional bias as may be present in 
the letter to the shareholders of companies originating from different cultures, 
and if so, how can we explain these? 
1.4 Structure of the study 
To provide answers to the two basic research questions posited in the previous 
section we first pay attention to attribution theory in chapter 2. Attribution theory 
is concerned with the thoughts people have about events and what causes them. It 
provides the basis for studying explanations. As is covered in that chapter, the 
internal-external dichotomy plays a crucial role in the contributions to attribution 
theory. This dichotomy illustrates that people can either attribute an outcome to 
internal, i.e. personal, factors or to external, i.e. environment-related, factors. In 
addition, in this chapter we will pay attention to some biases people show when 
they provide causal explanations for their own or someone else’s behaviour. One 
of those is the so-called “self-serving attributional bias.” This bias implies that 
people are likely to ascribe their own successes to internal factors whereas failures 
are ascribed to something external to the person. Such a bias is often present in the 
stories told by the CEOs in their letters to the shareholder. Furthermore, we will 
briefly discuss three complementary frameworks that may be used to place the 
self-serving attributional bias in a more well-defined context. In particular, we pay 
attention to impression management, corporate communication, and agency 
theory. Despite being of different origins, in all frameworks it is emphasised that 
CEOs are motivated to use self-serving explanations in their stories in an attempt 
to influence stakeholders’ perceptions of the company (and of the CEO himself). 
These perceptions are important because they impinge on the (need to justify the) 
CEO’s rewards and also because they may influence stakeholders’ decisions to 
continue their investment in the company or not. 
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In chapter 3 we move to culture. Culture, though being a rather vague and 
broad concept, involves shared values. It stresses that people with the same ethnic 
background basically have the same ideas about what is “good” or “bad”, 
“rational” or “irrational”, and so on. Indeed, most cross-cultural researchers focus 
on what they consider to be “core” cultural values. This strand of research, with 
contributions of, e.g. Hofstede, Parsons and Shils, and Schwartz, resulted in a 
number of dimensions that capture the essence of the various cultures throughout 
the world. The intention of this chapter is to briefly review the dimensions in order 
to arrive at a set of “core” cultural dimensions shared by the various researchers. 
In chapter 4 we discuss how culture affects the kind of attributions people 
make. In that respect the chapter integrates the ideas addressed in preceding two 
chapters. Based upon a review of cross-cultural and social-psychological research, 
we conclude that Americans, compared to Japanese, make more extensive use of 
self-serving explanations. We also see that the reasons researchers have used to 
account for this cultural difference are related to differences with respect to the 
importance of groups and differences in the way people communicate. 
Based upon the review of the literature we then try to translate the two basic 
research questions, as formulated in section 1.3, into more concrete, testable 
propositions in chapter 5. These propositions represent our expectations with 
respect to how culture (as represented by dimensions) influences the attributions 
CEOs from different countries make in their letters to the shareholders. This 
chapter also contains the outline of the research design we use to test our 
propositions.  
Chapter 6 presents the results of the study. In the chapter we test the 
propositions that we have formulated in chapter 5. Attention is paid to both 
whether self-serving attributional biases in letters are culturally determined as well 
as which other factors may help to explain possible differences found. Apart from 
the self-serving attributional bias we will also address some other forms of 
impression management that may be found in letters to the shareholders, including 
the tone of the letter and whether management inserts comments about future 
expectations or not. 
In chapter 7 we move to concluding this study and briefly highlighting 
possible areas for future research. 
2  The self-serving attributional bias 
“Success has a thousand fathers,  
while failure is an orphan” 1
Consider the following hypothetical case. You are the CEO of a large, listed 
company. Several years ago you and the other board members decided to 
drastically change the company’s strategy. Since then the company has focused on 
its core business being the production and sale of vitamins and other nutritional 
supplements. Initially, both financial analysts and the financial press were 
somewhat sceptical about this change in strategy, also fed by the disappointing 
results in the first year after the change. This fiscal year, fortunately, you are able 
to present outstanding performances: both sales as well as net income show 
double-digit growth percentages. However, you expect the competitors to report 
nice results as well, partially because of the favourable economic conditions in 
general, and the increased attention for one’s health in particular. At this moment 
you, in co-operation with public relations, are in the process of writing the CEO’s 
letter to the shareholders. One important issue in this process concerns the “story” 
behind the company’s results. Now, while being behind your desk, you are asking 
yourself how to explain this year’s outstanding performance. Should you explain it 
in terms of the general favourable economic conditions? Or should you take credit 
for this result by ascribing it to the effectiveness of the strategy you implemented 
some years ago? 
When you are answering such questions you are attributing an outcome to a 
cause. That is: you are providing one or more causal explanations for something 
you (or someone else) achieved. Within social psychology several scientists 
developed ideas that can be used to study and/or predict the attributions people 
make. Subsequent research using these ideas revealed that people, including 
CEOs, show certain tendencies when they explain the outcomes of their own 
actions. One of those is that they tend to take credit for good outcomes, while 
denying responsibility for bad outcomes. This is the so-called “self-serving 
attributional bias” on which this research focuses. The CEO, however, is not the 
1 Old English saying as quoted in Schlenker (1980). 
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only person who is making attributions. Based upon the information they have, 
observers—in our case e.g. financial analysts, the financial press, shareholders, 
etc.—will arrive at their own explanations for the company’s results. Indeed, it is 
not inconceivable that they make different attributions than the CEO did. In this 
chapter the main contributions to attribution theory, which addresses both how 
people explain their own behaviour as well as other people’s behaviour, are briefly 
covered (section 2.1). Subsequently we will address some of the biases people 
may show in their attribution processes, including the self-serving attributional 
bias (section 2.2). Organisational and accounting research with respect to the self-
serving attributional bias in the context of the letter to the shareholders is covered 
more in detail in section 2.3. Then we move to the theoretical frameworks that can 
be used to explain why people in general, and managers in particular, are both 
motivated and able to engage in self-serving behaviours. After this discussion of 
impression management, corporate communication, and agency theory in section 
2.4, it is evident that managers are motivated to explain organisational results in a 
way that serves the self in an attempt to influence stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
company (and of himself). Section 2.5 briefly summarises the chapter. 
2.1 Main contributions to attribution theory 
2.1.1 Heider’s “naive psychology” 
The publication of The psychology of interpersonal relations (1958) generally is 
considered to be the starting point of attribution theory. In this book, Heider 
described the processes (ordinary) people follow to explain the outcomes of 
people’s actions. In his view people acted similarly to amateur or naive scientists 
when they process information to search for explanations for outcomes of their 
behaviour. Heider suggested that in such attributional processes people basically 
have the choice between personal or internal factors on the one hand and 
environmental or external factors on the other. Regarding the personal factors it is 
possible to make a distinction between what Heider referred to as “can” and “try.” 
The first, “can”, refers to the ability of a person to accomplish something. The 
second aspect, “try”, concerns motivational factors; it has both a directional 
component (i.e. What is the person aiming at?, What are his objectives?) and a 
quantitative component (i.e. How hard is the person trying to accomplish that 
goal?, How strong are his efforts to achieve that goal?) Both “can” and “try” are 
important to achieve something as may be clear from the following example: 
“John may have all the algebra skills in the world, but he will flunk the test if he 
fails to try at all and does not record any answers. Obversely, maximum effort 
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cannot guarantee an A-average for a student of limited ability” (Jones, 1990: 42). 
Thus, Heider’s main premise is that people can choose between internal and 
external factors to attribute outcomes to causes. This dichotomy played an 
important role in subsequent refinements by Kelley (1967) and Weiner (1971) 
which we will address next.2
2.1.2 Kelley’s covariation model 
Kelley (1967) relied on Heider’s internal-external dichotomy to develop his 
covariation model. The covariation model describes how people, given the 
information they have, decide to attribute an outcome to internal or external 
factors. It is particularly helpful to describe how observers arrive at their 
attributions with regard to someone else’s behaviour (Martinko and Thomson, 
1998; Vonk, 1999), e.g. the causes shareholders use to explain an increase in a 
company’s profits. Underlying the covariation model is the assumption that people 
can and will use information from more than one instance of behaviour, e.g. the 
profits the company reported in previous years (consistency), the company’s 
performance on other aspects, e.g. sales (distinctiveness), and the profits reported 
by the company’s competitors (consensus). The “scores” on these three sources of 
information determine the type of attribution observers are likely to make. 
Following Kelley (1967) an internal attribution is likely when the behaviour was 
low in consensus, low in distinctiveness, and high in consistency. For example, if a 
company is the only in the sector to report an increase in profits (low in 
consensus), the company reports, for example, increasing sales as well (low in 
distinctiveness), and the company reported good results in previous years (high in 
consistency), then it is likely that the shareholders will attribute the increase in 
profits to the implementation of management’s strategy (an internal attribution). If, 
however, the competitors also report large increases in profits (high in consensus), 
the company reports a slight decrease in sales (high in distinctiveness), and it 
reported increasing profits in previous years (high in consistency) then, following 
Kelley’s covariation model, an external attribution, e.g. the favourable economic 
conditions, can be expected.  
The covariation model, however, has one important drawback: it is a highly 
normative model. It describes ideas regarding how people should arrive at their 
attributions if they acted fully rational rather than how this actually takes places 
2 Other basic theories addressing attribution processes are Jones and Davis’ (1965) 
correspondent inferences theory and Bem’s (1967, 1972) self-perception theory. In this 
study we do not pay attention to these ideas, because they do not address causal attribution
(as Kelley’s and Weiner’s ideas do). Rather they are concerned with attributing personal 
dispositions based upon behaviour or performance (Vonk, 1999: 115). 
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(Vonk, 1999). In reality and in contrast to Kelley’s model people tend to collect 
information only in a limited amount and base their attributions on incomplete, 
partial information. Reasons for less extensive inference processes may be that the 
issue is not considered important enough to justify a full inference process or that 
the perceiver lacks time. Besides, it is also possible that the perceiver has to rely 
on information from only one single observation. Furthermore, as Kelley (1971a) 
points out, the perceiver frequently has a certain framework of ideas based upon 
his past experiences, the so-called causal schemata. These causal schemata are 
“beliefs or preconceptions, built up from experience, about how certain kinds of 
causes interact to produce a specific effect” (Vaughan and Hogg, 1995: 82). That 
is: causal schemata are mental shortcuts that enable people to swiftly make their 
causal attributions. One example of such a causal schema is the so-called multiple 
sufficient causes schema. This causal schema suggests that people sometimes 
think it is sufficient to use only one cause out of a range of several causes to 
explain an outcome. According to Kelley this causal schema leads to the so-called 
discounting principle. The discounting principle implies that people ignore 
possible causes if other causes are also present, because then, as Jones (1990) 
notes, it is less certain which of these really caused an action or achievement to 
occur. In case of a company reporting good results, the discounting principle may 
imply that shareholders ignore (i.e. discount) management’s endeavours and 
explain the favourable results mostly in terms of external factors (e.g. favourable 
economic conditions). Another attributional principle Kelley introduced is the 
augmentation principle. At the basis of this augmentation principle is the 
difference between an inhibitory and a facilitative cause. While an inhibitory cause 
interferes with the occurrence of a given event, a facilitative cause increases the 
likelihood of its occurrence (Fiske and Taylor, 1984; Vonk, 1999). The 
augmentation principle implies that observers more strongly perceive a 
(facilitative) cause to bring about an effect if an inhibitory cause is present as well. 
Obviously, given the augmentation principle and the presence of an inhibitory 
cause it is more likely that a successful outcome will be attributed to the person. 
For example, if a company experienced a successful year while economic 
conditions in general have been harsh (an inhibitory cause), it is likely that the 
observers will attribute this success to management’s efforts (a facilitative cause). 
In the case that facilitative causes, e.g. favourable economic conditions, were 
present it is more likely that successful outcomes are attributed to such external 
causes. 
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2.1.3 Weiner’s attributional theory of motivation 
In contrast to Kelley, Weiner focused on the attributions people make regarding 
their own achievements (Martinko and Thomson, 1998; Vonk, 1999). His theory 
can be used to analyse the situation in which a CEO ascribes a company’s results 
to certain causes in the letter to the shareholders.3 Weiner (together with Frieze, 
Kukla and others, 1971) suggested that it is possible to explain successes and 
failures by causes that can be arranged along two basic dimensions. These are: 
1. Internal versus external. Heider and Kelley also used this distinction in their 
contributions to attribution theory. A cause is internal when something inside 
the person can be held responsible for the outcome (e.g. personal skills, 
intelligence, etc.). A cause is external if something in the environment has 
caused the effect (e.g. luck). This dimension is frequently referred to as “locus 
of causality.” 
2. Stable versus unstable. This dimension addresses whether causes are enduring 
and are likely to be present again or not. 
 Locus of causality 
Stability Internal External 
Stable Ability Task difficulty 
Unstable Effort Luck 
Table 2.1 Weiner et al.’s (1971) two-dimensional taxonomy 
Using these two dimensions Weiner et al. (1971) constructed a two-
dimensional taxonomy (table 2.1). They suggested that people’s choice to attribute 
an outcome to internal or external causes is influenced by other people’s 
performances on similar tasks. First of all, external attributions are likely if an 
outcome is consistent with other people’s performance, e.g. success when others 
have succeeded as well or failure when others have failed. On the other hand, an 
internal attribution is more likely if the person is the only person to succeed (or 
fail). For example, in the case of the vitamins company, it seems logical that the 
CEO attributes the outstanding performance to external factors (e.g. the favourable 
economic conditions), because the competitors showed good results as well. It 
3 In his model, Weiner also addressed the consequences of attributions on people’s 
emotions (e.g. feelings of pride), their expectations regarding future achievements, and 
their future behaviour. As these aspects are beyond the focus of this research we do not 
address them. The interested reader is referred to Weiner (1985, 1986) and Vonk (1999). 
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may be apparent that there is a relationship between Kelley’s consensus and 
Weiner’s locus of causality dimensions (Martinko and Thomson, 1998). An 
internal cause is likely if the performance was low in consensus (it is the only 
company showing good results). On the other hand, high consensus (the other 
vitamins companies show good results as well) is expected to lead to an external 
attribution. Apart from other people’s performance, people also take into account 
the outcomes of prior performances in similar situations. In Kelley’s model a 
similar assumption is made and is reflected by the consistency dimension. 
Weiner’s research showed that attributions to unstable causes are likely when the 
performance to be explained differs from prior performances (low in consistency). 
A performance that is highly consistent with prior performances is likely to be 
ascribed to stable causes. For example, based upon Weiner’s propositions, it seems 
logical that the CEO of the vitamins company ascribes the good results to unstable 
causes because in the past he had to report a loss. 
A considerable body of research on attributions of successes and failures relied 
on this two-dimensional taxonomy (Rosenthal, Guest and Peccei, 1996). This 
research, however, also revealed that the original taxonomy could not include all 
possible causes. To overcome this problem additional dimensions were added, 
including: 
3. Controllable versus uncontrollable. This dimension was added because some 
(internal) causes are controllable (e.g. amount of effort) whereas others are not 
(illness). This distinction is not relevant to external causes as these 
predominantly are uncontrollable (Vonk, 1999). 
4. Global versus specific. Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978) proposed 
this dimension. With this dimension, although not frequently used (Weiner, 
1985), they point at the possibility that some causes are specific to a situation, 
whereas others generalise across settings. A cause is global if it influences a 
number of different outcomes (e.g. the Asia Crisis). A cause is specific if it 
influenced only one particular outcome (e.g. a contamination of one of the 
vitamins company’s products). According to Martinko and Thomson (1998) it 
is possible to relate the globality dimension to Kelley’s distinctiveness: high 
distinctiveness leads to specific attributions. 
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2.2 Biases in people’s attributions 
2.2.1 The fundamental attributional error  
So far we have discussed three influential contributions of Heider, Kelley, and 
Weiner to the development of attribution theory. In their work these scientists 
already have suggested the possibility of distortions in people’s attributions. 
Heider (1958), to begin with, suggested that people tend to ascribe outcomes of 
events to people’s traits (i.e. make an internal attribution) rather than to factors in 
the environment. That is, people have the tendency to underestimate the impact of 
situational factors and to overestimate the role of dispositional (personal) factors in 
controlling behaviour (Ross, 1977). Jones and Harris (1967) were among the first 
to empirically confirm the presence of such a bias and since then many others 
followed (Gilbert and Malone, 1995; Lewis, 1995; Robins, Spranca and 
Mendelsohn, 1996). This “correspondence bias” or “fundamental attributional 
error” is even considered one of the most robust effects within social psychology 
(Ross, 1977; Jones, 1990). Also in the management literature and notably in the 
romanticised conception of leadership (Pfeffer, 1977, 1997; Meindl, Ehrlich and 
Dukerich, 1985; Meindl and Ehrlich, 1987; Meindl, 1990) such a notion exists. 
Indeed, this so-called “leadership bias” may be seen as the fundamental attribution 
error at work (Pfeffer, 1997). Meindl and his colleagues argued that people have a 
strong belief in the influence of leaders (CEOs) on organisational performance, 
notwithstanding the fact that the empirical evidence with regard to the impact of 
leadership on organisational performance is ambiguous (Meindl, 1990). Pfeffer 
(1977) has even argued that leadership exerts little, if any, influence on 
organisational performance. The press seems to favour to interpret organisational 
outcomes in terms of leadership as well (Chen and Meindl, 1991; Hayward and 
Westphal, 2002), which in turn could reinforce the leadership bias. Maybe, as 
suggested by Meindl (1990: 161) it is easier to believe in leadership than to prove 
it. Organisations, and especially their leaders, can make use of this belief in their 
reconstruction of organisational outcomes in annual reports.  
2.2.2 Actor-observer differences in attributions  
Closely related to the fundamental attributional error is the actor-observer effect, 
which indicates that people’s attributions may differ depending on the perspective 
(i.e. that of actor or observer) they have. According to Jones and Nisbett (1971: 2) 
the actor will emphasise the role of environmental factors when ascribing his own 
behaviour to causes. Meanwhile, the observer shows a tendency to explain the 
actor’s behaviour in terms of its stable dispositional properties (hence, internal or 
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personal factors). Several explanations are used to account for this actor-observer 
effect. Apart from explanations related to the maintenance of self-esteem, 
informational factors are employed to explain this effect (Robins et al., 1996). 
First, there is information asymmetry between the actor and the observer 
concerning the actor’s actions. Typically, as Jones and Nisbett (1971: 6) note, the 
observer always lacks some of the distinctiveness and consistency information the 
actor possesses by virtue of knowing his own history. Consequently, this may lead 
to different attributions. Another explanation for this effect is sought in the fact 
that different aspects of the available information are salient for actors and 
observers (Jones and Nisbett, 1971). Whereas the observers concentrate on the 
actor’s behaviour, the actor focuses on the environment. Such actor-observer 
differences may also occur in the context of the letter to the shareholders. This 
letter in which management provides explanations for the results is a publicly 
available document and is used by many constituencies in their decision-making 
process. These constituencies, such as, e.g. institutional investors, shareholders, 
employees, creditors, banks, etc., are expected to read the letter carefully and to 
confront it with information from other sources, e.g. their own knowledge, press 
releases, journal articles, and analysts’ forecasts. Given these different information 
sources it is not inconceivable that the constituencies have different views of an 
event, and consequently challenge or even reject the accounts offered by 
management (Ginzel et al., 1993).  
2.2.3 The self-serving attributional bias 
Generally speaking, people have positive views of themselves and want to 
maintain these positive views (Vonk, 1999). One possible way of upholding these 
positive images is by the attributions they make. A large body of social-
psychological research reveals the existence of the so-called “self-serving 
attributional bias.”4 This self-serving attributional bias implies that people are 
likely to attribute their successes to internal causes, whereas they tend to ascribe 
their failures to external causes (e.g. Harvey and Weary, 1981; Fiske and Taylor, 
4 See, e.g. Miller and Ross (1975), Weary (1978), Zuckerman (1979), and Arkin et al.
(1980) for reviews. Most of the studies reviewed by these authors concern laboratory 
experiments and typically include a teacher/student or therapist/client setting. A review by 
Mullen and Riordan (1988), however, found similar results for (real life) sport 
achievements, which were confirmed by Taylor and Riess (1989) and Santamaria and Furst 
(1994). More recently, Johnston and Kim (1994) found such a bias in a marketing-related 
setting, whereas DeDreu, Nauta, and Van de Vliert (1995) were able to show its presence 
in negotiation conflicts. The bias also seems present in the classroom (e.g. Ross and 
Nisbett, 1991; McAllister, 1996). 
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1984; Ross and Fletcher, 1985; Hewstone, 1989; Manstead and Hewstone, 1995; 
Vonk, 1999). This self-serving attributional bias consists of two elements, namely: 
1. Self-enhancement implying that people take credit for successes, i.e. the 
attribution of successes to internal, personal causes; and 
2. Self-protection implying that people deny to take responsibility for failures, i.e. 
the attribution of failures to external, environmental causes. 
Two explanations have been offered to explain why people are inclined to 
describe outcomes of their own actions in a self-serving manner. On the one hand 
is the view of Miller and Ross (1975), who explain the bias in terms of cognitive, 
informational factors. This explanation suggests that the self-serving bias stems 
mainly from certain tendencies in the way people process information (Baron, 
2000: 58). More specifically, Miller and Ross (1975: 223) argued that subjects are 
simply more likely to perceive a relationship between their behaviour and its 
outcome when they succeed than when they fail. One important reason for this is 
that people are more likely to accept responsibility for expected outcomes than for 
unexpected outcomes, and, in general people intend and expect success instead of 
failure. On the other hand is the view of Zuckerman (1979) and Weary (1978) who 
explain the occurrence of the self-serving attributional bias in motivational terms. 
In particular, these researchers contended that the self-serving attributional bias is 
mainly a result of people’s tendency to enhance or protect their self-esteem and 
have a desire to look good to others (Baron, 2000: 59). From the discussion 
between the two groups it seems that both cognitive and motivational factors have 
a role in bringing about the self-serving bias (e.g. Tetlock and Levi, 1982; Kunda, 
1990; Vaughan and Hogg, 1995; Brown, 1997). Based upon a review of the 
literature Kunda arrives at the following conclusion: “Although cognitive 
processes cannot fully account for the existence of self-serving biases, it appears 
that they play a major role in producing these biases in that they provide the 
mechanisms through which motivation affects reasoning. Indeed, it is possible that 
motivation merely provides an initial trigger for the operation of cognitive 
processes that lead to the desired conclusions” (1990: 493). Furthermore, she 
suggests that people’s reasoning—including their search for causes of event—is 
driven by directional goals (Kunda, 1990: 482), and in her view people are 
motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion. In doing so they attempt to be 
rational, i.e. objective, and to justify that conclusion. Such motivated way of 
processing information seems to apply to organisations and the individuals 
connected therewith as well. It has been argued that individuals within 
organisations, and whole organisations as well, are goal-seeking entities which 
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process information and make decisions in a self-interested manner (Staw, 1980). 
Hence, “self-serving reasoning patterns in accounting narratives (e.g. the letter to 
the shareholders) are almost unavoidable” (Aerts and Theunisse, 2000: 3). In the 
next section we will discuss previous research on the self-serving attributional bias 
in the letter to the shareholders. 
2.3 The self-serving attributional bias in letters to the shareholders 
Social-psychological tendencies such as self-serving behaviours which originally 
concern individuals have been applied to groups and organisations as well. Indeed, 
according to Johns (1999) ideas with respect to self-serving behaviours are really 
“multi-level.” That is, those ideas can be applied to individuals, groups, and 
organisations. In his review of the organisational literature, Johns (1999) provides 
an overview of different ways in which individuals, groups, and organisations 
show self-serving behaviours. He provides evidence of people remembering 
successes better than failures, reconstructing history in a self-flattering manner, 
and attributing favourable outcomes to themselves and negative outcomes to 
others.5 In a review of the literature on narcissism, Brown (1997) too argues that 
many ideas that describe individual behaviour apply to whole organisations. Both 
Johns and Brown draw on Staw (1980, 1991; see also Chatman, Bell and Staw, 
1986) who suggest that collectivities, such as organisations, behave in similar 
ways as individuals do (1980: 46). Furthermore, Staw and colleagues note that 
individual behaviour is more “macro” than we usually recognise, and organisation 
behaviour is more “micro” than is generally acknowledged (Chatman et al., 1986: 
211). The most important reason is that organisations are populated by individuals, 
and, Staw (1980: 47) proceeds, if there exist any generalizable tendencies within 
individuals, these tendencies will be manifested in organisational actions. Later, 
Staw (1991: 809) argued that part of organisational behaviour is really individual 
behaviour in disguise. Focussing on the “dominant coalition”, i.e. the key 
organisational decision-makers such as the CEO and/or the board of directors, are 
in this sense of particular importance. For example, in his book “Struggling with 
the Demon” Kets de Vries (2001) not only shows how organisational leaders’ 
irrational behaviours affect organisational life, but also how we can make sense 
out of such behaviours. He applies the so-called clinical approach6 to leadership 
5 Also in the social psychology literature there is evidence that groups show self-serving 
biases (see, e.g. Bond, Hewstone, Wan and Chiu, 1985; Leary and Forsyth, 1987). 
6 The starting point of the psychoanalytically oriented clinical paradigm is not to take for 
granted what is directly observable. According to Kets de Vries (2001: 6-ff) the following 
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and indicates, for example, what kinds of effects two rather conflicting 
personalities that CEOs may possess—hypomanics and alexithymics7—can have 
on organisations. For example, hypomanics are extremely self-confident, willing 
to take enormous risks and are extremely persuasive, but, on the other hand, they 
also do not like to be contradicted. Kets de Vries comments that when confronted 
with opposition hypomancis can become “pretentious, impertinent, and even 
rough. Trifling incidents can bring about open hostility and violent outbursts” 
(2001: 64). Hence, while they can make a great contribution to creating a very 
successful company, they are also able to bring the whole organisation down (for 
example because they do not wish to see that their choice of strategy is outdated 
or, alternatively, have taken too large risks). In another chapter on collusive 
relationships in management, Kets de Vries (2001) applies ideas from couple 
therapy to review superior-subordinate relationships in organisations. Based on his 
interviews with leaders, Kets de Vries suggests that many of the collusive 
relationships in organisations can be characterised as “narcissistic collusion” 
(2001: 133). This implies that the subordinate shows an almost exaggerating 
admiration for his superior. The superior on the other hand is all too happy to hear 
it. Kets de Vries warns for the dangers of such type of relationship: “Extreme 
narcissists are bound to create havoc around them. Preoccupied with wanting to be 
unique and superior, they exaggerate their talents, engage in boastful and 
pretentious behaviour, conduct themselves in a strongly self-centered and self-
referential manner, show an overriding need for attention and admiration, are 
prone to grandiose fantasies, and often possess vindictive characteristics” (2001: 
134).
Hence, given the possibilities to apply social-psychological ideas about the 
individual to organisations, is it not surprising that researchers have studied the 
three premises underly this paradigm. First, it assumes that behind every irrational action, 
decision, etc., there is a rationale or explanation. Second, it assumes that indivuals are not 
always conscious or aware of certain aspects of their character. The last premise of the 
clinical approach is that each individual is a product of his or her past, and as such, is 
shaped and influenced by his or her experiences. 
7 Kets de Vries (2001: 55-56) briefly outlines these personalities as follow. “People who 
are hypomanic are high-spirited, self-confident, and exhilarating, but they are also 
unpredictable; like “live volcanos,” they erupt with little warning. Because of their charm 
and charisma, such individuals can be highly effective at influencing others. The second 
group of people, alexithymics, present the opposite picture. It is their lack of feeling and 
emotion that sometimes leads to difficulties. Their emotions are flattened; whatever 
feelings of zest, enthusiasm, and passion they once mave had are now nonexistent. It is as 
if they were emotionally color-blind. Thus the impression they make on others is that of 
“dead fish”.” 
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self-serving attributional bias in the context of the letter to the shareholders. The 
research mainly focused on the United States (Bowman, 1976, 1978; Bettman and 
Weitz, 1983; Staw et al., 1983; Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Clapham and 
Schwenk, 1991; Schwenk, 1993). More recently, however, similar studies have 
been conducted in Belgium (Aerts, 1991, 1994, 1996; Aerts and Theunisse, 2000), 
the Netherlands (Kemp, Hooghiemstra, Van der Tas and Wierenga, 2000), the 
United Kingdom (Clatworthy and Jones, 2000b), and Singapore (Tsang, 2002). 
Below we shortly review these studies. 
Although Bowman (1976, 1978) did not specifically examine causal 
attributions, his results provide a preliminary indication of the self-serving bias in 
the letter to the shareholders. His study of 82 companies in the food-processing 
industry reveals that the less successful companies (in terms of sales) complain 
about the weather and governmental price controls. The more successful 
companies, on the other hand, prefer to address company’s actions and strategies 
in their letters to the shareholders. 
 Bettman and Weitz (1983) studied patterns of causal reasoning in 181 letters to 
the shareholders published in 1972 and 1974. In order to study such patterns, and 
the self-serving attributional bias in particular, they adopted Weiner’s taxonomy 
consisting of locus of causality, stability, and controllability. Their results indicate 
that “the typical patterns of attributions found in studies of causal reasoning for 
individual performance also generally characterises attributions to causes of 
corporate performance” (Bettman and Weitz, 1983: 180). In particular, Bettman 
and Weitz find that managers attribute favourable outcomes to internal causes that 
are stable and controllable, indicating self-enhancement among managers. 
Unfavourable outcomes, on the other hand, are attributed to external, unstable, and 
uncontrollable causes, indicating self-protecting tendencies.8 Recently, Tsang 
(2002) replicated this study using a sample of Singapore companies. His results 
corroborate the findings of Bettman and Weitz.  
 In the Staw et al., (1983) study of 87 companies (fiscal year 1977) a self-
serving attributional pattern is found as well. Both high- and low-performing 
companies (in terms of earnings per share) attribute positive outcomes to company 
causes (e.g. corporate actions, decision-making, etc.), while negative effects are 
ascribed to industry and environmental causes. Though being significant in both 
groups, the pattern is somewhat stronger in the low-performing companies. Staw 
8 Another finding related to the amount of causal reasoning. In line with previous social-
psychological research (Wong and Weiner, 1981; Weiner, 1986) they found that the 
amount of causal reasoning was more extensive if outcomes are unfavourable and/or 
unexpected.  
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et al. (1983) also examined the influence of stock-related and CEO-related factors 
on attributions in the letter to the shareholders. The change in stock price (prior to 
the annual report’s publication) appears to exert the strongest influence on 
attributions. Their results indicate that the greater the decline in a firm’s stock 
price, the greater the self-protecting tendency, which was particularly true for the 
low-performing companies. Likewise, the greater the increase in stock price, the 
greater the self-enhancing tendencies. Other factors, such as institutional 
ownership, CEO’s tenure9, age, and salary do not seem to affect self-serving 
attributions significantly.10
 Bettman and Weitz (1983) and Staw et al. (1983) employed social psychology 
as their main point of reference in their studies. This framework, however, does 
not fully take into account that CEOs may use attributions strategically. According 
to Salancik and Meindl (1984), who adopted the symbolic management 
perspective,11 attributions in financial reports—and specifically in the 
shareholders’ letter—are political statements that reassure constituents or induce 
them, when necessary, to participate in the organisation’s affairs (1984: 239). A 
consequence of this strategic use of attributions is that managers will be less likely 
to lay blame on the environment than the psychological explanations might imply. 
By accepting blame for negative outcomes, managers communicate that 
unfavourable circumstances are understood and, by implication, under control. 
Concerning successful performance, as is the case in the psychological 
9 However, Schwenk (1993) examined and found an effect of CEO’s and board of 
directors’ tenure on the self-serving attributional bias in letters to the shareholders. In 
particular, his study of 60 companies in the oil, chemical, and computer industries (fiscal 
year: 1984) revealed that the more experienced the CEO and board members were, the 
greater the self-protecting tendency. No significant difference was found regarding self-
enhancement among board members. 
10 Another interesting result concerned the location of the presentation of good and bad 
news. Not only did firms, generally speaking, blamed the environment for performance 
failures, they also tried to lessen the impact of this bad news by presenting any negative 
information early in their reports and moving quickly to more positive events (Staw et al.,
1983: 598; see also Fiol, 1989). It seems that all firms want to end their annual reports with 
positive news. 
11 A central assumption of the symbolic management perspective is that top management 
provides the meaning of organisational events. Furthermore, explanations provided in the 
letter to the shareholders constitute top management’s construal of an event (Ginzel et al.,
1993: 236). This perspective also assumes that in order to secure the support of various 
interest groups management must give the appearance of efficacy in a world in which 
control is often elusive (Salancik and Meindl, 1984: 238), because “the perception that top 
management is not really in control of events may threaten their security” (Ginzel et al.,
1993: 245). 
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explanation, internal attributions are employed. On average, their results, based on 
an 18-year sample of 18 companies, corroborate the findings of the 
aforementioned studies: positive effects are internalised, whereas negative 
outcomes are externalised. Additionally, their results show that the stability of 
company’s results exerts a significant influence on the attributional pattern. It 
appears that in stable firms, management is biased to take credit for positive 
outcomes and lay blame for negative outcomes. Unstable firms too tend to credit 
themselves for positive outcomes; however, they do not show a bias in explaining 
negative outcomes. The results are consistent with idea that attributions are used 
strategically, i.e. to create an illusion of control (Salancik and Meindl, 1984: 246-
ff.). Accepting blame for negative outcomes seems to pay for unstable firms: those 
who blamed the environment and not themselves experienced worse outcomes (in 
terms of profitability) in the future, suggesting that “constituents are not 
appropriately impressed” (Salancik and Meindl, 1984: 252). 
Clapham and Schwenk (1991), in their study of letters to the shareholders of 
20 companies in the electric and gas utility industry over a 5 year period (from 
1978 to 1982), confirmed the results of Salancik and Meindl regarding the 
negative relationship between self-protection and future firm performance. 
However, in contrast to Salancik and Meindl (1984) their results do not indicate a 
positive relationship between self-enhancement and future performance. 
According to Clapham and Schwenk (1991), whose results too indicate the 
presence of the self-serving attributional bias in general, their findings seem to 
favour an informational, cognitive interpretation rather than a motivational one. In 
particular they argue that, just like ordinary people, managers’ actions are intended 
to result in positive outcomes. So, if such outcomes are achieved it is natural to 
ascribe them to internal factors. “However, if outcomes are negative, it is not 
possible to explain them through management’s actions aimed at achieving 
positive outcomes. Therefore, executives must identify and discuss environmental 
events which negated the effects of their own actions. This results in an external 
focus when discussing poor performance” (Clapham and Schwenk, 1991: 226). 
Aerts’ (1991, 1994, 1996) and Aerts and Theunisse’s (2000) research is 
somewhat different from the studies discussed previously. Apart from causal 
explanations, which are usually expressed in clear-cut language, Aerts argues that 
letters to the shareholders frequently contain so-called “accounting explanations.” 
As they are expressed in typical accounting language,12 such accounting 
12 Aerts (1994: 339) provides the following example of such accounting explanation: “A 
decrease in profits could be explained by a decline of the operating results and/or by an 
increase of financial costs.” 
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explanations are often ambiguous: who is responsible for an outcome is not always 
explicitly stated. According to Aerts (1991, 1994) especially negative 
performances will be explained in technical-accounting terms—thereby hoping 
that responsibility for a failure is mystified. On the other hand, positive 
performances are accounted for in strict cause-effect terminology whereby 
responsibility becomes clear (Aerts, 1994: 341). To test this, Aerts (1991, 1994) 
used a sample of letters to the shareholders of 50 Belgian companies (fiscal year 
1983). The Belgian companies included in Aerts’ sample show strong self-
enhancing tendencies: positive effects are predominantly attributed to internal 
factors. However, in contrast to the American studies, Aerts was not able to detect 
a self-protecting tendency among his Belgian sample: on average they use external 
and internal factors to the same extent to explain negative effects.13 A similar 
picture emerge regarding the accounting bias: firms prefer to explain positive 
outcomes in clear-cut causal language, however, they show no preference for type 
of language (i.e. causal versus accounting) to explain negative outcomes. Aerts 
also studied whether attributions depended upon different situational determinants, 
including the stability of financial performance. In contrast to Salancik and Meindl 
(1984) the self-protecting tendency was accentuated in the unstable Belgian 
companies implying that the “illusion of control” does not seem to be present in 
Belgium. As in the Staw et al. (1983) study, Belgian firms as well prefer to 
highlight positive outcomes, irrespective of performance growth.14 Later research, 
using an eight-year sample of 22 companies’ letters to the shareholders (Aerts, 
1996) reveals that the number of attributions concerning positive outcomes in one 
year is highly correlated with the number in a previous year. No such correlation is 
found regarding negative outcomes, suggesting that it is easier for companies to 
report “good news.” In a later study, Aerts and Theunisse (2000) examined the 
effects of listing status on attributional patterns in letters to the shareholders. Using 
a sample of 63 not quoted and 95 quoted Belgian companies (fiscal years 1995 and 
1996), they find that listed firms exhibit more attributional behaviour (i.e. their 
letters contained more attributional statements) than unlisted companies. This 
effect is significant for explanations of both positive and negative effects. 
Although the number of attributional statements differs depending on listing 
status, their results do not indicate a difference in the degree of self-serving 
tendencies in the explanations offered: self-enhancing tendencies are present in 
either type of company, whereas a self-protecting tendency is absent.  
13 In later research using more recent data (Aerts, 1996; Aerts and Theunisse, 2000) this 
finding is confirmed. 
14 Similar results were found by Staw et al.(1983) and Clatworthy and Jones (2000b). 
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Research by Kemp et al. (2000) and Clatworthy and Jones (2000b) show that 
the self-serving attributional bias is also present in letters to the shareholders of 
Dutch and British companies. However, in the 50 listed Dutch firms Kemp et al.
(2000) examined the self-protecting tendency is less pronounced than in the 
American and British companies.  
In sum, it is evident that in letters to the shareholders a self-serving 
attributional bias is present. In particular, it seems that CEO’s tend to highlight 
“good news” and take credit for those positive outcomes. Regarding negative or 
bad news, however, a more mixed and sometimes even conflicting picture 
emerged: in most American and British companies CEOs ascribed negative effects 
to factors beyond their control. In some unstable companies (in terms of financial 
performance), however, CEOs want to create an “illusion of control” by ascribing 
negative outcomes to themselves (although here conflicting results emerged as 
well). However, in Belgian companies neither a self-protecting tendency nor a 
stability-effect was found, whereas in the Netherlands, though being present, the 
self-protecting tendency was less pronounced. These results suggest that there may 
be differences between countries with regard to the pervasiveness of the self-
serving effect. 
2.4 Three theoretical frameworks to explain self-serving biases 
2.4.1 Introduction
In this section we discuss the self-serving phenomenon from three different 
theoretical perspectives. The first angle is the social-psychological impression 
management or self-presentation point of view, which is related to the 
motivational explanation of the self-serving attributional bias. This impression 
management perspective points to the importance of other people’s perceptions in 
social interactions. For example, when a company’s CEO presents declining 
profits in a meeting with financial analysts it may be considered inappropriate to 
do it in a humorous, joyful manner. Because of the importance of others’ 
perceptions, people—including CEOs—are motivated to influence these 
perceptions by using different impression management techniques. Closely related 
to this social-psychological perspective is corporate communication from the field 
of marketing. In the corporate communication framework “corporate identity” and 
“corporate image” are central. Corporate identity refers to “all the forms of 
expression that a company uses to offer insight into its nature”, whereas corporate 
image refers to “the picture people have of a company” (Van Riel, 1995: 27). In 
the corporate communication framework it is stressed as well that companies are 
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trying to influence the ideas people have of the company. The economically 
oriented perspective that may explain why managers engage in self-serving 
attributions is offered by agency theory. The main premise of agency theory is that 
managers are guided by their self-interest and are able to do so because of 
uncertainty and information asymmetry. 
2.4.2 Impression management 
Impression management or self-presentation concerns the process by which 
individuals attempt to control the impressions others form of them (Leary and 
Kowalski, 1990).15 The primary aim of impression management is to be viewed by 
others as oneself desires, generally speaking, as favourable as possible. Goffman 
was one of the first to recognise the importance of impression management in 
everyday life. In his book, The presentation of self in everyday life (1959), he 
pointed to the importance of impression management for “face-maintenance”, i.e. 
for regulating the perceptions other people have of a person. The importance of 
face is that it is highly influential in social interactions: they will determine how 
other people see, and hence treat you. Since Goffman’s work many new insights 
on impression management have been developed. Overviews can be found in 
Schlenker (1980, 1985), Tedeschi (1981), Baumeister (1986), Schlenker and 
Weigold (1992), Rosenfeld, Giacalone and Riordan (1994, 1995), and Leary 
(1996). Impression management can take many forms, both verbally and non-
verbally (e.g. facial expression, clothing, etc.). Sometimes impressions are 
managed consciously, but often people engage in impression management without 
being aware of it. Much of our everyday behaviour can even be considered as 
impression management, e.g. giving compliments to others (whether or not 
truthfully), greeting colleagues when you meet them, appearing interested when 
other people talk, etc.. Although people are not always aware of the impressions 
they convey, a certain strategic behaviour can be assumed. According to Schlenker 
and Weigold (1992: 134-135) impression management is influenced by people’s 
agendas, i.e. their overt or covert interpersonal goals and their plans to achieve 
these goals. In this sense impression management can be viewed as instrumental 
(Goffman, 1959; Jones, 1990; Schlenker and Weigold, 1992; Manstead and 
Hewstone, 1995) or as purposive, goal-directed behaviour (Bozeman and Kacmar, 
1997). Indeed, in a review of the literature on impression management, Leary and 
Kowalski (1990) indicate that the motivation to manage impressions is aroused by, 
15 Others, e.g. Schlenker (1980), Weary and Arkin (1981), Tedeschi and Riess (1981a,b), 
Jones and Pittman (1982), Baumeister (1982a,b), and Rosenfeld et al. (1995) employ 
similar definitions of impression management. 
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amongst others, the goal relevance of the impressions and the gap between how 
others perceive a person (current image) and how that person wants others to 
perceive him (desired image). In an organisational context the first, goal relevance, 
seems particularly important. It depends on the publicity16 of one’s behaviour on 
the one hand and the individual’s dependency on the target17 on the other. The 
higher the publicity and/or the dependency on the target, the more important 
impressions are and the more the individual is motivated to engage in impression 
management. Fiol (1995) found direct evidence of this public-private effect in the 
context of managerial behaviour. She compared managers’ attributions in external 
communication (i.e. the letter to the shareholders) with those in internal 
communication (i.e. internal planning documents). Using content analysis, she 
found that managers’ private and public statements did not necessarily converge. 
Internal documents, compared to external ones, referred more to threats. External 
documents, on the other hand, contained more references to opportunities. 
According to Fiol (1995), the results provide an indication that statements 
containing positive or negative evaluations are a reflection of managers’ need to 
engage in impression management, particularly in unstable and competitive 
environments. According to Leary and Kowalski (1990) the kinds of impressions 
people subsequently want to convey depend on, for example, role constraints18, the 
target audience’s preferred impressions, and current or potential social images19.
16 Publicity is a function of both the probability that one’s behaviour will be observed by 
others and the number of others who might see or learn about it (Leary and Kowalski, 
1990); so learning about it from second-hand sources is also important (Leary, 1996). 
17 Dependency refers to the degree to which a person’s outcomes are contingent on the 
behaviour of another person (Leary, 1996: 56). In this sense future interaction is also 
relevant: i.e. the motive to manage impressions increases when one expects to interact with 
that person again in the future. 
18 Role constraints imply for example that people in certain positions are expected to 
behave in a certain way, which particularly applies to people in positions of authority (e.g. 
members of the board of directors and/or managers in general) (Leary and Kowalski: 
1990). According to these authors, the effectiveness of these people depends on their 
ability to maintain public images of being competent and effective leaders. Among 
corporate leaders images of trustworthy, credible, morally worthy, innovative, esteemed, 
and powerful are especially valued (Gardner and Avolio, 1998: 40; see also Leary, 1996). 
Not being able to create these images can eventually lead the leader to lose the right to 
enact that role. 
19 This factor suggests that when people construct their images they have to take into 
account what other people know or are likely to know about them in the future (Leary, 
1996). Basically it involves credibility. For example, people who continuously show a 
tendency to make self-enhancing attributions must eventually reckon with less sympathy of 
other people: they will be considered as braggarts and run the risk that their future claims 
29
All three factors seem to be of importance in a financial reporting context. As is 
advanced by e.g. Pfeffer (1981, 1992) management has a symbolic function. By 
providing explanations, rationalisations, and legitimisation for the organisational 
activities (Pfeffer, 1981; Elsbach, 1994), management wants to create an image of 
being in control (Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Meindl, 1990; Ginzel et al., 1993), 
i.e. that they are competent and powerful (Leary, 1996; Gardner and Avolio, 
1998). Establishing such an image assures investors so that they will continue to 
invest in the company. Also the audience, and the press in particular, seems to 
prefer such an image: they favour to interpret organisational outcomes in terms of 
leadership (Chen and Meindl, 1991). Impression management, e.g. by engaging in 
self-serving attributional behaviour, can contribute to create such an image. 
However, when doing so, the CEO has to reckon with investors’ subsequent 
evaluation: telling a story without company’s results matching it may be 
counterproductive. In addition, images have consequences (Schlenker, 1980: 97): 
not only do they bring prerogatives (i.e. they give the holder a certain set of 
allowable behaviours) but also responsibilities. So an image of success also has a 
drawback: in the future success is expected too (Baumeister, Tice, and others, 
1989). Credibility seems particularly important in the context of financial 
reporting (Gibbins et al., 1990; Ginzel et al., 1993; Aerts and Theunisse, 2000). 
Claiming an image to be what one is not, and then failing to match one’s words 
with deeds, not only will produce negative reactions in others and in oneself, but 
will also be at the expense of management’s credibility (Schlenker, 1980). Indeed, 
research by Limacher (1997) shows that management’s optimism or pessimism 
regarding the company’s business environment and future prospects in the letter to 
the shareholders influences investors’ perceptions of both firm performance and 
managers’ credibility.20 Using a laboratory experiment he found that “when 
will be taken with a grain of salt, i.e. their credibility will be endangered (Schlenker and 
Leary, 1982; Sutton and Callahan, 1987; Ginzel et al., 1993; Rindova, 1997). Regarding 
the credibility of claimed impression, not only other information about the actor is 
important but also two other—contextual—factors as mentioned by Aerts (1991: 102; see 
also Leary, 1996). Firstly, Aerts suggests that the offered explanations should fit the 
cultural-based expectations concerning possible causes of events. Secondly, he states that 
the explanations offered should be in line with other information regarding the social-
economic context in which the company or person operates. For example, in times of low 
inflation, a stable or low interest rate, an explanation of decreasing profits as a 
consequence of an increase in cost of debt capital is not credible. 
20 Optimism refers to such a presentation mode in which favourable aspects are 
emphasised. In the case of a pessimistic attitude unfavourable aspects are discussed (as 
well). Limacher (1997) notes that in reality management attitude is usually optimistic and 
ranges from unbridled optimism to mild pessimism. 
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financial performance had been good, an optimistic attitude resulted in higher 
assessments than did a pessimistic attitude. However, when financial performance 
had been bad, an optimistic attitude resulted in lower assessments than did a 
pessimistic attitude” (1997: 20). His findings, which are largely in line with 
previous social-psychological results (Schneider, 1981; Schlenker and Leary, 
1982; Robinson, Johnson and Shields, 1995), suggest that investors can be 
affected by the way managers present performance information in the letter to the 
shareholders. The main premise of Limacher’s study is that unbridled optimism is 
not always an advisable tactic: if performance does not match the story in the letter 
to the shareholders, investors will make lower assessments of both firm 
performance and managers’ credibility.21 Subsequently, this can have negative 
consequences for the impression manager: not only will he be seen as insincere, 
but the audience will also question the sincerity of the impression manager’s 
future claims (Ginzel et al., 1993; Rindova, 1997).  
In the literature on verbal impression management many possible strategies 
and typologies thereof are presented (see e.g. Scott and Lyman, 1968; Tedeschi 
and Riess, 1981a, b; Schlenker, 1980; Jones and Pittman, 1982; Tetlock and 
Manstead, 1985; Gardner and Martinko, 1988a, b; Jones, 1990; Rosenfeld et al.,
1995). For the purpose of this research we use the distinction between acquisitive 
and protective strategies. According to Aerts (1991: 96) it seems reasonable to 
assume that various forms of verbal impression management—and especially the 
acclaiming and accounting strategies—can be found in annual reports. The most 
interesting acquisitive tactic is that of acclaiming, a tactic that is used to account 
for successful outcomes. It consists of “enhancements” and “entitlements.” 
According to Schlenker (1980) people tend to use such techniques when 
circumstances are likely to deprive the actor of credit for the outcome. 
Entitlements is a tactic that maximises the actor’s responsibility for the event and 
is used when that responsibility is either ambiguous or unclear (Schlenker, 1980). 
The use of self-enhancing attributions—claiming that one is personally responsible 
for a successful outcome—is an obvious example of this tactic (Schlenker, 1986). 
In case of enhancements responsibility is beyond doubt, so the actor tries to 
maximise the desirability of the event itself (Schlenker, 1980). An example in the 
context of financial reporting might be that CEOs let the results speak for 
21 In a US study, based upon a survey distributed among security analysts, Higgins and 
Bannister found that “higher credibility companies were less inclined to take too much 
credit for good performance or externalise responsibility for poor performance” (1992: 31). 
They conclude that “self-serving attributions that take too much credit for good 
performance while blaming poor performance on external uncontrollable variables can 
erode strategic credibility” (1992: 35). 
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themselves. That is, CEOs speak of increasing profits, sales, etc. in their letters to 
the shareholders without providing an explanation for the improvement in 
company performance. Whereas the acquisitive tactics are used to address 
successes, accounting tactics are used to explain failures. Their aim is to offer the 
audience an explanation of or an apology for a predicament22 that separates the 
actor from the failure (Schlenker, 1980).23 In case of excuses the actor tries to deny 
responsibility for an unsuccessful outcome (Scott and Lyman, 1968; Schlenker, 
1980; Benoit, 1995). The use of self-protecting attributions—blaming the situation 
for an unsuccessful outcome—is an example (Schlenker, 1986). The “best” 
excuses are in general those that attribute failure to external, uncontrollable, or 
unintentional causes and offer the actor effective protection (Weiner, Figueroa-
Muñoz and Kakihara, 1991; Schlenker and Weigold, 1992). As is the case with 
many other forms of impression management, excuses are only effective if and as 
far as they provide a credible explanation. As a consequence, excuses people offer 
often “fit the facts” (Schlenker, 1980; Tetlock, 1985). In case of justifications, the 
person accepts responsibility but denies that the act was bad or wrong in order to 
reduce the negativeness of the consequences. Another remedial tactic is the use of 
apologies in which the actor admits blameworthiness for an undesirable event, but 
in addition also attempts to obtain a pardon from the audience. Apologies are 
designed to convince the audience that the undesirable event should not be 
22 A predicament is a condition or situation that is dangerous, unpleasant, embarrassing or 
sometimes comical (Schlenker, 1980: 125). An example, related to the topic of this 
research, is a decrease in profits or even a loss. 
23 Rosenfeld et al. (1995: 84-ff.) mention other protective tactics, e.g. self-handicapping 
and other-enhancement. Self-handicapping implies a person placing “impediments or 
barriers in the face of success” (Rosenfeld et al., 1995: 88; see also Tice and Baumeister, 
1990). Such a strategy has two consequences for the self-handicapper: If he succeeds the 
value of the success is heightened, if he fails, the negative impact will be weakened. To a 
certain extent such behaviour can also be expected in annual reports (Rosenfeld et al.,
1995: 91). In these annual reports managers have to provide information on expectations 
on future profits, sales, etc.. Hence, it may be possible that management is very careful and 
even pessimistic about the future profits and sales, although general economic conditions 
do not completely warrant such expectations. Related to self-handicapping is the use of 
other-enhancements. By using this tactic, individuals try to diminish the extent to which a 
relative failure is attributed to their own lack of ability by ensuring that the other is 
performing with an advantage (Shepperd and Arkin, 1991: 79). The use of other-
enhancements by companies, however, does not seem likely. After all, companies are 
operating on the same market and are competing for the same customers and investors. 
Presenting an impression that the company’s results have been disappointing due to the 
strength and other qualities of a competitor is not a very smart thing to do. A consequence 
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considered a fair representation of what the actor is “really like” as a person 
(Schlenker, 1980: 154). The use of apologies in annual reports are, however, not 
very likely. According to Giacalone (1988) it is often not the best strategy for the 
failing manager to use, because an apology explicitly admits failure, leaving the 
leader at the mercy of observers. The use of excuses seems better: because an 
excuse usually involves the denial of responsibility, the leader’s audience will be 
less likely to make a personal or internal attribution (Giacalone, 1988: 196).  
The last interesting accounting tactic is meta-accounts. According to Scott and 
Lyman (1968), people who want to avoid the need of giving explanations of their 
behaviour use meta-accounts. An example of such a meta-account is mystification, 
in which the person admits that his performance did not live up to the expectations 
but without really giving a reason for his or her failure—for example by stating 
that it is a long story. Another possibility, according to Scott and Lyman, is the use 
of referral, by which the person refers to a higher authority for his failure. It is 
clear that such a tactic is not open to the board of directors, except the possibility 
that company’s performance was affected by governmental legislation. 
Concerning financial reporting and the use of meta-accounts Aerts’ (1991, 1994) 
research is particularly interesting. In his research, Aerts introduced a special kind 
of explanation that is typically found in annual reports: the accounting 
explanations. According to Aerts (1994) these accounting explanations can be 
conceived of as explanations where assignment of responsibility are ambiguous 
and, hence, can be considered as a kind of meta-account which functions as an 
evasive verbal tactic by which accepting or denying responsibility is avoided. 
Aerts (1994) expected the use of such accounting explanations to be more 
prevalent to explain negative performances than to explain positive outcomes. His 
results, however, failed to indicate the presence of such a bias. 
2.4.3  Corporate communication 
Corporate communication encompasses all internal and external communications 
by an organisation, including marketing communication (e.g. advertisements and 
sales promotions), organisational communication (e.g. investor relations, public 
relations, public affairs), and management communication (by senior managers). 
Central to corporate communication is the co-ordination of these communication 
forms and is underscored in Van Riel’s conceptualisation. Van Riel defines 
corporate communication as “an instrument of management by means of which all 
consciously used forms of internal and external communication are harmonised as 
of such impression management tactic could be that investors might detract their funds 
from the company to invest it in the competitor. 
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effectively and efficiently as possible” (1995: 26). Others, as Argenti (1994), Gray 
and Balmer (1998) and Dolphin (1999), define corporate communication in similar 
ways. The goal of this “orchestrated” communication is to create a favourable 
reputation, so that people are persuaded to buy the company’s products or 
services, to invest in or work for the company (Baker and Balmer, 1997; Van Riel 
and Balmer, 1997). Corporate identity and corporate image (or reputation) play an 
important role in the corporate communication framework.  
Corporate identity refers to “all the forms of expression that a company uses to 
offer insight into its nature” (Van Riel, 1995: 27).24 Hence, it involves the way an 
organisation presents itself to an audience. According to Birkigt and Stadler (1986, 
as cited in Van Riel, 1995) this self-presentation of companies may be developed 
in three ways, namely: behaviour, communication, and symbolism (e.g. corporate 
name, logos, corporate headquarters, employee uniform, etc.). These three, 
comprising the so-called corporate identity-mix, represent the “personality” of the 
organisation and their use is aimed at creating or maintaining a certain corporate 
image or reputation. A company’s behaviour is the most effective medium to 
create or harm a corporate identity. After all, target groups will judge the company 
by its actions. Shell’s handling of the Brent Spar, proposing to sink it in the 
Atlantic Ocean, clearly illustrates the importance of corporate behaviour. 
Providing information on the actions is important as well (Deegan, Rankin and 
Voght, 1999). It is possible to emphasise particular aspects of company behaviour 
by means of communication and/or symbols. That is, communication can be used 
tactically (Birkigt and Stadler, 1986; Van Riel, 1995) so that it may “help to 
manage an organisation’s relationship with relevant publics through the shaping of 
external perceptions” (Neu et al., 1998, p. 266). It emphasises that management 
has a symbolic function: they have to make sure that certain images are signalled 
to the corporate audience (e.g. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981; Hines, 
1988; Elsbach, 1994). Images as being in control of the company and that 
manager’s interests and those of the stakeholders are converging are important. 
The corporate annual report, and the letter to the shareholder in particular, plays a 
major role in this signalling or communication process. Indeed, Clarke and Murray 
(2000: 145) stress that “the chairman’s statement (i.e. letter to the shareholders) is 
[…] not only relevant for the content of its communication but is also important 
for the symbolism which is attached to it in the corporate identity paradigm.” That 
24 We forego the discussion about the meaning of “identity”. In the literature the concepts 
“corporate identity” and “organisational identity” are used interchangeably despite their 
different meanings (e.g. Gioia, Schultz, and Corley, 2000). For an excellent overview of 
the differences between the two concepts we refer to Hatch and Schultz (2000). 
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is, the message contained in it has to contribute to create the desired corporate (and 
CEO’s personal) image. The importance of this symbolic function cannot be 
underestimated: having a corporate identity that is powerful and convincing 
creates certain advantages for a company. According to Van Riel (see also 
Dolphin, 1999) a convincing corporate identity first of all motivates the employees 
because employees find it more easy to identify with the company they work for. 
In addition, and more important in the context of financial reporting, a strong 
corporate identity inspires confidence among the company’s external target 
groups, which will secure their contribution to the organisation (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). 
Whereas corporate identity refers to an organisation’s self-presentation and is 
(or at least: should be) a reflection of how the organisation sees itself, the 
corporate image essentially refers to how the corporate stakeholders perceive the 
organisation. That is, corporate image refers to “the organisation as seen through 
the eyes of the constituents” (Argenti, 1998: 77). Some authors have linked 
corporate identity and image to social-psychological concepts (e.g. Ind, 1990; Van 
Riel, 1995; Markwick and Fill, 1997; Argenti, 1998; Dolphin, 1999; Bromley, 
2000; Hatch and Schultz, 2000). While corporate identity is equivalent to a 
corporate sense of the self—involving the question “who we are”—corporate 
image involves others’ perception of the self—relating to the question “how are 
we perceived by others.” More formally, corporate image or reputation25 may be 
defined as “the set of meanings by which an object (or organisation) is known and 
through which people describe, remember and relate to it. That is, it is the net 
result of the interaction of a person’s beliefs, ideas, feelings and impressions about 
an object (or organisation)” (Dowling, 1986: 110).26 The basic idea of corporate 
25 The difference between “image” and “reputation” seems to be marginal (Van Riel; 1995) 
and is related to time. While image refers to more momentarily perceptions a reputation 
refers to more enduring, stable characteristics as perceived by other people (e.g. Markwick 
and Fill, 1997; Rindova, 1997; Gray and Balmer, 1998; Dolphin, 1999). For example, 
Balmer (1998) comments that “image differs from reputation in that whereas the former 
concerns the public’s latest beliefs about an organisation, reputation represents a value 
judgement about the organisation’s qualities built up over a period and focussing on what 
it does and how it behaves. Thus reputation has an historical dimension” (as quoted in 
Bennett and Kottasz’s (2000: 225)). This difference has an important consequence: 
reputations cannot be changed quickly, images can or as Markwick and Fill (1997: 398) 
remark: “Images may be altered relatively quickly as a result of organisational changes or 
communication programmes, whereas reputation requires nurturing through time and 
image consistency”.
26 Other definitions include “the perception of a company held by people inside and 
outside a company” (Fombrun, 1996) and “the totality of a stakeholder’s perceptions of the 
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image is that it enables people to think about an organisation (or any other object) 
in terms of “good/bad”, “pleasant/unpleasant”, and so on (Van Riel, 1995). The 
corporate image represents the connotations that comes to mind when a persons 
sees or hears the corporate name or its logo (Gray and Balmer, 1998; Holten 
Larsen, 2000). A strong or good corporate reputation is important not only for the 
company but for the individuals connected therewith as well (e.g. Sutton and 
Callahan, 1987; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Bromley, 1993; Dutton, Dukerich 
and Harquail, 1994; Fombrun, 1996; Carter and Dukerich, 1998; Smidts, Van Riel 
and Pruyn, 2001).27 From Fombrun and Shanley (1990), Fombrun (1996), and 
Dowling (2001) it is apparent that firms with good reputations can, among other 
things, charge premium prices, enhance their access to capital markets, attract 
investors more easily, have better credit ratings (usually implying lower interest 
rates), and have less problems with attracting the right people wanting to work for 
the company. In addition, a strong corporate reputation seems to be helpful in 
guiding people in their decision-making process (Van Riel, 1996). Especially 
when people lack detailed knowledge about an organisation or it’s products 
connotations as “good”, “pleasant”, “high quality”, etc. are important to persuade 
people to buy a product. For example, when products are similar in quality and 
price, people are likely to buy the product of the company that they perceive best 
(Van Riel, 1996). Furthermore, corporate reputation has a strong influence on 
organisational identification, that is on the extent to which “oneness” between the 
organisation and its members is perceived (Smidts et al., 2001). Smidts et al. 
(2001) comment that identification is particularly strong in case of positive valued 
information, because then organisational members feel proud to be part of a well-
respected company, as it strengthens their feelings of self-worth. Employees that 
strongly identify with the organisation generally have a supportive attitude toward 
the company and are more likely to behave in accordance with the organisation’s 
way an organisation presents itself, either deliberately or accidentally” (Markwick and Fill, 
1997). The Pruyn (1990) and Bennett and Kottasz’s (2000) papers include overviews of 
the various definitions of images/reputations. 
27 Bromley notes that organisations are a kind of special as the board of directors is usually 
identified with the whole organisation, including its successes and failures. In fact, 
generally speaking, organisational successes and failures tend to be assigned to the person 
who is ultimately responsible, rather than to the wider membership (1993: 34). This also 
sheds another light on impression management by whole organisations: it is also in the 
interest of the board of directors and their personal reputation (as Van der Tas (1996) also 
suggested). In the same vein, Zajac and Westphal (1995) and before them also Elsbach and 
Sutton (1992) argue that corporate leaders use organisational communication to create a 
favourable interpretation of organisational activities to enhance their personal and 
professional reputations. 
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identity and strategy (Dutton et al., 1994; Smidts et al., 2001). This in turn may 
contribute to an organisation’s success (Smidts et al., 2001). Hence, a strong 
corporate image creates a competitive advantage for the company. So what are the 
key drivers of corporate reputations? Recently Fombrun, Gardberg and Sever 
(2000) developed the Reputation Quotient. According to this Reputation Quotient, 
corporate reputations are driven by six composite measures, namely: emotional 
appeal (indicating whether a person trusts and respects a company), products and 
services (whether the company delivers products or services that are of high 
quality and provide value-for-money), vision and leadership, workplace 
environment, social and environmental responsibility, and financial performance. 
In the context of this research particularly the last factor, financial performance, is 
relevant. According to Fombrun et al. (2000: 253) financial performance involves 
issues as whether the company “has a strong record of profitability”, “tends to 
outperform its competitors”, and “has strong prospects for future growth.”28 In 
another oft-used reputational measure, the Fortune’s “most admired companies” 
financial issues play a very important role as well. Indeed, Fryxell and Wang 
(1994) criticise the Fortune index for measuring little else than financial 
performance. Given the importance of financial performance in establishing a 
reputation it may be assumed that firms try to influence it by the presentation of 
the financial results in the annual report. This brings us to the subject how 
organisations are trying to affect their image or reputation. 
Previously we noted that (positive) corporate reputations are a valuable asset: 
they can form a competitive advantage for a company. Although 
reputations/images are in the minds of the corporate stakeholders and are to a 
certain extent beyond a company’s control, companies can try to influence 
stakeholders’ perceptions. Indeed, it is here where corporate communication is 
particularly relevant. According to Ind (1990: 24) corporate communication is “the 
process that translates corporate identity into corporate image.” Others as well 
have noted the interaction between identity and image (e.g. Argenti, 1994; Birkigt 
and Stadler, 1986; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Fiol and Kovoor-Misra, 1997; Van 
Riel, 1995). The relationship between corporate identity and corporate image is 
depicted in figure 2.1.  
28 Research by Fombrun and Shanley (1990: 252) shows that a firm’s reputation is affected 
by, among others, the quality of management, company’s financial soundness and its 
demonstration of social concerns. Their results indicate that a firm’s reputation correlated 
most strongly with the earnings the company reported in the preceding fiscal year. 
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Figure 2.1 The corporate communication framework 
The most important message of figure 2.1 is that the relationship between 
identity and image is not confined to a one-way interaction, but that image also 
affects identity. The first direction (identity influences image) seems logical: 
through the planned use of the instrument of the corporate identity-mix a company 
tries to affect stakeholders’ perceptions.29 Generally speaking companies can make 
use of the impression management techniques discussed previously to attempt to 
affect people’s perceptions of the company (e.g. Elsbach and Sutton, 1992; Van 
Riel, 1995; Carter and Dukerich, 1998; Dolphin, 1999; Fombrun and Rindova, 
2000). In the context of financial reporting, corporate reports, press conferences, 
29 Shell’s reactions after the Brent Spar controversy in 1995 is an example how a firm has 
tried—without initially succeeding—to handle a damaged corporate image by the use of 
the several instruments of the corporate identity-mix. Apart from placing corporate adds, 
Shell also changed its behaviour and way of communicating in particular (e.g. Van Riel 
and Van den Bosch, 1997; Hooghiemstra, 2000). Shell’s new communication style is not 
only more open, but also based on interaction with the stakeholders and reflects their 
willingness to adapt to changing external circumstances.  
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and shareholder meetings provide organisations and their top managers with 
opportunities for putting a positive spin on events (Ginzel et al., 1993: 232), which 
in turn can positively affect the company’s reputation (Marcus and Goodman, 
1991; Elsbach, 1994). However, not all information or cues from either the 
organisation or external sources (to be discussed below) will effectively influence 
people’s perceptions of the company as the stakeholders will filter the information 
and cues. The cues and information are first of all confronted with previous 
experiences with the organisation. In addition, the receiver will confront the 
information from different sources with each other: are the stories consistent or 
conflicting? Both will influence the credibility of the transmitted information and 
will determine to what extent the new information leads to an adjustment of the 
receiver’s perception of the company (Van Raaij, 1990; Rindova, 1997). 
Furthermore—as each stakeholder has a variety of backgrounds, objectives, and 
levels of dependency—it is not inconceivable that each of them will have different 
images of the organisation (Markwick and Fill, 1997: 398; see also e.g. Ind, 1990; 
Dowling, 1993; Van Riel, 1995; Leary, 1996; Gardner and Avolio, 1998).  
Corporate image influences corporate identity as well. Several authors stress 
that the way the audience perceives the organisation also influences the 
organisation’s self-presentation (e.g. Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and 
Kramer, 1996; Fiol and Kovoor-Misra, 1997; Rindova, 1997; Gray and Balmer, 
1998; Morsing, 1999). Rindova (1997), for example, suggests that corporate 
identity incorporates the feedback about how an organisation is perceived (for 
example in the form of a publicised reputational ranking as the Fortune index), and 
to what degree an organisation is meeting the various stakeholders’ expectations. 
This feedback is considered essential in order to make adjustments to the corporate 
identity strategy: “without it company executives are flying blind” (Gray and 
Balmer, 1998: 700).  
The figure also illustrates that environmental forces affect both identity and 
image. These environmental forces indicate that reputations are to a certain extent 
beyond the organisation’s control as they are based on affiliations (Vendelø, 
1998): a company’s reputation depends, among others, on the industry in which it 
operates and the narratives in the mass media about that company. The media in 
particular seems to be “a powerful player in the creation and destruction of 
organisations [and] can have an immediate impact on an organisation’s reputation” 
(Morsing, 1999: 118; see also Wartick, 1992; Hoeken and Renkema, 1998). The 
media coverage of the Brent Spar in 1995 clearly illustrates how the media has 
brought down a company (Shell). These environmental forces, however, also 
influence corporate identity. Several studies have shown how descriptions of the 
company in the media influenced the way the organisation presented itself (Dutton 
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and Dukerich, 1991; Dutton et al., 1994; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Morsing, 
1999). For example, Duimering and Safayeni (1998) found that organisations 
handle negative media attention by impression management techniques, i.e. the 
use of instruments of the corporate identity-mix, that overemphasise the positive 
aspects of their activities. Another possibility may be that a firm increases its 
charity donations in response to a reputational downturn (Carter and Dukerich, 
1998). The use of impression management is most salient in case of a reputational 
downturn (Carter and Dukerich, 1998) as consequence of, for example, product 
defects (e.g. Brinta, Olvarit, etc.) or a disaster to which the company is linked (e.g. 
the Exxon Valdez, the chemical leak in Bophal). The objective is, of course, to 
repair the reputational damage. When such negative events (or negative media 
coverage) are absent, managers seem less motivated to manage the corporate 
impressions. However, even then they still have to communicate positive events 
and outcomes in order to sustain (or even enhance) the corporate reputation. 
2.4.4  Agency theory 
Thus far we discussed self-serving attributional behaviour from two closely related 
perspectives: impression management and corporate communication. The basic 
premise of these two perspectives is that verbal behaviour in annual reports is a 
symbolic activity in which management tries to affect the perceptions people have 
of the company. Using self-serving attributions in the letter to the shareholders, 
that is claiming good outcomes and denying responsibility for bad outcomes, is 
one way by which managers try to influence people’s perceptions of the company. 
Managers engage in such and other forms of reputation management not only 
because good reputations may provide the company a competitive edge but also 
because they personally may benefit from it. In that sense “reputation management 
is nothing less than enlightened self-interest” (Fombrun and Rindova, 2000: 79). 
In agency theory manager’s self-interests play a crucial role as well. Indeed, in a 
critical assessment of agency theory, Kathleen Eisenhardt suggested that using 
agency theory with complementary theories are particularly appropriate in case of 
organisational behaviour topics that relate to information asymmetry. She refers to 
examples as impression management, lying and other forms of secrecy, and blame. 
According to Eisenhardt (1989: 71) “agency theory might contribute an overall 
framework in which to place these various forms of self-interest. Leading to a 
better understanding of when such behaviours will be likely and when they will be 
effective.” 
` Agency theory addresses the problems that arise because of the separation 
between ownership and control that is characteristic to the modern corporation 
(Berle and Means, 1932). In agency theory a firm is seen as a nexus of contracts 
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(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). By means of a contract the principals (shareholders) 
engage an agent (management) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; Walsh 
and Seward, 1990; Bromwich, 1992). Examples of such contracts are the 
compensation plan and debt convenants, which are usually defined and monitored 
in terms of accounting numbers (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Maijoor, 1991; 
Bromwich, 1992; Beaver, 1998). 
Given the presence of uncertainty and as both parties are rational utility-
maximisers, it is not illusory that management will pursue its own self-interest 
(e.g. power, prestige, rewards, etc.) at the expense of the interests of the 
shareholders (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Dassen, 
1989; Maijoor, 1991; Bromwich, 1992). In order to decrease the possibility of 
such opportunistic behaviour some costs have to be incurred. Two sorts of costs 
are mentioned (Jensen and Meckling, 1976): bonding costs (i.e. those costs 
incurred by the agent in order to show that interests have been converging) and 
monitoring costs (i.e. costs incurred by the principals in order to monitor the 
agent’s behaviour afterwards). Following Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981) 
(at least) three monitoring devices are important, namely the appointment of 
outside or supervisory directors, listing requirements of stock exchanges, and, 
more importantly, the publication of accounting reports (that are audited by 
independent auditors). According to these authors, such financial statements 
enable shareholders to determine whether management has complied with the 
contract (1981: 764). Despite these monitoring devices shareholders are, however, 
not perfectly able to monitor managers effectively due to uncertainty and 
asymmetric information (i.e. managers have superior knowledge about the 
performance and prospects of the company). According to agency theorists 
problems of “moral hazard” are likely to arise (Eisenhardt, 1989). Moral hazard 
implies that the manager is shirking, that is he lacks effort to realise the agreed-
upon objectives. The existence of uncertainty and information asymmetry, 
combined with the assumption of the pursuit of self-interest, has important 
consequences for financial reporting (Dassen, 1989; Bromwich, 1992; 
Abrahamson and Park, 1994; Hoogendoorn, 1996; Beaver, 1998). Firstly, as 
shareholders posses less information than the managers, managers have the 
possibility to bias the information contained in annual reports in order to disguise 
that their effort was sub-optimal. That is, information asymmetry enables 
managers to bias the information they provide in order to affect the perception of 
other people, notably the shareholders (see also Beaver, 1998; Revsine, 1991). 
Indeed, both Dassen (1989) and Hoogendoorn (1996) argue that moral hazard will 
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lead managers to claim responsibility for good outcomes, whereas bad, i.e. 
unsuccessful performances will be attributed to external influences beyond the 
control of the manager. In addition, because managers are guided by their self-
interests (e.g. justifying their rewards) it may be expected that positive outcomes 
are highlighted, whereas manager will spend as little attention as possible to 
negative, unsuccessful outcomes and will show an adverse selection for positive 
outcomes (Bromwich, 1992). In addition, Abrahamson and Park (1994) use 
agency theory to explain why managers may be motivated to conceal negative 
outcomes entirely. Firstly, managers do not want others to become aware of such 
negative outcomes not only because this may affect their bonuses, but also because 
it may impinge on their reputations. Secondly, as disclosure of this kind of 
information usually has a negative effect on the company’s share price, it may 
make it more vulnerable to a hostile take-over. 
2.5 Summary 
In this chapter we first discussed three influential contributions of Heider, Kelley, 
and Weiner to the development of attribution theory. Heider (1958) established the 
fundaments of the work on attribution. He was the first to differentiate between 
causes within the person, viz. “can” and “try”, and causes that lay outside the 
person. Other researchers have subsequently elaborated upon his ideas. Whereas 
Kelley focused especially on the processes people use to arrive at their attributions 
regarding other people’s behaviour, Weiner focused primarily on individuals’ 
causal explanations for the outcomes of their own behaviour (Martinko and 
Thomson, 1998; Vonk, 1999). Notwithstanding the differences in focus, it seems 
possible to draw parallels between Kelley’s informational dimensions and 
Weiner’s causal dimensions (see table 2.2). Subsequent research employing 
Weiner’s dimensions revealed that biases occur in the way people explain 
outcomes of behaviour. One of these is the self-serving attributional bias, implying 
that people tend to internalise successes and externalise failures. Researchers have 
found this bias in different kinds of settings, e.g. in sports, in the classroom, etc.. 
The bias is also present in letters to the shareholders: organisational and 
accounting research revealed that CEOs (from different Western countries) show 
strong self-enhancing tendencies. However, no general tendencies emerged 
regarding CEOs’ self-protection: both cultural factors and performance stability 
seem to affect it. After the discussion of previous research of letters to the 
shareholders, we paid attention to three frameworks which can be used to explain 
why managers show such kind of behaviour, viz. impression management (from 
social psychology), corporate communication (from marketing and organisation 
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studies) and agency theory (economics). Despite their different origins, all three 
stress that the letter to the shareholders has a symbolic function: the story 
contained in it is aimed at influencing people’s perceptions. The main reason why 
CEOs try to influence those perceptions is related to self-interest. Managers not 
only try to secure people’s contributions to the company (e.g. their investment), 
but there seems to be a more ulterior motive as well: it may impinge on their 
personal reputations and, more importantly, on (the justification of) the managers’ 
rewards. 
Information type 
(Kelley) 
Attributional dimension 
(Weiner)
High consensus External 
Low consensus Internal 
High consistency Stable 
Low consistency Unstable 
High distinctiveness Specific 
Low distinctiveness Global 
Table 2.2 Relationship between Kelley’s and Weiner’s dimensions 
3  Cultural influences 
“Every man is in certain respects 
a) like all other men, b) like some other 
man, c) like no other man” 1
Culture affects many things in life. It influences how we behave, how we 
communicate with others, how we express our feelings, show our emotions, use 
non-verbal cues, etc.. As the influence of culture on behaviour is pervasive 
(Sudarwan, 1995) it is important to understand how differences in culture may 
lead to differences in behaviour. Not succeeding doing so, may and often will lead 
to misunderstanding between people from different cultures. Culture, however, is 
not easy to define. It can be argued that there are as many definitions as there are 
authors writing about it. Indeed, in a recent review on the influence of culture on 
behaviour, Lonner and Adamopoulos (1997) even suggested that there at least 200 
definitions of “culture.” For example, following Sudarwan (1995: 29) culture has 
been defined as “a system of shared cognition” and as “a system of shared 
symbols and meanings.” In a similar vein, Perera and Mathews (1990: 221) refer 
to the following two descriptions of the term culture: “the total way of life of a 
people” and “the social legacy the individual acquires from his or her group.” Yet, 
another definition of culture may be “an organised system of meanings which 
members of that culture attribute to the persons and objects which make up the 
culture” (Rohner, 1984).2 What these definitions have in common is that they all 
stress that culture involves shared values: people belonging to the same culture 
have in common the same broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over 
others (Hofstede, 1997a: 8; see also Smith and Schwartz, 1997; Roe and Ester, 
1999). According to the well-known Nancy Adler “culture” involves something 
“that is shared by all or almost all members of some social group, something that 
1 Kluckhohn and Murray (1948). 
2 See Erez and Earley (1993) and Earley (1997) for other definitions of culture. Earley 
himself defines “culture” as “a specific set of beliefs and values that are shared by 
individuals having a common geographic and resource base as represented by individual-
level phenomena. […] Culture can be viewed as a hierarchical structure of beliefs and 
values, shared among individuals having a common background, that shape action” (1997: 
21).
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the older members of the group try to pass on to the younger members, and 
something (as in the case of morals, laws and customs) that shapes behaviour, or 
structures one’s perception of the world” (1997: 15). The central place of values—
“something that is shared”—is also underscored in Hofstede’s (1997a: 5) 
definition of culture. He sees culture as the collective programming of the mind 
which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another. 
Following Hofstede (1980, 1997a) a culture manifests itself in several ways, for 
example symbols, rituals, heroes, and values; and are different with respect to the 
possibilities to be changed. Values in this respect are very stable and entrenched, 
because they are learned at a young age. Although being enduring, values are 
malleable (Erez and Earley, 1993). Values determine whether a person perceives 
something as “good” or “bad”, as “rational” or “irrational”, and so on and, hence, 
represent the essence of a culture. Such values affect people’s ideas about what 
constitutes appropriate behaviour in any given situation. Indeed, various scholars 
have argued that culture also influences behaviour of organisations and of people 
within organisations, including affects CEOs (Triandis, 1983; Adler, 1997; House, 
Wright, and Aditya, 1997; Lonner and Adamopoulos, 1997). Newman and Nollen 
(1996), for example, comment that “there is ample evidence that national cultures 
vary and that a variety of management practices, including strategic decision 
making (Schneider and De Meyer, 1991), leadership style (Dorfman and Howell, 
1988; Puffer, 1993) differ by national culture.” In a similar vein, Adler (1997), 
House et al. (1997) and Schneider and Barsoux (2003) refer to studies which show 
that culture affects corporate strategy and other forms of organisational behaviour, 
such as communication, leadership, and conflict management styles. In support of 
the view that organisational behaviour varies across cultures, Jackofsky and 
Slocum (1988) present a cultural model of CEO roles, something previously 
investigated by Haire, Ghiselli, and Porter (1963). They explore and indeed find 
evidence that “societal value systems are reflected in the processes by which the 
CEO enacts his/her role” (Jackofsky and Slocum, 1988: 67). Furthermore, Earley 
(1989, 1993) finds culture to influence the extent in which organisational members 
engage in “social loafing” (referring to the tendency that individuals reduce effort 
if they act as part of a group rather than alone). Similarly, Chen, Chen and Meindl 
(1998) propose a model regarding the influence of culture on cooperation within 
organisations. These studies, and many others, underline the idea that 
organisational behaviour is—at least partially—driven by a nation’s cultural 
background. In order to measure cultural variability researchers have focused on 
values resulting in a number of cultural dimensions that describe the essence of a 
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culture (Smith and Schwartz, 1997).3 In the next section (4.1) we pay attention to 
cultural dimensions as have been identified by Hofstede (1980), Schwartz (1994, 
1999) and other cross-cultural researchers. Some of the cultural dimensions 
discussed in that section are derived from large-scale surveys, whereas others 
“only” have a theoretical basis. It is noted here that this chapter does not aim at 
providing a full-scale or complete overview of all the dimensions that have been 
identified by the various researchers. This would justify a book of it’s own as 
“theorists have set forth many value dimensions—far too many for the researcher 
to fully reconcile or employ” (Hambrick and Brandon, 1988: 12). Rather, we 
discuss those contributions we think exerted the most influence on the work on 
culture in general, and management and accounting in particular (based upon 
readings of the relevant literature). The objective of this discussion is to arrive at a 
set of core cultural dimensions shared by the various researchers. Indeed, authors 
as, for example, Ronen and Shenkar (1985), Hambrick and Brandon (1988), Lytle, 
Brett, Barsness, Tinsley, and Janssens (1995), Smith and Schwartz (1997), Smith 
and Bond (1998), and Schneider and Barsoux (2003) point to the existence of a 
limited number of dimensions that describe the variability between cultures. 
Section 4.2 is dedicated to the identification of these “core” cultural values. The 
chapter ends with a summarising section (4.3). 
3.1 Cultural variability 
3.1.1 Introduction 
As mentioned cultures manifest themselves in different ways. Most of the studies 
on cultural variability, however, concentrated on the analysis of value differences 
3 As is noted by, e.g. Smith and Bond (1996) and Smith and Schwartz (1997) values can be 
measured on two levels, namely the individual and the cultural/ecological level. At the 
individual level, values represent the motivational goals that serve as guiding principles in 
people’s lives. Well-known cross-cultural research on individual values includes Rokeach 
(1973) and Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990). On the other hand, values at the ecological 
level represent the socially shared, abstract ideas about what is good, right, and desirable. 
Well-known ecological cross-cultural research includes Hofstede (1980, 1997a) and 
Schwartz (1994, 1999). This research project focuses on the aggregate-cultural level. This 
line of research resulted in a number of cultural dimensions, which represent average 
differences between cultures and not every individual of culture per se. In the Hofstedian 
approach the following view prevails. If a researcher is interested in how the cultural value 
context relates to differences across cultures in themes such as popular media, political 
structures, or prevalence of attribution styles, he or she one should use the culture-level 
types (Schwartz, 1994). 
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(Smith and Schwartz, 1997). The reliance on values to measure cultural variability 
may be ascribed to their central place in cultures: they not only represent the 
central goals that relate to all aspects of behaviour, values are also influenced by 
everyday experiences in changing ecological and socio-political contexts (Smith 
and Schwartz, 1997). Furthermore, values are learned at a very young age 
(Hofstede, 1997a). There are, however, numerous values on which societies may 
be compared. Some of these are specific to a society, whereas others are more 
universal. In order to limit the number of values on which societies may differ, 
researchers focused on those values that “reflect the basic issues or problems that 
societies must confront in order to regulate human activity (Smith and Schwartz, 
1997: 95). The focus on basic values resulted in a relatively limited number of 
cultural dimensions. These dimensions involve “stereotyping” in the sense that 
they describe behavioural norms for members of a particular group (Adler, 1997; 
Schneider and Barsoux, 2003). The value of such dimensions is that they are 
“useful for comparing between cultures” (Ferraro, 2002:121), implying that they 
describe tendencies or preferences for a group in general and not for an individual 
member of a group per se. That is: such “stereotypes” indicate that members of the 
same culture are expected to have more in common with each other than with 
members of another culture (Schneider and Barsoux, 2003: 15). Indeed, Hofstede 
(1984: 24-25) warns researchers for the so-called “ecological fallacy”: that a 
culture, or some social group, on average shows a preference for certain values 
does not imply that every individual member has the same preference. If we 
recognise this important limitation, the dimensions form “helpful stereotypes” 
(Adler, 1997: 75-76). Below we will discuss these dimensions more in detail and 
in chronological order. Some of the efforts are based on large-scale empirical 
research (e.g. Hofstede, Schwartz, and Trompenaars et al.), whereas others are 
“only” theoretical ideas on cultural dimensions (e.g. Parsons and Shils and Fiske).  
3.1.2 Parsons and Shils 
One of the first who suggested that culture can be captured by a limited number of 
dimensions were Parsons and Shils (1951). In their General theory of action they 
described how a person’s actions are influenced by three interdependent systems: 
personality, social and cultural systems. Personality refers to a person’s motives, 
needs, cognition, and learning and influences how a person acts in certain 
situations. A social system is comprised of the relationships a person has with 
other persons. In such relationships each person has a certain role. The importance 
of these roles is that they highlight that individuals are part of a group and that his 
or her actions will be, at least partially, the result of other people’s actions. They 
further assume that both personality and the social system are part of a larger 
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cultural system. Parsons and Shils (1951: 55) describe a cultural system as “the 
organisation of the values, norms and symbols which guide the choices made by 
actors and which limit the types of interaction which may occur among actors.” 
What is important about the cultural system is that the person’s cultural 
background, i.e. his “value-orientation”, commits the person to certain norms and 
will guide him in making his choices. In this sense culture is comprised of a set of 
standards (Parsons and Shils, 1951). According to Parsons and Shils (1951) it is 
possible to define and categorise cultures on the basis of five dichotomies, the so-
called “pattern variables.” The pattern variables are (Parsons and Shils, 1951: 76-
f.f.): 
1. Affectivity versus Affective-neutrality. This pattern variable addresses “the 
dilemma of gratification of impulse versus discipline.” In the case of 
affectivity, gratification impulses are released immediately without regard to 
evaluative considerations. In the case of affective-neutrality, gratification is 
restrained in order to facilitate evaluative considerations. For example, this 
pattern variable determines whether a student spontaneously “jumps into the 
air” after having passed a difficult exam or awaits his reaction in order to 
reckon with the other students’ results. 
2. Self-orientation versus Collectivity-orientation. This variable pattern involves 
“the dilemma of private versus collective interests.” In case of self-orientation 
primacy is given to personal interests, goals, etc. without really considering 
their effect on collective interests. In case of collectivity-orientation primacy is 
given to the interests, values, etc. that are shared with the other members of the 
group. 
3. Universalism versus Particularism. This variable addresses “the dilemma of 
transcendence versus immanence.” In the case of universalism a situation is 
judged or evaluated in accordance with a general norm and, additionally, it is 
expected that the broad set of rules and policies guide all individuals’ actions 
(Erez and Earley, 1993). Particularism, on the other hand, involves a culture in 
which the unique aspects of the situation and its relevant aspects of the actor 
guide judgements about individuals. In this case it is possible to deviate from 
the rules because the situation or the person being judged may justify it 
(Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997).  
4. Ascription versus Achievement. This dimension covers “the dilemma of object 
modalities”; that is whether primacy is given to the qualities or attributes as a 
person or to a person’s performances or achievements when a person is 
judged. In societies in which achievement is important, status may be obtained 
by “doing.” In contrast in societies that value ascription, status is largely the 
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results of the individual’s background (“being”), that is because he belongs to 
some specific group (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997). 
5. Specificity versus Diffuseness. This last variable involves “the dilemma of the 
scope of significance of the object.” It addresses whether people should 
“engage others only in specific areas of life and single levels of personality, or 
diffusely in multiple areas of their lives and at several levels of personality at 
the same time” (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997: 81). For example, 
in extreme specific cultures it is rare to have colleagues that are close-friends 
as well: that is work and social life are largely separated from each other. 
However, in more diffuse cultures it is not rare at all to spend time, e.g. to 
have a drink, with your colleagues after working hours. 
3.1.3 Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 
In their work Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) approached the issue of cultural 
variability by what they referred to as “value orientations.” According to them, 
value orientations are “the complex but definitely patterned (rank-ordered) 
principles which give order and direction to the ever-flowing stream of human acts 
and thoughts as these relate to the solution of common human problems” (1961: 
4). According to Adler (1997: 18-19) Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s value 
orientations relate to questions such as: “Who am I?”, “How do I see the world?”, 
“How do I relate to other people?”, “What do I do?”, and “How do I use space and 
time?” These value orientations represent universal principles; differences in 
culture are only a reflection of differences in rank attached to each of the 
principles. They distinguished the following value orientations (Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck, 1961: 11-f.f.): 
1. Human nature orientation. This dimension relates to innate goodness or 
badness of people. According to them it is possible to describe human nature 
along the scale of “Evil, Good-and-Evil, and Good.” What is important is that 
the orientation determines whether a culture emphasises “trust” or “distrust.” 
In cultures where the view of human nature as generally good dominates, trust 
is high; if badness dominates, distrust will be high (Lytle et al., 1995). 
According to Adler (1997: 19) people in high-trust societies leave doors 
unlocked and do not fear being robbed or assaulted.  
2. Man-nature orientation. This dimension covers the relationship between man 
and nature and is comprised of a distinction between: “subjugation-to-Nature”, 
“Harmony-with-Nature”, and “Mastery-over-Nature.” In case of “subjugation-
to-nature” people believe that they cannot exert any influence over their 
surroundings; i.e. that they cannot control it, reflecting a certain fatalistic 
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attitude. This belief seems to be dominant in the Latin countries. In case of 
“harmony-with-nature” the idea is that nature and human are extensions of 
each other and is the dominant belief in Japan (Erez and Earley, 1993). 
“Mastery-over-nature” involves an attitude to overcome and try to control the 
environment and put it to the use of people. It reflects a belief that man is able 
to control the environment for example through technological means. 
Particularly of the Anglo-Americans it is said that they think they can master 
the environment (Erez and Earley, 1993), which is noticeable through, for 
example, economists’ structuring of markets, and sales representatives’ 
attempts to influence buyers’ decisions (Adler, 1997).  
3. Time orientation. This dimension deals with the temporal focus of human life 
and is represented by the division: “Past-Present-Future.” In some cultures, 
e.g. many modern European countries, the “Past” is emphasised: people like to 
preserve traditions. Point of reference for these cultures are the ancestors. In 
contrast, people from Latin countries prefer to think in terms of the “Present” 
and spontaneity is valued highly in these cultures (Lytle et al., 1995). In this 
case people do not refer to the past, nor are making real plans for the future. 
Finally, the Americans seem to be oriented toward the “Future”—”a future 
which is anticipated to be bigger and better” (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 
1961: 15). Indeed, according to Adler (1997: 30) Northamerican 
businesspeople focus on the present and near future: “they may talk about 
achieving five- or ten-year plans, but they work toward achieving this 
quarter’s results.” The Japanese on the other have a very long-term, future-
oriented time horizon. 
4. Activity orientation. This value orientation is related to what Parsons and Shils 
(1951) refer to as “Ascription versus Achievement” and is made up of: 
“Being”, “Being-in-Becoming”, and “Doing.” A “doing”-orientation, which 
seems to be present in the United States, implies that a person is judged based 
upon his accomplishments. In such cultures, obtaining results, working hard, 
etc. are particularly important. In case of a “Being”-orientation the emphasis is 
on the person as a social human being. In such a society the personal 
characteristics and enjoyment in life are more important than the achievements 
and working hard to obtain results. The “Being-in-Becoming”-orientation 
more or less lies in between the other two and development of the individual is 
stressed here. 
5. Relational orientation. This last value orientation describes a person’s relation 
to other persons and is divided in “lineality”, “collaterality”, and 
“individualism.” If “individualism” dominates, such as in the United States, 
personal goals and interests have primacy over the goals of the groups to 
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which a person belongs. In the other two cases, group goals are dominant with 
this difference that in case of “lineality” it is some older person who decides 
for the group what is best. In case of “collaterality” the group goals are 
decided upon by achieving consensus between its members. 
In contrast to Parsons and Shils this model was empirically tested (using value 
questionnaires). However, the chosen groups were all located within the United 
States and were to a large extent protected from outside influences. Hence, it is 
difficult to say whether Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s dimensions are applicable to 
cultures outside the United States. 
3.1.4 McClelland 
McClelland’s work was initiated by his interest to explain why European and 
North-American countries experienced greater economic growth than most of the 
Asian and African countries. As differences in climate and natural resources were 
not enough to fully explain the difference in economic growth, McClelland (1961) 
suspected that “differences in the people who live in those countries [...], their 
motives and values, social and political institutions” (McClelland, 1961: 3) were, 
at least partially, responsible. Especially differences in need for achievement
(shorthand: n Achievement) are suggested to play a major role: “… we might 
legitimately expect that people with strong achievement motives would seek out 
situations in which they could get achievement satisfaction. They ought to be the 
kind of people who set achievement standards for themselves, rather than relying 
on extrinsic incentives provided by the situation, and they should try harder and 
more successfully to reach the standards they set for themselves. It does not take a 
great stretch of imagination to assume further that if a number of people with high 
n Achievement happened to be present in a given culture at a given time, things 
would start to hum. […] Viewed in this light it would not be at all surprising to 
imagine that an increase in n Achievement should promote economic or cultural 
growth” (McClelland, 1961: 45-46). Entrepreneurship is according to McClelland 
(1961) the reason why countries characterised by a high need for achievement (as 
the United States) are likely to experience greater economic growth. Indeed, in 
such cultures people tend to take (calculated) risks, are likely to engage in novel 
and entrepreneurial activities, value concrete feedback about results and 
achievements (preferably in the form of monetary units) and think ahead; factors 
that are likely to result in a productive nation. In order to measure differences in 
the need for achievement he relied on children’s stories appearing in schoolbooks. 
These stories were subsequently content analysed to express the extent of 
achievement contained in the stories. Using the scores he was able to confirm the 
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relationship between the need for achievement and economic growth (as measured 
by growth in electric power production). Although his ideas on achievement have 
had considerable influence, some authors criticised his methods. Indeed, it has 
been suggested that his confirmation of the relationship between the need for 
achievement and economic growth was a result of the measures McClelland used 
and was influenced by the period in which his measures were collected. Hofstede 
(1984), who summarised much of the critique, concludes that it is doubtful 
whether McClelland’s achievement motive is able to offer a universal model for 
economic success, also because it seems biased towards values that are typical to 
the American culture. 
Apart from the need for achievement, McClelland (1961, 1975) also 
considered what he referred to as the need for affiliation and the need for power.
The need for affiliation refers to the importance of social interaction and 
relationships in a culture. McClelland (1961: 160) formally describes it as 
“establishing, maintaining, or restoring a positive affective relationship with 
another person. This relationship is most adequately described by the word 
friendship.” However, family ties are not part of the need for affiliation. Hofstede 
(1984) found that in individualistic countries the need for affiliation is larger than 
in collectivistic countries. According to Hofstede, there is less need for 
(additional) friendship in cultures where the groups to which one belongs 
predetermine friends. However, in more individualistic countries “making 
friendship becomes more an issue for the individual” (Hofstede, 1984: 163). The 
need for power, which he addressed in later work (1975), refers to the extent that 
the people of a culture value to be able to exert control over individuals and 
objects.  
3.1.5 Hofstede 
Hofstede’s work is said to have “defined the agenda for cross-cultural researchers 
in the past 15 years” (Smith and Schwartz, 1997: 96). In a similar vein, Magala 
(2002: 14) concludes: “The fact that even researchers representing different 
methodological traditions, working with different dimensions of culture, assuming 
different mechanisms of motivational influence of values and studying different 
levels of social aggregation acknowledge the role of Hofstedian dimensions should 
not come as a surprise. … The field of cross-cultural studies has changed both 
because of what Hofstede has written and because of what has been written for 
and against him.” Hofstede’s research draws on value questionnaires from 117,000 
IBM employees from 50 nations and 3 regions. So far it is the most comprehensive 
comparative study in terms of both the range of countries and the number of 
respondents involved (Kagitçibasi, 1997; Smith and Bond, 1998). The employees 
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questioned were all working in the marketing or servicing department of IBM. As 
Hofstede was interested in cultural differences on nation-level he computed 
average scores per nation for each questionnaire item. These items addressed four 
basic problems that Hofstede believed to underlie any nation’s culture. They 
include social inequality (e.g. the relationship with authority), the relationship 
between the individual and the group, the social implication of being a man or a 
woman, and ways of dealing with uncertainty (Hofstede, 1997a: 13-14). These 
basic problems were used to design a questionnaire that was related to work 
values. Factor analysing nation-averages on these questionnaire items resulted in 
four cultural dimensions that are presented below. 
1. Power distance (High versus Low). Hofstede (1980, 1997a) defines power 
distance as the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and 
organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed 
unequally (1997a: 28). Power distance determines the behaviour of both the 
less and more powerful members of a society. In fact, power only exists 
because some people are prepared to assume a subordinate position. In 
countries characterised by a high level of power distance, e.g. the Latin 
American, Asian, African and South European countries, people are willing to 
accept certain hierarchical relationships. For example, within families it is 
normal to show respect to parents and other elderly people (Hofstede, 1997a). 
In low power distance countries such as the United States and most of Western 
Europe, however, power has to be used legitimately and is subject to criteria of 
good and evil. People are much less prepared to accept the use of power, only 
because someone is older, has a higher position, etc.. In these societies power 
is derived from, among others, a person’s knowledge.
2. Individualism versus Collectivism. Following Zwier (1998: 2) this concept has 
been introduced into social sciences as a dimension that can be used to 
describe different patterns of social relationships and values that one finds in 
diverse cultures. Since its introduction it has become perhaps the most
important dimension of cultural differences in social behaviour. Some, e.g. 
Hui and Yee (1994) and Kagitçibasi (1997), estimated that approximately a 
third of the recently published studies employ this construct to explain, at least 
partially, the cultural differences found. Though there have been many authors 
writing about this dimension and used different definitions as well (for 
excellent overviews, see Triandis, 1995; Earley and Gibson, 1998; Oyserman, 
Coon and Kemmelmeier, 2002), it is evident that a major component of the 
dimension concerns “the nature of group membership” (Earley and Gibson, 
1998: 267). For example, Hofstede (1997a: 51), describes this dimension as 
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follows. In individualistic societies, such as the United States and the Western 
European countries, the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is 
expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family. On 
the other hand, in collectivistic societies, such as Japan and the Latin 
American countries, people are from birth onwards integrated into strong, 
cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect 
them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.4 This dimension is related to 
people’s self-concept: “I” or “we” (Hofstede, 1984). According to Adler 
(1997) differences in group orientation influence the way decisions are 
reached within organisations and the way people are praised for having 
performed well. First of all, in individualistic cultures such as the United 
States and the Netherlands, it is an individual who decides, whereas in Japan 
many people are involved in the decision-making process. Furthermore, in a 
country such a America “corporate performance is praised by singling out and 
rewarding the chief executive officer (CEO). General Electric’s outstanding 
financial performance is often attributed to CEO Jack Welch, as in the subtitle 
of the book How Jack Welch is making General Electric the World’s most 
competitive company” (Adler, 1997: 25). As we will see later, this dimension 
has also been used to explain cross-cultural differences in people’s construct of 
the self, their communication styles, and subsequently the attributions they 
make.
3. Masculinity versus Femininity. Hofstede (1997a: 82; see also Hofstede, 1980, 
1998) defines this dimension as follows. Masculinity pertains to societies in 
which social gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be 
assertive, tough and focused on material success, whereas women are 
supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. 
Femininity, on the other hand, pertains to societies in which gender roles 
overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and 
concerned with the quality of life. Furthermore, in countries that score high on 
masculinity, e.g. the English-speaking nations and Japan, the masculine values 
such as competition, success and achievement are considered important in 
work and study (by both men and women). Such cultures can be typified as a 
“performance society” in which the quality of life depends on the rewards 
from work (Hofstede, 1997a). Feminine countries on the other hand, such as 
4 In a classical work on Japanese culture Lebra (1976: 22) concurs with the strong 
collectivistic tendency as she notes that the Japanese are extremely sensitive to and 
concerned about social interaction and relationships. In her book, Lebra discusses this 
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the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, are much more socially 
oriented: caring for others, preservation, tolerance, solidarity, and the welfare 
state are considered important. Besides, these societies highly value the 
protection of the environment: there is a true balance between the environment 
and economic growth (Hofstede, 1997a). These differences are also reflected 
in organisational life and can be summarised in the juxtaposition of the two 
slogans, namely the masculine “live in order to work” and the feminine “work 
in order to live” (Hoppe, 1998: 42). Elaborating on these slogans, Hoppe 
(1998) argues that masculine expressions of organisational life include job-
centeredness (e.g. emphasis on visible achievements and desires for tangible 
expressions of success), performance-centeredness (e.g. challenge, excellence 
and competition are important) and result orientation. Their respective 
feminine counterparts include employee-centeredness (e.g. emphasis on social 
interaction and belonging), relationship-centeredness (e.g. quality of work 
environment, being a sound contributor, and collaboration), and people 
orientation (e.g. solidarity and consensus). These differences expect us to 
believe that also the attributions people make will be different depending on 
their more masculine or feminine cultural background (see de Mooij, 1998).
4. Uncertainty avoidance (High versus Low). This dimension is concerned with 
the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or 
unknown situations (Hofstede, 1997a: 113). Countries characterised by high 
uncertainty avoidance, e.g. the Latin American countries and the countries in 
the South of Europe, show a need for a large amount of precise rules that will 
try to enforce uniformity in behaviour, opinions, ideas, etc.. In fact by such 
detailed rules, both written and unwritten, a society tries to control an 
otherwise uncertain future by creating clarity in it.
Later research and especially by the Chinese Culture Connection (1987) and 
notably Bond did not only confirm these dimensions (except uncertainty 
avoidance), but also found an additional dimension (Smith and Bond, 1996): 
“Confucian dynamism”, also labelled “long-term” versus “short-term orientation”. 
These researchers used a questionnaire that was more suited for the Far East than 
Hofstede’s questionnaire which was biased towards a Western orientation 
(Hofstede, 1997a). Cultures in the Far East showed a tendency towards long-term 
orientation, meaning that they stress the fostering of virtues oriented towards 
future rewards, in particular perseverance and thrift (Hofstede, 1997a: 261). 
collectivistic nature in terms of “belongingness”, “empathy”, “dependency”, “occupying 
the proper place”, and “reciprocity”. 
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Although Hofstede’s work is one of the most frequently cited and many have 
relied on it in their research to approximate cultural variability, it has also received 
criticism. The most important objections against his work include the following. 
Firstly, some have expressed doubts concerning his sample choice as he obtained 
his data from a multinational (IBM) of which many argue that it has a strong 
corporate culture. As a consequence some wonder whether his data actually 
measured cultural variability of whole nations and not typically that of IBM (e.g. 
House et al., 1997; Baskerville, 2002; McSweeney, 2002). Hofstede, however, 
considers his sample choice as strength, because it only differed with respect to 
nationality. As a consequence, he argues, comparing IBM subsidiaries show 
national culture differences with unusual clarity (Hofstede, 1997a: 252; see also 
Adler, 1997; Van de Vijver and Leung, 1997a,b; Hoppe, 1998; Smith and Bond, 
1998; Van Oudenhoven, Mechelse and DeDreu, 1998). In support of this view are 
Laurent’s (1983) results. In his independent—i.e. not relying on Hofstede’s 
dimensions—cross-cultural study involving subjects from 10 western nations he 
found cultural differences to be more pronounced among employees working in 
the same multinational than among employees working for different organisations 
in the various countries. Hence it seems that “organisational culture maintains and 
enhances national differences” (Adler, 1997: 63). A second objection concerns the 
fact that Hofstede’s data have been collected more than 20 years ago. Hence, there 
are doubts whether the changes that occurred throughout the world would result in 
different dimensions and/or locations on Hofstede’s dimensions (Schwartz, 1994). 
A last important caveat in Hofstede’s study is that no nations from Eastern Europe 
were included. These objections, together with its many praises and widespread 
usage, leave the researcher with a dilemma (Punnett and Withane, 1990)—Should 
he or she embrace or abandon Hofstede’s value indices? As most of the replication 
studies, e.g. by Merritt (2000)5, Hoppe (1998)6, the Chinese Culture Connection 
5 Merritt (2000) conducted one of the most interesting replications. She surveyed 9,000 
people working in the aviation industry in 18 countries, representing the largest replication 
study (Hofstede, 1998). The primary goal of this study was to test whether Hofstede’s 
work also applied in other industries in the 1990’s (Merritt, 2000). In order to test this, she 
designed a questionnaire, consisting of 16 items derived directly from Hofstede’s own 
questionnaire and an additional 23 items that reflect Hofstede’s dimensions but with 
particular reference to the aviation sector. Her study did easily replicate Hofstede’s 
Individualism/Collectivism and Power distance dimensions. However, Masculinity/ 
Femininity could not be satisfactory replicated. A possible reason might be that the 
dimension has little conceptual relevance within the male-dominated, pilot profession 
(Merritt, 2000). In conformity with other studies, e.g. Schwartz and Sagiv (1995), and 
Smith, Dugan and Trompenaars (1996), Merritt failed to replicate the Uncertainty 
avoidance dimension. A possible explanation could be the strong corporate culture of IBM 
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(1987)7, and others8 resulted in (partially) confirmatory results it seems that 
Hofstede’s dimensions still are apt to represent current cultural variability. 
in which strong norms of tenure and conformity dominated (Merritt, 2000). However, 
Merritt’s study has some caveats which could have influenced the results. First, she 
focused on male pilots, which could have influenced the fact that the 
Masculinity/Femininity-dimension could not be replicated (although Hofstede’s sample 
was also biased towards males). Second, as acknowledged by Merritt (1999), Anglo-Saxon 
countries that made up one third of the actual sample dominated the sample. 
6 Hoppe (1998) undertook a second, large-scale replication of Hofstede’s work. In order to 
test the construct validity of Hofstede’s dimensions he surveyed over 1,500 respondents 
(between 1983 and 1984) from 17 Western and Southern European countries, Turkey and 
the United States. His sample consisted of managerial, professional, academic, and 
political elites attending courses in Austria (Hoppe, 1998). He used the actual Value 
Survey Module questionnaire as designed by Hofstede’s team. Although his results 
significantly support the validity of Hofstede’s four dimensions (Hoppe, 1998: 32), he 
reported important changes in the country scores. Recently Fernandez, Carlson, Stepina, 
and Nicholson (1997) also reported significant shifts in country scores compared to 
Hofstede’s original scores. However, as the rank order of the Hoppe and Hofstede studies 
significantly correlated with respect to all four dimensions (Hoppe, 1998), the dimensions 
still seem apt to express cultural variability between nations. In this context it is important 
to note the meaning of country scores on Hofstede’s dimensions using Hofstede’s (1980, 
1997a) own words. In an appendix on how to read mental programs, Hofstede (1997a: 
255) stresses that the national culture scores only describe differences between countries; 
their absolute value has no meaning. So, interpreting these words, it seems better to look at 
ranks than scores. The reported correlations with respect to country ranks in the Hoppe and 
Hofstede study are all above 0.70 and statistically significant at the 0.0001-level. 
7 The primary aim of this project was to establish whether Hofstede’s dimensions were not 
universal but, instead, biased towards a Western conception not apt to measure eastern 
values. Therefore, this project started by asking scientists from eastern cultures to list at 
least 10 basic values of the Chinese tradition (Chinese Culture Connection, 1987: 145). 
These values (forty in total) were then used to construct a survey (in Chinese/Mandarin 
and English) that was administered to students in 22 countries. Using a similar procedure 
as Hofstede, the group found four ecological factors: integration, human-heartedness, 
moral discipline, and Confucian work dynamism. The first three factors correlated highly 
with Hofstede’s collectivism, masculinity, and power distance, respectively. However, 
Confucian work dynamism appeared to be a dimension that was more specific to eastern 
cultures. According to the Chinese Culture Connection this result is not surprising as its 
underlying dimensions—e.g. thrift, persistence, having a sense of shame, protecting your 
“face”, and respect for tradition—may be cumbersome and peculiar (1987: 158) to people 
from western cultures. According to Smith and Bond (1998) the results of this project 
indicate that Hofstede’s dimensions of collectivism, masculinity, and power distance 
represent values are assumed to hold in most studied cases. 
8 There also have been other replication studies, that used much smaller samples in terms 
of respondents surveyed and/or countries represented (e.g. Hofstede and Bond, 1984; 
Dorfman and Howell, 1988; Punnett and Withane, 1990; Shackleton and Ali, 1990; 
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Therefore, returning to the question whether to embrace or abandon Hofstede, we 
are inclined to carefully embrace it, also because Hofstede’s dimensions seem to 
“form the most widely adopted starting point in research studying management in 
different nations” (Peterson, Smith et al., 1995: 429). 
3.1.6 Schwartz 
Schwartz’s research on value differences addresses both the individual and the 
ecological level. His research indicates that the dimensions at the two levels are 
closely related (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). As other researchers before him did, 
Schwartz too began with basic social issues to derive his ecological value 
dimensions. These issue addressed (1) the nature of the relation between the 
individual and the group, (2) the assurance of responsible social behaviour (i.e. 
that people will consider others’ welfare too), and (3) the relation of humankind 
and the natural and social world (see Schwartz, 1994, 1999; Smith and Schwartz, 
1997). The three dimensions are summarised below. 
1. Conservatism versus Autonomy. Schwartz (1999: 27; 1994) defines 
conservatism as a cultural emphasis on maintenance of the status quo, 
property, and restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt the solidary 
group or the traditional order (social order, respect for tradition, family 
security, wisdom, and preserving public image, self-discipline are important 
values in such a culture). Conservatism is very similar to Hofstede’s 
collectivism, as it is also concerned with describing whether the person is 
viewed as an entity who is embedded in the collectivity and finds meaning in 
life largely through social relationships (Schwartz, 1994, 1999). In cultures 
characterised by Autonomy9, the other end of this dimension and resembling 
Hofstede’s individualism, those values that view the person as an individual 
entity that is entitled to pursue his own interests are stressed (Schwartz, 1994: 
Fernandez et al., 1997). Søndergaard (1994) reviewed 61 of these replications, including 
unpublished ones. His main conclusion from this review is that by and large, Hofstede’s 
findings were confirmed in the reviewed replication studies once some modifications with 
respect to perception of environment at the time of the research and the known sample 
characteristics had been made (1994: 452). Especially the Individualism/Collectivism-
construct appeared to be most easily replicable.  
9 To be precise, Schwartz (1994, 1999) divides Autonomy into (1) Intellectual autonomy, 
stressing that individuals will independently pursue their own ideas and intellectual 
directions, and (2) Affective autonomy, that stresses that individuals will independently 
pursue affective positive experiences, e.g. pleasure, a varied and exciting life, etc.. 
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102). Furthermore, in such a culture a person is encouraged to express his own 
internal attributes, e.g. preferences, traits, feelings, and motives. 
2. Hierarchy versus Egalitarianism. The Hierarchy-pole of this dimension relates 
to the issue of power differences, and the importance of hierarchical relations 
in a culture. Schwartz (1999: 27) defines Hierarchy as a cultural emphasis on 
the legitimacy of an unequal distribution of power, roles and resources 
(authority, social power, humility, and wealth are the values that are stressed). 
In cultures where Egalitarianism is stressed the members will consider each 
other as moral equals who share basic interests and in which the welfare of 
others is important. Values such as equality, social justice, freedom, 
responsibility, and honesty are important in this culture (Schwartz, 1994, 
1999).
3. Mastery versus Harmony. The Mastery-pole of this dimension states that there 
is an emphasis on achievement through active self-assertion, stressing values 
as success, ambition, and competence (Schwartz, 1999: 28). On the other 
hand, the Harmony-pole puts an emphasis on fitting harmoniously into the 
environment, where unity with nature and protecting the environment are 
important values.
In Schwartz’s theory these ecological dimensions form a certain structure, in 
which some poles are contradictory (e.g. conservatism and autonomy), whereas 
the poles of different dimensions are complementary (e.g. cultures stressing 
hierarchy usually stress conservatism and mastery as well). The structure of value-
types Schwartz proposes is depicted in figure 3.1. In this figure the contradictory 
poles are placed opposite to each other, while the complementary poles are placed 
adjacently. In order to validate both the dimensions and structure, Schwartz used 
the questionnaire results that he used to derive the individual-level value types. In 
this survey both teachers and students from about 50 nations, between 1988 and 
1993, were asked to indicate, on a Likert-scale, whether they considered a single 
value as guiding principles in their own, individual life. The individual-level 
analysis indicated that 45 of 56 values had equivalent meaning across the nations 
examined. Hence, only these 45 values were included in the analysis for validating 
and deriving scores regarding the cultural dimensions (Schwartz, 1999: 30). The 
analysis showed several cultural regions emanating (with some minor differences) 
in both the teacher and student samples (Schwartz, 1999: 37-ff.). First, the 
English-speaking nations showed a tendency to emphasise Mastery and (affective) 
Autonomy over Harmony and Conservatism. Second, there was also a Western 
European region in which values related to (intellectual) Autonomy and 
Egalitarianism are stressed. Third, a separate Eastern European region emerged in 
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which values related to Conservatism and Harmony are stressed. Furthermore, a 
Latin American region appeared, with nations scoring moderate on all dimensions. 
Finally, a Far-Eastern region emerged, characterised by an emphasis on Hierarchy, 
Mastery and Conservatism. 
Figure 3.1 Schwartz’s structure of ecological value types (Schwartz, 1999) 
3.1.7 Fiske 
Another contribution to the identification of the different cultural dimensions is 
Fiske (1992). In his work Fiske addressed the different ways in which social 
relations may be organised. The basic assumption underlying his ideas is “that 
people are fundamentally sociable—that they generally organise their social life in 
terms of their relations with other people. The theory postulates that people in all 
cultures use just four relational models to generate most kinds of social interaction, 
evaluation, and affect” (Fiske, 1992: 689). Although Fiske refers to empirical 
papers that support his four elementary models and their cultural variability, his 
theory has not yet been empirically tested. The four elementary models Fiske 
proposes are:  
1. Communal sharing. Involves those relationships in which people belonging to 
a group treat each other as the same and in which commonalties between the 
members are more important than differences relating to the individual. 
“People in a CS relationship often think of themselves as sharing some 
common substance (e.g. blood)” (Fiske, 1992: 690-691). Especially in the 
Japanese culture communal sharing seems to be the dominant model. In this 
country “people seek the sense of the group, contributing ideas not as 
EgalitarianismHarmony
Conservatism
Hierarchy 
Mastery 
Affective 
autonomy
Intellectual
autonomy 
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individual positions but as part of the search for a joint judgment that 
transcends the separate attitude of the participants. […] People conform 
because they identify with the group and want to belong, so the influence of 
the group is stronger the more similar its members are to the target person and 
the more unanimous they are” (Fiske, 1992: 697). 
2. Authority ranking. Involves relationships in which it is possible to identify an 
asymmetry among people or a social hierarchy between them. The higher 
ranked people have authority, prestige, prerogatives, and privileges that the 
lower ranked people lack. However, it is also expected that the people lower 
on the social ladder are protected and cared for. With respect to decision-
making, authority ranking implies that “people channel information upward 
and hand decisions down through the chain of command, as in a military 
organisation. The highest ranked person decides for all subordinates, or else 
delegates specific decision authority. Social influence works in a similar way: 
People emulate, defer to, or obey their superiors” (Fiske, 1992: 700). 
3. Equality matching. In this kind of relationship balance is the central issue. 
“The idea is that each person is entitled to the same amount as each other 
person in the relationship, and that the direction and magnitude of an 
imbalance are meaningful” (Fiske, 1992: 691). For example, among 
acquaintances and friends it is expected to give one another presents of 
approximately equal value, to pay for dinner in turns, and so on. With respect 
to decision-making, equality matching implies a one vote per person principle 
and rotating chairmanship; it creates a sense that each person or country has 
the same amount of influence or power. 
4. Market pricing. In this last model relationships are expressed in a single value 
or utility metric. “The most prominent examples of interaction governed by 
market pricing are those that are oriented towards prices, wages, commissions, 
rents, interest rates, taxes, and all other relationships organised in terms of 
cost-benefit ratios and rational calculations of efficiency or expected utility” 
(Fiske, 1992: 692). The “invisible hand” is one evident example of how 
decision making operates in a market pricing society. In societies as the United 
States, remuneration, occupation, and achievements are considered particularly 
important. For example, in such countries it is not uncommon to ask a relative 
stranger the question “How much do you earn?” or to hear him stating his or 
her occupation when he introduces him- or herself. 
Fiske assumes that people combine all four models to construct their social 
relations. However, one model may be emphasised depending on the type of 
relationship (e.g. close kinship, close friendship, being acquaintance with 
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someone, etc.). For example, family relations are, ordinarily speaking, best 
described by communal sharing, whereas equality matching may be typical to 
friends and acquaintances. Work relations and boss-employee relations in 
particular on the other hand usually involve some form of authority ranking. Apart 
from the type of social relationship, culture also influences in which way the 
different models are combined. With respect to the influence of culture Fiske 
(1992: 712) remarks: “[…] people in different societies commonly use different 
models and combinations of models in any given domain or context. This taken-
for-granted consensus within societies, along with the striking discrepancies 
between societies, implies that culture is the primary determinant of the selection 
of models. There appear to be two major aspects of this cultural implementation of 
the models—rules that stipulate when each model applies, and rules that stipulate 
how to execute each model.” Exemplary for the cultural relativity of the models is 
stressed by Earley (1997). He notes that “market pricing may be very important in 
the United States but [is] less so in Sweden. Further, it may manifest itself in the 
United States as individual achievement over others in a business context (e.g. the 
corporate “rat race”) but in Sweden as a social achievement (e.g. individual 
achievement in an environmental cause). However, it is present in both countries” 
(Earley, 1997: 133). 
3.1.8 Trompenaars and colleagues 
Trompenaars and colleagues’ contributions to the cross-cultural field are among 
the most recent ones. They took Parsons and Shils’ (1951) five dimensions and 
two, somewhat revised versions of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s (1961) 
dimensions10 as their starting point. The database they used consisted of 30,000 
respondents (mainly managers) from 55 countries. Although they published 
country scores for some individual survey items in their initial work (1993, 1997), 
no further statistical analysis to validate the proposed dimensions was conducted.11
Indeed, one of Hofstede’s points of criticism is directed toward this lacking 
10 More specifically they adopted the ideas about “Time orientation” and “Man-nature 
orientation” from Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck. The last, however, was translated into 
Rotter’s (1966) locus of control. Its objective is to measure people’s believe in being able 
to control the environment (internal) or not being able to do so (external). The following 
statements represent this distinction clearly: “What happens to me is my own doing” 
(internal locus of control) versus “ Sometimes I feel that I do not have enough control over 
the directions my life is taking” (external locus of control) (Trompenaars and Hampden-
Turner, 1997: 142). 
11 It should be noted, however, that part of this statistical analysis was included as an 
appendix to Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997). 
62
analysis. A consequence is that “it is not clear where exactly a country is supposed 
to be positioned on a dimension […]” (Hofstede, 1997a: 190). In later work, 
however, Smith, Dugan and Trompenaars (1995, 1996, 1997) re-analysed the data 
from the earlier work. Apart from examining a subset of the original sample (43 
nations, using approximately 9,000 surveys), Smith et al. (1996) considered only 
questionnaire items that specifically relate to the dimensions “Universalism versus 
Particularism”, “Achievement versus Ascription”, and “Individualism versus 
Collectivism.” Using multidimensional scaling they found two dimensions:12
1. Conservatism versus Egalitarian Commitment. This dimension contrasts 
societies where particularistic relationships are valued and where status is 
obtained because a person belongs to a certain group of people with those 
societies that value universalistic relationships and in which status is based on 
someone’s achievements. Their data revealed that the Anglo-Saxon and 
Nordic countries (Scandinavia, Germany and the Netherlands) are more 
egalitarian-committed cultures, whereas Japan and many of the former Soviet 
countries tend towards conservatism. 
2. Utilitarian versus Loyal Involvement. This dimension asserts whether people’s 
involvement with a group (e.g. family, organisation, etc.) is based on loyalty 
and in which case the relationship is not easily terminated or is based on 
utilitarian considerations. In the latter case an individual remains member of a 
group because it is beneficial for him to participate. This relationship, 
however, will be terminated if the benefits are not considered substantial 
anymore. Two dilemmas (i.e. questionnaire items) reflected this dimension 
most clearly, namely whether one is loyal to the family and is prepared to 
continue with the family business after the father-founder has died (or, instead, 
to sell the company to a third party) and whether one is prepared to share 
responsibility for a failure of another team member. The results indicate that in 
Asian countries, including Japan, there is a tendency toward loyalty. The 
western nations on the other hand showed a slight preference for utilitarian 
involvement. However, this was stronger in the Nordic countries than in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries. 
In another study, focussing on cultural differences in locus of control, Smith et 
al. (1995) found three dimensions as well. Two of them, labelled “Personal-
12 Smith et al. (1996) found a third dimension that remained unlabelled. However, as noted 
by Smith and Schwartz (1997) this third dimension was not clearly interpretable. 
Therefore, we will not discuss this third dimension. 
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Political” and “social-Individual”, correlated strongly with the “Loyalty-Utilitarian 
Involvement” and “Conservatism-Egalitarian Commitment” dimensions, 
respectively. The third dimension this study yielded measured whether people 
believe that luck and change in life play a role in what people achieved. Smith et 
al. (1996) found that particularly in the Asian cultures, including Japan, such 
believe is present. 
3.2 Towards an integration of cultural dimensions 
Thus far we discussed some of the most important contributions to the cross-
cultural literature. Whereas contributions of Parsons and Shils and Fiske present 
theoretical ideas about cultural dimensions, others, as Hofstede, Schwartz, and 
Trompenaars empirically derived their cultural dimensions. Apart from 
methodology, these contributions also differed with respect to the objectives of the 
research. The Hofstede, Schwartz, and Trompenaars studies were specifically 
aimed at identifying nation-level cultural dimensions. Fiske (1992), on the other 
hand, was interested in the models that are able to describe different social 
relations in a country, notwithstanding acknowledging the existence of cultural 
differences therein. McClelland’s work on need for achievement originated from 
his interest to explain why western countries experienced more economic growth 
than many of the African and Asian countries. 
Notwithstanding such differences, it is interesting to investigate whether the 
researchers’ ideas about the dimensions concur with each other. The goal of 
comparing the dimensions is to arrive at a set of “core” cultural dimensions. That 
is, the objective is to see whether it is possible to generate a limited set of 
dimensions shared by the various researchers whose work has been discussed in 
section 4.1. Consistencies across the different studies may point to the most central 
and reliable dimensions that may be used to describe the basic differences between 
cultures (Smith and Schwartz, 1997). Indeed, previous papers suggested that some 
of the dimensions discussed so far are either empirically (based on statistical 
analysis of country scores) or conceptually similar (e.g. Ronen and Shenkar, 1985; 
Hambrick and Brandon, 1988; Lytle et al., 1995; Smith and Schwartz, 1997; 
Earley and Gibson, 1998; Smith and Bond, 1998). It seems that the various “value 
schemes have striking overlaps” (Hambrick and Brandon, 1988: 12). For example, 
based upon a review of three studies that statistically examined the consistency of 
the various cultural dimensions, Smith and Schwartz (1997: 103) conclude that 
two basic cultural dimensions emerged in all the empirical studies: 
1. “The preferred cultural view of individual-group relations (autonomous versus 
embedded).” 
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2. “The preferred cultural mode of motivating responsible social behaviour and 
allocating resources (negotiation among equals versus acceptance of unequal 
hierarchical roles).” 
The first dimension Smith and Schwartz (1997) distilled seems evident: it 
refers to Hofstede’s Individualism-Collectivism dimension. Apart from being 
statistically comparable with Schwartz’s Conservatism and Affective Autonomy it 
is conceptually similar to dimensions proposed by other researchers as well (see 
Table 4.1 at the end of this chapter for more details). The central issue behind this 
dimension is whether individual or group interests are stressed in a culture, and 
whether an individual, independent attitude is valued in a culture. For example, in 
cultures as is dominant in most western nations (see, e.g. Hofstede, 1984) persons 
are stimulated not only to pursue their own interests, but also to express their own 
feelings, motives, etc.. In a more group-oriented culture as Japan, on the other 
hand, the group is more important than the individual. Indeed, here individuals are 
expected to give priority to the interests, goals, etc. shared with the members of the 
group (e.g. family, friends, co-workers). As is discussed in the next chapter, 
differences in whether the individual or the group is emphasised influences the 
attributions people are likely to make.  
The second dimension emerging from the statistical analysis and conceptually 
shared with the theory-driven studies as well, includes those dimensions (e.g. 
Power Distance, Authority Ranking, Hierarchy versus Egalitarianism) that 
basically address the issue of power or equality. These dimensions cover the 
question whether social hierarchies are important in a culture and, hence, whether 
it is possible to identify a person that has more status, power or authority than 
another person. For example, in many Latin-oriented countries (e.g. Italy) the 
father is the head of the family and it is him who decides for the whole family, 
while it is expected that the other family members respect his point of view. On 
the other hand in, for example, the Netherlands, in which equality is more 
important, the other family members have, to a certain extent, a voice in decisions. 
The importance of equality in the Netherlands is also reflected by the fact that the 
Prime Minister is a primus inter pares among the rest of the Cabinet’s members. 
Other dimensions of the various researchers conceptually show similarities as 
well though statistically no relationships have been discovered. First of all, almost 
all studies, except for Trompenaars, addressed the importance of achievement in 
different cultures. In some cultures, as for example the American, free competition 
and achieving success are particularly important (e.g. Hofstede, 1984). 
Scarborough (1998: 16), for example, writes on the American culture: “Our 
achievement orientation makes us very goal-driven; we need to see some results 
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and compare them to a standard. Performance-based compensation thus appeals to 
us. We find breakthroughs exciting, but we have difficulty applying ourselves to 
undramatic and long-term endeavours like continuous improvement. We are 
materialistic not just in the value we place on possessions in and of themselves but 
as evidence of our adherence to and success in pursuing all these values. In this 
pursuit, we tend to neglect Hofstede’s feminine values of quality of life and human 
relationships.” In contrast, in Scandinavian countries and in the Netherlands as 
well, feminine values are emphasised: not achievement per se but good working 
conditions and relations are important. Furthermore, a more modest attitude is 
expected from people in these cultures (Hofstede, 1998).  
A dimension that is conceptually shared by several cross-cultural researchers 
as well involves the question how people cope with uncertainty. One option is that 
(detailed) rules have been formulated that should enable people to handle 
unknown, new situations. Another possibility is that hardly any rules, or only 
general guidelines have been formulated and people cope with uncertainty as they 
think is the most appropriate. This difference is for example reflected in the code 
versus common law system. In the first, which is typically found in Latin-oriented 
countries the legal system consists of all kinds of detailed rules. In case of 
common law, which is dominant in the Anglo-Saxon countries, written legal rules 
only provides general rules which judges apply to and interpret in the context of 
specific cases.  
Ideas about cultural differences with respect to time have been addressed in 
two studies. The ideas, however, are not completely comparable. Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck’s dimension “Time orientation” addresses whether people are oriented 
towards the past, present, or the future. The “Confucian work dynamism” of 
Hofstede (and Bond) asserts whether people are oriented towards the future in the 
long-term or have a more short-term perspective when they looked at the future. 
This difference is also reflected in Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner’s (1997) 
work on time in a cultural perspective. In both Hofstede’s and Trompenaars’ work 
it was found that the Americans are considerably shorter-term oriented than the 
Japanese. Indeed, a “consistent competitive advantage attributed to the Japanese is 
that of strategizing long-term. Their corporations persist, aiming for more growth 
than for profit, and fight for market share till others give up and withdraw” 
(Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1993: 135). International managers in a 
European management forum survey confirmed the difference in time-orientation 
of these nations. Whereas Japan was acknowledged to be the number-one country 
in which firms take a long-term view, the United States only ranked 19th (out of 
31) in the same survey. The Netherlands occupied a position between these two 
countries and ranked 10th (see Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1993).  
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3.3 Summary 
The intention of this chapter was, first, to discuss some important contributions to 
the cross-cultural psychological literature and, second, to investigate whether it is 
possible to capture a rather vague and broad concept as “culture” by a limited 
number of dimensions. We paid attention to the contributions of various 
researchers as Hofstede, Schwartz, and Parsons and Shils, who either empirically 
or theoretically deduced their cultural dimensions. The importance of their 
contributions is that they enable the operationalization of a country’s culture in 
terms of a number of dimensions. Largely, these dimensions have in common that 
they address basic human dilemmas or choices each human being is confronted 
with. Hence, these dimensions represent the essence of a culture. Although the 
various researchers labelled their dimensions somewhat differently, the 
comparison of the dimensions in section 3.2 “provide substantial encouragement 
for the view that there is considerable replicability in the results emerging from 
value surveys sampling relatively large numbers of nations” (Smith et al., 1996: 
259). In addition, the various dimensions are to a large extent conceptually 
comparable. Based upon the discussion in sections 3.1 and 3.2, it seems that it is 
possible to distinguish a limited number of “core” cultural dimensions, namely: 
1. Self-interest versus Group-interest. Basically this dimension addresses the 
dilemma “I” versus “we” (Hofstede, 1980). For example, in cultures where the 
self-interest is guiding, the person is seen as “an autonomous entity 
independent of groups” (Chen et al., 1998: 289). On the other hand, in 
collectivistic cultures where the group interest prevails, the person is defined 
in terms of “its connectedness to others in various in-groups” (Chen et al.,
1998: 289). This key cultural dimension also covers the importance of 
personal versus group goals and whether relationships are emphasised or not 
(Triandis, 1995; Chen et al., 1998). For example, Earley (1994: 89) comments 
that “in an individualistic [i.e. self-interested] culture, people look to their own 
actions to understand who they are, and these actions are relatively 
independent of others. In a collective [i.e. group-interested] culture, people 
base their self-understanding on the reactions of important others around 
them.” As a consequence, “individualists” [i.e. those with an emphasis on self-
interest] are more oriented toward task achievement, sometimes at the expense 
of relationships, whereas “collectivists” [i.e. those with an emphasis on group-
interest] put more emphasis on harmonious relationships, sometimes at the 
expense of task accomplishment” (Chen et al., 1998: 289). 
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2. Power versus Equality. This dimension asserts the importance of social 
hierarchies in a culture. Power-oriented societies tend to value differences in 
authority, status, and so on. In such cultures, the more powerful people have 
certain rights and prerogatives that the less powerful lack. Decision-making in 
such cultures is mainly top-down oriented. In equality-oriented cultures, on the 
other hand, social hierarchies are less important. In these societies it is not 
natural that a person has more power than others, just because he/she is older, 
belongs to a certain group, etc.. Furthermore, in such cultures, people strive at 
participation in decision-making. 
3. Importance of achievement (high versus low). This dimension considers the 
importance of masculine values as competition, success, and material rewards. 
In case societies do not consider achievement very important, the more 
feminine values as good relationships with colleagues, good working 
conditions, and friendship are more important. 
4. Importance of rules to cope with uncertainty (high versus low). There are 
nations who prefer to deal with uncertain situations by the formulation of all 
kinds of detailed rules. On the other hand, there are also societies that do not 
fear to deal with uncertainty and, as a consequence, only have some general 
rules that provide some guidance. 
5. Long-term versus Short-term orientation. This last core cultural dimension 
deals on the one hand with societies that show a preference for looking at the 
long-term and for which short-term effects are of lesser importance and those 
that focus more on obtaining short-term effects and partially loosing the long-
term out of sight. 
Before translating our two basic research questions into more concrete, 
testable propositions and discussing our research design in chapter 5, we first will 
address how culture affects the attributions people make in the next chapter. 
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4  Culture and people’s attributions  
“The richer rice ripens, the lower its head hangs” 1
So far we have paid attention to two topics. First of all, in chapter 2 we addressed 
the so-called “self-serving attributional bias.” This bias implies that people are 
inclined to explain outcomes of their own actions in a rather biased way. While 
they ascribe successes to their own efforts, failures are blamed on the 
environment. Extant research indicates that such bias is also present in CEOs’ 
explanations in the letter to the shareholders. For example, increasing profits are 
attributed to a strategy the board implemented a few years ago. Losses, on the 
other hand, are frequently blamed on something outside their control, e.g. general 
economic conditions. In the second part of that chapter we also explained such 
managerial behaviour from three different, yet complementary, perspectives. 
Notwithstanding the differences, in all three frameworks it is stressed that the 
letter to the shareholders has a symbolic function: the story contained in it is aimed 
at influencing people’s perceptions. The main reason why CEOs try to influence 
those perceptions is related to self-interest. Managers not only try to secure 
people’s contributions to the company (e.g. their investment), but there seems to 
be a more ulterior motive as well: it may impinge on their personal reputations 
and, more importantly, on (the justification of) the rewards they receive. The 
second topic we discussed concerned “culture.” In the previous chapter we saw 
how a complex phenomenon as culture may be captured by a limited number of 
cultural dimensions, thereby somewhat reducing its complexity. To that purpose, 
we covered various researchers’ cultural dimensions. Although not being perfectly 
identical with each other, the dimensions reflect similar ideas about basic beliefs 
and values. In that respect the dimensions represent the essence of cultures, and 
guide researchers when they want to compare different cultures. Based upon this 
comparison, we identified five “core” cultural dimensions which we labelled “self-
1 Old Japanese saying as quoted in Kameda (2001). This saying expresses Japanese 
humility: “Japanese people don't speak about their own abilities by themselves. Those who 
do, are avoided by others and may criticise such a person as “a man full of conceit”. Those 
who have achieved success usually talk of their success with much humility” (Kameda, 
2001: 144). 
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interest versus Group-interest”, “Power versus Equality”, “Importance of 
achievement”, “Importance of rules to cope with uncertainty”, and “Long-term 
versus Short-term orientation.” In this chapter we will integrate the knowledge on 
these two subjects and look at the influence of culture on self-serving attributional 
biases. In section 4.1 previous social-psychological research with respect to this 
subject is discussed. In section 4.2 we pay attention to the explanations provided 
for the differences found. As will be evident after reading this section, most of the 
explanations provided reflect underlying differences in importance of self-interest 
(or the individual) or group-interests. Section 4.3 summarises the chapter.  
4.1 Culture and attributional biases 
Although people across cultures do generally show a self-serving bias, research 
also indicates that there is a pervasive difference between western cultures 
(notably the United States) and eastern cultures (mostly Japan) (e.g. Fry and 
Ghosh, 1980; Chandler, Shama, Wolf and Planchard, 1981; Miller, 1984; Kashima 
and Triandis, 1986; Al-Zahrani and Kaplowitz, 1993; Morris and Peng, 1994; Yan 
and Gaier, 1994; Markus et al., 1996; Meijer, 1996; Kitayama et al., 1997; Lee 
and Seligman, 1997; Semin and Zwier, 1997; Zwier, 1998; Choi et al., 1999; 
Menon et al., 1999). All these studies, using different methods and subjects, 
arrived at the same, general conclusion: the self-serving bias was found more in 
western cultures than in eastern cultures. First, Americans are more than eastern 
subjects inclined to explain events in terms of dispositional factors, and typically 
when it involves successful outcomes. That is, Americans employ internal causes 
to a larger extent than people from the East to account for successful outcomes, 
also implying that people from eastern cultures are more modest in their 
attributions. On the other hand, people in eastern cultures are more inclined to 
assume personal responsibility for failures than Americans do: especially Japanese 
people, but Indian and Chinese as well, show self-deprecating tendencies (e.g. 
Kashima and Triandis, 1986; Yan and Gaier, 1994; Tuss et al., 1995; Meijer, 
1996; Kitayama et al., 1997; Lee and Seligman, 1997; Akimoto and Sanbonmatsu, 
1999). Below a short review of these studies is provided. 
Fry and Ghosh (1980) used white Canadian and Asian Indian Canadian 
children (between 8 and 11) in a laboratory experiment to test whether they 
differed with respect to the attributions they make. They found that the Asian-
Indian children were more modest in their attributions. Miller (1984, 1987), 
however, did not find differences in attributional patterns between young-aged 
subjects from the United States and India when she asked them to explain 
behaviour of an acquaintance they witnessed in everyday life (Morris and Peng, 
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1994). However, older subjects in her study showed the same pattern that Fry and 
Ghosh (1980) and others found. Morris and Peng (1994) put question marks with 
Miller’s methodology. They argue that her study has the drawback of confounding 
two possible sources of the effect: a difference between American and Indian 
subjects’ attribution processes and an objective difference in the actual causes of 
their acquaintances’ behaviour (1994: 952). In order to study whether the main 
finding that Americans are more dispositional in their attributions than Chinese 
are, they executed three studies (only the first two seem relevant for our research). 
In their first study among secondary school children, the subjects had to watch 
cartoon displays of social (e.g. the movement of a fish compared to a group) and 
psychical events (e.g. the movement of a ball) and report their causal perceptions 
(Morris and Peng, 1994: 953). Their second study consisted of comparing 
attributions for mass murders in newspapers serving American and Chinese 
communities in New York. One murder was committed by an American and 
another by a Chinese. Both studies confirmed that Americans, relatively speaking, 
overuse dispositional attributions, whereas the Chinese are inclined to explain 
events in terms of situational or contextual factors. Menon and her colleagues 
(1999) used a similar procedure that was more related to business scandals. One of 
the scandals involved the rogue trading by Nick Leeson that finally led to the 
collapse of Britain’s oldest bank, Barings. Comparison of the attributions for this 
scandal made in an American newspaper (The New York Times) and in a 
comparable Japanese one (Asahi Shimbun), showed the same pattern as Morris and 
Peng found. They found that the American newspaper referred more frequently to 
the individual than the organisation as the cause of the financial scandal. The 
Japanese newspaper, on the other hand, referred more to the organisation. 
In their studies Kashima and Triandis (1986), Meijer (1996), and Zwier (1998) 
asked respondents to explain their successes and failures. In the case of Kashima 
and Triandis (1986), American and Japanese students (all studying in the United 
States) were asked to explain their successes and failures in a difficult experiment 
in which they were asked to remember unfamiliar scenes from different countries. 
Afterwards the subjects were assigned to a success or failure group and were asked 
to explain their achievements using free responses. It appeared that Heider’s 
categories of ability, effort, task difficulty and luck could be used to classify the 
causes given. Furthermore, compared to the Japanese, the American subjects were 
more internal in their explanations of successes. Japanese subjects, on the other 
hand, showed “self-deprecating” biases: they ascribed failures more to themselves. 
Meijer (1996) and Meijer and Semin (1998) found similar results using Japanese 
and Dutch subjects. Zwier (1998) concentrated on differences in language use 
between the Netherlands and Turkey (also in a more natural context, namely sports 
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commentators during a soccer match between the Dutch and Turkish national 
teams). In both the experimental and natural context, she found that the Dutch 
subjects drew a more dispositional picture of the person while the Turkish subjects 
drew a more contextual picture of the person (Zwier, 1998: 120). However, 
contrary to the previous studies, she did not find self-serving or modesty biases 
when people were asked to attribute social events (e.g. completing the sentence “A 
trusts B, because …”). Zwier (1998: 121) suggests that maybe the self-serving and 
modesty bias are limited to the explanation of achievement-related events, rather 
than generalising to social events in general (also because in her second study, that 
of explanations provided by sports commentators, such a bias was found).2
Other biases we discussed in section 2.2 are culturally determined as well. 
Despite its robustness in Western settings (e.g. Gilbert and Malone, 1995; Choi et 
al., 1999), the actor-observer effect seems to be less present in the Japanese 
culture. Instead, the pattern seems to be reversed (Yamauchi, 1988; Markus and 
Kitayama, 1991; Meijer and Semin, 1998), making the comment that perhaps 
some extra-terrestrials may be free from actor-observer differences (Choi et al.,
1999: 47) sound even more ironic. The same may be true for the fundamental 
attribution error. The results of the studies by, e.g. Miller (1984), Cousins (1989), 
Shweder and Bourne (1991), and Morris and Peng (1994) indicate that the 
fundamental attribution error is particularly present in Western cultures where 
people have an independent view of the self (see below) (Markus and Kitayama, 
1991). Hence, it is not surprising that Pfeffer (1997: 130) comments that the 
degree to which people have a romanticised conception of leadership—which in 
section 2.2.1 we saw was related to the fundamental attribution error—varies 
across cultures and that it may be more relevant in individualistic, western 
societies. 
The main conclusion from the review of the literature is that western and 
eastern cultures show different attributional patterns: whereas Americans in 
general use self-enhancing and self-protecting attributions, Japanese people are 
2 To be more precise: she found among the Dutch and Belgian commentators the so-called 
group-serving bias, that states that people tend to favour the members of their in-group 
over the members of out-groups (Zwier, 1998: 46). Otherwise stated this bias implies that 
people have a tendency of making internal attributions for the in-group’s success and the 
out-group’s failure, while on the other hand they prefer to explain the in-group’s failure 
and the out-group’s success in terms of external factors (Semin and Zwier, 1997). In her 
study, Zwier (1998) found that the Dutch and Belgian commentators when describing the 
negative behaviours of the Turks used more abstract, i.e. dispositional, terms than when 
they described their positive behaviours. The Turkish commentators, however, showed a 
reversed pattern in describing the behaviour of Turkish football players. 
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more modest and even self-deprecating in their attributions of achievement-related 
outcomes. This indicates that people in western nations tend to use a more 
optimistic attributional style, whereas people in eastern nations use a more 
pessimistic style (Lee and Seligman, 1997), a finding that is quite robust (Heine 
and Lehman, 1997; Choi et al., 1999; Menon et al., 1999). Although cross-cultural 
research in social psychology has concentrated on the differences between western 
and eastern cultures, there is also some evidence that among eastern and western 
cultures differences in attributional patterns exist (e.g. Forgas, Furham and Frey, 
1988; Nurmi, 1992; Bornstein et al., 1998; for western evidence, and Chandler et
al., 1981; Crittenden and Bae, 1994; for eastern evidence). Especially Nurmi’s 
(1992) study is worthwhile mentioning. His results showed a consistent cross-
cultural difference in causal attributions: American students tended to use self-
serving attribution bias to a greater extent than Finnish students did. However, the 
Finnish subjects still showed a tendency to use self-serving attributions (Nurmi, 
1992). In addition, Nurmi refers to a study by Cohen, Van den Bout, Kramer, and 
Van Vliet (1986) in which Dutch and American subjects were compared in a 
similar experiment. Comparing these two studies Nurmi found that the mean 
scores of the Finnish sample for internality, stability, and globality after good 
outcomes were almost identical to those for the Dutch sample. However, the 
scores concerning bad outcomes were even higher for the Finnish than those for 
the Dutch. This finding indicates that of the three cultural groups, the Finnish 
sample tended to show the lowest level of self-serving bias (Nurmi, 1992: 74). 
4.2 Explaining cultural differences in self-serving biases 
The main lesson to be learned from the preceding is that compared to western 
societies, people in eastern societies, and notably Japan, are more modest and self-
deprecating when they offer attributions for their behaviour. In this section we will 
address the explanations that are offered to account for these cultural differences 
in attributional behaviour. A review of the relevant literature tells us that three 
issues seem to be of importance (see also Tsang, 2002). First, cultural differences 
in the construal of the self, and second, differences in communication styles (e.g. 
Gudykunst and Nishida, 1986; Triandis, 1989, 1995; Markus and Kitayama, 1991, 
1994; Gudykunst, Matsumoto, and Ting-Toomey, 1996; Gudykunst and Kim 
(1997); Kagitçibasi, 1997; Semin and Zwier, 1997; Zwier, 1998) are often used to 
explain it. In addition, also considerations about (loss of) “face” may be an 
important factor that can bring about differences between nations. 
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Construal of the self 3
The construal of the self defines how we perceive ourselves vis-à-vis others and, 
hence, will determine the nature of individual experiences, including cognition, 
emotion, and motivation (Markus and Kitayama, 1991, 1994). Therefore, it has 
been suggested that differences in construal of the self also affect people’s 
attributional styles. 
 In an influential paper, Markus and Kitayama (1991, 1994) proposed that there 
are cultural differences in the construal of the self. They argued that on the one 
hand there is an independent construal of the self and on the other hand an 
interdependent construal of the self. These different construals are reflections of 
the Individualism-Collectivism distinction (Triandis, 1989, 1995; Markus and 
Kitayama, 1991, 1994; Kagitçibasi, 1997; Zwier, 1998): the independent view is 
typical for individualistic countries, such as the United States and the northern 
European countries. The interdependent view on the other hand is dominant in 
collectivistic nations, such as Japan, Latin America and southern European 
countries.4 The independent construal dictates that a person is independent from 
others and the emphasis is on the expression of one’s unique attributes. According 
to Markus and Kitayama (1991: 226) an essential aspect of this construal is that 
the self is seen as an autonomous, independent person. Elaborating on the 
independent view of the self, Fiske et al. (1998: 920) note that the following 
features of a person are emphasised: the person is a bounded, coherent, stable, 
autonomous, “free” entity. In addition, in this model of the self, independent 
“success” and “achievement” play a central role in goal-formulation, decision-
making, and interpersonal communication (Fiske et al., 1998). In contrast, in the 
interdependent construal of the self, the person is regarded as not separate from 
the social context but as more connected to and less differentiated from others 
(Markus and Kitayama, 1991: 227). Hence, the interdependent view of the self 
implies that the self is viewed as variable and in principle dependent on the 
influence from social contexts and relationships (Zwier, 1998: 8). This also 
3 The “construal of the self” mainly seems suitable to explain differences in attributional 
patterns between eastern, southern European, and Latin American countries on the one 
hand and Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries on the other. However, as Nurmi’s (1992) 
study revealed, there are also differences within these regions, e.g. the Netherlands/Finland 
versus the United States. Maybe here the distinction Masculinity–Femininity (Hofstede) or 
Mastery–Harmony (Schwartz) is more apt to study these within-region differences. 
Supporting this expectation is Smith et al.’s (1995) finding that people’s locus of control 
correlates with Schwartz’s Harmony-Mastery dimension. 
4 E.g., Heine (1996) and Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, and Nisbett (1998) stress that although 
both the independent as well as the interdependent construal of the self may be found in all 
cultures, some cultures emphasise one construal more than the other. 
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implies that social relationships, roles, norms, and group solidarity are more 
fundamental and more valued than self-expression (Fiske et al., 1998: 922). In this 
interdependent model of the self, harmony with the collectivity seem particularly 
important. Therefore, it is not surprising that a person evaluates life with reference 
to collective needs and one’s contributions to them.5
 Differences in the view of the self have implications for people’s verbal 
behaviours (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Si, Rethorst and Willimczik, 1995; 
Zwier, 1998) and their definition of self-esteem (Markus and Kitayama, 1991, 
1994; Nurmi, 1992; Yan and Gaier, 1994; Meijer, 1996; Heine and Lehman, 1997; 
Kagitçibasi, 1997; Kitayama et al., 1997; Heine, Lehman, Markus and Kitayama, 
1999; Heine, Takata and Lehman, 2000; Heine, Kitayama and Lehman, 2001). As 
the focus in the independent view of the self is on one’s own person it is logical 
that outcomes are explained in dispositional terms (e.g. Miller; 1984; Cousins, 
1989; Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Al-Zahrani and Kaplowitz, 1993; Morris and 
Peng, 1994; Lee, Hallahan and Herzog, 1996; Heine and Lehman, 1997; Zwier, 
1998). In addition, self-esteem in individualistic countries requires that one’s 
uniqueness is emphasized and that inner attributes are expressed (Markus and 
Kitayama, 1991: 242; 1994). This will lead to self-serving behaviour. In 
collectivistic countries, on the other hand, the focus is on the social context in 
which one is operating. Therefore, situational or contextual attributions are 
expected. Besides, stimulating self-esteem is achieved in a different way than in 
individualistic countries. Markus and Kitayama (1991: 242, 1994) note that 
positive feelings about the self should derive from fulfilling the tasks associated 
with being interdependent with relevant others: belonging, fitting in, occupying 
one’s proper place, engaging in appropriate action, promoting others’ goals, and 
maintaining harmony. Hence in these nations there is a “collective self-esteem” 
(Kagitçibasi, 1997; Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990). Regarding previous comments it 
should not be surprising that self-enhancement or self-promotion are perceived 
negatively in the Japanese culture as a study by Yoshida, Kojo and Kaku (1982; 
5 Triandis (1989) and Kagitçibasi (1997) presented related conceptions of the self. Triandis 
(1989) made the distinction between the private and the collective view of the self. In the 
private view traits, states, or behaviour regarding the self are stressed. On the other hand, 
in the collective view the self is embedded in a collective in-group, such as family or 
friends (see also Zwier, 1998). Although in all cultures both the private and collective view 
are found, Triandis (1989) argues that in individualistic nations the private view will 
dominate, whereas the collective view will prevail in collectivistic cultures. Markus and 
Kitayama (1991), that received empirical support by Singelis and Brown (1995), have a 
similar opinion regarding their independent and interdependent construals of the self. 
Kagitçibasi’s (1997) distinction between the “Relational Self” and “Separated Self” is very 
similar to the proposals by Markus and Kitayama and Triandis. 
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quoted in Markus and Kitayama, 1991) has indicated. In these cultures modesty is 
the norm. Indeed, Kitayama et al. (1997) argued that the fact that people in eastern 
societies are more sensitive to negative self-relevant information than people from 
western cultures, does not imply that they are low(er) in self-esteem (see also 
Akimoto and Sanbonmatsu, 1999 and Heine et al., 1999, 2000, 2001). However, 
being prone to such information and using it, has positive consequences in eastern 
cultures: it serves to affirm one’s belongingness to a group and can be seen as part 
of a strategy of self-improvement (Meijer and Semin, 1998: 17; Heine et al., 1999, 
2000, 2001). Such self-critical orientation seems typical for Japanese people. 
According to Heine (1996: 13) “Japanese feel that they need to be particularly 
vigilant of, and sensitive to, information indicating their shortcomings or their 
incompleteness—areas upon which they must work harder to improve. From a 
young age, Japanese are taught to reflect upon their weaknesses (hansei suru) and 
to focus upon how they can improve themselves.” Therefore, it may be argued that 
modesty and self-deprecating tendencies typically found in the Japanese culture is 
the result of a consideration of others. That is, following Meijer and Semin (1998: 
15), the Japanese seem to make sure not to deny others’ contribution to a success, 
and save their face (see below) by not blaming them in any way for a failure, also 
because blaming others would disrupt harmony in a relationship (Meijer and 
Semin, 1998).  
Communication styles 
The way people communicate, i.e. their communication style, is influenced by 
their cultural background. In fact, it is argued that communication and culture 
reciprocally influence each other (Gudykunst, 1997: 327). Whereas in the past the 
influence of culture on communication was largely ignored, nowadays there is an 
increased attention for this subject (e.g. Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey, 1988) 
although there is still much to be learned (Zwier, 1998). 
One of the most important efforts to study the influence of culture on 
communication was Hall (1977). Hall suggested that in order to understand the 
messages people convey, the context is an important aspect that has to be taken 
into consideration, because without the context the code (i.e. a verbal message) is 
incomplete (Hall, 1977: 86). Hall reasoned that the importance of the context in 
communication varies across cultures. He distinguished high-context and low-
context communication cultures, although admitting that each culture has elements 
of both. Following Hall (1977: 91) a high-context communication or message is 
one in which most of the information is either in the psychical context or 
internalised in the person, while very little is in the coded, explicit part of the 
message. Zwier (1998) characterises this high-context style as indirect, implicit, 
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and affective (see also Gudykunst et al., 1996; Morris et al., 1998).6 A low-context 
communication is according to Hall (1977: 91) just the opposite; i.e. the major part 
of the information is vested in the explicit code. Therefore, it can be characterised 
as a direct, explicit and instrumental communication style (Zwier, 1998; see also 
Gudykunst et al., 1996; Morris et al., 1998). Following Gudykunst and Ting-
Toomey (1988), Erez and Earley (1993), and Singelis and Brown (1995) it appears 
that in individualistic countries, e.g. the United States and most of north-western 
Europe, the use of low-context communication styles predominates. In 
collectivistic countries, e.g. Japan, southern European and Latin American 
countries, however, the high-context communication style is more apparent.  
Ehrenhaus (1983) relates Hall’s variations in context to attributional styles. He 
argues that members of high-context cultures are attributionally sensitive and 
predisposed toward situational features and situationally based explanations. 
Members of low-context cultures, on the other hand, are attributionally sensitive to 
and predisposed towards dispositional characteristics and dispositionally based 
explanations (1983: 263). In addition, it also seems that in high-context culture, 
e.g. Japan, people in high positions are more prepared to accept responsibility for a 
failure than similar people from low-context cultures, such as the United States 
and the Netherlands (Hall, 1977). In the latter case, a lower-ranked scapegoat is 
frequently offered us: Oliver North in the Contras-Irangate scandal is only one 
well-known example underscoring this.7
Face
A third factor, though related to those previously discussed, that may explain 
cross-cultural differences in attributions is “face.” Face, a concept originating from 
6 Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey (1988) and Triandis (1994) say about these characteristics: 
Direct–Indirect style. The extent senders of messages reveal their intentions through 
explicit verbal communication. 
Affective–Instrumental style. Affective verbal style is receiver-oriented language usage, 
whereas the instrumental verbal style is sender-oriented. 
7 Finally, Triandis (1994: 184-185) also points to several important differences in 
communication styles between individualistic (or low-context) and collectivistic (or high-
context) cultures. First, in individualistic cultures the focus is on the communicator, also 
evidenced by the fact that the word “I” is used frequently. In these cultures, attributes as 
credibility, intelligence, and expert knowledge are important. On the other hand, in 
collectivistic cultures, the focus to a larger extent is on the receiver. In addition, the word 
“we”, stressing interdependency, is also emphasised, whereas ambiguity, subjectivity, 
generality, and vagueness in communication is also more common. This could indicate that 
the use of accounting-technical language (Aerts, 1991, 1994) would be even more 
prevalent in these cultures than it is in an individualistic culture such as Belgium. 
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Chinese (Hu, 1944; Ho, 1976; Cocroft and Ting-Toomey, 1994; Earley, 1997)8,
basically refers to the positive public image a person claims for himself (Lim, 
1994: 210). Face is associated with issues as respect, honour, reputation, 
credibility, competence, loyalty, trust, relational indebtedness, and trust (Ting-
Toomey, 1988: 190).9 The different conceptualisations of face notwithstanding, all 
researchers seem to stress three characteristics of face (Lim, 1994; Earley, 1997). 
First, face is public not private. Second, it is a projected image that not necessarily 
has to be in line with public’s expectations. Third, face is related to positive social 
values. Furthermore, it seems that although face is important in all cultures, the 
content of face and people’s ways of managing face, e.g. by the use of the self-
presentational techniques discussed in chapter 2, is influenced by cultural 
differences.10,11 This view is clearly expressed by Hallahan, Lee and Herzog 
8 As indicated by, e.g. Cocroft and Ting-Toomey (1994) and Earley (1997), and Hu (1944) 
and Ho (1976) before them, “face” has two different conceptualisations in Chinese. These 
two are lien or lian on the one hand and mien-tzu or mianzi on the other. From their 
discussions it seems that lien is that part of face that is related to a person’s behaviour 
regarding society’s norms and values; a loss of which cannot easily be recovered (Earley, 
1997). Mien-tzu, however, is that part of face that is derived from a person’s position; 
according to Earley (1997) a CEO of a large multinational has a lot of mien-tzu compared 
to an administrative clerk of that same company. What is important is that they can exist 
separately: Michael Milken, the “junk bond king” of the 1980’s, may have recovered some 
of his mien-tzu (reputation), but not his lien, as people still question his underlying values 
and motives (Earley, 1997: 65). Furthermore, it seems that research so far has concentrated 
on mien-tzu. For a more elaborate discussion of the Chinese conceptualisation of face, we 
refer to Ho (1944) and Hu (1976), and Earley (1997). 
9 It seems that there are cross-cultural differences in the concept of face. Whereas in the 
Japanese stress issues as honour, pride, claimed self-image, respect extended by others, 
and dignity, Americans tend to stress credibility, self-respect, individual reputation, 
recognised personal worth, and status (Morisaki and Gudykunst, 1994; Markus et al.,
1996). The influence of the Individualism-Collectivism construct is apparent.
10 However, it might be that face is more important in Eastern cultures (Erez and Earley, 
1993; Tsang, 2002). This is also evidenced by findings of the Chinese Culture Connection 
(1987) showing that countries as China and Japan scored high on their “Confucian work 
dynamism”. This dimensions comprised issues such as “having sense of shame”, “personal 
steadiness”, and “protecting face”. See Imahori and Cupach (1994) for empirical evidence 
regarding cross-cultural differences in the management of face. 
11 Regarding the relationship between “face” and impression management or self-
presentation, Earley (1997: 53) remarks: “A large literature on the topic of impression 
management has emerged in the West that is related to face. Although the emphasis of this 
literature is generally on mianzi and not lian (particularly given that impression 
management refers to an active manipulation in order to shape others’ view of oneself), it 
is useful to note that many of the strategies and tactics used in managing impressions have 
application to face and facework. For instance, Tedeschi and Riess (1981a, b) discuss 
79
(1997: 769) who state that face may be a universal human need, because all people 
from whichever culture are concerned with how they are perceived by others, as 
well as they are concerned with protecting others from losing face. 
In this context Ting-Toomey proposed an interesting model. She uses Brown 
and Levinson’s (1978) ideas on politeness as her primary point of departure. 
Following these authors, she makes a distinction between “positive” and 
“negative” face. Negative face refers to a person’s desire for autonomy (i.e. the 
right to do as one wishes) and claim to territories. Positive face is the desire for 
approval and the desire to be appreciated and accepted by others. In other words, 
negative facework emphasises the need for dissociation. Positive facework, on the 
other hand, emphasises the need for association (Ting-Toomey, 1988: 216). Apart 
from face-need, Ting-Toomey also addresses the issue of face-concern to develop 
a cultural theory on face. Face-concern involves the distinction between self and 
other face; i.e. it is related to the extent to which one is sensitive to other people’s 
face in managing a person’s own face. Using these two aspects of face, the 
distinction individualism and collectivism, and Hall’s communication dimension, 
Ting-Toomey arrives at a number of propositions regarding the cultural variability 
of the management of face. From these propositions it seems that in 
individualistic, low-context communication cultures, such as the United States, 
people are especially concerned with their own face and, in addition, show a 
negative face-need. On the other hand, in Japan, a collectivistic, low-context 
communication culture, people are more concerned with other face and tend to 
seek approval (i.e. have a positive face-need).12 Morisaki and Gudykunst’s (1994) 
ideas on independent, which predominates in individualistic cultures, and 
interdependent face are very similar to Ting-Toomey’s ideas. Furthermore, these 
authors (1994: 78) assert that there may be differences in time frame: whereas 
people from individualistic cultures are concerned with short-term or immediate 
several reasons why people engage in impression management, such as social role-playing 
in symbolic interaction, avoiding blame and gaining credit, maintaining self-esteem, 
controlling power and social influence, and creating a connotative impression (e.g. 
evaluation and potency) for instrumental value. Throughout this literature, impression 
management and self-presentation are discussed as ways for a person to maintain and 
manipulate a positive self-image power similar to the outcome of acquiring mianzi”.
12 Recently, Ting-Toomey and Kurogi (1998), hypothesised on the influence of power 
distance on facework. They note that in cultures with small power distance, one’s personal 
rights will be reflected in the management of face. On the other hand, in large power 
distance cultures, it is important to carry out one’s ascribed duties responsibly, which may 
imply that other face is particularly important (Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998). These 
authors also discuss the influence of this dimension on facework by members with 
differences in status. 
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face-management, people from collectivistic cultures are concerned with long-
term face-management. What is stressed in both Ting-Toomey’s (1988) and 
Morisaki and Gudykunst’s (1994) ideas is that Japanese people perceive face (and 
the self) to be interrelated with others (Cocroft and Ting-Toomey, 1994: 499).  
These cultural differences in face (and self, as previously discussed) also have 
consequences for the attributions people make. In a “classic” work, Lebra stresses 
the importance of a balance between humility and dignity in the Japanese culture, 
also implying that face-enhancing strategies, e.g. self-enhancing attributions, are 
generally speaking not culturally approved (1976: 129; see also Heine et al., 1999, 
2000, 2001). She comments that self-praise or boasting (jiman) is irreconcilable 
with modesty and humility and is strongly disapproved by a large part of the 
Japanese (1976: 127). Indeed, self-praise or standing out from the group may be 
perceived as an asocial strategy and would threaten harmony (Cocroft and Ting-
Toomey, 1994; Heine and Lehman, 1995). Therefore, presenting oneself as 
comparable to others, i.e. seeing oneself as average, would be a strategy that is 
culturally acceptable in Japan to a larger extent than self-enhancement (Heine and 
Lehman, 1995).13 The use of self-protecting attributions, e.g. blaming others for an 
unsuccessful result also runs counter to the importance of concern for other 
people’s face and may disrupt harmony (Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998).14
4.3 Summary 
The main objective of this chapter was to review social-psychological and cross-
cultural literature on cultural differences in attributional biases. From this review it 
is apparent that we can contrast western and eastern nations when studying 
attributional biases. Extant research shows that the American and Japanese differ 
with respect to the explanations they provide for achievement-related outcomes. 
13 In their seminal work on culture and the self, Markus and Kitayama indicate that the 
“exact nature of these modesty, self-effacing, or other-enhancing biases has yet to be 
specified. Perhaps those from interdependent cultures have simply learned that humility is 
the desired response, or the culturally appropriate response, and that it is wise not to gloat 
over their performance or to express confidence in their ability. This interpretation implies 
that the modesty biases observed in the studies […] are primarily the result of impression 
management and that the subjects involved actually could have held different, perhaps 
opposite, beliefs about themselves and their ability. However, it is also possible that these 
other-enhancement biases reflect, or are accompanied by, psychologically authentic self-
perceptions” (1991: 244). 
14 Ting-Toomey and Kurogi (1998: 192) remark that individualists, when their face is 
threatened, tend to use situational accounts to save face. Collectivists, on the other hand, 
tend to use negative internal dispositional accounts when their face is threatened. 
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Most important is the finding that the self-serving attributional bias—frequently 
found in the United States—is not commonly employed by Japanese people. 
Indeed, when Japanese explain successful outcomes they, compared to Americans, 
exhibit fewer and weaker self-enhancing biases. That is, they refer more to 
external causes than Americans do to explain those successes. In case of failures 
the Japanese are more self-deprecating in their explanations than the Americans. 
That is, they are to a larger extent inclined to assume personal responsibility for 
those failures. Other attributional biases seem to be less universal as well: neither 
actor-observer differences nor the fundamental attribution error could be replicated 
perfectly when Japanese subjects were used. Apart from differences between 
eastern and western cultures, there is also some, though less extensive, evidence of 
differences within those regions. For example, a study with Finnish and American 
subjects showed that the Finnish subject showed less self-serving tendencies than 
their American counterparts did (although the bias was still present).  
 The explanations used to account for this pervasive difference between eastern 
and western cultures all seem to be a reflection of one of the “core” cultural 
dimensions. More specifically, differences in construal of the self, in 
communication styles and in importance of face, all reflect differences with 
respect to “Self-interest vs Group-interest.” Whereas in the United States, “the 
cultural mandate is for individuals to be adequate, competent, and self-sufficient, 
[…] the cultural mandate in Japan is for individuals to achieve a sense of 
interpersonal harmony and connection with others” (Heine, 1996: 5-6). An 
important consequence of this difference in orientation is that the value of self-
enhancement and self-protection is, at least, questionable in the Japanese culture. 
In contrast, both “would only weaken the solidarity of the group” (Heine, 1996: 
32). Whereas differences related to self-interest versus group-interest are able to 
explain differences in self-serving biases between the East and the West, the 
dimension “Importance of achievement” seems more apt to explain differences 
within regions (and the western countries in particular). In the next chapter we 
will, among others, formulate our expectations regarding cultural differences in 
self-serving attributional biases in the letter to the shareholders. 

5  Research design 
“Accounting cannot be isolated and analysed as an independent 
component of culture. It is, like mankind and other social institutions, 
a product of culture and contributes to the evolution of the culture 
which employs it. Since accounting is culturally determined, other 
cultural customs, beliefs, and institutions influence it” 1
In the first chapter of this study, we formulated the two basic research questions of 
this study. As you may recall these questions were as follow: 
1. Do managers show self-serving biases to explain organisational outcomes in 
the letter to the shareholders? And if so, what organisational and/or 
situational factors explain differences in the extent of self-serving biases? 
2. Do differences exist in the self-serving attributional bias as may be present in 
the letter to the shareholders of companies originating from different cultures, 
and if so, how can we explain these?
In this chapter we use the literature discussed so far to translate our two basic 
questions into more concrete, testable propositions. The propositions derived in 
this chapter represent our expectations with respect to self-serving attributional 
tendencies in letters to the shareholders and the influence of culture thereon. 
Section 5.1 is devoted entirely to this exercise. The research method used and 
composition of the sample are addressed in section 5.2. 
5.1 Formulation of research propositions 
Self-serving attributional biases in general 
As was covered in chapter 2, extant evidence indicates that, people in general, use 
self-serving explanations to account for achievement-related outcomes. That is, 
they are inclined to attribute favourable outcomes to themselves, whereas negative 
outcomes are blamed on the environment (that is to factors beyond their control). 
1 Violet (1983). 
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Different studies have consistently found evidence of this bias in letters to the 
shareholders as well. Researchers as Bettman and Weitz (1983), Staw et al.
(1983), Salancik and Meindl (1984), and Clapham and Schwenk (1990) report that 
favourable corporate outcomes are more likely to be attributed to company 
strategy and effort, while unfavourable outcomes are often attributed to 
environmental causes as inflation, the weather, or governmental policy. Also in 
Aerts’ (1994) study of Belgian letters a self-enhancing bias is found, though he 
does not find Belgian managers merely blaming circumstances outside their 
control for disappointing organisational outcomes.  Although we cannot 
completely ignore cognitive factors, it seems that motivational factors “provide the 
initial trigger” (Aerts and Theunisse, 2000: 3) for such behaviour (see also Kunda, 
1990; Brown, 1997; Johns, 1999). In section 2.4 we saw that “images” and 
“impressions” are important motivating factors for managers to engage in self-
serving explanatory behaviour. In support of this view Aerts (2001: 3-4) argued 
that “[a]rgumentation patterns in annual report narratives can be conceptualised as 
being part of a set of symbolic activities engaged in by management in order to 
affect the company’s public image and reputation.” More specifically, this 
symbolic management perspective advances that “the meaning of organisational 
events is provided in large part by top management” (Ginzel et al., 1993: 236). 
The explanations provided in the letter to the shareholders are one important way 
to accomplish that task and in that sense represent “top management’s construal of 
an event” (Ginzel et al., 1993: 236). Management may use this opportunity to 
explain organisational outcomes in self-serving ways: in case of positive outcomes 
they may try to bolster the corporate (and personal) image, whereas in case of 
negative outcomes they may try to minimise blame and subsequent repercussions. 
Indeed, as is advanced in agency theory, managers not only are motivated to act in 
self-serving manners, because of uncertainty and asymmetric information they are 
actually able to do so (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Abrahamson 
and Park, 1994). According to Ginzel et al. (1993: 233) there may often be 
“considerable uncertainty [...] whether a particular event constitutes a success or a 
failure. Changes in financial performance, for example, can have ambiguous 
implications for an organisational image. In the early 1980s, CEO Lee Iaccoca 
claimed that Chrysler’s quarterly losses were a success because they were far 
lower than had occurred in prior quarters, suggesting a turnaround was in the 
making.” Furthermore, and adding to the problem, it is often difficult, not only for 
managers themselves but for the stakeholders as well, to disentangle managerial 
and environmental origins of performance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Walsh and Seward, 
1990; Stiles and Taylor, 2001). The preceding discussion suggests that managers 
are motivated and, at least to a certain extent, able to construct their views of the 
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organisation’s reality in self-serving manners, leading to the following 
propositions: 
Proposition 1–Self-enhancement: Generally speaking, managers claim 
responsibility for positive organisational outcomes (successes) in letters to the 
shareholders. That is, the number of internal-positive causal statements (IP) is 
larger than the number of external-positive statements (EP) in a letter to the 
shareholders. 
Proposition 2–Self-protection: Generally speaking, managers deny 
responsibility for negative organisational outcomes (failures) in letters to the 
shareholders. That is, the number of external-negative causal statements (EN) 
is larger than the number of internal-negative causal statements (IN) in a 
letter to the shareholders. 
Cultural differences in self-serving attributional biases  
So far we have formulated our expectations with respect to the use of self-serving 
attributions in letters to the shareholders in general. Another important element of 
this study concerns possible cultural differences therein. Whereas previous 
management and accounting research has addressed the first issue, the cultural 
aspect remained unaddressed so far. In fact, the idea of culture influencing 
financial reporting is, relatively speaking, of a recent date. Indeed, most of the 
work on this subject started to appear after the publication of Hofstede’s Culture’s 
consequences. Particularly Gray (1988) “was a pioneering paper in the 
development of the idea that culture might influence accounting practices” 
(Chanchani and MacGregor, 1999: 5). Very briefly stated, Gray proposed that 
apart from institutional factors as legal system, capital market influences, 
corporate governance structures, etc., cultural or societal values also affect a 
country’s accounting system (see Chanchani and MacGregor, 1999 for a review). 
He argued that societal values, as represented by Hofstede’s dimensions, are 
reflected in the values of the accounting profession, which constitutes a subset of a 
country. Gray distinguished four accounting values, namely: professionalism-
statutory control, uniformity-flexibility, conservatism-optimism, and secrecy-
transparency. The first three accounting values are irrelevant for this research as 
they deal with the technical side of accounting. That is, they deal with the figures 
of financial reporting, i.e. valuation methods and determination of profits. 
However, his ideas with regard to secrecy-transparency are more relevant for this 
research project as it deals with the amount of information disclosed in financial 
reports. The dimension reflects a preference for either confidentiality and the 
restriction of information to those who are closely involved with company’s 
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management and financing, or for a more transparent, open and publicly 
accountable approach. In his theory, Gray proposed a number of relationships 
between his accounting and Hofstede’s cultural values—of which he expected 
individualism and uncertainty avoidance to exert the strongest influence. 
According to Gray, secrecy (implying less disclosure of financial information in a 
company’s report) is negatively related to individualism and masculinity, while 
being positively influenced by uncertainty avoidance and power distance.2 As 
Gray’s ideas were largely exploratory, other researchers have subsequently 
attempted to empirically validate them. Most of the validation efforts concentrated 
on Gray’s propositions with respect to secrecy-transparency (Doupnik and Salter, 
1995; Gray and Vint, 1995; Riahi-Belkaoui, 1995; Zarzeski, 1996; Jaggi and Low, 
2000). The results of these studies confirm that secrecy is, at least partially, 
influenced by culture: the amount of disclosure is negatively affected by 
uncertainty avoidance and positively by individualism. However, no 
straightforward relationship could be demonstrated with respect to the influence of 
the two other value dimensions. Nevertheless, there seems to be a relationship 
between the nature of the information disclosed and the degree of masculinity. It 
appears that companies in Anglo-Saxon, masculine countries will disclose more 
financially oriented information. On the other hand, companies in the Nordic, 
feminine countries are more likely to disclose socially oriented information. Apart 
2 The arguments behind these relationships are as follow. The argument that individualism 
negatively influences secrecy is that “individualistic societies are less likely to have 
developed large closely-held companies and are likely to be less dependent on banking 
relationships for capital. Because there are relatively less secretive business relationships 
in an individualistic society, its companies are more likely to exhibit higher levels of public 
investor-oriented information” (Zarzeski, 1996: 27). Uncertainty avoidance, on the other 
hand, negatively affects the amount of disclosure, because in societies with strong 
uncertainty avoidance there is “a need to restrict information disclosures so as to avoid 
conflict and competition and to preserve security” (Gray, 1988: 11). Power distance, as 
well, seems to negatively affect disclosure. In high power distance societies inequality and 
authority are important. In order to preserve the unequal distribution of power it is likely 
that the provision of information is limited. With regard to the influence of masculinity on 
secrecy contradictory ideas have been presented, which may be the result of 
inconsistencies between Gray’s hypothesis regarding the relationship secrecy-masculinity 
and the argument leading to that hypothesis (Chanchani and MacGregor, 1999). However, 
a positive relationship seems to be most likely, that is “societies which are more assertive 
and success oriented could exhibit a tendency towards more publicity” (Gray and Vint, 
1995: 36). Zarzeski (1996: 27) remarks with respect to this relationship: “masculine 
countries are likely to be growth-oriented, economically and otherwise. Such countries are 
more likely to advocate business relationships and institutions that foster growth activities. 
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from culture, there are other factors, such as type of financing system (usually 
opposing the Anglosaxon equity-system with the German and Japanese credit-
based systems) that drive disclosure as well (Doupnik and Salter, 1995; Salter and 
Niswander, 1995; Zarzeski, 1996; Nobes, 1998; Jaggi and Low, 2000).  
The previous discussion provided some indication of cultural variability in 
accounting. However, as our study deals with self-serving attributions in letters to 
the shareholders, social and cross-cultural psychology specifically provide 
important information. As was covered in chapter 4, since the beginning of the 
Nineties there has been an increased attention for the influence of culture on the 
way people explain outcomes. The increased attention is noticeable by the 
increasing number of social-psychological articles addressing possible differences 
between people from the West—and the United States in particular—and from the 
East—i.e. Japan. By and large, scholars found a difference between Japanese and 
Americans subjects. Although it seems that people from both cultures are not 
completely free from self-serving biases, various studies indicate that the self-
serving bias is more prevalent in western cultures than in eastern cultures (e.g. 
Miller, 1984; Morris and Peng, 1994; Markus et al., 1996; Meijer, 1996; Kitayama 
et al., 1997; Semin and Zwier, 1997; Zwier, 1998; Choi et al., 1999; Menon et al.,
1999). To be more precise, it seems that Americans, compared to Japanese, are 
both more self-enhancing and self-protecting. A number of different studies (as 
reviewed in chapter 4) reveal that Japanese take into account external factors when 
explaining successes they achieved and accept personal blame if an outcome was 
disappointing. Researchers from the social-psychological field have used the 
concept of individualism-collectivism as a key determinant of how culture might 
affect self-serving attributions. Basically the dimension, which we referred to as 
“self-interest versus group-interest” in this study, reflects the importance of the 
individual in comparison to the importance of the group. Hence, it covers whether 
people are inclined to individually pursue their desires and, additionally, think in 
terms of “I” (Hofstede, 1980), or instead, prefer to be seen as a member of a larger 
collective for whom it is important to realise group objectives and, hence, think in 
terms of “we” (Hofstede, 1980). In section 4.2 we saw that such differences in 
group-orientation may have consequences for how people define themselves vis-à-
vis other people. From the work of particularly Markus and Kitayama (1991, 
1994), it seems that in western, individualistic cultures, as the United States, a so-
called “independent construal of the self” dominates. In eastern, collectivistic 
cultures, like Japan, on the other hand, the “interdependent construal of the self” 
To compete cost effectively in the business world, businesses in masculine societies are 
more likely to disclose higher levels of information”. 
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prevails. Subsequently, we observed that differences in construal of the self will be 
reflected in, among others, self-esteem and self-serving behaviour. Whereas 
acknowledging others’ contributions to a success and accepting personal blame for 
a failure would be disserving to the self for people from western cultures, this is 
clearly different for people from eastern cultures. On the contrary, such self-
critical attitude (Heine et al., 2000, 2001) enables them to pursue tasks that are 
valued within their cultural context as it contributes to the preservation of a sense 
of harmony within the group (Meijer and Semin, 1998). Fiske et al. (1998: 920), 
for example, support this group-oriented emphasis of the Japanese individual. 
They state that whereas in the East “the person is principally oriented toward the 
harmonious functioning of social entities (which are centred on collective needs 
and purposes)”, the person in the European-American culture “is oriented 
primarily toward individual success and achievement” (1998: 920). In order not to 
disturb the harmonious functioning of the group, Japanese people are careful not to 
step on someone else’s toes. Similarly, Earley (1994: 89) commented that “in an 
individualistic culture, people look to their own actions to understand who they 
are, and these actions are relatively independent of others. In a collective culture, 
people base their self-understanding on the reactions of important others around 
them.” In this study we will look whether managers are like ordinary people when 
they account for organisational outcomes in their letters to the shareholders, and 
hence, whether the same cultural effect is present in letters to the shareholders. 
Indeed, Triandis (1989) suggested that as managers are members of a particular 
national culture, their cultural background affects the attitudes and behaviour, 
including the use of self-serving attributions. Additionally, it seems that “culture 
operates largely at the unconscious level in shaping the executive’s perceptions of 
situations” (Hambrick and Brandon: 1988: 24) and, in that respect, an “executive’s 
role behaviour is not random” (Jackofsky and Slocum, 1988: 70). Indeed, 
Jackofsky and Slocum (1988) have provided evidence that cultural values affect 
CEO behaviour. Using anecdotal evidence from popular business presses, they 
show that CEO behaviour is in line with Hofstede’s country clusters (based on his 
four cultural dimensions discussed previously). Furthermore, we implicitly assume 
that psychological ideas and findings with respect to the individual apply to whole 
organisations as well. Staw (1980) in particular advocated the idea that 
organisations behave in similar ways as individuals do. The most important reason 
is that individuals populate organisations, and as Staw (1980: 47) argued, if there 
exist any generalizable tendencies within individuals, these tendencies will be 
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manifest in organisational actions as well (see section 2.3).3 In view of previous 
discussion, we propose the following: 
Proposition 3a–Self-enhancing attributions and self-versus group interest:
Managers from collectivistic cultures use external-positive causal statements 
to a larger extent than do managers from individualistic cultures. 
Proposition 3b–Self-protecting attributions and self-versus group interest: 
Managers from collectivistic cultures use internal-negative causal statements 
to a larger extent than do managers from individualistic cultures.
Propositions 3a and 3b form the basis for our cultural comparison, mainly 
because previous social-psychological research has focused on this dimension. 
This focus seems logical: people from the United States and Japan differ 
considerably with respect to group-orientation. However, this dimension cannot be 
used to explain possible differences in explanatory behaviour among western or 
eastern nations. There is evidence, though less extensive than the East-West 
comparison, which suggests that people within western (and eastern) cultures also 
differ with respect to their reasoning patterns. For example, Nurmi (1992) found 
his American students to use self-serving attributions to a larger extent than his 
Finnish students did, though the latter were not completely free from such bias. A 
similar result has been found between American and Dutch students in a study by 
Cohen et al. (1986). As all the countries involved may be characterized as 
“individualistic” or self-interested countries (see Hofstede, 2001), other 
differences in cultural background may have evoked the differences in explanatory 
behaviour among these western countries. While the nations, and the United States 
and the Netherlands in particular, score fairly close on four of the five dimensions 
of culture (see section 6.4.2 below for the scores on Hofstede’s dimensions), there 
is a wide gap on what Hofstede called “masculinity versus femininity”, and which 
we labelled “importance of achievement” in chapter 4. At first sight, the 
dimension capturing the importance placed on achievement within a society, 
seems the most suitable to address the difference among western nations. The 
dimension, which is widely shared among cross-cultural researchers, addresses 
whether masculine values as competition, success, and material rewards are 
important, or, instead, the more feminine values as good relationship with 
colleagues, good working conditions, and friendship are more valued in a society. 
3 Hambrick and Brandon (1988) remark that Carnegie theorists (Cyert, March, and Simon) 
also thought that decision-making processes by “upper-echelons” are, amongst others, 
influenced by culture.  
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Whereas the United States may be characterised as a high-achievement society, 
the Netherlands and (to a lesser extent) Finland, are examples of societies in which 
achievement is less important. According to Hofstede (1998), one of the 
pioneering scholars with respect to this dimension, a key difference between 
nations scoring at each end of this dimension is that in feminine cultures (i.e. those 
who place relatively little emphasis on achievement) “everybody is supposed to be 
modest”, whereas, on the other hand, in masculine cultures (i.e. those who do 
emphasise achievement) “men are supposed to be assertive, ambitious and tough” 
(Hofstede, 1998: 16). And Hofstede continues (1998: 85): “Assertiveness means 
ego-boosting.” In contrast, in society placing less emphasis on achievement, “ego-
effacing” seems to be the norm (Hofstede, 1998). Furthermore, in the more 
achievement-oriented societies, greater emphasis is placed on wealth, success, 
ambition, and material things (Hofstede, 1998). Hence, given the importance of 
“ego-boosting” in high-achievement societies, it is more likely that self-serving 
attributions are being used when people provide explanations for their 
achievements. Before formulating our formal propositions, it is important to note 
that those propositions (4a and 4b) reflect our expectations with respect to 
differences among western (or eastern) nations. In order to make the east-west 
comparison, the dimension reflecting an orientation towards self- or group interest 
(Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism) is the most relevant. In that sense, the 
influence of this dimension is “secondary.” 
Proposition 4a–Self-enhancing attributions and cultural emphasis on 
achievement: Managers from high-achievement cultures will use internal-
positive causal statements to a larger extent than do managers from low-
achievement cultures. 
Proposition 4b–Self-protecting attributions and cultural emphasis on 
achievement: Managers from high-achievement cultures will use external-
negative causal statements to a larger extent than do managers from low-
achievement cultures. 
Other factors influencing self-serving behaviour 
Apart from culture we think that organisational and CEO-related circumstances 
determine such tendencies as well. In order to discuss these factors we use a 
somewhat amended version of Lang and Lundholm’s (1993) categorisation of 
potential factors that may explain differences in firms’ financial disclosure levels. 
These authors make a distinction between so-called performance-related, 
structure-related, and market-related variables, of which the first two are 
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particularly relevant for this study.4 Performance-related variables represent the 
“features by which firms” performance over time can be identified” (Olusegun 
Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994: 45) and include variables as profits or earnings 
per share. Basically, these variables are an expression of a firm’s profitability. 
Previous research with respect to the relationship between profitability and 
disclosure levels, however, showed mixed results. Based upon a meta-analysis of 
29 studies, Ahmed and Courtis (1999: 55) concluded that “profitability was found 
to be not significantly associated with aggregated disclosure levels”, although 
there may be some “weak support for the hypothesis that superior and profitable 
firms are more likely to disclose more information to investors.” It is important to 
note that the studies reviewed by Ahmed and Courtis considered disclosure levels 
in annual reports in general. Hence, it included information other than the letter to 
the shareholder as well. Apart from the relationship with disclosure level, 
researchers have investigated the relationship between profitability and readability. 
Despite that the results are inconclusive here as well and further research is needed 
(Jones and Shoemaker, 1994), it seems that letters of poor-performing companies 
are less readable than those of companies that performed well (Courtis, 1995, 
1998; Jones and Clatworthy, 2000a). Given these mixed findings, it seems that “at 
present disclosure management theory does not offer direct and unambiguous 
arguments to infer the impact of (changes in) performance results on the 
construction of verbal accounts” (Aerts, 2001: 8). Nevertheless, we do expect that 
profitability has a direct impact on attributional behaviour in letters to the 
shareholders. It is logical to expect that the nature of the organisational 
performance, i.e. an improvement or deterioration of results, largely determines 
the nature of the explanations management has to give (Bettman and Weitz, 1983; 
Abrahamson and Park, 1994; Barlow, 1996; Aerts and Theunisse, 2000; Aerts, 
2001). When a company experiences a deterioration in performance, i.e. losses or 
decreasing profits, such information will be most salient (Bettman and Weitz, 
1983) and, consequently, needs to be addressed in the letter to the shareholders 
(Abrahamson and Park, 1994). Whether it represents an image-threatening event 
or not, is beforehand not always clear. The case of Lee Iaccoca being positive 
about the losses his company experienced, we referred to at the beginning of this 
4 Market-related variables refer to “aspects of a firm’s behaviour brought about by its 
association with other firms in its operational environment” (Olusegun Wallace et al.,
1994: 47) and include factors as listing status. As our research sample only consisted of 
listed companies (see section 5.2.2), we were not able to look at the effect of listing status 
on self-serving behaviour. Aerts and Theunisse (2000), however, examined and found that 
listing status influence the amount of self-serving attributional biases present in letters to 
the shareholders. 
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section, illustrates this point. Our expectations regarding the influence of firm 
performance on self-serving attributions are summarised in proposition 5. 
Proposition 5–Firm performance: Self-enhancement is more prevalent in 
years in which the company achieved a performance improvement, self-
protection is more prevalent in years a company experienced a deterioration 
of performance.
So far we have addressed the influence of current profitability, i.e. reported 
profits for the year, on attributional behaviour in the letter to the shareholders. 
However, previous research indicates that stability of performance may influence 
the nature of attributions (e.g. Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Meindl, 1990; Aerts, 
1994). In chapter 2 we saw that part of management’s function is “symbolic” 
(Pfeffer, 1981). By providing explanations management wants to create an image 
of being in control of the circumstances (Pfeffer, 1981; Salancik and Meindl, 
1984; Ginzel et al., 1993). Not only top managers themselves prefer to 
communicate images of being powerful, competent, and in control (e.g. Leary, 
1996; Gardner and Avolio, 1998), stakeholders too expect them to have influence 
on the circumstances (Meindl and colleagues, 1985, 1987, 1990). If stakeholders 
feel that management is not really in control, it is likely that they will withdraw 
their resources from the organisation to invest it in another (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Zajac and Westphal, 1995). Therefore, Salancik and Meindl (1984) suspect 
that managers strategically use causal attributions to create an image of being in 
control of the circumstances. Hence, they argue that managers may be less likely 
to lay blame than the social-psychological framework might imply. “By accepting 
blame for negative outcomes, they [the managers, RH] communicate that hitherto 
unfavourable circumstances are understood, and, by implication, are under 
control” (Salancik and Meindl, 1984: 239). As management’s control is not 
measurable, Salancik and Meindl (1984) use stability of firm performance as an 
indication of management’s control. They reason that “managements of firms with 
unstable outcomes, by implication, lack control. [...] If outcomes were 
controllable, one would expect them to stabilise, since constituents prefer stability 
(Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) [...] This being so, then, a 
management that could control the environmental impacts on the firm would do so 
to assure the continued support of its constituents and in so doing would produce 
stable outcomes” (Salancik and Meindl, 1984: 242).” Indeed, two recent social-
psychological studies by Fiona Lee and colleagues (Lee and Robinson, 2000; Lee 
and Tiedens, 2001) also question whether self-protecting attributions are really 
self-serving for individuals in high-status roles, like CEOs, or, instead, might 
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actually be “disserving.” After all, the use of self-protecting attributions—blaming 
the environment for a negative outcome—suggests “that the attributor does not 
have control over critical outcomes, does not have the ability to affect and change 
the course of events, and appears dependent on others” (Lee and Tiedens, 2001: 
257). Hence, it may evoke a perception of “powerlessness.” Furthermore, the 
admission of lack of power and control, which external attributions seem to imply, 
are also “contradicting others’ knowledge and expectations associated with the 
high-status role. As such, high-status individuals who make external attributions 
may come across as dishonest, lying, evasive or as having something to hide” (Lee 
and Tiedens, 2001: 258). This may lead to negative impressions and affect towards 
the attributor. In various experimental settings, Lee and colleagues found strong 
evidence that external attributions are indeed highly disserving for people in high-
status positions: audiences’ perceptions of managerial power and credibility were 
affected negatively. Hence, this also supports the idea that “passing the buck and 
pointing the finger elsewhere” (Meindl, 1990: 171) may not always be the best 
tactic for managers to use. Therefore, in line with Salancik and Meindl’s 
argument, we too expect stability of financial performance to moderate self-
protecting tendencies: 
Proposition 6–Stability of financial performance: Managers of companies 
with unstable financial performance will, relatively speaking, make greater 
use of internal-negative causal statements in their letters to the shareholders 
than do managers of companies with stable financial performance. 
The second group of variables Lang and Lundholm (1993) used to explain 
variations in financial disclosures are the so-called structure-related variables. 
These variables “describe a firm on the basis of its underlying structure—its size 
and gearing” (Olusegun Wallace et al., 1994: 44). Initially, researchers, and in 
particular those adopting positive accounting theory, used these variables to 
explain differences in accounting methods employed by firms to determine profits. 
Later, studies revealed that firm size, though not uniformly measured, seems to 
positively affect both financial and social disclosures (e.g. Neu et al., 1998; 
Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). The reasons why larger firms disclose more 
information, and of higher quality as well, however, are divers. One frequently 
mentioned rationale is that larger firms, especially if they have shares listed on a 
stock exchange5, are more visible. The effect of this greater visibility on reasoning 
5 In this study we will not look at the effect of listing status on attribution behaviour in 
letters to the shareholders, notwithstanding the fact that previous researchers found such an 
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patterns in letters to the shareholders, however, is not unequivocal (Johns, 1999). 
Firstly, in section 2.4.2 we saw that the more public behaviour is, that is the 
greater the probability that one’s behaviour is observed by others and the greater 
the number of others who might see or learn about it, the more important 
impression management becomes (Leary and Kowalski, 1990; Aerts, 1994). This 
would imply that larger firms, compared to firms of smaller size, are more 
motivated to engage in self-serving reasoning patterns. However, the larger, more 
visible companies are also subject to greater, more intense public scrutiny.6 This 
greater scrutiny is evidenced by the larger amount of media attention they receive 
and the greater number of financial analysts keeping track of the company (Aerts, 
1991; Lewellen, Park, and Ro, 1996). This increased scrutiny, obviously, implies 
that the communication of the company is watched closely and confronted with 
other sources of information. Hence, the chance of explanations being contradicted 
by other information is also greater (Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Ginzel et al.,
1993). For the large, quoted companies, which usually are subject to intense 
scrutiny, credibility is particularly important (Gibbens et al., 1990; Aerts, 2001). 
In order to remain credible, a factor which we address more in detail next, 
managers have to address not only good news, but bad news as well, while, 
additionally, the plausibility of their explanations for changes in financial 
performance are intensely scrutinised. In this sense, visibility imposes a limit on 
the possibilities to overly engage in self-serving behaviour. Indeed, in a study 
focussing on the choice of stock market index used to compare the companies’ 
own share performance with, Lewellen et al. (1996) showed that larger firms 
showed smaller biases in the benchmark index they chose to compare their stock 
performance with. Because of the importance of credibility for listed companies 
(which comprise our research sample), we expect the moderating effect of 
visibility to be greater than the exacerbating effect. That is, we expect: 
Proposition 7–Visibility: The larger the firm, the less self-enhancing and self-
protecting attributional biases will be present in the letter to the shareholders. 
impact (Gibbens et al., 1990; Aerts, 1994; Aerts and Theunisse, 2000). The main reason 
for not looking at it is related to data availability: that is, in this study we only looked at 
letters to the shareholders of public, i.e. quoted, firms (see section 5.2.2). 
6 Johns (1999: 19) defines scrutiny as “the monitoring of behaviour or performance, 
frequently with the goal of increasing accountability”. Sutton and Galunic (1996) have a 
similar view on scrutiny, while also asserting that CEOs, in particular, are often subject of 
intense scrutiny. Or as Kanter (1979: 35) claimed: “Life at the top is life in a goldfish 
bowl”. 
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 In the preceding discussion we emphasised the importance of credibility. 
Indeed, Gibbens et al. (1990, 1992) asserted that reporting credibility is crucial to 
disclosure effectiveness. Only if the receiver feels that the company publicises 
credible information, he will use this information in his decision-making process. 
Furthermore, credibility of current messages also affects future disclosure 
effectiveness. If the receiver does not believe and accept the information managers 
distributed, the manager not only will be seen as insincere, but the receiver will 
also question the sincerity of the manager’s future claims (Rindova, 1997). This 
has an important consequence for the explanations offered in the letter to the 
shareholders and possible distortions therein: “self-serving tendencies can be 
effective as long as the message they represent is plausible and the messenger 
remains credible (Aerts and Theunisse, 2000: 6; see also Zajac and Westphal, 
1995). In line with this argument is the suggestion that explanations people 
provide “fit the facts” (Schlenker, 1980; Tetlock, 1985). Transposed to the letters 
to the shareholders this argument implies that the explanations offered have to 
reflect information on amongst others the general economic conditions, the 
performance of the industry as a whole, etc.. Indeed, Bettman and Weitz (1983) 
used Kelley’s (1971a) discounting and augmentation principles (discussed in 
section 2.1.2) to assess the effects of information about the general economic 
circumstances on the attributions managers are likely to make. They suggested that 
if an unfavourable outcome is experienced in an economically bad year, there are 
many potential and plausible external reasons that may serve to explain such 
performance. However, if such unfavourable outcome is experienced in times of 
economic prosperity, the use of external factors to explain the outcome is less 
plausible. “Hence, the augmentation principle implies the role of internal causes to 
be greater” (Bettman and Weitz, 1983: 169). Similar arguments hold for 
favourable performances: if they are experienced during a period of economic 
downturn, the role of internal causes—management’s strategy, etc.—should be 
highlighted, as they “were obtained in spite of the presence of plausible inhibitory 
external factors” (Bettman and Weitz, 1983: 169). However, if the company 
experienced outstanding results in times of favourable economic conditions, it is 
likely that management also attributes some of the success to those external, 
facilitative conditions in order to remain credible. Basically this discussion boils 
down to the following proposition in which the effect of economic conditions on 
the nature of attributions is clarified: 
Proposition 8a–Economic conditions and favourable results: The use of 
external-positive causal attributions is larger in years in which economic 
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conditions have been favourable, compared to years in which they have been 
unfavourable. 
Proposition 8b–Economic conditions and unfavourable results: The use of 
internal-negative causal attributions is larger in years in which economic 
conditions have been favourable, compared to years in which economic 
conditions have been unfavourable. 
Another factor we consider is CEO tenure or the extent of experience the 
person has as organisational leader. The effect of tenure on self-serving 
explanations, however, is, difficult to predict, as there seem to be two rather 
conflicting interpretations. Firstly, Staw et al. (1983) hypothesized that the need to 
engage in self-serving attributions decreases the older the CEO gets and the longer 
he serves as company’s CEO. The main reasons that more tenured CEOs are less 
inclined to engage in self-serving explanations, are, firstly, that they feel less 
pressure from the public and, secondly, because career enhancement is less 
important for them. That is, newly appointed CEOs may feel the need to prove 
themselves, which may result in an exacerbation of self-serving tendencies. 
Indeed, in his book on power, Pfeffer (1992) comments that a leader’s reputation 
is formed soon after he enters the organisation, and that first impressions have a 
great impact on reputations. Therefore, “it matters to develop a good track record 
early” (Pfeffer, 1992: 145). Staw et al.’s (1983) fail to support the idea that the 
need to engage in self-serving attributions decreases with tenure. In contrast to 
Staw et al. (1983) and Pfeffer (1992) is Schwenk’s (1993) expectation that longer 
tenured CEOs exhibit stronger self-serving tendencies. The rationale Schwenk 
adopts is related to the idea of escalating commitment. Simply stated, escalating 
commitment refers to a tendency to stick to a certain strategic direction managers 
decided upon in the past, even though it only cost the company money (e.g. 
Brockner, 1992; Johns, 1999). This escalation of commitment seems to be 
increasing with the tenure of CEOs. Supporting this idea is the finding that 
shorter-tenured CEOs are more likely to adopt novel strategies (Schwenk, 1993), 
whereas longer-tenured CEOs tend to have a narrow focus (Barlow, 1996; 
Rajagopalan and Datta, 1996). Given longer-tenured CEOs’ commitment to 
strategic decisions, it is likely that they will “interpret negative performance in 
biased and self-serving ways which do not challenge the current strategy” 
(Schwenk, 1993: 451). Hence, they will often deny responsibility for failures 
(Brockner, 1992; Johns, 1999). This suggests that, contrary to Staw et al.’s (1983) 
predictions, longer-tenured CEOs show stronger self-protecting tendencies than 
shorter-tenured CEOs. In a study of 60 letters to the shareholders of firms from the 
oil, chemical, and computer industries, Schwenk found strong evidence that 
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longer-tenured CEO showed greater self-protecting tendencies than shorter-
tenured CEOs did. Concerning self-enhancing attributions, however, Schwenk was 
not able to find a significant effect of tenure. The two interpretations of effect of 
tenure on attributional behaviour are difficult to reconcile. But maybe the truth is 
in the middle. We expect that the interpretation of Staw might be particularly 
important if a CEO is in his first year and has to present himself as being a 
successful leader. However, the longer he is serving as CEO, the more likely that 
he will be committed to the strategy he was responsible for (Salancik, 1977; 
Brockner, 1992), which subsequently make them refuse to see that their strategy 
may have been ineffective. That is, we expect: 
Proposition 9a–Effect of new CEO: Compared to sitting CEOs, CEOs who 
are in their first term will make greater use of self-enhancing explanations to 
account for favourable organisational results in their letters to the 
shareholders. 
Proposition 9b–Escalation of commitment: Longer-tenured CEOs, 
compared to shorter-tenured CEO, show greater self-protecting tendencies to 
account for negative organisational outcomes (failures) in the letter to the 
shareholders. 
Apart from CEO-tenure, the literature frequently mentions another 
management-related factor: “owner-control” (Abrahamson and Park, 1994). 
Owner-control indicates whether shareholders are an important group with which 
management has to reckon. It builds upon the classical work of Berle and Means 
(1932). In their work about the “modern corporation”, Berle and Means described 
that although the owners, i.e. the shareholders, legally controlled the corporation 
(by means of the voting rights attached to their shares), it was, in fact, company 
management who controlled the firm. They convincingly argued that the 
shareholdings were too dispersed for owners being able to effectively influence 
corporate actions. Given this lack of “external constraints, managers have broad 
discretion to pursue their own objectives, even when these come into conflict with 
those of stockholders” (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989: 169) (an idea that is 
explored more in detail in agency theory, see section 2.4.4). These ideas, however, 
originated from the thirties and since the publication of Berle and Means’ work a 
lot has changed. Recently, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer (1999: 472) 
reported that “in many countries large corporations have large shareholders and, 
further, that those shareholders are active in corporate governance”, which is “in 
contrast to the Berle and Means idea that managers are unaccountable.” Indeed, 
they depict a corporate world in which “only 24 percent of the large companies in 
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rich countries are widely held, compared to 35 percent that are family-controlled, 
20 percent are State-controlled, and 21 percent are in the residual categories” (La 
Porta et al., 1999: 496). Hence, Berle and Means’ image of a widely held 
corporation controlled by management “has begun to show some wear” (La Porta 
et a., 1999: 472). This is an important observation, because previous research, as 
briefly reviewed by Gomez-Mejia, Tosi and Hinkin (1987) showed that so-called 
owner-controlled firms (i.e. firms that have a large shareholder not being part of 
company management), compared to management-controlled firms (i.e. firms that 
do not have an independent large shareholder, hence, the corporation Berle and 
Means had in mind), are different with respect to accounting practices, risk 
aversion, and profitability. Basically, it seems that these large shareholders are not 
only more motivated, but also in the position to monitor the board of directors 
more closely and effectively than private investors will and can (e.g., Shleifer and 
Visny, 1986; Walsh and Seward, 1990, La Porta et al., 1999), implying that 
management cannot remain unaccountable as Berle and Means suggested. Indeed, 
Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) empirically found that the level of monitoring was 
positively influenced by the presence of such outside owners. The most obvious 
reason why large shareholders are motivated to monitor companies is an economic 
one. For them it is more difficult to immediately exit if they are dissatisfied with 
the company’s performance (Shleifer and Vishy, 1986; Abrahamson and Park, 
1994). Indeed, of small investors it is often said that they have little (economic) 
interest in (and abilities to) monitoring companies’ management (Walsh and 
Seward, 1990). Furthermore, small investors lack the technical expertise that large, 
institutional investors possess and, hence, have less “skills to employ in 
monitoring the information officers disclose” (Abrahamson and Park, 1994: 1311). 
This may imply a more intense scrutiny and, consequently, may pose a limit to 
conceal negative outcomes (Abrahamson and Park, 1994) and to overly engage in 
self-serving attributional behaviour as well. Therefore, we expect the presence of 
large shareholders to influence attributional behaviour in the letter to the 
shareholders in the following way: 
Proposition 10–Large shareholders and self-serving biases: The presence 
of one or more large shareholders negatively influences the extent that 
managers engage in self-serving attributional behaviour in their letters to the 
shareholders. 
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Other ways to impression manage with accounting narratives 
The 10 propositions we previously have formulated relate to self-serving 
attributional biases in accounting narratives and enable us to indicate which factors 
either exacerbate or attenuate CEOs’ tendencies to show such biases in their 
explanations for organisational outcomes. These explanations, self-serving or not, 
are part of a wider range of impression management techniques available to 
managers when they present news with respect to organisational outcomes in the 
annual report. Therefore, and because they are closely related to our study of self-
serving attributional biases and, hence, could be easily incorporated in the content 
analysis, we decided to explore three other forms of impression management in 
accounting narratives as well. 
Firstly, we examine the use of “accounting explanations” (Aerts, 1994) to 
account for bad outcomes. As was briefly addressed in section 2.4.2, accounting 
explanations “use the internal logic of the financial accounting model, relating 
(intermediary) accounting effects and categories, in order to explain financial 
actions and results” (1994: 339) and are similar to so-called meta-accounts (Scott 
and Lyman, 1968). A basic characteristic of meta-accounts, including accounting 
explanations, is that the assignment of responsibility remains ambiguous (Aerts, 
1994). Given accounting explanations’ ambiguity and managers’ self-interest, 
Aerts expected the accounting and causal, self-serving explanations to be 
complementary. While positive outcomes are stated in ordinary, causal 
explanations, where responsibility may be easily assigned, he suggested that 
negative outcomes are more likely to be explained in ambiguous, accounting 
language. Indeed, he even suggested the possibility of a so-called “accounting 
bias”, which “manifests itself as a tendency to explain negative performance more 
in technical accounting terms, while positive performance are more accounted for 
in strict cause-effect terminology whereby responsibility becomes clear” (1994: 
341). Though his results indicate that positive outcomes are predominantly 
explained in clear-cut language, he does not find his Belgian managers to address 
bad results in accounting-technical language. In this study we look at the 
accounting bias as well. In this study we explore there are cultural differences in 
the presence of the accounting bias in letters to the shareholders. 
Apart from the accounting bias, we also explore the location of the news being 
conveyed. Apart from looking at the variation in language used to explain 
organisational outcomes, in this study we also look at the location of the news 
being conveyed. In one of the earlier studies looking at attributions in letters to the 
shareholders, Staw et al. considered “the art of presenting good and bad news” 
(1983: 596). First of all, they found both high- and low-performing firms 
emphasising positive events, something Jones and Clathworthy (2000b) found as 
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well in a more recent study of British companies. Apart from looking at the 
emphasis on type of news, Staw and colleagues also looked at the location of 
positive and negative information. The results they found are rather interesting. 
The high-performing companies in their sample tried to maintain a positive tone 
throughout the whole letter to the shareholders. Low-performing companies, 
however, also have to account for negative news. The results of Staw et al.’s study 
indicate that the low-performing firms prefer to address negative news “at the 
outset and to end their letters on an upbeat tone that is nearly as positive as the 
information presented by successful companies” (1983: 597).7 This finding is 
interesting in view of the so-called primacy and recency effects. Basically, the first 
suggests that the impressions people form of other persons are primarily based on 
the information they receive first. The recency effect, on the other hand, assumes 
that the information that is conveyed last, is the most important when people form 
their impressions of another person (Vonk, 1999; Pruyn and Wilke, 2001). 
According to Pruyn and Wilke (2001) there is no agreement among social 
psychological researchers about which effect is strongest, although researchers do 
agree that the information that is provided in the middle is remembered least. The 
findings of Staw et al. (1983) may indicate that managers, assuming that they are 
aware of the existence of such effects, think that readers of the letters to the 
shareholders base their judgement of management on the information that is 
provided at the end in the letter to the shareholders. Therefore, in this study we 
decided to look at the tone of the message contained in the first and last few lines 
of the letter to the shareholders.  
The presentation of future expectations forms another way by which the board 
of directors may try to manage people’s impressions. Forecasts of earnings play an 
important role in the pricing process on equity markets, as stock prices are said to 
reflect perceptions about future earnings (Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 1998). In 
most, if not all, developed countries, however, management is free to include such 
earnings forecasts in the annual report. For example, in a study of Canadian 
companies, Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1994) found a mere 36 percent 
disclosing forecast information in their annual report (a comparable US sample of 
100 firms led to a similar percentage of 33 percent). Their findings, however, do 
emphasise the importance of forecast information in the impression management 
process. Firstly, Clarkson et al. (1994) found their good news firms being more 
7 It is also possible that the credibility issue is at stake here. Usually speaking 
disappointing performance is not what investors expect and therefore is likely to attract 
extra attention. In order to remain a credible messenger this information has to be 
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prepared to include a future outlook in the annual report. Secondly, it was found 
that “only 17.5 percent of the sample forecasts represent revisions downward 
relative to the previous year’s result” (1994: 425), while “the decision to forecast 
is not related to the firm’s forecast decision in the previous year” (1994: 433). If 
such future outlook was provided, in 50 percent of the Canadian (and 68 percent of 
the US) firms, the letter to the shareholders was the designated place. Given the 
possibilities to use information on future expectations to manage people’s 
impression, we explore which factors determine both the decision to include this 
information in the letter to the shareholders, and additionally, if such information 
is included, which factors influence the tone of those expectations. 
5.2 Research design 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Content analysis is a research technique that enables the researcher to make 
quantifiable inferences based upon narrative documents. More formally, content 
analysis has been defined as “a research method that uses a set of procedures to 
make valid inferences from text” (Weber, 1990: 1), or as “a research technique for 
making replicative and valid inferences from data to their context” (Krippendorff, 
1988: 21). In essence content analysis involves assigning certain parts of texts to a 
limited number of predefined categories using a set of decision rules. As such, 
content analysis has been frequently used in accounting and management research. 
For example, within the accounting domain, content analysis has been a 
commonly used technique to assess organisations’ social and environmental 
disclosures (Milne and Adler, 1999). Furthermore, previous studies looking into 
management’s causal reasoning patterns (e.g. Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Staw et 
al., 1983; Aerts, 1994), all made use of the technique to derive their conclusions 
whether management showed self-serving attributional biases in their letters to the 
shareholders or not. Also within social-psychological research, though less 
frequent as experiments, content analysis has been used, amongst others, to assert 
possible cultural differences in self-serving behaviour. For example, Menon et al.
(1999) content analysed American and Japanese newspaper articles to investigate 
possible cultural differences in the provision of reasons for the collapse of Barings 
after Nick Leeson’s rogue trading practices. Likewise, Morris and Peng (1994) 
focused on newspaper articles addressing two mass murder incidents, again in an 
presented first, before management can pay attention to more positive aspects of the past 
fiscal year. 
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American and Japanese newspaper, to investigate the blame questions from a 
cultural perspective. In this study we make use of content analysis as well. More 
specifically, letters to the shareholders were subjected to content analysis in order 
to establish in what way directors explain organisational performances in the letter 
to the shareholder and to see if they culturally differ in that respect. Below we 
address the design more in detail.  
5.2.2 Sample description 
The sampling method we use is similar to those used in prior studies looking into 
cultural influences on accounting (Hussein, 1996; MacArthur, 1996; Zarzeski, 
1996) and management practices (Newman and Nollen, 1996; Borkowski, 1999). 
Our sample consists of 139 firms from the Netherlands, Japan, and the United 
States: from Japan and the United States we had 52 companies, while 35 
companies were of Dutch origin.8 Three reasons justify the choice of companies 
from these three countries. Firstly, these countries represent cultures with 
significant differences on the individualism-collectivism dimension (Hofstede, 
1980), which seems to be the most important dimension when studying cultural 
differences in self-serving behaviour. Secondly, previous social-psychological 
studies have focused on the United States and Japan. Including a country such as 
the Netherlands adds perspective to prior findings and may reveal differences in 
8 We acknowledge the oft-heard critique that nation states (i.e. countries) cannot be 
equated with cultures per se (e.g. Harrison and McKinnon, 1999; House et al., 1999; 
Sivakumar and Nakata, 2001; Baskerville, 2002; McSweeney, 2002) and hence “that 
country is a proxy, albeit imperfect, for culture” (Sivakumar and Nakata, 2001: 559), 
although it seems that it may be the “only kinds of units available” (Hofstede, 2002: 1356; 
see also House et al., 1999) for making cross-cultural comparisons. Notwithstanding the 
possibility that within the borders of a country several cultural groups may be found, it 
seems that “within any nation state there is a modal set of values, which constitutes a 
country’s national culture” (Sivakumar and Nakata, 2001: 559). Indeed, as research 
“demonstrates greater differences between countries than within countries, national 
differences are often used as a proxy for cultural differences” (Schneider and De Meyer, 
1991: 311). Although cultural values do not fully dictate a person’s behaviour, “we would 
expect that people coming from the same country will exhibit some of the same general 
tendencies and think about things in a similar way” (Earley and Erez, 1997: 23). This 
seems to be true for managers as well: management studies have revealed that CEO 
behaviour is affected by national culture (Haire et al., 1963; Jackosfsky and Slocum, 1988; 
Schneider and De Meyer, 1991). Hence, we would expect the Japanese CEOs to show 
more similar behaviours when compared to each other than when compared to their 
American and/or Dutch colleagues. Previous research looking into cultural differences in 
management practices also tend to focus on nations (e.g. Janssens, Brett and Smith, 1995; 
Newman and Nollen, 1996). 
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self-serving explanations among western cultures as well. Lastly, the countries are 
not only economically important, in addition they represent major countries with 
respect to the development of the accounting profession (Nobes & Parker, 1998). 
As starting point for the selection procedure we used the Global 500 list that is 
published annually in Fortune. An additional valuable resource was the 
Worldscope database, which is a database containing corporate information (based 
on annual reports) on all the major companies from most of the developed world. 
Beforehand we decided to exclude banks, insurance companies, and other 
financial institutions due to the specific nature of their activities and terminology 
used in their financial reports. In order to assure comparability of the companies 
selected we tried to match the firms as much as possible (Pascale, 1978; Lytle et
al., 1995). In the matching procedure we made sure that the firms were 
comparable with respect to their main activities by looking at both the primary 
SIC-code and the business description mentioned in the Worldscope database. 
Furthermore, the procedure encompassed matching on the basis of firm size (in 
terms of dollar sales as of fiscal 1997, which is exactly in the middle of our sample 
period). This implied that, for example, the largest beer company in Japan (Kirin 
Breweries) was coupled with the largest beer company in the Netherlands 
(Heineken) and the United States (Anheuser-Busch). The results of this procedure 
are displayed in Appendix I. In practice, however, the sample selection procedure 
was driven by the availability of annual reports of Japanese companies (either in 
hard copy or in pdf-format) and resulted in reports of companies that are all quoted 
on the stock exchange. Although various people, e.g. the CEO, the CFO, a 
company lawyer, investor and/or public relations, are involved in drawing up a 
letter to the shareholder it is the CEO who signs the letter to the shareholders 
(Bettman and Weitz, 1983), thereby acknowledging that he is ultimately 
responsible for its content. Therefore, we also made sure that the nationality of the 
CEO was in conformity with the culture he should represent. This implied, for 
example, that companies as ASML (in the Netherlands) and 7-Eleven (in the 
United States) were not included in the sample as they have an American and a 
Japanese CEO, respectively. Implicitly we assume that the values of a culture a 
CEO should represent guide his behaviour, including the use of self-serving 
attributions. That is, implicitly we assume that, for example, Japanese values are 
relevant when studying Japanese CEO’s behaviour in a cross-cultural context. 
Indeed, research by, e.g., Jackofsky and Slocum (1988) confirms the idea that 
national cultural values affect CEO behaviour. Furthermore, we expect Japanese 
CEOs to show more similar behaviours when compared to each other than when 
compared to their American and/or Dutch colleagues. However, the possibility 
that an individual Japanese manager behaves in a more western fashion cannot be 
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fully eliminated (see also Hofstede, 1984; Earley and Erez, 1997; Schneider and 
Barsoux, 2003). 
Table 5.1 below provides some general characteristics of the firms included in 
the sample based on fiscal 1997 figures (in U.S. dollars). As is clear from the table 
below, the Dutch companies are, on average, considerably smaller than both the 
American and Japanese companies.9
Average US JP NL 
Salesa 16,826,704  14,511,818  4,604,913 
Net incomea 889,794  263,545  285,129 
Market capitalisationa 16,903,854  11,378,326  4,010,749 
Total assetsa 18,896,119  15,210,090  3,547,777 
a Figures are in thds US dollars     
Table 5.1 Statistics regarding profitability and size of companies in sample 
For each of these 139 companies we tried to obtain two annual reports: one of 
a year in which performance improved and another in which performance 
deteriorated. The reports were selected from the fiscal years 1994 to 2000. In case 
of the Japanese companies this often implied a year-end of 31st of March (e.g. 
fiscal 1998 implies a period that runs from 1st of April 1998 to 31st of March 
1999). For the American and Dutch companies the fiscal year was often equal to 
the calendar year (implying a year-end of 31st of December). Due to “missing” 
years, for example as consequence of mergers, or simply because a company was 
set up during the period under consideration, the actual period may have been 
smaller in a number of cases. In order to select a report of a “good” and a “bad” 
year, information on sales, net income, return on assets and earnings per share, in 
the original reporting currency, as reported in the Worldscope database was used. 
A year was considered favourable if the trend (i.e. by comparing this year’s 
performance with previous year’s figures) of two out of net sales margin (=net 
income/sales), return on assets, and earnings per share showed an increasing line. 
Similarly, it was unfavourable if two out of the three showed a declining trend. 
This resulted in 141 reports from a favourable year and another 137 concerned 
unfavourable years. These reports were used to obtain the letter to the shareholders 
9 Further ANOVA-analysis and pairwise comparisons of the means reveal that whereas the 
U.S. and Japanese companies are comparable with respect to size, the Dutch are on 
average significantly smaller—in terms of sales, total assets, and market capitalization— 
than their Japanese and U.S. counterparts. 
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or a comparable document.10 In case of the U.S. and Dutch companies the letters 
were read in their original language. In case of the Japanese companies, however, 
the majority were in the English language. Due to a lack of availability we 
succeeded only to obtain 15 reports that were written in Japanese. One pair of 
coders (see the next sub-section for an outline of the coding procedure) read these 
15 letters. One coder read the Japanese version, while the other used the English 
version. As the two versions yielded largely the same sentences being identified as 
causal attributions, we felt safe that the English version does not deviate materially 
from the Japanese equivalent. Table 5.2 below, presents some characteristics with 
respect to the number of pages the letters used in the content analysis consisted of. 
As is obvious, the Dutch produced somewhat longer reports. This can be ascribed 
to the fact we had to use management reports in a number of cases instead of 
formal letters to the shareholders, as some companies did not produce these. 
 US  JP  NL 
Good year      
Average 3.19  2.86  6.70 
St.deviation 1.45  1.45  4.90 
Range 1-9  1-10  1-20 
Bad year      
Average 3.00  3.11  7.02 
St.deviation 1.59  1.50  5.47 
Range 1-10  1-8  1-22 
Table 5.2 Size (in number of pages) of letters to the shareholders in this study 
5.2.3 Dependent variable–Content analysis 
As was explained at the outset of this section, in this study we made use of content 
analysis, which is a “method for codifying the text of a piece of writing into 
various groups (or categories) depending on selected criteria” (Hackston and 
Milne, 1996: 84). In order to perform the content analysis, and to assure that the 
process is reliable, systematic and objective (Krippendorff, 1980), a coding 
10 As not all Dutch companies included a formal letter to the shareholders (or a comparable 
CEO’s preface) in their financial reports, we used management reports in 36 cases instead. 
In order to have the number of pages and the message that are content analysed as 
comparable as possible for companies that have a formal letter and those that don’t, we 
decided to analyse only the general and financial discussion sections of the management 
report. That is, sections containing specific information about divisions, geographical 
segments, etc. were omitted from the analysis. For all the Japanese and American 
companies in the sample, we analysed letters to the shareholders. 
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protocol was developed containing the procedure to be followed and a description 
of the key concepts of the content analysis. Previous studies of Bettman and Weitz 
(1983), Staw et al. (1983), Salancik and Meindl (1984), Aerts (1991, 1994), as 
well as social-psychological studies (e.g. Weiner et al., 1971; Silvester, 1998; 
Munton, Silvester, Stratton and Hanks, 1999) were consulted to derive our coding 
dimensions and to draw up the coding protocol. Appendix II contains a copy of the 
coding protocol.  
All the codings were duplicated. Five pairs of coders independently read and 
coded the letters to the shareholders. Apart from the author, six undergraduate 
students in economics and two Ph.D. candidates in economics performed the 
codings. Before starting the actual coding, all coders were instructed about the key 
concepts and the procedures. However, they were not informed of the goals of the 
study. After the instruction, the coders went through a practice round on three 
letters to the shareholders in order to familiarise themselves with both the 
procedure as well as the key concepts. These three letters to the shareholders were 
not part of the final sample.  
The coding process encompassed several phases. Excluding the instruction and 
training phase, the first phase concerned the identification of attributional (causal) 
statements. This phase involved coders independently reading and marking the 
units that subsequently had to be coded. Using previous studies of, e.g. Bettman 
and Weitz (1983), Staw et al. (1983), and Aerts (1994), as point of departure, we 
arrived at the following definition of causal statements: A causal statement or 
attribution refers to one or more coherent sentences or phrases (i.e. part of 
sentence) in which an organisational outcome (i.e., profits, sales, revenues, etc.) is 
connected with a cause or reason for that outcome. The coders were instructed to 
only look for statements that specifically referred to financial outcomes, hence, 
only sales, profits, costs, and similar accounting concepts. Also included were 
statements referring to earnings per share, shareholder value, and market share, 
although we acknowledge that the latter is not a real accounting concept. Causal 
statements may be related to past/present or future organisational outcomes, with 
the fiscal year under consideration being the point of reference for deciding on 
past/present outcomes. Frequently, a causal statement can be recognised explicitly 
because connective words or phrases are used, for example: “influenced by”, “is 
caused by”, “contributed to”, “can be ascribed to”, “because”, “despite”, 
“notwithstanding”, and so on. However, a sentence or phrase is considered a 
causal statement as well if no such connective words or phrases are present, but a 
causal relationship between an organisational outcome and explanatory variable 
can implicitly be derived from the text. To be considered a causal statement, a 
cause-effect relationship has to be clearly present. Furthermore, organisational 
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outcome (“effect”) and explanatory variable (“cause”) have to appear in proximity, 
e.g. within one or two sentences, or within the same paragraph. Whenever several 
causes or reasons are provided to explain one organisational outcome, whether or 
not in the same sentence, each of those combinations is treated as a separate causal 
statement. Below we reproduced some examples of causal statements that 
appeared in letters to the shareholders. 
“In 2000, this pricing strategy was very successful, with net revenue per 
barrel increasing 2.5%” (annual report Anheuser-Busch 2000). 
“Sales in 1998 were $29.4 billion, down 1% from $29.8 billion in 1997. The 
decline is attributable to lost sales from various non-strategic and poorly 
performing businesses that we decided to exit” (annual report Motorola 1998). 
“Applied Materials’ performance in fiscal 1999 was fuelled by the 
semiconductor industry recovery, but of equal importance was our ability to 
respond quickly to the steep rebound” (annual report Applied Materials 1999). 
“Despite a challenging operating environment, Alpine Electronics and Alps 
Transportation Systems Corporation continue to post strong performance, 
through market differentiation based on proprietary technologies and unique 
services” (annual report Alps Electric 1999) 
“During the year under review, due to the impact of the yen’s appreciation, 
Sony’s consolidated net sales decreased 1.7% to ¥6,686.7 billion and 
operating income fell 30.9% to ¥240.6 billion” (annual report Sony 
Corporation 2000). 
“I believe Konami’s achievement of yet another year of record growth in both 
net sales and operating income, despite the difficult operating environment, 
confirms the correctness of our outgoing and bold management strategy”
(annual report Konami 2000). 
“Considerable management attention is invested in leveraging the existing 
store base and our brand strength, resulting in growth of sales and operating 
results” (annual report Royal Ahold 2000). 
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“I am delighted to say that Philips made a good start to the new millennium. 
The fruits of the efforts of the past four years are becoming clearer” (annual 
report Philips 2000).
 Apart from such causal statements, in which organisational (financial) 
outcomes are linked to one or more causes, the coders also searched for 
unexplained organisational (financial) outcomes (regarding profits, sales, costs, 
etc.). These are similar to causal statements, except that no cause or explanation is 
provided for the outcome. Examples of such unexplained organisational outcomes 
are: “This year the company was able to report record sales” and “Profits for 2000 
reached an all-time-high.” Previous organisational and accounting researchers did 
not discern this form of impression management when they looked at attributional 
behaviour in letters to the shareholders. However, we decided to include it, 
because we expected that apart from “genuine” causal statements, such a form of 
impression management might be important in the context of financial reporting. 
After the two coders independently read the letters to the shareholders and 
identified the causal statements and unexplained organisational outcomes, they 
met in order to discuss their outcomes. The intention was to arrive at an agreed-
upon set of statements that subsequently was subjected to the actual coding. 
Additionally, this procedure ensures that the same causal statements are coded. 
In the second phase the two coders performed the actual coding (that is the 
assignment of causal statements to the various categories) using this “agreed-upon 
set.” In the coding phase several decisions regarding organisational outcomes 
(effect) and reasons or causes for that outcome (explanatory variable) had to be 
made and recorded. Firstly, we discuss the coding dimensions concerning the 
organisational outcomes. Subsequently, we pay attention to the dimensions 
concerning causes or reasons (explanatory variables).  
Coding dimensions organisational outcome (effect) 
Below are addressed the five dimensions on which the organisational outcomes, or 
effects, had to be coded. Apart from the categories mentioned below, coders could 
also opt for a category “uncodeable on this dimension.” The coders were 
instructed to use this category only if they thought that not one of the provided 
options (for a single dimension) was able to reflect the meaning of the effect that 
had to be coded. The coding decisions for (real) causal statements were recorded 
onto coding sheets by the two coders, independently of each other. An example of 
such a coding sheet appears in Appendix IV. An example of a cover sheet is 
included in Appendix III. The dimensions regarding organisational outcomes 
were: 
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1. Type of effect. The type addresses the kind of financial outcome that is 
addressed. We discerned five categories, viz. net profits/profits/earnings, 
revenues/sales, costs, market share, shareholder value/earnings per share. In 
addition, coders could also use the categories general/other and “more than 
one of those mentioned above.” 
2. Valence (positive versus negative). The valence of the outcome indicates 
whether the organisational outcome is to be evaluated positive (e.g. increase in 
sales, best-ever year profits, etc.) or negative (e.g. decrease in profits, increase 
in losses, etc.) from the directors’ point of view. 
3. Nature (qualitative versus quantitative). The nature concerns whether the 
organisational outcome is expressed in quantitative terms (e.g. 5% increase, 
decrease from 1.5 billion to 1.25 billion, etc.) or in qualitative terms in which 
only adjectives are used (e.g. the record revenue level may be explained from 
…, a considerable deterioration of profits …, etc.). It was also possible to use a 
category “both qualitative and quantitative” (“The record profits of $1,3 billion 
we achieved this year…” is an example of a case in which this category should 
be used). 
4. Time orientation (past/present versus future). The time orientation of the 
outcome addresses whether the outcome occurred in the past/present (i.e. 
current fiscal year) or will occur in the future. The fiscal year under 
consideration served as point of reference for deciding on past/present/future 
outcomes. 
5. Level (division/product versus group/corporation as whole). This coding 
dimension addresses whether the causal statement concerns an effect at the 
organisational level or at a more specific, i.e. divisional or product, level. 
Coding dimensions for explanatory variable (cause) 
After having coded the statements as far as the effect is concerned, causal 
statements had to be coded for causes or explanations. Hence, the next eight 
dimensions are only relevant for “genuine” causal statements. Here as well, the 
coders could opt for a category “uncodeable on this dimension.” The dimensions 
included: 
1. Expression of cause-effect relationship (explicit versus implicit). The 
expression of the cause-effect relationship indicates whether a causal statement 
can be identified, because connective words or phrases as “because”, 
“despite”, “due to”, “ascribed to”, etc. have been used. If such connective 
words or phrases are present, it is coded as “explicit”, otherwise as “implicit.” 
110
2. Direction of cause-effect relationship (common versus opposite). In case of a 
common direction, cause and effect have the same sign. An example of such 
relationship is: “The increase in profits was due to a well established corporate 
strategy.” In case of an opposite direction, cause and effect have different 
signs, e.g. when positive outcomes have been realised despite negative 
influences. Such relationships can usually be identified by words as “despite”, 
“notwithstanding”, “although”, and so on. 
3. Time orientation (past/present versus future). The time orientation of the cause 
addresses whether the cause occurred in the past/present (i.e. current fiscal 
year) or will occur in the future. The fiscal year under consideration served as 
point of reference for deciding on past/present/future causes. 
4. Nature (quantitative versus qualitative). The nature of the cause concerns 
whether the cause is quantified or is merely expressed in qualitative terms. 
5. Language of causal statement (causal versus accounting technical). Causal 
language refers to “everyday life” or “laymen” statements in which a cause-
effect relationship may be easily identified. An example of a causal statement 
that is expressed in causal language is: “The decrease in sales can be attributed 
to a deterioration of the economic conditions in Latin America.” On the other 
hand, an accounting-technical relationship between cause and effect is present 
if the relationship is explained in accounting terms, where responsibility is not 
easily identified. Aerts, who introduced these accounting-technical 
attributions, defines them as “explanations of accounting effects termed in 
financial accounting language and [involve] explanations in terms of the 
structure of the balance sheet or the profit-and-loss account to explanations in 
terms of cost-volume-profit relationships” (2001: 13). “The decrease in profits 
can be attributed to the higher interest”, is an example of an accounting-
technical explanation. 
6. Locus of causality (internal versus external). The locus of causality dimension 
refers to the degree that an outcome was caused by directors’ or the 
organisation’s actions (e.g. good quality of personnel, strategy, etc.), in which 
case it is internal, or by influences outside the organisation (e.g. economic 
situation, industry trends, inflation, interest rate, the weather, etc.), in which it 
is coded “external.” Within the internal-external dichotomy we created some 
further refinements. With respect to internal causes, coders had the option to 
indicate that the cause referred to either actions or decisions of 
management/board of directors, to segments or divisions within the company, 
or to corporate personnel. They were instructed to use these categories only if 
they were able to explicitly extract one of the groups mentioned. Otherwise, 
the category “other internal causes had to be used.” Similarly, regarding 
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external causes it was possible to indicate that the (external) cause was on 
general economic- or industry/sector level. 
7. Stability (stable versus unstable). The stability dimension refers to whether or 
not the cause of the outcome changes over time. A cause is stable if it would 
persist in the future and, more or less, would lead to the same outcome. 
Otherwise stated, stable causes are to a certain extent permanent and 
unchanging. Corporate strategy, the economic trend are examples of stable 
causes. Temporal causes, on the other hand, are less permanent. On the 
contrary, they are temporal and may change within the period of a year. It is 
very likely that such variable cause would lead to a different outcome. One 
time disvestment of a division, start-up costs, etc. are examples of variable 
causes. 
8. Controllability (controllable versus uncontrollable). A cause is controllable if 
the directors or the organisation has it within its power to change that cause, 
e.g. strategy, marketing effort, acquisition decision, and so on. A cause is 
uncontrollable if directors or the organisation does not have the power to 
influence it, e.g., market prices, competition, general economic situation, etc.. 
Hence, the central issue is whether management or the corporation is able to 
influence, i.e. to control, the cause. 
Coding dimensions unexplained effects 
Unexplained effects were coded along three dimensions, namely type of effect, 
valence, and qualitative/quantitative. Apart from the categories mentioned below, 
coders could also opt for a category “uncodeable on this dimension.” The coders 
were instructed to use this category only if they thought that not one of the 
provided options (for a single dimension) was able to reflect the meaning of the 
effect that had to be coded. The coding decisions for (real) causal statements were 
recorded the cover sheets by the two coders, independently of each other. An 
example of such a cover sheet appears in Appendix III. The cover sheet also 
contained some general information about the company and the letter to the 
shareholders (see below). The dimensions regarding unexplained effects were: 
1. Type of effect. The type addresses the kind of financial outcome that is 
addressed. We discerned five categories, viz. net profits/profits/earnings, 
revenues/sales, costs, market share, shareholder value/earnings per share. In 
addition, coders could also use the categories general/other and “more than 
one of those mentioned above.” 
2. Valence (positive versus negative). The valence of the outcome indicates 
whether the organisational outcome is to be evaluated positive (e.g. increase in 
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sales, best-ever year profits, etc.) or negative (e.g. decrease in profits, increase 
in losses, etc.) from the directors’ point of view. 
3. Nature (qualitative versus quantitative). The nature concerns whether the 
organisational outcome is expressed in quantitative terms (e.g. 5% increase, 
decrease from 1.5 billion to 1.25 billion, etc.) or in qualitative terms in which 
only adjectives are used (e.g. the record revenue level may be explained from 
…, a considerable deterioration of profits …, etc.). It was also possible to use a 
category “both qualitative and quantitative” (“The record profits of $1,3 billion 
we achieved this year…” is an example of a case in which this category should 
be used). 
General issues regarding letters to the shareholders 
After having coded all of the causal statements and unexplained effects, the coding 
sheets were put together and a cover sheet was included. The letter to the 
shareholders used for coding, as well as the version used to identify the statements, 
also had to be included in this set. On the cover sheet (see Appendix III for an 
example) data with respect to the coder (name, initials, date, and time spent), data 
with respect to the annual report (name of company and fiscal year), and data with 
respect to the letter to the shareholders (number of pages, number of columns, 
number of causal statements, and number of “unexplained effects”) had to be 
recorded. In addition, coders had to determine the following issues regarding the 
letters to the shareholders they read: 
1. Information with respect to the opening sentence and opening section. More 
specifically, it concerned coders’ perception whether the message contained in 
the opening section is positive, neutral or negative. Furthermore, they had to 
indicate whether the opening (that is: first) sentence contained a reference to 
the result that has been obtained in the fiscal year under review. 
2. Information with respect to the closing section. With respect to the closing 
section the coders had to indicate whether management addressed future 
expectations and/or directed words of gratitude towards its employees, 
shareholders, and so on. In addition, they were asked to state their perception 
of the tone of the final section: positive, negative, or neutral. 
3. Future outlook. Here, coders had to indicate whether management addresses 
its future expectations in the letter to the shareholders (hence, including 
locations other than the final section). If so, they had to record whether the 
expectations are positive, negative, or neutral. 
4. Words of gratitude. Here, the coders had to lay down whether the management 
board directed words of gratitude towards a specific interest group, as 
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shareholders, employees, customers, society, or other. It was possible to cross 
mark more than one category. 
5.2.4 Intercoder reliability 
Content analysis is “a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from data according to their context” (Krippendorff, 1980: 21). 
Particularly important in research using content analysis is reliability, because 
“without acceptable levels of reliability, content analysis measures are 
meaningless” (Neuendorf, 2002: 12). Reliability is the extent to which a measuring 
procedure yields the same results on repeated trials (Neuendorf, 2002: 141).
According to Krippendorff (1980) it is possible to distinguish three levels of 
reliability, namely stability, reproducibility, and accuracy. Stability, the weakest 
form of reliability, implies that coding results remain the same over time. It 
involves a single person redoing his codings after a certain period using the same 
coding instructions. The next level of reliability, reproducibility or intercoder 
reliability, implies agreement among multiple coders who independently of each 
other perform the codings using the same instructions. According to Krippendorff 
(1980) data should be at least reproducible. The highest level of reliability, 
accuracy, refers to the extent to which the classification corresponds to a standard 
or norm. However, accuracy is seldom used and researchers tend to settle for 
reproducibility (Weber, 1990). 
Measuring reproducibility or intercoder reliability involves assessing the 
proportion of coding errors between the various coders (Milne and Adler, 1999). 
Researchers have used various forms of calculations to measure intercoder 
reliability, including correlation coefficients, coefficients of agreement, Scott’s pi, 
Cohen’s kappa, and Krippendorff’s alpha. Whereas neither correlation coefficients 
nor coefficients of agreement take chance into consideration and, consequently, 
tend to overestimate reliability, the other reliability measures do make adjustments 
for chance.11 In this study we use Cohen’s kappa (κ) to report intercoder 
reliability, notwithstanding that it is criticised as being overly conservative giving 
credit only to agreement beyond chance. Cohen’s kappa is not only the most 
widely used reliability measure (Kolbe and Burnett, 1991; Neuendorf, 2002), 
additionally, it assumes coders to be independent, coder effects to be random 
(Hughes and Garrett, 1990), and data to be on the nominal level (Neuendorf, 2002: 
11 The reliability measures that adjust for chance agreement are of the following basic 
form: (observed agreement – expected agreement)/(1 – expected agreement). The 
calculation of estimated chance agreement, however, differs for Cohen’s kappa, Scott’s pi, 
and Krippendorff’s alpha. 
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150). Cohen’s kappa has a range from 0.00, implying agreement at chance level, to 
1.00, indicating perfect agreement. Additionally, scores below 0.00 indicate 
agreement less than chance. What constitutes an acceptable level of intercoder 
reliability, however, is unclear because it may vary among authors and depends on 
the reliability measure used (Krippendorff, 1980; Riffe, Lacy, and Fico, 1998; 
Neuendorf, 2002). Fortunately, there are certain rules of thumb available to make 
judgements about reliability using Cohen’s kappa (e.g. Landis and Koch, 1977; 
Banerjee et al., 1999). According to both Landis and Koch (1977) and Banerjee et 
al. (1999) a Cohen’s kappa between 0.40 and 0.80 indicate fair to good agreement 
beyond chance, while kappas higher than 0.80 indicate excellent agreement 
beyond chance.12
Table 5.3 reports Cohen’s kappas for the various dimensions of the 
unexplained effects (Zs), organisational outcomes (As), and causes or explanations 
(Bs).13 As can be seen in table 5.3 the reported kappas are all significantly 
different from 0.00, implying intercoder agreement greater than chance. 
Furthermore, except for the explicitness of the relationship, reported kappas 
indicate at least moderate agreement. With respect to valence of the attributed 
effect (κ = 0.96), direction of the cause-effect relationship (κ = 0.86), and locus of 
causality (κ = 0.81)—which form the most important dimensions of this study—
reported kappas are above the 0.80-level indicating excellent intercoder agreement 
beyond chance. Given Cohen’s kappas we conclude that the content analysis 
yielded sufficiently reliable data. The single exception concerns the explicitness of 
the relationship with κ of 0.28. Therefore we omit this dimension from further 
analysis. 
12 Landis and Koch (1977) reported the most detailed division: 
Kappa statistic  Strength of agreement
0.00    Poor 
0.00-0.20   Slight 
0.21-0.40   Fair 
0.41-0.60   Moderate 
0.61-0.80   Substantial 
0.81-1.00   Almost perfect 
13 We also determined Scott’s pis for the various dimensions. This, however, did not result 
in significantly different reliability scores. 
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Table 5.3 Reliability of content analysis 
14 Reducing the locus of causality dimension from eight to three categories, viz. internal 
(originally four internal categories were distinguished), external (originally three external 
categories were distinguished), and an uncodeable category, yields a substantially higher 
kappa of 0.81. In further analysis we use this limited categorisation scheme. 
Panel A – Unexplained effect (Zs) 
Dimension Cohen’s κ Significance 
Type of effect 0.80  0.000 
Valence 0.90  0.000 
Nature (qualitative/quantitative) 0.80  0.000 
Panel B – Organisational outcomes (As) 
Dimension Cohen’s κ Significance 
Type of effect 0.77  0.000 
Valence 0.96  0.000 
Nature (qualitative/quantitative) 0.78  0.000 
Time orientation 0.52  0.000 
Level 0.81  0.000 
Panel C – Explanations (Bs) 
Dimension Cohen’s κ Significance 
Expression of cause-effect 0.28  0.000 
Direction of cause-effect 0.86  0.000 
Time orientation 0.52  0.000 
Nature (qualitative/quantitative) 0.64  0.000 
Causal/accounting language 0.66  0.000 
Locus of causality 0.66 14 0.000 
Stability 0.50  0.000 
Controllability 0.79  0.000 

6  Results 
“In America, “the squeaky wheel gets  
the grease.” In Japan, “the nail that stands 
out gets pounded down”” 1
In this chapter the results of the study are presented. After this chapter we should 
be able to provide answers to our two main research questions and have a picture 
regarding managers’ tendencies to use self-serving attributional biases when they 
provide explanations for organisational outcomes. We also should be able to 
indicate whether managers from different cultures differ in the same way as 
“ordinary” people like students when it comes to providing explanations for their 
outcomes. Section 6.1 provides some descriptive data regarding the coding entities 
the content analysis has yielded. Subsequently, we combine some of the 
dimensions of the outcomes (As) and the causes (Bs), in order to make a start with 
analysing self-serving attributional biases and to provide answers to the 10 
propositions we have formulated in the previous chapter. More specifically, we 
have split our ten propositions into two groups. The first group comprises 
propositions 1 to 4. These propositions not only aim at determining whether CEOs 
explain company results in self-serving ways in their letters to the shareholders, in 
addition they hypothesised on cultural variability therein. In section 6.2 we use 
non-parametric tests to examine such cultural variability. The second group, which 
includes propositions 5 to 10, deals with possible other factors that may either 
exacerbate or attenuate such self-serving tendencies. In section 6.3 we use two 
special forms of regression, viz. count and ordered logit regression which take the 
specific nature of our dependent variable into account, in order to examine which 
determinants (e.g. firm size, CEO-tenure, etc.)—apart from culture—influence 
self-serving behaviour in letters to the shareholders. After having tested our 10 
propositions we subsequently analyse other interesting features of explanatory 
behaviour and letters in general in section 6.5. As argued in section 5.1, self-
1 Anecdotes that underscore the dissimilarities between the American and Japanese 
cultures, as mentioned in Markus and Kitayama’s (1991: 224) paper on construal of the 
self. 
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serving attributions are part of a wider range of impression management 
techniques available to managers when they present news with respect to 
organisational outcomes in the annual report. Therefore, and because they are 
closely related to our study of self-serving attributional biases and, hence, could be 
easily incorporated in the content analysis, we explored three other forms of 
impression management in accounting narratives as well. Firstly, we examine in 
which way culture and other organisational circumstances influence the use of 
accounting-technical language in letters to the shareholders. For example, we 
investigate whether the type of performance (i.e. improvement versus 
deterioration) influences the type of language used to account for such 
performance. Furthermore, we look at the tone at the beginning and end of letters 
to the shareholders and the inclusion of statements regarding future expectations.  
6.1 Descriptive data coding results 
6.1.1 General descriptive data 
As was described in section 5.2, where we have outlined our research design, we 
content analysed 278 letters to the shareholders. This resulted in 914 unexplained 
effects (Zs) and 911 organisational outcomes (As) that were explained by 1,420 
causes (Bs). Table 6.1 provides a breakdown per country suggesting that, maybe 
except for the number of causes, the number of coding entities is more or less 
equally divided among Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States.  
However, looking at the average number of unexplained effects and cause-
effect relationships per letter provides a different picture. As is evident from table 
6.1, the Dutch reports contain on average more coding entities (As, Bs, and Zs) 
than either the American or Japanese letters. This result seems logical as the Dutch 
produced somewhat longer management reports. Furthermore, the number of 
letters not containing any causal statement is larger in the United States (19) and 
Japan (15) than in the Netherlands (5). The average number of causal attributions 
per letter found in previous studies are: 2.33 in the Bettman and Weitz (1983) 
study, 8.5 in the Salancik and Meindl (1984) study, 7 in the Clapham and Schwenk 
(1991) study, and 13.4 in the Aerts (1994) study. In the most recent study on self-
serving attributional biases in Singapore letters to the shareholders, Tsang (2002) 
reports an average of 4.30 causal attributions per letter. 
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Panel A – Unexplained effects (Zs) 
 US JP NL Total 
Total 336 293 285 914 
Average per report 3.23 2.82 4.07 3.29 
St. deviation 3.00 3.56 3.17 3.29 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Max 13 20 19 20 
Panel B – Organisational outcomes (As) 
 US JP NL Total 
Total 282 316 313 911 
Average per report 2.71 3.04 4.47 3.28 
St. deviation 2.28 2.44 3.30 2.71 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Max 11 10 12 12 
Panel C – Explanations (Bs) 
 US JP NL Total 
Total 394 500 526 1420 
Average per report 3.79 4.81 7.51 5.11 
St. deviation 3.29 4.11 6.72 4.87 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Max 14 20 32 32 
Table 6.1 Descriptive data coding entities 
6.1.2 Descriptive data regarding explained effects (As) 
Of the 911 organisational outcomes that are explained by the CEOs in their letters 
to the shareholders, 605 or 66.5% relate to the main accounting issues, namely 
profits, sales, and costs. Issues as market share and shareholder value, however, 
are not frequently addressed in managers’ causal attributions: 7.2% of the 
attributed effects are devoted to one of these subjects. In 241 cases (26.5%) the 
attributed effects are coded as either “other” or involve more than one issue. Table 
6.2 summarises the findings. 
We see significant differences between the three countries with respect to the 
issues being addressed (Ȥ2 = 80.21; p-value = 0.000). Japanese managers mostly 
pay attention to profits, sales, and costs in their causal attributions: 230 of the 316 
(72.7%) attributed effects relate to these issues. Dutch managers show a similar 
tendency: 71.0% of their organisational outcomes are devoted either to profits, 
sales, or costs. In American letters, however, only about half (54.2%) of the 
explained effects relate to the “real” accounting issues. Americans say a great deal 
more about shareholder value than either Japanese or Dutch managers. Regarding 
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market share we do not see significant differences between the countries: in about 
5% of the organisational outcomes market share is being addressed. In all 
countries, but particularly the United States, the categories “other” and “more 
effects” are frequently used to code the explained effects. In the United States they 
make up more than a third (35.4%) of the organisational outcomes. In Japan and 
the Netherlands the percentages are somewhat lower with 22.1% and 26.5%, 
respectively.  
  US    JP    NL   Total 
Nature effect Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Profits 80 28.4 87 27.5 106 33.9 273 30.0 
Sales 63 22.3 136 43.0 85 27.2 284 31.2 
Costs 10 3.5 7 2.2 31 9.9 48 5.3 
Market share 16 5.7 14 4.4 18 5.8 48 5.3 
Shareholder 
value 
13 4.6 2 0.6 2 0.6 17 1.9 
Other 59 20.9 33 10.4 48 15.3 140 15.4 
More effects 41 14.5 37 11.7 23 7.3 101 11.1 
Total 282 100.0 316 100.0 313 100.0 911 100.0 
Table 6.2 Cross tabulation nature explained effect * country 
 US   JP   NL   Total Valence effect 
Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Positive 190 67.4 170 53.8 215 68.7 575 63.1 
Negative 89 31.6 143 45.3 96 30.7 328 36.0 
Uncodeable 3 1.1 3 0.9 2 0.6 8 0.9 
Total 282 100.0 316 100.0 313 100.0 911 100.0 
Table 6.3 Cross tabulation valence explained effect * country 
The figures in table 6.3 suggest that a large part (63.1%) of the results is 
favourable and concern, for example, increasing sales, a higher net income, etc.. In 
only 328 cases (36.0%) the effect is considered negative. However, the unbalanced 
attention for positive outcomes occurs particularly in the Western nations of this 
study (Ȥ2 = 18.56; p-value = 0.000). In both the United States as well as the 
Netherlands slightly more than two thirds of the effects being explained (67.4% 
and 68.7% for American and Dutch companies, respectively) have a positive 
valence. These percentages are comparable with Aerts’ (1991) study of Belgian 
management reports. Also in the Staw et al. (1983) study it is found that 
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Americans tend to stress the positive: even the ill-performing companies (i.e. those 
who have to report a performance deterioration) are not inclined to pay a lot of 
attention to their failures: only 41.1% of their attributed effects are negative. In 
case of the high-performing companies this percentage even decreases to a mere 
16.8%. If we, however, consider our Japanese companies, we see a more balanced 
coverage: 53.8% of the attributed effects are coded “positive”, while 45.3% are 
coded unfavourable and relate to, for example, declining sales or profits (the 
remaining 0.9% could not be coded on this dimension). These percentages are very 
similar to Tsang’s (2002) study of Singapore letters to the shareholders. He finds 
52.8% and 47.2% of his attributions coded as favourable and unfavourable, 
respectively. 
6.1.3 Descriptive data regarding explanations (Bs) 
In only a small percentage (12.6%) of the 1,420 explanations the relationship 
between effect and explanation are of opposite nature.2 This implies that generally 
speaking managers do not make frequent use of causal statements such as “In spite 
of the highest fuel prices since the Gulf War, we generated $562 million in pre-tax 
income in 2000 and have delivered 23 straight quarters of profit” (annual report 
Continental Airlines 2000). They show a clear preference for avoiding such “in 
spite of”-relationships. 86.7% Of the causal statements are of the form “These 
[declining] results reflect in no small degree the prolonged recession in Japan and 
the monetary crisis in other Asian countries” (annual report Sumitomo Chemical 
1999), involving statements in which cause and effect are expressed in similar 
directions. There is, however, a significant difference among the three countries 
we examine (Ȥ2 = 12.70; p-value = 0.020). The Japanese make, relatively speaking, 
greater use of these “in spite of”-relationships than both the American and Dutch 
managers do (15.8% of the causal attributions in the Japanese letters are expressed 
in “in spite of” terms, compared to 12.7% and 9.5% for the American and Dutch 
managers, respectively). Table 6.4 provides detailed information with respect to 
this dimension. 
2 Aerts (1991) found a similar percentage of 12.9% in his study of 50 Belgian management 
reports.  
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 US    JP   NL   Total Direction
cause-effect  Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Similar 340 86.3 416 83.2 475 90.3 1231 86.7 
Opposite 50 12.7 79 15.8 50 9.5 179 12.6 
Uncodeable 4 1.0 5 1.0 1 0.2 10 0.7 
Total 394 100.0 500 100.0 526 100.0 1420 100.0 
Table 6.4 Cross tabulation direction cause-effect relationship * country 
As the figures in table 6.5 suggest, explanations are predominantly expressed 
in clear-cut, causal language. In only 336 cases (23.7%) managers make use of 
accounting-technical statements such as “Pre-tax charges in the fourth quarter of 
1998 had a negative impact on the results of ƒ1.6 billion” (annual report Philips 
1998). There is, however, a significant difference between the countries. In Dutch 
reports, the use of accounting-technical language is, relatively speaking, the most 
prominent. Whereas in Japanese and American letters less than 20% of the 
statements use accounting-technical language, more than a third of the 
explanations Dutch managers give contain language in which responsibility is not 
easily assigned (Ȥ2 = 53.62; p-value = 0.000). 
 US   JP   NL   Total Language 
explanations Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Causal 334 84.8 401 80.2 346 65.8 1081 76.1 
Accounting-
technical 
60 15.2 97 19.4 179 34.0 336 23.7 
Uncodeable 0 0.0 2 0.4 1 0.2 3 0.2 
Total 394 100.0 500 100.0 526 100.0 1420 100.0 
 Table 6.5 Cross tabulation language explanation * country 
Generally speaking managers’ explanations are internally oriented (see table 
6.6). 45.1% Of the 1,420 explanations refer to causes as management strategy, the 
success of products the company developed and introduced, the contributions of 
the employees, and so forth. In only 472 cases (or 33.2%) they refer to the external 
environment as the reason why the company’s performance improved or 
deteriorated. A large number (21.6%) of the explanations are uncodeable on this 
dimension. This percentage is related to the large amount of explanations 
expressed in accounting-technical language. As was discussed in section 2.3 an 
important characteristic of accounting-technical language is that the issue of whom 
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is responsible for an outcome frequently remains unclear (Aerts, 1994). If we only 
look at the causal statements, i.e. those statements where locus could be assigned, 
the overall bias towards internal causes is even stronger: in that case 57.6% of the 
explanations is internal. Here we see arise one of the largest cultural differences 
(Ȥ2 = 92.56; p-value = 0.000). If we omit the explanations that are uncodeable on 
this dimension, 61.3% of the American causes and 63.1% of the Dutch causes are 
internal. Japanese managers, on the other hand, use internal and external causes 
almost equally to account for company results. 
 US   JP  NL    Total Locus of 
causality Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Internal 209 53.0 213 42.6 219 41.6 641 45.1 
External 132 33.5 212 42.4 128 24.3 472 33.2 
Uncodeable 53 13.5 75 15.0 179 34.0 307 21.6 
Total 394 100.0 500 100.0 526 100.0 1420 100.0 
Table 6.6 Cross tabulation locus of causality of explanation * country 
With respect to the stability of the cause (see table 6.7), we find that 42.9% is 
of temporary nature and is unlikely to be present the next year. 35.4% of the 
causes is considered enduring, while 21.7% could not be coded on this dimension 
(which again relates to the use of accounting-technical language). No difference 
between companies from the United States and Japan is noticeable, both make 
greater use of temporal causes than of stable causes. The Dutch, on the other hand, 
show no real preference for either type of cause (Ȥ2 = 77.02; p-value = 0.000). 
 US   JP   NL   Total 
Stability Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Stable 149 37.8 186 37.2 168 31.9 503 35.4 
Temporal 191 48.5 239 47.8 179 34.0 609 42.9 
Uncodeable 54 13.7 75 15.0 179 34.0 308 21.7 
Total 394 100.0 500 100.0 526 100.0 1420 100.0 
Table 6.7 Cross tabulation stability of explanation * country 
The last dimension, controllability of the cause, is summarised in table 6.8. As 
expected, the reported percentages are similar to the division of causes based on 
locus of causality: 44.1% are controllable, 34.3% are uncontrollable, and 21.6% 
are uncodeable on this dimension (which is related to the use of accounting-
technical explanations). Regarding possible cultural differences, we see that the 
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Japanese managers, in contrast to their western colleagues, show no real 
preference for using controllable or uncontrollable causes to account for company 
results (Ȥ2 = 92.27; p-value = 0.000). 
 US   JP   NL    Total Controlla-
bility Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Controllable 200 50.8 208 41.6 218 41.4 626 44.1 
Uncontrollable 141 35.8 217 43.4 129 24.5 487 34.3 
Uncodeable 53 13.5 75 15.0 179 34.0 307 21.6 
Total 394 100.0 500 100.0 526 100.0 1420 100.0 
Table 6.8 Cross tabulation controllability of explanation * country 
6.1.4 Descriptive data regarding unexplained effects (Zs) 
Table 6.9 provides descriptive statistics for the 914 unexplained effects with 
respect to the nature of the effect, that is with respect to the issue being addressed. 
The large majority concern either sales (33.6%) or profits (31.8%). Only 16 of the 
914 (1.8%) unexplained effects relate to costs, whereas market share is subject in 
only 4.4% of the cases. Management pays more attention to shareholder value and 
earnings per share: this is covered in 11.3% of the unexplained effects. The 
remaining 17.2% of the effects covers either more than one issue at the same time 
(frequently both sales and profits) or involves other issues that could not be 
assigned to one of the categories. For the sample as a whole it is obvious that 
management predominantly addresses the traditional accounting concepts such as 
sales, profits, and costs: these are subject in almost two thirds of the unexplained 
effects. 
 US   JP   NL   Total 
Nature effect Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Profits 78 23.2 103 35.2 110 38.6 291 31.8 
Sales 100 29.8 141 48.1 66 23.2 307 33.6 
Costs 6 1.8 3 1.0 7 2.5 16 1.8 
Market share 14 4.2 9 3.1 17 6.0 40 4.4 
Shareh. value 57 17.0 14 4.8 32 11.2 103 11.3 
Other 33 9.8 8 2.7 34 11.9 75 8.2 
More effects 48 14.3 15 5.1 19 6.7 82 9.0 
Total 336 100.0 293 100.0 285 100.0 914 100.0 
Table 6.9 Cross tabulation nature unexplained effect * country 
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 There are, however, significant differences between the three countries with 
respect to the issues addressed in unexplained effects (Ȥ2 = 100.91; p-value = 
0.000). Although in the letters from all three countries profits and earnings receive, 
relatively speaking, the largest attention (see table 6.10), it seems that Japanese 
managements in particular confine themselves to reporting on these issues. More 
than 80% of the Japanese unexplained effects relate to profits and sales. In 
American and Dutch companies this percentage is considerably lower with 53.0% 
and 61.8%, respectively. In these countries management is keener to address 
shareholder value related issues (e.g. earnings per share): whereas in Japanese 
reports only 4.8% concern shareholder value, this is 11.2% and a considerable 
17.0% for the Dutch and American companies, respectively. Regarding the 
attention for costs and market share no real difference is noticeable.  
 With respect to the valence of the issues addressed we find that the large 
majority (75.3%) of the unexplained effects have a positive valence in which 
management, for example, claims that “sales increased 16.6 percent to more than 
$1.2 billion for the year” (annual report Steinmart 2000) or that “Our net income 
rose 6.7% in the past fiscal year, to ¥481.9 billion ($4.5 billion)” (annual report 
Toyota 2000). However, here we see a significant difference between the 
companies from the different cultures as well (Ȥ2 = 43.96; p-value = 0.000). As is 
evident from table 6.10 below, in case of the Western companies approximately 
80% of the unexplained effects relate to positive results. The Japanese companies, 
on the other hand, use a more balanced strategy: 61.8% involve positive outcomes, 
while in 33.8% of the unexplained effects a negative outcome is addressed. 
 US   JP   NL   Total Valence effect 
Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Positive 280 83.3 181 61.8 227 79.6 688 75.3 
Negative 47 14.0 99 33.8 51 17.9 197 21.6 
Uncodeable 9 2.7 13 4.4 7 2.5 29 3.2 
Total 336 100.0 293 100.0 285 100.0 914 100.0 
Table 6.10 Cross tabulation valence unexplained effect * country 
6.1.5 Discussion 
The analysis at the level of single dimensions yields a number of interesting 
observations from a cross-cultural perspective. Firstly, the results with respect to 
valence of the effect indicate that managers from the two Western cultures tend to 
stress the positive in their letters to the shareholders (see tables 6.3 and 6.10). We 
find, in line with previous research of e.g. Staw et al. (1983), Salancik and Meindl 
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(1984), and Clapham and Schwenk (1991), that the large majority of the outcomes 
is favourable and concerns increasing sales, profits, etc.. About 80% of the 
unexplained effects (Zs) (table 6.10) and approximately two thirds of the explained 
effects (As) (table 6.3) in the American and Dutch reports are favourable. The 
Japanese on the other hand, show a more balanced coverage strategy in which bad 
news is addressed as well. We find that about 35% of their unexplained effects 
(table 6.10) and 45% of the explained effects (table 6.3) present negative 
information regarding, for example, decreasing profits, lower sales, etc.. Tsang 
(2002) in his recent study of letters of CEOs from Singapore finds similar results: 
approximately 47% of his attributed effects were coded “unfavourable.” This 
greater presence of favourable results in western letters to the shareholders and the 
more balanced coverage strategy among the Japanese is in line with recent social-
psychological findings and can be explained in two ways.  
The first draws on recent findings in the social-psychological field, which 
indicate that the need for a positive self-regard is particularly strong in Western, 
individualistic (i.e. North American) cultures, where there is an independent 
construal of the self—cultures in which independence, ability, success, and 
individual control and responsibility are important (e.g. Markus and Kitayama, 
1991, Kitayama et al., 1997; Heine et al., 1999, 2000, 2001). The need to view 
oneselves positively encourages people “to seek out, enhance and elaborate their 
positive characteristics” (Heine et al., 1999: 775). In a study with undergraduates, 
Heine and colleagues (2001) find that in individualistic societies negative 
information is considered threatening to the self and lead people to engage in 
compensatory strategies. On the other hand in cultures with an interdependent 
construal of the self, such as Japan, negative information is not considered 
threatening at all. On the contrary, it suits their strive for continuous self-
improvement. Indeed, the social-psychological literature documents evidence of 
self-criticism among the Japanese, implying that they tend to focus on their weak 
points that they should try to improve. According to Heine et al. the “self-critical 
orientation is often described as a defining characteristic of Japanese […] which is 
encouraged early in life through the mechanism of hansei (self-reflection)” (1999: 
770). Furthermore, this mechanism is expected to stimulate people to focus on 
potentially negative features of the self (i.e. to self-criticise). Hence, being prone to 
negative information is—at least in Eastern cultures—not an indication of low 
self-esteem. Rather, it should stimulate self-esteem “as it better enables them to 
pursue tasks relevant within their cultural context” (Heine et al., 2001: 435). 
Indeed, “information about where one has fallen short […] is used to improve or 
perfect one’s actions and thus serves to affirm one’s belongingness to a certain 
social group” (Kitayama et al., 1997: 1246). In two studies Kitayama and 
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colleagues (1997) found that American individuals are quite biased toward 
positive information. “They chose a greater number of success than failure 
situations as relevant to their self-esteem […]. By contrast, the Japanese 
individuals showed a tendency for self-criticism. They chose a greater number of 
failure than success situations as relevant to their self-esteem” (Kitayama et al.,
1997: 1261). Heine et al. using undergraduates as well find direct evidence that 
confirms the cultural difference between the United States and Japan and conclude 
that “negative information is less threatening to the Japanese self [than to the 
American], and therefore there is not the same need to ward it off” (2001: 441).  
A second interpretation why the Japanese address, relatively speaking, more 
negative information in their letters to the shareholders than either the Americans 
or the Dutch is the Asia Crisis which started in July 1997. It started with the 
sudden devaluation of the Thai bath and soon created a sharp region-wide plunge 
(e.g. Lazonick, 1999; Legewie and Meyer-Ohle, 2000; Woo, Sachs and Schwab, 
2000). Countries, including Japan, that formerly were part of The East Asian 
Miracle (World Bank, 1993), suddenly had to deal with a drop in consumer 
demand, economic instability and experienced negative rates of economic growth 
in 1997 and 1998. Apart from the sharp drop in demand for their products—as for 
many Japanese companies the Southeast Asian region constituted the most 
important market (Legewie and Meyer-Ohle, 2000)—companies were suddenly 
also confronted with a situation that required changes in the way business had 
been done and the keiretsu system showed its first cracks (see e.g. Lazonick, 
1999). The Asia Crisis even “prompted calls for Japanese corporations to embrace 
the corporate governance principle of maximizing shareholder value” (Lazonick, 
1999: 2). Obviously, the Asia Crisis comprised large part of the years from which 
the letters were selected. A consequence might be that, as a result, the Japanese 
companies simply just had to address more bad news as they were affected more 
severely than companies from the West (Harrigan, 2000). 
Another interesting finding concerns the difference found with respect to the 
topics managers choose to address in the letters to the shareholders. Though in all 
countries the vast majority of the outcomes (both explained and unexplained) 
concern either sales or profits (see tables 6.2 and 6.9), which corroborates Aerts’ 
(1991) findings, we do see arise an East-West difference. We find that managers 
from the Western nations pay, relatively speaking, more attention to shareholder 
value-related issues than their Eastern counterparts. This particularly holds for the 
American CEOs: 17% of the unexplained effects and 5% of the explained effects 
relate to shareholder value. The Japanese on the other hand hardly pay attention to 
it: in only 5% of the unexplained effects and in less than 1% of the explained 
effects shareholder value is discussed. This difference in attention for shareholder 
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value fits the corporate governance characteristics of those countries. Since the 
beginning of the Nineties a vast amount of literature has been publicised on 
corporate governance. In essence, corporate governance refers to “the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury Report, 1992) and 
involves the power arrangement between the various corporate stakeholders, 
including the CEO, non-executive directors, shareholders, employees, creditors, 
etc.. A lot of literature has addressed the issue of international differences in 
corporate governance structures. Amongst others, researchers have looked into 
issues such as whether there is an one-tier, in which executive and non-executive 
directors are organized into a single board, or two-tier structure, in which 
executive and non-executive directors formally operate independently of each 
other in two separate corporate organs (e.g. Tricker, 1994; Charkham, 1995), and 
the effectiveness of non-executives in those two systems (e.g. Demb and 
Neubauer, 1992; Stiles and Taylor, 2001). Furthermore, the dispersion of 
ownership has been investigated (e.g. La Porta et al., 1999), as well as whether 
there is an insider, bank-dominated system such as Japan and Germany or an 
outsider, capital-market system such as the United States and the United Kingdom 
(e.g. Moerland, 1995; Morck and Nakamura, 1999; LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 2000). In many writings on corporate governance it is 
emphasized that in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and the United States in 
particular—with its reliance on equity finance—managers tend to focus on 
achieving value for their shareholders that may lead to a short-term time horizon. 
Hall and Weinstein (1996: 1), for instance, comment that “the US system, with its 
allegedly impatient shareholders, is thought to push managers to focus on the 
current bottom line.” Some even warn for the danger of short-terminism. The well-
known strategist Michael Porter (1992: 67) commented that “the US system first 
and foremost advances the goals of shareholders interested in near-term 
appreciation of their shares—even at the expense of the long-term performance of 
American companies.” Moerland (1995: 29), in a similar vein, argues that 
managers may bother so much about presenting favourable financial results in the 
short run that they overlook the importance of basic investments to sustain the 
firm’s performance in the long run. The recent collapses of Enron, Worldcom, and 
others only underscore the validity of Porters’ and Moerland’s observations. In 
contrast, directors from the Netherlands and Japan—notwithstanding the growing 
importance of achieving shareholder value due to increasing globalisation—are 
more concerned with “stakeholders who share in the returns from long-term 
investments in the firm” (Demirag, 1998: 19). Indeed, in an international survey 
among American, German, and Japanese managers, Porterba and Summers (1995) 
find direct evidence that Asian and European CEOs have a longer-term orientation 
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than their American colleagues. Furthermore, in a study among 43 leading Dutch 
non-executives, Van Manen (1999) as well finds that directors consider 
safeguarding the long-term continuity of the firm more important than achieving 
short-term return for their shareholders.3 Part of this difference to show good 
performance in the short-term seems to be culturally driven. Kuada and Gullestrup 
(1998: 43) comment that “firms operating in societies with relatively longer-term 
orientations are more likely to cater not only for the interest of their shareholders, 
but those of their organisational members and customers as well.”4 The difference 
in importance of short-term performance may be reflected in annual reports. 
According to Demirag (1998) firms that are located in insider, banker-based 
systems are more concerned with long-term corporate growth than short-term 
profitability. In these countries, such as Japan, managers focus on long-term 
growth, e.g. sales, market share and firm growth (Doi, 1998: 340-341). On the 
other hand, in countries “where the equity finance plays a dominant role in the 
provision of finance to companies, managers are expected to be rewarded using 
short-term performance measures such as earnings per share and other profit 
related measures” (Demirag, 1998: 67). The results of this study are in line with 
this difference. We saw that the American CEOs paid, relatively speaking, the 
most attention to shareholder value-related issues (including earnings-per-share-
measures). Additionally, the figures in tables 6.2 and 6.9 show that the Japanese, 
relatively speaking, pay a lot of attention to reporting on sales-related issues: 
almost half of their explained and unexplained effects relate to it. Regarding the 
relative attention for market share, however, we do not see a difference between 
the three countries. 
6.2 Preliminary analyses: Propositions 1 to 4 
6.2.1 Unit of analysis and composite variables 
In the previous section we presented descriptive data with respect to the coding 
entities (As, Bs, and Zs). Those statistics are based on individual causal statements 
(and unexplained effects) and do not take the company-related context in which 
they arise into consideration. Bettman and Weitz (1983) use this approach in their 
3 In a recently published article, Hofstede, Van Deusen, Mueller, Charles, and the Business 
Goals Network (2002) also find evidence that “continuity of the business” is perceived 
particularly important among Dutch business leaders. However, the same survey indicates 
that “this year’s profits” ranks high among US business leaders. 
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study of self-serving causal attributions in letters to the shareholders. They believe 
it is justified to take individual causal attributions as the unit of analysis because 
“there is no unambiguous method for summarising [...] the attributions in a single 
statement that describes the relationship of causal reasoning to overall corporate 
performance” (Bettman and Weitz, 1983: 172). In a later study, however, Staw et 
al. argue that “causal events are not independent cases, although one could argue 
that they do have meaning as identifiable acts or separate aspects of behaviour” 
(1983: 592). Their argument basically involves the idea that the type of outcome 
expected to be mostly addressed in the letter to the shareholders (i.e. the valence 
assigned to effects) depends on the performance the company is able to report. 
Therefore, it also seems more “logical” to take the entire letter to the shareholders 
as the unit of analysis rather than individual causal statements. Indeed, most 
studies after Bettman and Weitz (1983) take the entire letter to the shareholders as 
the unit of analysis rather than individual causal statements (Salancik and Meindl, 
1984; Clapham and Schwenk, 1991; Aerts, 1994).  
In this study we use the methods Aerts (1994) proposed to aggregate the 
coding results at company-year level, enabling us to take the letter in a specific 
year as the unit of analysis. In our case this procedure implies that the initial 
sample consisting of 914 unexplained effects and 1,420 causal attributions are 
reduced to 278 company-year observations. Two methods are used to determine 
these company data. First of all, we use plain frequency measures. This involves 
counting the number, per company per year, of the attributions coded in a certain 
way on a specific dimension. An example is that in year X company Y has 7 
positive effects and 3 negative effects. Additionally, we transform these 
frequencies into proportional data, which “reflect the relative frequencies of 
specific verbal characteristics and control for variation in the number of coded 
explanations per company” (Aerts, 2002: 11). In that respect, they add perspective 
to the frequency measure by complementing it with intensity measures (Gardner 
and Martinko, 1988; D’Aveni and MacMillan, 1990; Aerts, 1994). However, as 
Aerts (2002: 11) notes they have “the inconvenience that their validity becomes 
obscured when the denominator becomes equal to zero. [Consequently], their 
results should be considered with more caution than those of the frequency 
measures due to missing value-differences.” 
Apart from addressing individual causal statements, the descriptive data 
provided in section 6.1 concern single dimensions and indicate that some 
percentage of the causal attributions have a positive valence (as far as the effect is 
4 Following Bond and Hofstede, Japan and the Netherlands are countries that have a long-
term orientation, while the United States is a country with a short-term orientation. 
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concerned), have an internal locus of causality (with respect to the explanation 
provided), etc.. However, in order to verify whether managers’ attributions in the 
letters to the shareholders are self-serving or not, we have to combine coding 
dimensions of the effects (A) with those of the causes (B). At first sight, the 
valence of the effect (positive, negative, or uncodeable) and locus of causality of 
the cause (internal, external or uncodeable) are most relevant. However, the 
direction of the cause-effect relationship is vital as well. The implied meaning of a 
causal statement such as “Due to the favourable economic conditions our sales 
increased” is very different from the meaning of a statement such as 
“Notwithstanding the Asia crisis our sales increased.” Both statements are coded 
as a positive effect that is explained externally. Yet while the first credits the 
environment for the success, the second statement should be considered an 
enhancing type of attribution as managers implicitly claim they were responsible 
for the success. In effect, such a statement leads to an upgrading of the 
favourability of the outcome (Tedeschi and Melburg, 1984; Aerts, 2002). 
Similarly, in case of a statement such as “In spite of our actions, profits for the 
year declined”—which would be coded as a negative effect that is explained by an 
internal cause—denial of responsibility is implied. In such a statement 
management comments on a negative outcome “as something that happened in 
spite of internal events or actions that normally should have led to the contrary” 
(Aerts, 2002: 5), thereby also trying to shift blame on the environment. Treating 
such “leverage-effects” (Aerts, 2002) without taking the implied meaning into 
consideration yields an unreliable picture. Therefore, two analyses are performed. 
Firstly, we perform an analysis in which such “in spite of”-attributions are 
completely ignored. Subsequently, we re-analyse the data by taking the implied 
meaning into consideration. Hence, in the second analysis a statement such as 
“Notwithstanding the Asia crisis, our sales increased” is considered a positive 
effect that is explained internally; that is an enhancing type of attribution.5
6.2.2 Descriptive data composite variables 
In order to verify whether the explanations for organisational results in letters to 
the shareholders are self-serving, we combine the codings with respect to the 
valence of the effect with the locus of causality of the explanation. Tables 6.11 and 
5 This method differs from the one Aerts (1991, 2002) uses. Aerts first analyses the codings 
without taking the implied meaning of “in spite of”-effects into account, hence treating 
statements such as “Due to the favourable economic conditions our sales increased” and 
“Notwithstanding the Asia crisis our sales increased” similarly (i.e. positive effect, external 
locus of causality). Subsequently, he re-analyses the results by completely excluding the 
“in spite of”-statements. 
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6.12 present the results with respect to these composite variables and tell us in 
what terms managers tend to explain positive and negative effects. The tables 
contain the average number and standard deviation (in parentheses) for frequency 
measures (Panel A) and proportional measures (Panels B and C).6 In order to 
determine the percentages we eliminate those attributions that are uncodeable 
along locus of causality. The difference between Panel B and C is that Panel B 
completely ignores leveraged attributions. In Panel C such statements are included. 
Table 6.11 shows that on average letters to the shareholders have 3.2 positive 
effects that are explained by the CEO. Furthermore, we observe that there are on 
average 1.6 positive attributions in which the CEO refers to management’s 
strategy, the success of the company’s products, or other causes that are seen as 
having an internal locus of causality. External sources are less frequently used to 
account for positive outcomes: on average each letter only has 0.5 external, 
positive attributions. Furthermore, the figures in Panel A of table 6.11 indicate that 
leveraged statements—those statements in which cause and effect are stated in 
different directions—are used in an enhancing mode. On average per letter we 
encounter 0.4 statements such as “We confronted dramatically higher prices for oil 
and natural gas, a weak euro and keen Asian competition. We reported earnings 
growth in the face of these challenges” (annual report DuPont 2000). 
6 The averages and standard deviations as far as the frequency measures are concerned are 
based on the full sample (n=278). Consequently, they are also based on the letters that do 
not contain any positive or negative effects. The result is that the calculated means are 
affected negatively. In the proportional data those letters are filtered out as they are treated 
as “missing values” as the denominator equals zero. For sake of completeness we included 
data on the number of letters not addressing any positive (table 6.11) or negative effects 
(table 6.12). 
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Positive effects
Panel A – Frequency data 
US
(n=104)
JP
(n=104) 
NL
(n=70) 
Total 
(n=278) 
Number of letters with no 
positive effects 
32 31 11 74 
Number of positive effects 
2.48
(2.80) 
2.69
(3.06) 
5.03
(5.69) 
3.20
(3.95) 
Internal* 
1.51
(1.86) 
1.39
(1.67) 
2.21
(2.36) 
1.64
(1.96) 
External* 
0.27
(0.75) 
0.42
(0.86) 
0.81
(1.68) 
0.46
(1.11) 
Opposite, internal 
0.04
(0.24) 
0.03
(0.17) 
0.09
(0.33) 
0.05
(0.24) 
Opposite, external 
0.31
(0.90) 
0.37
(0.67) 
0.24
(0.55) 
0.31
(0.68) 
Uncodeable 
0.35
(1.00) 
0.48
(0.99) 
1.68
(2.57) 
0.74
(1.64) 
Panel B – Proportional data (excl. uncodeable and leveraged effects) 
US
(n=66) 
JP
(n=70) 
NL
(n=55) 
Total 
(n=193) 
% Internal 
87.32 
(25.47) 
79.27 
(32.00) 
75.07 
(33.38) 
80.78 
(30.70) 
% External 
12.68 
(25.47) 
20.73 
(25.47) 
24.93 
(33.38) 
19.22 
(30.70) 
Panel C – Proportional data (excl. uncodeable effects) 
US
(n=72) 
JP
(n=71) 
NL
(n=58) 
Total 
(n=201) 
% Internal 
72.06 
(35.68) 
67.66 
(33.46) 
67.86 
(33.46) 
69.30 
(34.10) 
% External 
10.53 
(22.43) 
17.03 
(26.84) 
21.23 
(28.84) 
15.92 
(26.14) 
% Opposite, internal 
1.42
(7.61) 
0.77
(4.30) 
2.71
(9.39) 
1.56
(7.26) 
% Opposite, external 
15.99 
(30.50) 
14.54 
(21.58) 
8.20
(19.13) 
13.22 
(24.66) 
* Excluding opposite statements    
Table 6.11 Descriptives regarding to positive outcomes 
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The preference for presenting good results in an enhancing way, either directly 
or indirectly, is also confirmed by the proportional data (Panels B and C). If we 
ignore statements in which cause and effect are expressed in opposite directions, 
we see that somewhat over 80% of the positive effects that are codeable along 
locus of causality are attributed to management’s own actions, decisions, etc.. In 
only 20% a positive effect is ascribed to favourable general economic conditions, 
sector influences, or some other external factor. The inclusion “in spite of”-
statements (Panel C) does not really alter this general tendency and merely results 
in a shift between the categories. Additionally, the proportional data confirm the 
enhancing use of “in spite of”-statements: managers indirectly claim responsibility 
in 13% of the positive outcomes through the use of a statement such as the one 
found in Canon’s annual report 1997: “Despite these generally difficult economic 
circumstances, Canon realised increases in both sales and profits for the fourth 
consecutive term.” The proportional measures, as they take into account possible 
differences in the number of causal attributions per letter, are also relevant for 
comparing the three countries with each other. Using a non-parametric Kruskal-
Wallis test,7 with nation as grouping variable, reveals a significant country-effect 
with respect to the relative use of internal and external factors to account for 
positive outcomes (Ȥ2 = 6.44; p-value = 0.040). Further pair wise comparison using 
Mann-Whitney tests indicates that the Americans, if we exclude the leveraged 
effects, ascribe positive effects more to internal causes and less to external causes 
compared to both the Dutch and Japanese managers. Panel B of table 6.11 
indicates that Americans show a clear preference to attribute successes to 
themselves: 87% of the positive outcomes are ascribed to internal causes. 
Although this tendency is somewhat, yet significantly, lower for both the Japanese 
and the Dutch, it is still considerable with 79% and 75, respectively. The inclusion 
of statements such as the one found in the letter of Konami’s CEO “I believe 
Konami’s achievement of yet another year of record growth in both net sales and 
operating income, despite the difficult operating environment, confirms the 
correctness of our outgoing and bold management strategy” (annual report Konami 
2000), has a considerable influence (see Panel C). In that case we are only able to 
observe a significant difference between the three countries with respect to the 
relative use of external, positive attributions: such statements are relatively 
speaking more frequently used in Japan and the Netherlands than in the United 
States (Ȥ2 = 7.59; p-value = 0.022). In a next sub-section we will investigate 
7 Kolmogorow-Smirnov tests for goodness of fit reveal that not one of the composite 
variables follows a normal distribution (all p-values < 0.001). Consequently, we will use 
non-parametric statistics. 
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whether these differences also imply that there is a cultural effect in the extent to 
which managers show self-enhancing tendencies. 
Table 6.12 presents descriptive data with respect to negative outcomes. The 
letters on average contain 1.9 negative effects, which is lower than the number of 
positive effects (3.2). In the previous section we observed that the tendency to 
stress the positive was predominantly present in letters from the Western nations. 
This is also reflected in the number of positive effects letters on average present 
compared to the number of negative effects. For the American letters it is 2.5 
positive compared to 1.3 negative effects, for the Dutch it is 5.0 positive to 2.4 
negative effects. The Japanese (as seen in section 6.2) are more balanced in terms 
of coverage: on average the number of positive effects (2.7) is slightly higher than 
the number of negative effects (2.1). Furthermore, the results indicate protecting 
tendencies among the managers: letters have 0.9 external, negative effects, which 
is approximately twice as much as the average number of internal, negative effects 
(0.5). “In spite of”-statements that deflect responsibility away indirectly are not 
frequently employed. On average, letters only have 0.1 of such statements. The 
results indicate that, for the sample as whole, managers prefer to shift away blame 
directly rather than indirectly through the use of “in spite of”-relations. If we look 
at the proportional data (Panels B and C of table 6.12) we notice that, if we 
eliminate statements in which cause and effect are expressed in different 
directions, managers are inclined to blame the environment for performance 
deteriorations. In 62% of the negative outcomes they refer to the economic 
situation, the sector, or some other external factor as the cause of the bad result. If 
we include “in spite of”-statements, the percentage remains relatively unchanged: 
in 56.5% of the negative outcomes management blames some external factor 
directly. Additionally, in 6.5% of the cases managers try to avoid responsibility 
indirectly for the bad result by presenting it in a statement such as “In spite of our 
efforts, net income decreased, reflecting primarily such one-time factors as stock 
evaluation losses owing to a plunge in the Japanese stock market halfway through 
the year and currency losses from the devaluation of the Brazilian Real” (annual 
report Fuji Film 1999). Still in more than 35% managers are willing to accept 
blame for performance declines directly by ascribing it to a cause with an internal 
locus of causality. 
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Negative effects
Panel A – Frequency data 
US
(n=104) 
JP
(n=104) 
NL
(n=70) 
Total 
(n=278) 
Number of letters with no 
negative effects 
56 44 28 128 
Number of negative effects 
1.28
(1.95) 
2.08
(2.64) 
2.41
(3.41) 
1.86
(2.67) 
Internal* 
0.34
(0.76) 
0.41
(0.88) 
0.74
(1.24) 
0.47
(0.95) 
External* 
0.68
(1.29) 
1.21
(1.65) 
0.74
(1.72) 
0.90
(1.56) 
Opposite, internal 
0.07
(0.35) 
0.16
(0.44) 
0.06
(0.29) 
0.10
(0.38) 
Opposite, external 
0.00
(0.00) 
0.04
(0.19) 
0.03
(0.17) 
0.02
(0.15) 
Uncodeable 
0.19
(0.48) 
0.26
(0.68) 
0.84
(1.44) 
0.37
(0.92) 
Panel B – Proportional data (excl. uncodeable and leveraged effects) 
 US 
(n=42) 
JP
(n=55) 
NL
(n=38) 
Total 
(n=135) 
% Internal 
34.77 
(37.92) 
25.42 
(32.21) 
59.37 
(43.21) 
37.88 
(39.64) 
% External 
65.23 
(37.92) 
74.58 
(32.21) 
40.63 
(43.21) 
62.12 
(39.64) 
Panel C – Proportional data (excl. uncodeable effects) 
US
(n=45) 
JP
(n=56) 
NL
(n=39) 
Total 
(n=140) 
% Internal 
32.45 
(37.64) 
23.13 
(30.17) 
56.31 
(43.46) 
35.38 
(38.88) 
% External 
58.66 
(39.26) 
67.03
(32.65) 
39.06 
(43.32) 
56.55 
(39.42) 
% Opposite, internal 
8.89
(26.73) 
6.58
(13.83) 
3.72
(16.67) 
6.53
(19.54) 
% Opposite, external 
0.00
(0.00) 
3.26
(15.05) 
0.86
(3.72) 
1.54
(9.77) 
* Excluding opposite statements    
Table 6.12 Descriptives regarding negative outcomes 
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There are, however, significant differences between the three countries. Firstly, 
at first sight it seems that the Japanese managers show the strongest protecting 
tendencies. Compared with the two Western nations, they blame the external 
environment more often for performance deteriorations. In 75% the Japanese 
referred to, for example, the Asia Crisis, or some other external cause, compared to 
65% and 41% for the American and Dutch managers, respectively (Kruskal-Wallis 
test; Ȥ2 = 9.30; p-value = 0.010). Furthermore, the results indicate that the Dutch, 
comparable to the Belgians in Aerts’ earlier studies (1994, 2002), are willing to 
accept blame for a failure: in 59% of the attributions addressing bad outcomes they 
refer to an internal cause. Further pair wise comparison (using Mann-Whitney tests 
with nation as grouping variable), reveals no significant difference between the 
United States and Japan with respect to the relative use of internal or external 
attributions to account for negative outcomes. The Dutch, however, stand out with 
their readiness to accept blame. When looking at the proportional data, we see that, 
compared to both the Americans and the Japanese, the Dutch make significantly 
greater use (p-values < 0.050) of negative internal attributions (irrespective of the 
inclusion of leveraged statements). Whereas managers from both the United States 
and Japan refer, relatively speaking, more to external causes (65% and 75%, 
respectively, of the negative outcomes are blamed on the environment; see Panel 
B), Dutch managers refer more to internal causes to explain the bad results. In 
sum, the results seem to imply that managers, irrespective of the type of effect and 
whether addressing accounting issues or not—except for the Dutch when 
explaining bad outcomes—make use of self-serving attributions.  
So far we have looked at all effects. In an earlier study Aerts (1991) found that 
the elimination of non-traditional accounting concepts has a considerable effect on 
the extent to which outcomes are internally or externally attributed. Therefore, we 
re-do the analysis using only those causal attributions that relate to profits, sales, 
or costs. Tables 6.13 and 6.14 contain the descriptives with respect to this 
restricted set. In table 6.13 we first see that the number of positive accounting 
effects addressed on average in the letter to the shareholders is 2.09. As the 
number of positive effects ascribed to internal causes decreases from 1.6 to 0.8, 
and while the average number of external positive attributions hardly changes (see 
Panel A), it seems that if managers decide to include a positive statement with 
respect to non-accounting issues (e.g. market share and shareholder value), such 
effect is attributed predominantly to their own efforts. This may explain why we  
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Positive accounting effects (sales, profits, and costs)
Panel A – Frequency data 
US 
(n=104) 
JP
(n=104) 
NL
(n=70) 
Total 
(n=278) 
Number of positive effects 
1.35 
(2.07) 
1.83 
(2.58) 
3.59 
(4.34) 
2.09 
(3.09) 
Internal* 
0.79 
(1.36) 
0.88 
(1.45) 
1.29 
(1.61) 
0.95 
(1.47) 
External* 
0.15 
(0.48) 
0.36 
(0.81) 
0.61 
(1.34) 
0.35 
(0.90) 
Opposite, internal 
0.03 
(0.22) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.07 
(0.31) 
0.03 
(0.21) 
Opposite, external 
0.16 
(0.59) 
0.17 
(0.40) 
0.23 
(0.54) 
0.18 
(0.52) 
Uncodeable 
0.22 
(0.72) 
0.41 
(0.90) 
1.39 
(2.19) 
0.58 
(1.38) 
Panel B – Proportional data (excl. uncodeable and leveraged effects) 
US 
(n=45) 
JP
(n=54) 
NL
(n=47) 
Total 
(n=146) 
% Internal 
81.94 
(34.99) 
72.35 
(38.00) 
70.06 
(37.89) 
74.57 
(37.15) 
% External 
18.06 
(34.99) 
27.65 
(38.00) 
29.94 
(37.89) 
25.43 
(37.15) 
Panel C – Proportional data (excl.uncodeable effects) 
US 
(n=49) 
JP
(n=56) 
NL
(n=49) 
Total 
(n=154) 
% Internal 
70.13 
(40.81) 
64.80 
(39.70) 
59.17 
(37.48) 
64.71 
(39.36) 
% External 
15.31 
(31.78) 
22.14 
(31.72) 
25.76 
(34.63) 
21.12 
(32.75) 
% Opposite, internal 
2.30 
(14.36) 
1.78 
(13.36) 
3.06 
(11.50) 
2.35 
(13.06) 
% Opposite, external 
12.26 
(28.50) 
11.28 
(21.16) 
12.01 
(24.92) 
11.82 
(24.72) 
* Excluding opposite statements    
Table 6.13 Descriptives regarding positive outcomes 
observe a slight decrease in the proportion of positive effects that is attributed to 
management or company-related, hence internal, factors from 81% to 75% (if we 
include the “in spite of”-statements the decrease is comparable from 69% to 65%). 
Comparison of the figures in tables 6.11 and 6.13 suggest that the change in locus 
(about 6% from internal to external), due to the elimination of non-accounting 
effects, is more or less comparable for all three countries. However, the tendency 
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of both the Japanese and the Dutch, compared to the Americans, to ascribe positive 
outcomes slightly more to external causes remains present. 
Negative accounting effects (sales, profits, and costs)
Panel A – Frequency data 
 US 
(n=48) 
JP
(n=60) 
NL
(n=42) 
Total 
(n=150) 
Number of negative effects 
0.74 
(1.38) 
1.62 
(2.31) 
1.84 
(2.92) 
1.35 
(2.25) 
Internal* 
0.17 
(0.65) 
0.36 
(0.84) 
0.54 
(0.96) 
0.33 
(0.81) 
External* 
0.41 
(0.89) 
0.86 
(1.30) 
0.59 
(1.55) 
0.62 
(1.25) 
Opposite, internal 
0.06 
(0.34) 
0.13 
(0.39) 
0.03 
(0.24) 
0.08 
(0.34) 
Opposite, external 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
Uncodeable 
0.10 
(0.36) 
0.23 
(0.65) 
0.65 
(1.13) 
0.30 
(0.75) 
Panel B – Proportional data (excl. uncodeable and leveraged effects) 
 US 
(n=31) 
JP
(n=51) 
NL
(n=30) 
Total 
(n=112) 
% Internal 
26.88 
(40.52) 
31.75 
(40.36) 
60.02 
(42.69) 
37.97 
(42.86) 
% External 
73.12 
(40.52) 
68.25 
(40.36) 
39.98 
(42.69) 
62.03 
(42.86) 
Panel C – Proportional data (excl. uncodeable effects) 
US 
(n=33) 
JP
(n=52) 
NL
(n=30) 
Total 
(n=115) 
% Internal 
25.25 
(39.77) 
29.65 
(39.09) 
58.24 
(43.16) 
35.85 
(42.23) 
% External 
64.90 
(42.99) 
60.20 
(39.09) 
38.65 
(42.75) 
55.92 
(42.16) 
% Opposite, internal 
9.85 
(27.91) 
6.64 
(15.15) 
1.33 
(7.30) 
6.11 
(18.58) 
% Opposite, external 
0.00 
(0.00) 
3.51 
(15.60) 
1.78 
(6.99) 
2.05 
(11.12) 
* Excluding opposite statements    
Table 6.14 Descriptives regarding negative outcomes 
The exclusion of non-accounting items reduces the number of negative 
explained effects from 1.9 to 1.4 (see tables 6.12 and 6.14). Large part of the 
negative accounting effects is still blamed on the environment: for the sample as a 
whole the percentage of bad results that is ascribed to external factors remains 
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relatively unchanged at 62%. There are, however, important shifts within the 
United States and Japan. Whereas in the United States the percentage of negative 
outcomes that is blamed on factors beyond management’s control increases from 
65% to 73%, it decreases in Japan from 75% to 68%, thereby further reducing the 
difference between the two nations. The results suggest that management is 
inclined to include causal statements with respect to market share and shareholder 
value—typical non-accounting items—only if they have positive news to present. 
However, if negative information is presented on these subjects, at least in Japan, 
this is largely blamed on the bad economic conditions. In sum, it seems that the 
exclusion of non-accounting items from the analysis does not affect the differences 
between the three countries materially. 
6.2.3 Self-serving attributional biases in accounting narratives 
In section 2.2.3 we saw that the self-serving attributional bias consists of two 
components, namely the self-enhancing bias and the self-protecting bias. The first 
bias, self-enhancement, implies—in an organisational context—that managers 
want to take as much credit as possible for good results, e.g. increasing profits, 
higher sales, etc., by attributing those outcomes more to internal than to external 
causes. Self-protection, on the other hand, is particularly relevant in case of 
negative outcomes and involves a preference for blaming the environment for a 
performance deterioration (i.e. attributing the failure to an external cause) rather 
than taking responsibility for it by ascribing it to an internal cause. By doing so 
managers want to avoid that they are blamed for the disappointing results.  
 So far we have discussed the separate components of the self-enhancing and 
self-protecting biases. In the previous sub-section we saw that, when we ignore the 
leveraged statements, 80% of the positive outcomes are ascribed to management’s 
decisions, actions and other internal factors. Negative outcomes, on the other hand, 
are explained in terms of the bad economic situation, disappointing results 
throughout the sector, etc.. We observed that in more than 60% of the negative 
outcomes management blamed some external cause. In order to examine whether 
this also implies that self-enhancing and self-protecting biases are present, we have 
to examine whether internal positive attributions occur more frequently than 
external positive attributions, that is IP > EP, and whether external negative 
attributions are more frequently used than internal negative attributions, that is EN 
> IN. Similarly, we can test whether IP–EP > 0 (implying self-enhancement) and 
EN–IN > 0 (implying self-protection). This enables us to provide answers to our 
first two propositions in which we hypothesised that—irrespective of cultural 
background—on the one hand managers claim responsibility for favourable 
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outcomes (i.e. IP>EP) and deny responsibility for unfavourable ones (i.e. EN > IN) 
on the other. More formally they have been formulated as follow: 
Proposition 1–Self-enhancement: Generally speaking, managers claim 
responsibility for positive organisational outcomes (successes) in letters to the 
shareholders. That is, the number of internal-positive causal statements (IP) is 
larger than the number of external-positive statements (EP) in a letter to the 
shareholders. 
Proposition 2–Self-protection: Generally speaking, managers deny 
responsibility for negative organisational outcomes (failures) in letters to the 
shareholders. That is, the number of external-negative causal statements (EN) 
is larger than the number of internal-negative causal statements (IN) in a 
letter to the shareholders. 
Table 6.15 below contains the average difference in locus of causality for 
positive effects (IP–EP) and for negative effects (EN–IN). In parentheses the 
standard deviations are presented. Panel A contains the frequency data and 
proportional data excluding the “in spite of”-statements. Previously we observed 
that managers are to a certain extent inclined to indirectly assume responsibility 
for good results and try to shift blame away for bad results by the use of “in spite 
of”-statements. Therefore, if we want to have a complete picture of the self-
serving attributional bias, we have to consider the implied meaning of such 
statements as well. Panel B of table 6.15 presents the data in which those 
statements are included. In this case self-enhancement is calculated as the 
difference between the number of statements in which responsibility for a success 
is assumed directly (IP) or indirectly through an “in spite of”-statement (OPP_EP) 
and where the environment is credited for the success directly (EP) or indirectly 
(OPP_IP). Hence, self-enhancement is determined as (IP+OPP_EP)–
(EP+OPP_IP). Similarly, self-protection is calculated as (EN+OPP_IN)–
(IN+OPP_EN). The presence of self-serving tendencies would imply positive 
differences for IP–EP (indicating self-enhancement) and for EN–IN (indicating 
self-protection) that are significantly greater than zero. 
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All effects
Panel A – Data excluding leveraged effects 
 US  JP  NL  Total  
Frequency 
1.24
(1.82)
*** 0.97 
(1.76)
*** 1.40 
(2.00)
*** 1.18 
(1.85) 
***
Positive effects 
(IP–EP) 
Proportional 
74.63 
(51.48)
** 58.56 
(64.00)
*** 50.14 
(66.76)
*** 61.57 
(61.40) 
***
Frequency 
0.35
(1.30)
*** 0.80 
(1.65)
*** 0.00
(1.78)
 0.43 
(1.59) 
***
Negative 
effects 
(EN–IN) Proportional 
30.47 
(75.83)
*** 49.17 
(64.42)
*** -18.73 
(86.42)
 24.24 
(79.28) 
***
Panel B – Data including leveraged effects 
  US JP NL Total 
Frequency 
1.51
(1.96)
*** 1.31 
(1.95)
*** 1.56
(2.15)
*** 1.45 
(2.00) 
***
Positive effects 
Proportional 
76.10 
(46.64)
*** 64.41 
(53.85)
*** 52.11 
(63.40)
*** 65.05 
(55.01) 
***
Frequency 
0.41
(1.40)
*** 0.92 
(1.85)
*** 0.51 
(1.70)
 0.51 
(1.70) 
***
Negative 
effects 
Proportional 
35.10
(75.27)
*** 47.23 
(63.08)
*** -14.43 
(86.98)
 26.16 
(78.12) 
***
***
**
*
 Significant at 0.01 using a Wilcoxon signed rank test  
 Significant at 0.05 using a Wilcoxon signed rank test 
 Significant at 0.10 using a Wilcoxon signed rank test 
Table 6.15 Difference in locus of causality for positive and negative outcomes 
Regarding positive effects we see overwhelming evidence of a self-enhancing 
bias. The IP–EP differences, which indicate the tendency to take credit for good 
results, are all highly significant and support proposition 1. Non-parametric signed 
ranks tests reveal that managers are self-serving with respect to positive outcomes 
as they attribute them more to themselves than to factors beyond their control. 
With respect to both frequency and proportional measures we see significant 
effects. The inclusion of indirect statements (i.e. “in spite of”-statements) only 
results in a larger or stronger bias (indicated by the larger z-values not provided 
here). These results confirm our first proposition that, managers claim 
responsibility for positive organisational outcomes (successes) by ascribing them 
to a larger extent to internal causes than to external causes. With respect to 
negative outcomes we see strong self-protecting biases as well, though smaller 
than the self-enhancing bias. The EN–IN differences, which indicate the tendency 
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to lay blame on the environment, are significant for both the American and 
Japanese managers. The Dutch managers, however, show no self-protecting bias. 
Similar to their Belgian counterparts (Aerts, 1991) they do not refer significantly 
more to external factors such as economic recessions than internal factors when 
they explain why the company experienced a performance decline. On the 
contrary, as is evidenced by the negative difference in the proportional data, they 
make relatively speaking more internal attributions than external attributions when 
addressing a disappointing result. Again the inclusion of leveraged statements does 
not affect the general picture, it only widens the gap.8 In sum, the results tend to 
partially support proposition 2 (the Dutch are free of self-protection). We re-tested 
the data for self-serving biases in explaining the accounting effects (hence, 
restricted the effects being explained to sales, profits, or costs). Although the 
differences IP–EP and EN–IN, indicating self-enhancement and self-protection, 
respectively, become somewhat smaller, the biases remain significantly present. 
Again the Dutch managers do not show a self-protecting bias when they explain 
bad news regarding accounting effects. These results partially support our second 
proposition that managers deny responsibility for negative organisational 
outcomes (failures) in letters to the shareholder by ascribing them more to external 
causes than to internal ones. Only the Dutch managers did not show such a 
tendency.  
So far we have determined that irrespective of country managers show strong 
self-enhancing biases: they have a tendency to credit good news to themselves. In 
case of bad news, however, we observe that only the American and Japanese 
managers want to protect themselves by blaming it on the environment. The 
Dutch, on the other hand, do not exhibit self-protecting tendencies. We even see a 
small (though insignificant) self-deprecating tendency among the Dutch: they 
referred relatively speaking more to internal causes than to external causes when 
explaining bad results. The next step involves determining whether there are 
cultural differences in the extent in which managers from the three different 
countries show self-enhancing and self-protecting biases by comparing the IP–EP 
and EN–IN differences. This enables us to examine cultural variability in self-
serving attributional biases and to answer propositions 3 and 4 which were as 
follow: 
8 We checked whether the large amount of letters not explaining any positive or negative 
effects influences the outcomes. Using a restricted sample of 204 letters with at least one 
positive effect and 150 letters with at least one negative effect, we do not find different 
results. In this restricted set self-serving biases are still overwhelmingly present. 
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Proposition 3a–Self-enhancing attributions and self-versus group interest:
Managers from collectivistic cultures use external-positive causal statements 
to a larger extent than do managers from individualistic cultures. 
Proposition 3b–Self-protecting attributions and self-versus group 
interest: Managers from collectivistic cultures use internal-negative 
causal statements to a larger extent than do managers from 
individualistic cultures.
Proposition 4a–Self-enhancing attributions and cultural emphasis on 
achievement: Managers from high-achievement cultures will use internal-
positive causal statements to a larger extent than do managers from low-
achievement cultures. 
Proposition 4b–Self-protecting attributions and cultural emphasis on 
achievement: Managers from high-achievement cultures will use external-
negative causal statements to a larger extent than do managers from low-
achievement cultures. 
In order to provide answers to these propositions we have to compare the three 
countries simultaneously and pair wise. According to Hofstede (2002), the United 
States is a culture that may be characterised as highly individualistic and highly 
masculine, hence as a culture in which “personal achievement” is highly valued. 
Japan, on the other hand is a highly collectivistic, masculine country. The Dutch 
values may be summarised as individualistic and feminine. In table 6.16 the results 
of the overall cultural comparison (using three countries) and three pair wise 
comparisons (each using two countries) are presented. The table contains the p-
values of the comparisons, using non-parametric statistics. The comparisons are 
based on the difference in IP–EP and EN–IN of the three countries as have been 
reported in table 6.15. For example, the p-value of 0.489 is based on a comparison 
of 1.24 versus 0.97, of the US and Japan, respectively (see table 6.15). The figure 
(i.e. p-value) suggests that, when looking at frequency measures, the IP–EP 
difference of the two countries are not significantly different from each other. 
Hence, this implies that the US and Japan are not significantly different with 
respect to self-enhancement (when looking at frequency measures).  
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All effects
Panel A – Data excluding leveraged effects 
Overall US-JP US-NL JP-NL 
Frequency 0.439 0.489 0.488 0.211 Positive effects 
(IP–EP) Proportional 0.040 0.067 0.014 0.421 
Frequency 0.000 0.034 0.008 0.000 Negative effects 
(EN–IN) Proportional 0.001 0.261 0.013 0.000 
Panel B – Data including leveraged effects 
  Overall US-JP US-NL JP-NL 
Frequency 0.680 0.590 0.678 0.400 
Positive effects 
Proportional 0.033 0.080 0.011 0.309 
Frequency 0.000 0.056 0.007 0.000 
Negative effects 
Proportional 0.002 0.605 0.009 0.001 
Overall comparison based on a Kruskal-Wallis test (p-value) 
Pair wise comparison based on a Mann-Whitney test (p-value) 
For underlying averages see table 6.15 
Table 6.16 Cross-cultural differences in self-serving attributional biases 
 Such comparisons may be used to provide answers to propositions 3 and 4. 
Turning our attention to self-enhancement first (hence, propositions 3a and 4a), we 
observe that we have to make a distinction between the frequency data and the 
proportional data. In terms of average number (hence, frequency data) we do not 
detect any significant cultural difference between any of the three countries. That 
is, as no p-value is equal or lower as 0.10, we have to conclude that the average 
difference IP–EP is the same for all three nations, notwithstanding that it is the 
lowest in Japan (see table 6.15). However, the proportional data, which express the 
relative use of attributional tactics, do indicate the presence of cultural differences. 
The figures in table 6.16—representing p-values based on a non-parametric 
comparison of IP–EP—suggest that in letters from Japanese (a collectivistic, high-
achievement oriented culture) and the Netherlands (an individualistic, low-
achievement oriented culture) the use of external, positive attributions is more 
prevalent than in U.S. (an individualistic, high-achievement oriented culture) 
letters. These results are (partially) in line with propositions 3a and 4a. In partial 
support of proposition 3a, which stated that the use of external-positive causal 
attributions is greater in group-oriented, collectivistic cultures, such as Japan, than 
in individualistic cultures, such as the United States and the Netherlands, we find 
that American managers compared to their Japanese colleagues show more 
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elaborate self-enhancing tendencies. The difference in the proportion in which 
positive outcomes are explained internally compared with the proportion that is 
ascribed in external terms is significantly larger for the American CEOs than for 
the Japanese CEOs. In table 6.15 we saw that the difference in locus of causality, 
based on proportional data, for the United States is almost 75% compared to 58% 
for the Japanese. The inclusion of “in spite of”-statements (see Panel B), which are 
predominantly used in enhancing ways, does not influence the outcomes. 
However, in contrast with proposition 3a we do not detect a significant difference 
between the Dutch (an individualistic, feminine culture) and the Japanese (a 
collectivistic, masculine culture) with respect to self-enhancing tendencies. On the 
other hand, the Dutch tend to make less self-enhancing than their American 
colleagues. This finding is in line with proposition 4a, which stated that the use of 
internal-positive causal attributions is greater in masculine, achievement-oriented 
cultures, such as Japan, and the United States, than in more feminine oriented 
cultures, such as the Netherlands. Indeed, in table 6.15 we observed that, when 
looking at the proportional measures, the Dutch showed the smallest tendency to 
self-enhance (IP–EP difference is 50%). Taken together these results not only 
indicate that, as expected, there is an East-West difference—i.e. Japan versus the 
United States—regarding the use of self-enhancing attributions, but also, and more 
surprisingly, that the use of self-enhancing attributions differs among western 
cultures. In the next section we will investigate whether differences in masculinity-
femininity are able to account for this difference. 
Propositions 3b and 4b relate to self-protection. If we investigate the self-
protecting tendencies based on the EN–IN differences, we see—in a simultaneous 
analysis of all three nations—a significant cultural effect (p-values < 0.010). 
Irrespective of frequency or proportional data we notice that Dutch managers 
compared to their American and Japanese counterparts use significantly different 
tactics to explain bad news: a self-protecting tendency is completely absent when 
they account for negative outcomes in their letters to the shareholders. Previously, 
in table 6.15, we observed that the average difference EN–IN for the Dutch was 
almost equal to zero in case of frequency data and was even negative in case of 
proportional data. The managers from the other two countries, on the other hand, 
do show self-protecting tendencies. If we look at the difference in locus of 
causality based on the average numbers (hence frequencies) we see a slightly 
significant (p < 0.100) difference between Japan and the United States. However, 
if we take the relative use of the different attributions into account and look at the 
difference in the proportional use of external and internal factors to explain 
negative effects the difference between the Japanese and the American managers 
disappears. In sum, we can conclude the following regarding propositions 3b and 
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4b. First of all, in sharp contrast with proposition 3b, which stated that the use of 
internal-negative causal statements should be most prevalent in a collectivistic-
oriented culture as Japan, we find (see tables 6.15 and 6.16) that its use is in fact 
the smallest of all three countries. This also explains why the amount of self-
protection is the largest in the Japanese letters (although not significantly different 
from the United States). In the discussion section (6.2.5) we try to explain this 
rather unexpected result. On the other hand, proposition 4b is strongly supported: 
we found significant evidence that both the Japanese and American managers (two 
high-achievement oriented cultures) refer to a greater extent to external causes to 
explain negative outcomes than do their Dutch colleagues. This also accounts for 
the absence of self-protection among the Dutch, which significantly deviates from 
the Americans and the Japanese (see tables 6.16). 
Accounting effects (sales, profits, and costs)
Panel A – Data excluding leveraged effects 
  Overall US-JP US-NL JP-NL 
Frequency 0.463 0.681 0.739 0.518 Positive effects 
(IP–EP) Proportional 0.121
#  0.078 0.059 0.778 
Frequency 0.005 0.212#  0.013 0.003 Negative effects 
(EN–IN) Proportional 0.003 0.445 0.002 0.004 
Panel B – Data including leveraged effects 
  Overall US-JP US-NL JP-NL 
Frequency 0.852 0.851 0.702 0.575 
Positive effects 
Proportional 0.092 0.090 0.038 0.538 
Frequency 0.005 0.285#  0.059 0.003 
Negative effects 
Proportional 0.002 0.203 0.001 0.007 
Overall comparison based on a Kruskal-Wallis test (p-value) 
Pair wise comparison based on a Mann-Whitney test (p-value) 
# Cultural difference disappears after elimination of non-accounting items 
Table 6.17 Cross-cultural differences in self-serving attributional biases 
(accounting effects) 
 Limiting ourselves to real accounting effects (that is to causal statements 
regarding sales, profits, or costs) produces marginally different results as becomes 
evident in table 6.17. A “#” in table 6.17 marks the changes in cultural differences 
due to the elimination of non-accounting items. The most important difference is, 
if we confine ourselves to accounting effects, that the American and Japanese 
managers are no longer different with respect to the amount in which they engage 
in self-protecting tendencies. Previously, when we looked at all effects, we 
observed that they differed in the extent of self-protection based on frequency 
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measures, whereas we did not detect differences between the United States and 
Japan based on proportional or relative use. For the remainder, the cultural 
differences found with respect to the extent to which managers from the United 
States, Japan, and the Netherlands make use of self-enhancing and self-protecting 
attributional biases still hold.  
6.2.4 Discussion 
More than 15 years ago Bruce (1987) observed that (American) letters to the 
shareholders are notorious for adopting optimistic attitudes and presenting 
euphemistic descriptions of company results and prospects. Direct evidence 
supporting his remark was provided by the findings of Bowman (1976), Bettman 
and Weitz (1983), Staw et al. (1983), and Salancik and Meindl (1984). These 
researchers all found that CEOs tend to take credit for good outcomes in their 
letters, but deny responsibility for bad results. Since Bruce’s observation other 
researchers confirmed that CEOs show self-serving tendencies when they explain 
organisational results in their letters to the shareholders (e.g. Clapham and 
Schwenk, 1991; Schwenk, 1993; Aerts, 1994; Clatworthy and Jones, 1999; Tsang, 
2002). These findings, with the exception of Tsang (2002), have all been obtained 
in a western context. Recent social-psychological literature, however, suggests that 
tendencies to remember success better than failure, to reconstruct history in self-
flattering ways, to see oneselves as above average, to internalise favourable 
outcomes and externalise unfavourable ones (Johns, 1999) may be more typical 
behaviour for people from western cultures than for people from eastern cultures; a 
topic we addressed more in detail in section 4.1. Indeed, social-psychological 
research confirms this cultural difference: though people from the East are not 
completely free of the self-serving attributional bias, they do tend to engage in it in 
smaller amounts than individuals from the West. Most of the studies that revealed 
the East-West difference have used undergraduates who participated in some 
experiment. Consequently, the results of those studies may be criticised as being 
“due to researchers’ assigning target variables that are inconsequent to Asians” 
(Harrington and Liu, 2002: 39; see also Heine et al., 2000). This problem is 
aggravated, as the results of the various researchers are sometimes conflicting. In 
this study we examined attributions from a naturally occurring source: the letter to 
the shareholders. According to Hallahan et al. (1997: 771) the major advantage to 
this approach is “that researchers can observe unsolicited attributions for actual 
behaviours that are meaningful to the person making the attributions. [Hence, it] 
nicely complements and extends experimental research.”  
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Study Country 
% IP of 
positives 
% EN of 
negatives 
This study US, JP, 
NL 
80% 62% 
Tsang (2002) Singapore 78% 64% 
Aerts (1994) Belgium 79% 48% 
Salancik and Meindl 
(1984)*
US 83% 80% 
Staw et al. (1983) US 70% 75% 
Bettman and Weitz 
(1983) 
US 60% 73% 
* Estimation based on data provided in paper 
Table 6.18 Comparison findings of this study with previous studies 
In general, the pattern of attributions managers make for positive and negative 
results are in complete agreement with previous studies looking into self-serving 
attributional biases in letters to the shareholders (see table 6.18). In this study we 
as well find overwhelming evidence that managers tend to take credit for good 
outcomes and lay blame on the environment for disappointing results (the Dutch, 
however, assume and shift away blame for disappointing results in similar 
amounts). This confirms propositions 1 and partially 2 (the Dutch are the 
exception). We find that on average around 80% of the positive effects is 
attributed internally. Unfavourable outcomes, on the other hand, are generally 
speaking blamed on the environment: in only 38% managers refer to some internal 
cause to account for the deterioration in performance. For example, Bettman and 
Weitz (1983) in their study of 181 American letters to the shareholders found that 
the proportion of favourable outcomes attributed to internal causes is 60% while 
73% of the unfavourable outcomes are ascribed externally. Staw and colleagues 
(1983), in their study of 81 letters from the United States, found comparable 
percentages of 70% and 75% for the positive and negative outcomes, respectively. 
In the most recent study published on self-serving behaviour in accounting 
narratives Tsang (2002), using a sample of Singaporean letters to the shareholders, 
finds a proportion of favourable outcomes attributed to internal causes of 78% and 
a proportion of unfavourable outcomes attributed to external causes of 64%. In 
sum, corroborating the findings of previous studies, we find as well that managers 
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display strong tendencies to credit themselves for positive outcomes and blame 
negative effects on the environment. 
After having determined that managers from all countries tend to explain 
organisational results in a way that serves the self, we subsequently examined the 
data for possible cultural differences in the extent to which managers from the 
three cultures show the bias. The results of the analysis in view of the first four 
propositions are provided in table 6.19 below. 
Hypothesis   Confirmed 
1. Self-enhancement  ¥
2. Self-protecting  Partial
3a. Self-enhancement and self vs group orientation   Partial
3b. Self-protection and self vs group orientation  Not 
4a. Self-enhancement and emphasis on achievement  ¥
4b. Self-protection and emphasis on achievement   ¥
¥ Proposition is supported 
Table 6.19 Preliminary results and confirmation of propositions 1 to 4 
Regarding the tendency to internalise favourable results, we find—in support 
of proposition 3a—that, compared to the American CEOs, Japanese CEOs are 
significantly less inclined to engage in self-enhancement, although they are not 
free from it. This result is largely in line with the growing body of social-
psychological studies of the past decade, which indicate that self-enhancement is 
attenuated in Asian cultures (Kitayama et al., 1997; Semin and Zwier, 1997; Heine 
et al., 1999). The findings regarding the Dutch managers seem at first sight 
surprising (and in contrast with proposition 3a). Relatively speaking, they showed 
the smallest degree of self-enhancement (though not significantly smaller than the 
Japanese). This result suggests that even among western cultures differences in the 
amount of self-enhancement arise. Indeed, in one of the few studies comparing 
western nations, Nurmi (1992) found the Dutch and Finnish participants to show 
smaller self-enhancing tendencies than their American counterparts. A possible 
explanation, as the countries are not different with respect to the construal of the 
self (hence, individualism), may be related to differences in masculinity and 
femininity. Previously, we saw that in the Dutch and the Finnish cultures 
achievement-oriented values are of less importance than in the American culture. 
It is possible that people’s attributions are different depending on their more 
masculine or feminine cultural background (de Mooij, 1998).  
151
Regarding negative outcomes, we found evidence of self-protection among 
American and Japanese managers. The Dutch CEOs, in line with Aerts’ (1994) 
findings among a sample of Belgian letters, did not show tendencies to self-protect 
when results are unsatisfactory. The most surprising result, however, concerns the 
strong tendency to externalise bad organisational outcomes among the Japanese 
managers. Relatively speaking they showed the strongest tendency to self-protect. 
This finding seems in sharp contrast with previous social-psychological findings, 
in which evidence of smaller amounts of self-protection and even self-deprecation 
was found. Consequently, we had to reject proposition 3b. There are two possible 
interpretations of our results. The first involves the Asia Crisis that affected the 
Japanese companies more severely than the companies in the Western nations 
(Harrigan, 2000). The crisis was an internationally recognised and widely 
discussed phenomenon and is likely to have gained some legitimacy as a causal 
factor in the failure of Japanese firms. Indeed, the observation that Japanese firms 
chose to externalise the bad results in a time of crisis is in line with Kelley’s 
(1971a) augmentation principle. Based upon this principle it is expected that if 
unfavourable outcomes are experienced in an economically bad year, managers are 
likely to refer to one of the many potential external reasons for the disappointing 
results. In both Bettman and Weitz’s (1983) and Tsang’s (2002) studies evidence 
supporting the augmentation principle in the financial reporting-context was 
found. In the next section we will examine whether the augmentation principle is 
valid in a cross-cultural context. An alternative—or maybe additional—way to 
interpret our results relate to the sample. Previous social-psychological research 
has relied on undergraduates and it is possible that the findings are not 
generalizable. Hence it may be possible that cultural differences in self-serving 
behaviour fade away over time and that managers do no longer show behaviours 
that are considered typical for the cultural-context in which they operate. Indeed, 
Heine et al. (1999: 787) leave room for that possibility. They comment that “it 
may be the case that in situations in which Japanese are in positions of leadership 
or near the top of a hierarchy they may self-enhance and be motivated to believe 
that they have the requisite skills and abilities to fulfil their roles and to take care 
of their subordinates. Thus, we might expect that seniors at schools would 
demonstrate more self-enhancement than freshmen, full professors more than 
assistant professors, and older sisters more than younger brothers. Likewise, we 
may find that there are phases in life in which one is more likely to be in positions 
higher in the hierarchy; namely, old age, and this period may be associated with 
more self-enhancement and less self-criticism. [Typically social-psychological] 
studies have been conducted with undergraduates, and the relative lack of self-
enhancement [and the tendency toward self-criticism] among the Japanese may 
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reflect their lower position in the hierarchy due to their youth. That a cardinal tenet 
of Confucianism is to respect the elderly suggests that Japanese gain esteem from 
others as they age. Japanese youth may be making payments in humility and 
effacement until they reach the age that they can retire from self-criticism and 
finally accrue feelings of esteem and respect from others. Thus, Japanese self-
improving motivations to become better may reflect a comparable desire for 
positive self-regard, and this desire is satisfied by knowing that one is working 
toward securing this regard in the future.” A related argument, in which self-
serving tendencies are linked with power, has been recently advanced by Lee and 
Tiedens (2001: 51-52). These authors argue that self-serving biases are “more 
prevalent among high power than low power individuals. People with high 
socioeconomic status generally have higher self-esteem and self-confidence than 
people in low socioeconomic status. Also, people in high power positions are more 
likely to rate themselves as more competent, more likeable, more desirable, and 
better looking than people in lower power positions. When things go wrong, 
people in high power positions are less likely to take personal responsibility and 
blame themselves than people in lower power positions.” Although we cannot 
fully discount the effects of the Asia Crisis, we tend to favour the interpretation 
that—at least Japanese—managers maybe less inclined to self-efface than 
undergraduates. This preference is linked to Tsang’s (2002) recent study of letters 
to the shareholders of Singapore companies in a period preceding the Asia 
Crisis—a country with a similar collectivistic orientation as Japan—in which he 
too found strong tendencies to blame negative outcomes on the environment. In 
the next section we examine which factors, apart from culture, may explain 
differences in self-serving attributional biases in accounting narratives. 
6.3 Determinants of self-serving attributions: Propositions 5 to 10 
6.3.1 Introduction 
Thus far we observed that American, Dutch, and Japanese managers use self-
serving attributions to explain organizational outcomes in their letters to the 
shareholders. That is, they tend to internalize good outcomes and externalize bad 
ones. Furthermore, the preliminary analyses of section 6.2 reveal the presence of 
cultural differences among the three countries. In this section we investigate what 
factors, apart from culture, influence the tendency to engage in self-serving 
attributions. It draws on the discussion in the previous chapter in which we 
identified possible determinants, such as stability of firm performance, CEO 
tenure, firm size, etc., that may exacerbate or attenuate self-serving tendencies. 
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Before formally testing propositions 5 to 10 via two forms of regression (count 
regression and ordered logit regression), we first deal with how we have 
operationalized our independent variables in section 6.3.2. In that sub-section we 
also discuss how we checked the data for multicollinearity. In subsection 6.3.3 we 
present our results regarding the two models, which are discussed in subsection 
6.3.4.
6.3.2 Independent variables 
In section 5.1 we described how organisational and CEO-related circumstances 
might affect the amount of self-serving attributions in letters to the shareholders. 
Apart from CEO-tenure we also hypothesised on the possible impact of so-called 
performance- and structure-related variables. Below we address how we have 
operationalized these independent variables. Descriptive statistics and tests for 
multicollinearity follow this presentation. 
Firm performance—Firm performance is measured by sales, net income, net sales 
margin (calculated as: net income/sales), return on assets (ROA, calculated as net 
income/total assets), and earnings per share (as expressed in the company’s 
reporting currency). These measures, which represent indicators of short-term 
financial performance, have been frequently used in previous accounting and 
management research (e.g. Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; 
Abrahamson and Park, 1994; Aerts, 1994; Barlow, 1996). An additional 
consideration was that all firms include information on sales, net income and 
earnings per share in their annual reports, while net sales margin and ROA can be 
easily determined from annual report information. Furthermore, the Worldscope 
database includes information on all these variables. For each year that was coded, 
we determined the relative change on a one-year period. That is, we used a growth 
index representing the change in this year’s performance compared to previous 
fiscal year’s performance. Three of the five measures are used to determine 
whether the firm experienced a good year (with a rising performance trend) or a 
bad year (with a declining performance trend), viz.: net sales margin, return on 
assets, and earnings per share. The first two measures, net sales margin and ROA, 
say something about the quality of the results. More specifically, they reflect the 
profitability/efficiency of the company (Salancik and Meindl, 1984). Earnings per 
share, on the other hand, plays an important role on capital markets as it reflects a 
company’s investment/capital market potential (Salancik and Meindl, 1984). A 
year was considered “good” if (at least) two out of the three measures showed 
positive growth. Similarly, it was considered “bad” if two measures declined. 
Hence, firm performance was measured as a dummy, with “0” representing a bad 
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year and “1” a good year. Out of the 278 company observations, 137 concerned 
bad years, i.e. years in which the company (had to) report a deterioration in 
company performance. The other 141 observations were coded as being a good 
year. 
Stability of performance—Similar to Salancik and Meindl’s (1984) we calculate 
coefficients of variation to measure the stability of a firm’s performance. It is 
determined by dividing the standard deviation by the mean, which assures that 
differences in scales or magnitudes are taken into account (Madsen and 
Moeschberger, 1986). Each firm’s mean and standard deviation are computed for 
the three performance indicators mentioned above—net sales margin, ROA, and 
earnings per share (raw performance, not growth index)—using Worldscope data 
from 1994 to 2000 (which comprised our sample period). Hence, stability in firm’s 
performance is based on a seven-year time frame. Subsequently, for each 
performance measure the deviation from the overall (and/or country) average was 
determined for each firm. If the firm scored negative (implying a variation below 
average) on two out of the three measures, the firm is classified as stable and is 
scored “0”. If the firm scores positive (implying a variation above average) on two 
out of the three measures, the firm is given the score “1”, implying that it is seen 
as a firm with unstable performance. This procedure resulted in 71 firms that have 
stable performance, while the other 68 companies are considered unstable ones. 
Firm size—Especially researchers from the positive accounting tradition have 
looked into the effect of firm size on amongst others financial disclosures quantity 
(e.g. Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993; Lewellen et al., 1996; Ichausti, 1997), with mostly confirmatory 
results (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). The idea is that larger firms are more visible 
and, consequently, more likely to be subject of a political process. Firms respond 
to this greater scrutiny by increasing the amount of disclosure in their financial 
reports. In this study we pay attention to possible size effects as well. In order to 
assert the influence of size three proxies were used namely: total assets, sales and 
market capitalization. Fiscal 1997 was used as our base-year as it is exactly in the 
middle of the sample period. Furthermore, like many researchers before us did, we 
use the natural logarithm form of the variables in order to get around the problem 
of heterocedasticity (e.g. Hackston and Milne, 1996; Ichausti, 1997; Patten and 
Nance, 1998; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Aerts, 2001). 
Influence of large shareholders—Recently, La Porta et al. (1999) have observed 
that since Berle and Means the corporate world has changed significantly. 
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Dispersed ownership—which Berle and Means had in mind when their book was 
published—no longer seems to characterise the contemporary corporate world: in 
many countries corporations have large shareholders. This is an important 
observation as previous research suggests that shareholders who control 5% or 
more of the firm’s stock have significant influence in the corporation and form a 
group with which management has to reckon (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Tosi and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Abrahamson and Park, 1994; Lewellen et al., 1996; Wade et 
al., 1997). Not only does it seem that these large shareholders, in comparison with 
private investors are more motivated to monitor management more actively, in 
addition, they are also in the position to effectively do so. Therefore, it seems 
important to include the presence of large shareholders as independent variable in 
the analysis. Like La Porta et al. (1999) we rely on Worldscope data to identify 
possible large shareholders. Again fiscal 1997 formed our base year, although in 
some cases we had to use other years due to data availability. However, “since 
ownership patterns tend to be relatively stable, the fact that the ownership data do 
not all come from the same year is not a big problem” (La Porta et al., 1999: 475). 
In addition, the internet (for proxy statements of American companies) and other 
bibliographical sources were consulted as well. Originally, we tried to follow a 
procedure similar to Gomez-Mejia et al. (1987) who included shareholder control 
as dummy variable. More specifically, a firm was designated as owner-
controlled—implying the presence of least one large shareholder—if 5 percent or 
more of the outstanding stock was in the hands of one individual or organisation 
that was not involved in actual management of the company. A firm was given the 
code “0” if there was a large shareholder; otherwise it was coded “1”. However, as 
only 2 out of the 139 firms did not have a major shareholder, we decided to 
include the percentage of the largest controlling block in the analysis instead. 
CEO tenure—A number of studies have hypothesised a link between CEO-tenure 
and self-serving attributional behaviour in letters to the shareholders (Staw et al.,
1983; Schwenk, 1993; Barker and Patterson, 1996; Barlow, 1996). The results, 
however, are still inconclusive, while the underlying rationales are difficult to 
reconcile as well. In this study we make a distinction between a CEO who is in his 
first term and more experienced CEOs, and expect attributions to differ 
accordingly. In order to test the effect of CEO-change we use a dummy variable. 
The dummy variable is assigned the value of “1” if it is the CEO’s first year in 
office; that is, if he was appointed during the fiscal year being examined. In all 
other cases the dummy is given the value of “0”. Information on CEO appointment 
was derived from annual reports. 53 Of the 278 observations concern years in 
which the firm experienced a change of CEO. That is, in almost 20% of the letters 
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to the shareholders we analysed it was the first time that a CEO drew up the letter. 
In the other 225 letters it was a sitting CEO who spoke. In previous studies CEO-
tenure has been measured as the number of years the CEO has held his position 
(e.g. Staw et al., 1983; Schwenk, 1993; Westphal and Zajac, 1994; Barlow, 1996; 
Wade et al., 1997). The idea is that the longer a CEO has held his post the greater 
his power, the more immune he becomes to outside influence and performance 
problems (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Hill and Phan, 1991; Ocasio, 1994; 
Westphal and Zajac, 1994; Wade et al., 1997) and the less he has to fear that he is 
forced to step down (Staw et al., 1983; Barlow, 1996). Whereas most previous 
studies looked at the number of years per se, in this study, however, we used a 
dummy variable to include CEO tenure into the analysis. More specifically, we 
dichotomised between CEOs who were in office three years or less (in which case 
it was coded “0”) and CEOs who were in office more than three years (in which 
case it was given the value of “1”). This choice of using three years as a sort of 
cut-off point was based on Frederickson, Hambrick and Baumrin (1988) and 
Allgood and Farrell (2000). Frederickson et al. (1988) observed that especially in 
the first three years newly appointed CEOs experience a period of extreme 
vulnerability, evidenced by “the disproportionate number of CEOs whose tenure 
lasts three years or less” (1988: 258). Similarly, Allgood and Farrell (2000) found 
the most CEO turnovers to take place in those early years. In our sample almost 
half (139) of the CEOs who drew up a letter to the shareholders are considered 
experienced and are coded “1”. The other 137 observations concern letters that 
have been written by relatively inexperienced CEOs, i.e. those who were in office 
for less than three years. 
Economic conditions—Previously we asserted that in order to remain credible 
management might be inclined to provide explanations that fit the fact to a certain 
extent. We also saw that general economic conditions form an important 
contextual factor which may limit the possibility to overly use self-serving 
attributions and that it is likely that management’s explanations for organisational 
outcomes will reflect information on these conditions. Indeed, previous studies 
looking into self-serving attributional biases in letters to the shareholders assessed 
the impact of this information on self-serving attributions (Bettman and Weitz, 
1983; Salancik and Meindl, 1984). In this study we also measured possible effects 
of general economic conditions. Two national economic indicators relevant to 
corporations and previously used in Bettman and Weitz’s (1983) and Salancik and 
Meindl’s (1984) studies were included in the analysis: gross national product and 
stock market indices. For each year—that is: 1994 to 2000—and country, the 
relative growth was calculated for each measure based upon information from the 
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OECD and Datastream. In the actual analysis we used dummy variables to indicate 
whether a corporate performance was experienced in favourable or unfavourable 
economic conditions. If both indices showed a declining trend, the concerning year 
was designated unfavourable and was scored “0”. If the trend for both indicators 
was upwards, it was coded “1” implying that the year was favourable. Table 6.20 
displays the outcome of this procedure for our sample period. 
Year US JP NL 
1994 1 1 1 
1995 0 1 0 
1996 1 1 1 
1997 1 1 1 
1998 1 0 1 
1999 1 0 1 
2000 1 1 1 
2001 0 0 0 
“0” 
“1” 
Year is considered unfavourable 
Year is considered favourable 
Table 6.20 Favourability of the economy (based on GDP and stock index) 
Culture—Cultural values for each of the three countries have been obtained from 
Hofstede (2001). A country’s cultural values for dimensions of Individualism, 
Masculinity, Power distance, Uncertainty avoidance, and Long-term versus short-
term orientation have been used as proxies for the culture in which the firm’s head 
office is based. It means that cultural values of all companies from a single country 
will be the same. A similar approach has been used in other, related studies (Gray 
and Vint, 1995; Zarzeski, 1996; Jaggi and Low, 2000). Below we reproduced 
Hofstede’s indices of cultural values for the three countries of interest (see table 
6.21). It is important to note that “the country scores on the five dimensions do not 
provide absolute country positions, but only their positions relative to the other 
countries in the set” (Hofstede, 2001: 36). That is, they indicate whether a certain 
cultural trait is, relatively speaking, more or less valued in a country than in 
another. Thus, Hofstede’s value indices are measures of differences only 
(Hofstede, 1997a: 25). The value indices are measured on a scale of 0 to 100, 
where 0 indicates a small preference for a cultural trait and 100 a high preference. 
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In the table we also reproduced (in parentheses) the original ranks of the countries 
in Hofstede’s study among 53 countries.9
Cultural index US JP NL 
Individualism (IDV) 91 (1) 46 (22) 80 (4) 
Power distance (PDI) 40 (38) 54 (33) 38 (40) 
Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) 46 (43) 92 (7) 53 (35) 
Masculinity (MAS) 62 (15) 95 (1) 14 (51) 
Long-term orientation (LTO) 29 (17) 80 (4) 44 (10) 
Table 6.21 Country scores on Hofstede’s value indices 
Descriptives and multicollinearity
Table 6.22 below displays some basic descriptive statistics regarding the 
independent variables such as the mean, minimum, maximum, and standard 
deviation. It is followed by a table (6.23) in which the correlation coefficients are 
reproduced. 
9 The fifth dimension, long-term versus short-term orientation, was obtained in a later 
study among 23 countries. 
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As is obvious from table 6.23 there are a number of cases of high collinearity. The 
first group of variables with high collinearity concerns market capitalization, sales, 
and total assets. This seems logical, as the three measures are proxies for firm size. 
In subsequent analysis we use (the natural logarithm of) total assets to control for 
firm size. The other cases of high collinearity occur between the cultural proxies, 
which can be ascribed to the small number of countries represented in this study. 
With respect to individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and long-
term versus short-term orientation we even observe (almost) perfect correlations 
(which in case of individualism on the one hand and power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, and long-term versus short-term orientation is negative). Given these 
perfect correlations we had to omit three of these four cultural proxies, in order to 
avoid problems due to singularity. In the analysis we include individualism only. 
With respect to the relationship of masculinity on the one hand and the other four 
cultural proxies on the other, we observe moderate collinearity (ȡ > 0.60). To 
ensure that no severe multicollinearity exists, we obtained the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) for all independent variables, which tell us the degree to which an 
independent variable is explained by the other independent variables. Only two of 
the original independent variables—power distance, uncertainty avoidance and 
long-term versus short-term orientation were already omitted—namely the size 
proxies had VIFs larger than 10, which according to Hair, Anderson, Tatham and 
Black (1998) is a common cutoff threshold. All other VIFs are lower than five. A 
similar result is obtained by another test for multicollinearity, which is based on 
the variance-decomposition matrix and condition indices (see Hair et al., 1998). 
This procedure yields the same results. From the foregoing tests, which resulted in 
the omission of three cultural proxies (namely long-term versus short-term 
orientation, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance) and two size proxies (total 
sales and market capitalisation), we are not concerned about making incorrect 
inferences due to multicollinearity. 
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6.3.3 Testing of propositions 5 to 10 
Introduction 
In this study we use two sorts of regression to establish which factors induce 
managers to engage in self-serving attributional behaviour in their letters to the 
shareholders. We use discrete choice regression models in this study, as the nature 
of our dependent variables does not permit the use of ordinary least squares 
(OLS). First and foremost the distribution of the various dependent variables are 
highly skewed to the left, suggesting that the regression error terms are 
heteroscedastic. Consequently, “OLS estimates of parameters are inefficient and 
nominal significance levels associated with the test statistics may be unreliable” 
(Noreen, 1988: 121). In that case it is more appropriate to use specifically 
designed regression models that are able to capture the specific nature of our 
dependent variables. Firstly, we use count regression models (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 1998) to investigate whether the occurrence of IP, EP, IN, and EN varies 
across companies and/or cultures. Such models have been developed to deal with 
event counts; that is with the number of times a certain event occurs. An important 
characteristic of count data is that they can only assume non-negative and integer-
valued numbers. In our case the event concerns the number of times a specific 
causal attribution (e.g. internal-positive) is mentioned in the CEO’s letter to the 
shareholders. In many cases, and in previous studies of letters as well, linear 
regression (such as OLS) has been used. However, according to both Long (1997) 
and Cameron and Trivedi (1998) treating count data as though they are 
continuous—which they are not—and applying linear regression “can result in 
inefficient, inconsistent, and biased estimates” (Long, 1997: 217). After discussing 
count regression models and applying them to our data, we discuss a model that is 
able to analyse dependent variables that have a limited number of possible values. 
Ordered logit regression is used to analyse whether company- or cultural-specific 
factors influence the likelihood of engaging in self-enhancement and self-
protection. The results of the two models, in view of our propositions and previous 
studies, are discussed in section 6.4.4. 
Model 1: Count regression 
The content analysis used in this study has yielded data that refer to the number of 
times a certain type of causal attribution is used to account for outcomes in the 
CEO’s letter to the shareholders. After the content analysis we were able to say 
that, for example, company X has used 4 internal and 1 external attribution to 
account for positive results. Count regression models have been developed to 
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analyse such non-negative, integer-valued dependent variables (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 1998; Greene, 2000; Winkelmann, 2000). In our study we use count 
regression to determine which factors influence the counts of the various types of 
attributional statements. The count models are not suitable to analyse which 
factors determine the presence of self-serving attributional biases. For that analysis 
we use (ordered) logit regression models that are discussed subsequently. 
The most basic form of count regression is the Poisson regression model 
(PRM) that is derived from the Poisson distribution, by allowing the intensity 
parameter µ to depend on the independent variables. One important characteristic 
of the Poisson distribution, and hence, underlying any Poisson count regression 
model, is that the expected value and the variance are equal to µ. More 
specifically, we can denote this relationship as follows: 
ι
β µ==|=| ⋅ixii xx eYVarYE ii )()(       
where xi is a vector of independent regressors that are thought to influence Yi, the 
number of counts, and β is a vector representing the coefficients. In the regression 
model, the exponential value of xi⋅β is used in order to assure that the expected 
count is positive. Furthermore, the model assumes that the dependent variable, Yi,
is Poisson distributed: 
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Given equations 6.1 and 6.2 maximum likelihood procedures are used to obtain 
estimations of the β‘s. As stated Poisson models assume equidispersion, implying 
that the variance and the mean are equal. However, as is noted by Long (1997) and 
Cameron and Trivedi (1998), count data are usually overdispersed implying that 
the variance of the dependent variable exceeds the mean. The use of Poisson 
models if data are overdispersed yield estimates of β‘s that are consistent, but 
inefficient, while the standard errors are biased downwards, z-values to be 
spuriously large, and, consequently, to overestimate the significance of the 
regressors (Long, 1997: 230). In case of overdispersion the negative binomial 
regression model is more appropriate. This regression model uses the negative 
binomial distribution (NBRM), which allows the variance to exceed the mean. 
More specifically the negative binomial model assumes the variance to be a 
quadratic function of the mean: 
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where α is the dispersion parameter. The dispersion parameter affects the shape of 
the distribution: the larger it becomes, the larger the variance of the distribution 
will be. Obviously, we have the Poisson distribution when α = 0. Just like the 
Poisson distribution, the negative binomial model has an expected value that is 
equal to the intensity parameter, hence: 
ι
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The count regression model which assumes that the dependent variable 
follows a negative binomial distribution, uses maximum likelihood to estimate the 
coefficients. For more mathematical considerations and derivations we refer to 
Cameron and Trivedi (1998), Greene (2000), and Winkelmann (2000) as those are 
beyond the scope of this study. As recommended by those authors we report the 
results of both the Poisson (PRM) and the negative binomial (NBRM) regression 
model to estimate regressors in the following model: 
MASIDVBlockEcon
SizeCeoExpCeoNewStablePerformYi
⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅
+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+=
9876
543210
ββββ
ββββββ
where Yi = count of Z
+, Z-, IP, EP, IN, or EN.
Table 6.24 below displays the estimates from the Poisson and negative 
binomial regression models based on maximum likelihood estimation procedures. 
Panel A contains the estimates for the positive effects (hence Z+, IP, and EP), 
while Panel B displays the results for the negative effects (Z-, EN, and IN). 
Additionally, the dispersion parameters (α) are reported as well, indicating that the 
various dependent variables are indeed overdispersed. In table 6.24 we first of all 
see that the two models yielded similar results. In most cases the signs of the 
coefficients (β’s) are the same, while the models essentially estimate the same 
coefficients to be statistically significant as well. Most striking is that the results 
presented in table 6.24 indicate that the type of performance the company has to 
report in a particular year (as measured by the dummy variable “perform”) exerts  
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Panel A: Positive effects 
    
 Z+ IP EP 
 PRM NBRM PRM NBRM PRM NBRM 
Constant 0.19 0.47 0.47 0.30 0.26 0.33
Perform 0.59 *** 0.61 *** 0.48 *** 0.48 *** 0.92 *** 0.88 *** 
Stable 0.12 0.12 -0.02 -0.04 0.51 ** 0.41
CeoNew 0.17 0.22 -0.07 -0.11 0.32 0.34
CeoExp 0.30 *** 0.30 ** 0.04 0.04 0.22 0.30
Size 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.10 * 0.06
Econ -0.18 -0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06
Block 0.39 0.47 -0.47 -0.39 -1.45 ** -1.29 
IDV 0.01 ** 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.03 *** -0.03 **
MAS -0.01 *** -0.01 * -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.02 *** -0.02 *** 
α   0.68 **  0.70 *   1.65 * 
-2lnLog 1281.36 1117.51 1088.88 952.00 513.36 465.93 
Panel B: Negative effects 
    
 Z- IN EN 
 PRM NBRM PRM NBRM PRM NBRM 
Constant 1.42 0.84 2.30** 2.22 2.07** 2.25*
Perform -1.18*** -1.15*** -1.30*** -1.37*** -1.21*** -1.16*** 
Stable 0.60*** 0.70** 0.49** 0.38 0.45*** 0.46*
CeoNew 0.70*** 0.59* -0.22 -0.33 -0.39** -0.36
CeoExp 0.41** 0.24 -0.06 0.02 -0.08 -0.07
Size -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06
Econ -0.05 -0.36 0.23 0.19 -0.23 -0.33
Block 0.33 0.01 -0.18 -0.03 -0.12 0.42
IDV -0.03*** -0.02* -0.02*** -0.02** -0.02*** -0.01
MAS 0.00 0.00 -0.01*** -0.02*** 0.00 0.00
α  1.64**   1.08  1.47* 
-2lnLog 652.67 575.92 440.42 465.72 757.82 670.78 
***
**
*
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.01 level 
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.05 level 
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.10 level
Table 6.24 Count regression results 
the strongest influence on the counts of the various attributional statements. In all 
cases the reported β’s are not only highly significant with p-values < 0.01, but the 
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β’s are among the largest as well. Furthermore, we observe that stability, only 
affects the negative part of the attributional statements. The influence of culture 
(via individualism and masculinity) on the number of IP, EP, EN, etc. is noticeable 
as well: the β’s are in most cases statistically significant. As count regression 
models are non-linear models, there are not only various ways to interpret the 
results of the two count regression models, but we have to transform the reported 
coefficients as well to indicate the effect of the various independent variables. 
According to Long (1997) the percentage change in E(Yi | xi) and the discrete 
change in E(Yi | xi) are the most informative. The first, the percentage change, 
indicates that a unit change in a certain xk, while holding all other variables 
constant at their mean value, will result in a change in the expected count by 
100(exp(βk)-1) per cent. The discrete change, on the other hand, indicates the 
change in E(Yi | xi) due to a change in xk from xMIN to xMAX, again holding all other 
variables constant. In that respect it expresses the maximum variability in the 
results due to the kth variable. The percentage and discrete changes are reported in 
table 6.25 below. As the results of the two models are similar, we only report the 
percentage and discrete changes based on the negative binomial regression model. 
In table 6.25 below, Panel A displays the results for positive effects and Panel B 
those for the negative effects. The first column (labelled “sig”) indicates whether 
coefficients are statistically significant or not. The second column (denoted “% 
¨”) reports the percentage change. That is, it presents the percentage increase or 
decrease in the number of counts as a result of a unit increase in the corresponding 
independent variable. The third column (marked “0ĺ1”) displays the discrete 
change in Yi due to a change in a dummy variable from 0 to 1. The last column 
(named “¨range”) presents the discrete change in the expected number of counts 
as a result from letting a continuous variable increasing from its minimum to its 
maximum value. In that respect it shows the total possible effect of a continuous 
independent variable on Yi.
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Panel A: Positive effects (based on NBRM) 
    
 Z+ IP EP 
Sig. % ¨ 0ĺ1 ¨ range Sig. % ¨ 0ĺ1 ¨ range Sig. % ¨ 0ĺ1 ¨ range
Perform *** 83% 1.39 - *** 61% 0.75 - *** 142% 0.91 -
Stable n.s. 13% 0.28 - n.s. -4% -0.06 - n.s. 50% 0.41 -
CeoNew n.s. 24% 0.53 - n.s. -10% -0.17 - n.s. 40% 0.38 -
CeoExp ** 35% 0.68 - n.s. 4% 0.06 - n.s. 35% 0.30 -
Size n.s. 4% - 0.75 n.s. 5% - 0.75 n.s. 7% - 0.58
Econ n.s. -3% -0.08 - n.s. 3% 0.04 - n.s. 6% 0.06 -
Block n.s. 59% - 0.82 n.s. -32% - -0.39 n.s. -73% - -0.72
IDV n.s. 1% - 0.65 n.s. 0% - -0.28 ** -3% - -1.36
MAS * -1% - -0.98 *** -1% - -1.22 *** -2% - -1.84
Panel B: Negative effects (based on NBRM) 
    
 Z- IN EN 
Sig. % ¨ 0ĺ1 ¨ range Sig. % ¨ 0ĺ1 ¨ range Sig. % ¨ 0ĺ1 ¨ range
Perform *** -68% -1.22 - ***-75% -1.50 - *** -69% -1.23 -
Stable **100% 0.71 - ** 47% 0.39 - * 58% 0.46 -
CeoNew * 80% 0.72 - n.s. -28% -0.30 - n.s. -30% -0.32 -
CeoExp n.s. 28% 0.25 - n.s. -2% -0.02 - n.s. -6% -0.07 -
Size n.s. 2% - 0.22 n.s. -1% - -0.12 n.s. -6% - -0.59
Econ n.s. -30% -0.40 - n.s. 21% 0.19 - n.s. -28% -0.36 -
Block n.s. 1% - 0.01 n.s. -3% - -0.02 n.s. -34% - -0.27
IDV * -2% - -0.92 *** -2% - -1.15 n.s. -2% - -0.64
MAS n.s. 0% - -0.36 *** -2% - -1.58 n.s. 0% - 0.04
***
**
*
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.01 level 
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.05 level 
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.10 level
% ¨  Percentage change in E(Yi | xi) due to one unit increase in xk; calculated as 100%(exp(βk)-1), c.p. 
0ĺ1  Increase in E(Yi | xi) (raw count) due to a change in xk, dummy from 0 to 1, c.p. 
¨ range  Increase in E(Yi | xi) (raw count) due to a change in xk, continuous from xMIN to xMAX, c.p. 
Table 6.25 Percentage and discrete changes based on NBRM 
The following picture arises from table 6.25 above. If we look at the positive 
attributional statements, it is obvious that the company’s results (indicated by the 
dummy “perform”) largely determines the counts of Z+, IP, and EP. Drawing up a 
letter to the shareholders in a good year—a year in which the company is able to 
present favourable performance—increases the expected number of Z+, IP, and EP 
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by, respectively, 1.39, 0.75, and 0.91, when compared to a year in which 
performance was unfavourable. Similarly, the number of negative attributional 
statements decreases along company’s performance. A change in the dummy 
“perform” from 0 to 1, while holding all other variables constant, results in a 
decline in the expected counts of Z-, EN, and IN with 1.21, 1.23, and 1.50, 
respectively. In a subsequent model we will investigate whether this performance 
variable is able to account for differences in self-serving tendencies as well.  
The results reported in the table furthermore suggest that stability of 
performance only influences the negative component of attributional statements. 
We find that stability has a significant positive effect on Z-, EN, and IN. This 
finding, which we discuss more in detail later, seems to be in line with Aerts’ 
(1994) and Clapham and Schwenk’s (1992) findings, but in contrast with Salancik 
and Meindl (1984). With respect to CEO-related factors (tenure and change) we 
fail to find any significant relationships (except for the number of positive 
unexplained effects that is positively related to whether a CEO is considered 
tenured or not). Regarding the positive attributional statements, and IP and EP in 
particular, the result is in line with previous research by Schwenk (1993) who 
content analysed 60 American letters to the shareholders. However, he also found 
a significant positive effect of tenure on the number of EN, suggesting that the 
longer the CEO has been with the company, the more likely it is that the annual 
report will contain external-negative attributions. A possible explanation for this 
difference may be that Schwenk measured CEO tenure as “the number of years the 
CEO had been employed in the company” (1993: 452), suggesting that years prior 
to his appointment as CEO were included as well, while we only looked at the 
number of years a person really served as a company’s CEO in order to determine 
whether he is considered “tenured” or not. In line with Aerts (1994)—other studies 
did not look at this variable—we do not find company size (measured by the 
natural logarithm of total assets) to influence the number of any of the six forms of 
attributional statements we examined. The general economy does not seem to 
influence the various counts significantly. This result, however, has to be 
interpreted with care as in our sample period, comprising the years 1994 up to 
2000, only 4 years were considered unfavourable. Generally speaking, the size of 
the blockholding a major shareholder controls does not influence the individual 
counts of Z+, Z-, EP, IP, EN, or IN. 
If we turn our attention to culture it is important to make a distinction between 
positive and negative effects. If we consider the positive explained effects first, we 
do not see an influence of individualism on the number of internal-positive 
statements in a letter to the shareholders, which confirms the results of the 
preliminary analysis. That is, we fail to find a significant East-West difference 
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with respect to IP. This result suggests that managements from eastern (Japan) and 
western cultures (US and the Netherlands) are equally inclined to credit 
themselves for positive results. With respect to external-positive attributions we 
find a significant negative effect. More specifically, the results suggest that every 
additional point on Hofstede’s Individualism index results in a decrease by 
roughly 3% in the expected number of EP’s present in a letter to the shareholders 
(holding all other variables constant). This difference is more striking if we 
compare the United States and Japan, which of the three countries have, 
respectively the highest and lowest IDV-score. The discrete change from varying 
IDV from its minimum to its maximum results in a decrease in the expected EP-
count by 1.36. In line with previous research, and in support of proposition 3a (see 
also section 6.3.4), this result suggests that managers from the West, compared to 
their eastern colleagues, are less inclined to take the environment into 
consideration when they address favourable results. In the next model we will 
examine whether this also implies that self-enhancement—which is measured as 
the difference IP-EP—varies depending on Individualism (as one would expect). 
The results also point to a difference within the Western cultures with respect to 
the number of positive attributional statements. From table 6.25 above (Panel A) 
we see that every additional point on Hofstede’s Masculinity-index yields a 
decrease of respectively 1, 1, and 2% in the expected number of Z+, IP, and EP. At 
first sight this effect is somewhat surprising as it indicates that letters of companies 
from the more masculine countries (i.e. Japan and the United States) contain a 
smaller amount of positive attributional statements. However, it is less surprising 
given the larger number of pages the Dutch reports on average comprised. 
Regarding the negative attributional statements, we can remark the following. First 
of all, we fail to find a significant effect of Individualism on the number of 
external-negative statements, which confirms the findings of our preliminary 
analyses (in which we failed to find a difference between the U.S. and Japan as 
well). This result indicates that managers, irrespective of whether they are from 
the East or the West, are equally inclined to blame the environment if performance 
was bad. We do, however, see an East-West difference with respect to the 
inclination to accept blame for a failure. If we hold all other variables constant and 
let IDV increase from its minimum (Japan) to its maximum (US), we see a 
decrease in the expected count of IN by 1.15 statement. That is, managers from the 
West, and the United States in particular, compared to eastern managers (i.e. 
Japan) use less internal statements to account for negative outcomes. Whether this 
implies that western managers show more self-protecting tendencies than their 
eastern counterparts is examined in model 2. We also observe, in conformity with 
our preliminary analyses, that masculinity has a negative effect on the expected 
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IN-count, implying that managers from masculine countries are less inclined to 
accept blame for a failure than those from feminine countries; which is in line with 
our previous findings supporting proposition 4b. 
Model 2: Ordered logit regression 
So far we have showed how company- and cultural-related factors influenced the 
use of specific types of attributional statements in letters to the shareholders. In 
model 2 we show how these same variables are likely to influence managers’ use 
of self-serving attributional biases in their corporate stories. More specifically we 
use ordered logit models to analyse this. Such discrete choice models have been 
used in accounting studies, for example to investigate the relationships between 
accounting method choices and variables such as size and leverage (see Noreen, 
1988 and Stone and Rasp, 1991 for overviews). An ordered logit model is a 
discrete choice model which may be used to analyse dependent variables that have 
a limited number of possible values. Furthermore, the ordered logit model assumes 
the dependent variable to be ordinally-scaled implying that it is possible to rank 
the outcomes in terms of “low” to “high”, with distances between adjacent 
categories to be unknown. In order to apply ordered logit models to our data we 
transformed them in the following manner: 
0 = No positive/negative outcome is addressed 
1 = Positive/negative outcome is addressed, but no self-serving tendency 
is present 
2 = Positive/negative outcome is addressed, self-serving tendency is 
present 
The categories Y=1 and Y=2 are based on the following decision-rules: self-
enhancement is present if IP–EP>0, while self-protecting implies EN–IN>0, hence 
Y=2; in all other cases Y assumes the value of “1”. 
 The basic idea of ordered logit models is the estimation of thresholds or 
cutpoints, Ĳ, from an unobserved continuous latent variable Y*. The value on the 
observed variable Y (hence 0, 1, or 2) depends on whether or not you have crossed 
a certain threshold. For example, in case of self-enhancement, the observed value 
Y is related to the latent Y* in the following manner: 
 0 ĺ no positive effects if  Ĳ0 = -  Y*  Ĳ1
Y =  1 ĺ positive effects, no self-enhancement if Ĳ1  Y*  Ĳ2
 2 ĺ positive effects, self-enhancement if Ĳ2  Y*  Ĳ3 = 
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In order to estimate both the threshold parameters, Ĳ’s, and the regressor 
coefficients, ȕ’s, information on the latent variable Y* is used. Usually, Y* is 
assumed to be the following function: 
iixY εβ +⋅=*          
Maximum likelihood techniques, which in our case assumes that İi has logistic 
distribution with µ = 0 and Ȧ = ʌ2/3, are used to estimate the regression of Y* on xi
(see Long, 1997 chapter 5 and Greene, 2000 chapter 19 for further details). In this 
study the following models are estimated: 
MASIDVBlockEconSize
CeoExpCeoNewStablePerformSelfenh
⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅
+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+=
98765
43210
βββββ
βββββ
and
MASIDVBlockEconSize
CeoExpCeoNewStablePerformSelfpro
⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅
+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+=
98765
43210
βββββ
βββββ
The results of the ordered logit models with ȕ0 = 0 are displayed in table 6.26 
below. The table is divided into three parts. The top part contains the estimates of 
the ȕ’s. The middle part of the table reports the thresholds-values. The bottom part 
presents some general statistics with respect to the model (comparable to R-square 
figures for ordinary least squares). The information in this table can be used to 
estimate the probability that Y will take the value of 0, 1, or 2.1 First of all, 
information about the signs and significance of the coefficients tell us that only the 
variables “perform” and the score on the masculinity index influence the 
probability of engaging in self-enhancement. Regarding self-protection, we 
observe that again “perform” and the score on the cultural value individualism 
affect the probability.  
1 In the models we have omitted the leveraged effects to estimate the regressors. In 
additional analyses we have, however, checked that the inclusion of such effects does not 
significantly affect the outcomes. 
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Variable 
Selfenh 
(IP-EP>0) 
 Selfpro 
(EN-IN>0) 
Perform 0.74 *** -1.30 *** 
Stable -0.14 0.51 *
CeoNew -0.14 -0.39
CeoExp 0.40 -0.23
Size 0.07 -0.09
Econ -0.17 -0.40
Block -0.42 -1,15
IDV -0.01 -0.02 *
MAS -0.01 * 0.00
Thresholds     
Ĳ1 -0.67 -3.88
Ĳ2 -0.07 -2.89
General 
-2lnLog 509.69  480.37  
G2 (9 df) 18.34  41.35  
p-value 0.031  0.000  
***
**
*
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.01 level 
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.05 level 
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.10 level
 Table 6.26 Ordered logit regression results
Comparable with count regression, information about the coefficients does not 
tell us how those variables really affect Y. Here we can look at the discrete 
changes as well. These are provided in table 6.27 below. With ordered logit 
models, the discrete changes show the change in the predicted probability in Y 
assuming a certain state as a consequence of a change in xk, while holding all other 
variables at a certain value. Furthermore it is important to note that, as the model is 
non-linear, “the value of the discrete change depends on (1) the level of all of the 
variables that are not changing; (2) the value at which xk starts; and (3) the amount 
of change in xk. Most frequently, each continuous variable except xk is held at its 
mean” (Long, 1997: 136). Furthermore, the average absolute discrete change is 
reported as well, in table 6.27 this change is included under the column marked as 
“ ∆ ”. This measure summarises the effects by a variable xk by computing the 
average of the absolute values of the changes across Y=0, Y=1, and Y=2. It shows 
which effects exert the strongest influence on a certain dependent variable. Panel 
A of the table contains the results of the positive effects, while Panel B displays 
those with respect to the negative outcomes.  
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Panel A: Self-enhancement (IP-EP>0) 
Variable Sig Change ∆
Y=0 
(No Pos) 
Y=1 
(No Enhance)
Y=2 
(Yes Enhance) 
Perform *** 0ĺ1 0.12 -0.15 -0.03 0.18 
Stable n.s. 0ĺ1 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.04 
CeoNew n.s. 0ĺ1 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.04 
CeoExp n.s. 0ĺ1 0.07 -0.09 -0.01 0.10 
Size n.s. ¨ range 0.10 -0.13 -0.02 0.15 
Econ n.s. 0ĺ1 0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.03 
Block n.s. ¨ range 0.05 0.06 0.01 -0.07 
IDV n.s. ¨ range 0.04 0.05 0.01 -0.06 
MAS ** ¨ range 0.16 0.20 0.04 -0.24 
Panel B: Self-protecting (EN-IN>0) 
Variable Sig Change ∆
Y=0 
(No Neg) 
Y=1 
(No Protect) 
Y=2 
(Yes Protect) 
Perform *** 0ĺ1 0.21 0.31 -0.07 -0.25 
Stable * 0ĺ1 0.08 -0.13 0.03 0.10 
CeoNew n.s. 0ĺ1 0.06 0.10 -0.03 -0.07 
CeoExp n.s. 0ĺ1 0.04 0.06 -0.01 -0.05 
Size n.s. ¨ range 0.15 0.22 -0.05 -0.17 
Econ n.s. 0ĺ1 0.07 0.10 -0.02 -0.08 
Block n.s. ¨ range 0.13 0.19 -0.06 -0.15 
IDV * ¨ range 0.13 0.20 -0.04 -0.16 
MAS n.s. ¨ range 0.05 0.07 -0.02 -0.05 
***
**
*
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.01 level 
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.05 level 
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.10 level
∆  Average absolute discrete change 
0ĺ1  Increase in P(Yi | xi) due to a change in xk, dummy from 0 to 1, c.p. 
¨ range  Increase in P(Yi | xi) due to a change in xk, continuous from xMIN to xMAX, c.p. 
Table 6.27 Discrete changes based on ordered logit regression
The data provided in Panel A, first of all tell us that the variable “perform” has 
the strongest influence on the way managers address positive outcomes in their 
letters to the shareholders. Of all variables “perform” has the highest average 
absolute discrete change. The impact of this variable is as expected. The figures in 
table 6.27 above indicate that the probability of letters containing no explained 
positive effects is 16% higher if a letter is drawn up in a bad year than when it is 
written when the company experienced improving results (i.e. a good year). 
Similarly, we see that being able to report good news (hence “perform” assumes 
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the value of “1”) increases the likelihood that managers present those good 
outcomes in a self-enhancing way by 18%. Of the cultural values, masculinity is 
the only one that is able to explain differences in self-enhancing behaviour. From 
table 6.27 we observe that moving from the minimum score on this dimension (the 
Netherlands with 14) to its maximum (Japan with 95), while holding all other 
variables constant, results in an increase by 20% in the probability that a letter 
does not contain any positive effects that is explained. The effect on the 
probability that a letter explain positive effects are explained in a self-enhancing 
manner is negative: moving from the minimum to the maximum score decrease 
the probability of self-enhancement with 24%. The other variables, including 
individualism and the state of the general economy, did not significantly influence 
the way managers explain positive outcomes.  
If we turn our attention to the negative effects, we again observe that the 
variable “perform” exerts the strongest influence (as indicated by the highest ∆ ).
The numbers reported indicate that the probability of letters containing no negative 
effects is 31% higher for years in which performance improved compared to years 
in which performance deteriorated. Similarly, the chance that managers explain 
results in a self-protecting way is 25% higher if it concerns a bad year (i.e. results 
worsened) compared to a good year. Furthermore, we previously observed that 
stability of company’s performance has a significant influence on the way negative 
outcomes are explained. In table 6.27 we see that if a company’s performance is 
unstable, the likelihood that CEO addresses negative outcomes in a self-protecting 
mode is 10% higher compared to companies with stable performance. This result 
suggests that managers of unstable firms are more likely to explain negative 
results in a self-protecting way and confirms the findings of Salancik and Meindl 
(1984). Regarding the influence of culture we see that individualism, which is the 
dimension that is most frequently used to account for East-West differences, has a 
rather unexpected influence in view of previous social-psychological findings. If 
we let the score on IDV increase from it minimum (Japan with 62) to its maximum 
(the US with 91) we see a decrease by 15% of the probability of letters containing 
self-protecting tendencies. That is, western managers are less likely to engage in 
self-protection than their colleagues from the east are likely to do, which confirms 
our results found in the preliminary analysis. 
6.4.4 Discussion 
In this section we used two models to analyse which factors determine the way in 
which managers explain organisational performance. These models enabled us to 
provide answers to the propositions we have previously formulated. Model 1 
(count regression) indicates managers’ preferences for certain sorts of 
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explanations, while Model 2 (ordered logit regression) can be used to examine 
which factors influence the presence of self-serving attributional biases in letters to 
the shareholders. The two models yielded similar results with respect to the 
determinants of explanatory behaviour in management’s letters. First of all, the 
variable that measured the type of performance a company obtained in a fiscal 
year—good versus bad—exerts the strongest influence on both the numbers of 
causal statements (e.g. Z+, IP, EN, etc.) as well as on the presence of self-serving 
biases therein. The count regression model shows that the number of positive 
statements (Z+, IP, and EP) is significantly higher in letters regarding years in 
which the CEO is able to report improving performances, compared to years in 
which performance deteriorated. The ordered logit regression model subsequently 
indicated that the likelihood of managers engaging in self-enhancement (i.e. IP–EP 
>0) is 18% higher in good years compared to bad years. A similar effect is present 
with respect to causal statements regarding negative company results. Model 1 
indicated that Z-, EN, and IN are more prevalent in years in which company 
performance worsened than in years in which company performance improved. 
Additionally, the results of Model 2 tell us that the probability of self-protection is 
26% smaller in favourable years than in unfavourable ones. Together these results 
suggest the presence of a significant performance effect and confirm the findings 
of Barlow (1996) who found a tendency to disclose information to shareholders 
that is based on the performance level of the company. They also confirm 
proposition 5 which stated that self-enhancement is more prevalent in years in 
which the company achieved a performance improvement, while self-protection is 
more prevalent in years a company experienced a deterioration of performance. 
The results further indicate that the change in the number of negative statements 
(in absolute terms) is larger than the change in number of positive statements if we 
vary company performance. This result, at least partially, confirms the results of 
Abrahamson and Park (1994) and Aerts (2001), who found a “consistently high 
level of positive attributions and [a] non-responsiveness of this level to overall 
performance” (Aerts, 2001: 29). We also found evidence that the responsiveness to 
performance of self-protection is larger than that of self-enhancement. The results 
of the ordered logit model, first of all, revealed that a change in company 
performance from favourable to unfavourable leads to a 15% decrease in the 
likelihood that letters do not address any positive results at all. However, the 
decrease in the probability that letters do not contain any negative result being 
explained due to a shift in performance from bad to good is twice as large (31%). 
These results, combined with the larger decrease in likelihood of encountering 
self-protection in letters (26%) compared to the decrease in probability of self-
enhancement (18%) due to performance change, corroborate Staw et al.’s (1983) 
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findings that even if firms have been unsuccessful they still try to report positive 
news.
 Proposition 6 hypothesised on the effect of performance stability on causal 
attributions. In accordance with Salancik and Meindl (1984) we expected the 
unstable firms to make greater use of both internal-positive and internal-negative 
causal statements. The rationale of that expectation is that managers of unstable 
companies lack control over organisational outcomes and “as a consequence 
strategically manipulate causal attributions to manage impressions of their control” 
(Barlow, 1996: 31). According to Salancik and Meindl (1984: 238) this strategic 
manipulation implies that “managements [of unstable firms] claim responsibility 
for both positive and negative outcomes more than do the managements of firms 
with stable performance, and, contrary to psychological theories, seem reluctant to 
attribute poor performance to uncontrollable, environmental events.” Indeed, their 
findings confirm the idea that managers of unstable firms try to create an 
impression of being in control of the circumstances. The IP–EP bias for unstable 
firms was significantly larger than for stable ones, while the EN–IN bias was 
smaller (the latter was due predominantly to the smaller use of external-negative 
causal statements by the unstable firms). Although our results are largely in line 
with Salancik and Meindl’s findings and with proposition 6, they not 
unequivocally support them. First of all, although the signs were as expected, the 
count regression (Model 1) did not yield a significant stability effect on the 
number of positive statements. Most important is that stable and unstable firms 
only marginally differed with respect to the number of internal-positive causal 
attributions. This result is in with Clapham and Schwenk’s (1991) and Aerts’ 
(1991) findings. In the second analysis, using ordered logit regression, we 
discovered that although unstable firms are slightly more likely to self-enhance 
they do not differ significantly from the stable firms in this respect. This finding 
corroborates the results of Clapham and Schwenk (1991), Aerts (1991), and 
Barlow (1996). Regarding the negative outcomes, the results are more in line with 
Salancik and Meindl. In line with Salancik and Meindl (1984) and Clapham and 
Schwenk (1991) we as well find that unstable firms make significantly less use of 
external-negative causal statements in their letters to the shareholders than do the 
stable firms. They, however, as one might expect following Salancik and Meindl’s 
arguments, do not make significant greater use of internal causes to explain 
unfavourable performances. Consequently, in Model 2, we find in line with the 
results of Salancik and Meindl (1984) and Clapham and Schwenk (1991), but in 
contrast with Aerts’ (1991) findings, that managements of unstable firms, 
compared to those of stable ones, are less likely to show self-protecting 
tendencies. Taken together these results partially support the idea that 
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managements of unstable firms, at least compared to their colleagues of stable 
firms, to larger extent use causal statements strategically as an attempt to 
“convince constituents of their ability to direct the corporation more effectively” 
(Salancik and Meindl, 1984: 252). 
Proposition 7 hypothesised on the negative effect of visibility, as measured by 
firm size, on self-serving attributional biases. The idea was that larger firms are 
confronted with more intense public scrutiny and consequently have fewer 
possibilities to engage in self-serving attributional biases in their letters to the 
shareholders than do smaller firms. Our results, however, in accordance with Aerts 
(1994, 2001), failed to indicate any significant effect of firm size on either the 
number of the various types of causal statements or the presence of self-serving 
biases. A possible explanation may be the nature of the companies included in the 
sample. All firms are quoted on major stock exchanges, and all may be considered 
large firms in their countries (and frequently in an international setting as well). 
Additionally, it is noted that researchers from the positive accounting field looked 
at the quantity of financial disclosures in general and not accounting narratives in 
particular. Hence, both our and Aerts’ studies suggest that firm size has no 
influence on accounting narratives. 
Although the effects of the general economy were as expected, they failed to 
reach a statistically significant level. Hence, although we observed that 
managements try to remain credible by increasing the number of external-positive 
and decreasing the number of external-negative causal statements if the economy 
was generally favourable, the effect was not strong enough to unconditionally 
support either propositions 8a or 8b. In a related study, Bettman and Weitz (1983) 
neither found unequivocal evidence that the economy exerts influence on 
managers’ attributions in their letters to the shareholders. The only effect they 
found was that if economic conditions were generally harsh managers did refer 
more often to those unfavourable circumstances to account for worsening 
performances. In a recent replication of Bettman and Weitz’s research, Tsang, 
using letters of Singapore companies from 1985 and 1994, did find that economic 
conditions influenced managers’ explanations. He not only confirmed Bettman 
and Weitz’s finding that harsh economic conditions lead to greater use of external-
negative causal statements, but also that management tended to use internal-
positive statements more often in a year in which the economy was unfavourable. 
Few words of caution are in order here when comparing our results with those of 
these researchers. First of all there is a difference in sample selection procedure. 
Their studies started with choosing a good and a bad year in terms of economic 
conditions, based on GDP and stock price information. Subsequently from the two 
years thus selected they obtained the companies’ letters. Hence, their main 
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objective was to arrive at a sample that was balanced in view of the economic 
circumstances. Our study on the other hand aimed at arriving at a sample that was 
balanced in terms of company performance. That is, from the period 1994 to 2000 
we tried to obtain, for each company, a letter from a year in which company 
results improved and one from a year in which company results deteriorated (see 
also section 5.2). As a consequence our sample was not balanced in terms of 
economic conditions. It is not inconceivable that this has driven the results with 
respect to the influence of the economy on managers’ explanations and that it may 
be well possible that results would have been different if more unfavourable years 
(in terms of the general economy) were included. 
 Propositions 9a and 9b concerned the possible effect on managers’ 
explanations of a new CEO and tenured CEOs, respectively. In section 5.2 we 
argued that newly appointed CEOs might show stronger self-serving tendencies 
than do their colleagues who are not in their first term. Particularly, newly 
appointed CEOs may feel the need to prove themselves or to show how successful 
they have been in their first term, which may exacerbate self-enhancement. 
However, comparable to Staw et al. (1983) and Schwenk (1993) we do not find 
evidence that CEOs who write their first letter to the shareholders are particularly 
motivated to use self-enhancing attributions. The only significant effect we find is 
that the disclosure of negative unexplained effects (Z-) is significantly higher for 
newly appointed CEOs. This finding is partially in line with Barlow’s (1996) 
results who found that CEOs with little tenure disclosed more negative news than 
did their highly-tenured counterparts. According to her “this tendency seems to be 
an effort by CEOs with low company tenure to show that they intend to address 
the problem. This exertion of control is another way in which a CEO with low 
tenure can increase his power in the company. [Alternatively], this may be an 
effort by the low tenure CEOs to gain shareholder support by telling them 
everything about the poor performance” (Barlow, 1996: 76). However, in view of 
the last possibility raised by Barlow it is strange that they leave the negative 
outcomes unexplained (we do not find a difference regarding EN or IN). Maybe 
they hope that the constituents—that is the shareholders—will put the blame on 
the circumstances or their predecessors for the disappointing performance 
themselves. Our results do no indicate that tenured CEO, i.e. those with three or 
more years experience as company’s CEO, differ significantly from the relatively 
speaking inexperienced CEO. Hence, proposition 8b cannot be substantiated. This 
finding is largely in line with the results of Staw et al. (1983), Schwenk (1993), 
and Barlow (1996). The only effect we observe is that our more experienced CEOs 
make greater use of Z+ statements. That is, they include more unexplained positive 
effects than do their less experienced colleagues. This may indicate that they feel 
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less pressure to take credit for successes—they also referred in larger amounts to 
external-positive statements though not statistically significant—than do the 
inexperienced CEOs and let the results speak for themselves. 
The last possible determinant we looked at concerned the influence of 
blockholders. Comparable to Staw et al. (1983) we do not find this variable to be 
significantly related to managers’ causal statements. Hence, we have to reject 
proposition 10. However, although the effect is statistically insignificant we do 
observe that it has a negative effect on the likelihood of engaging in self-serving 
behaviour, and—in line with previous findings of Abrahamson and Park (1994) 
and Barlow (1996)—that they do seem to disclose marginally more negative 
effects in their letters to the shareholders. This seems to be an indication—though 
weak—that a CEO feels more pressure to disclose information, even if negative, 
as shareholders become more influential “in order to be loyal to the shareholders 
and institutions that invest in his company (Eisenhardt, 1985)” (Barlow, 1996: 77). 
 Table 6.28 summarises the results with respect to propositions 5 to 10. 
Hypothesis   Confirmed 
5. Performance effect  ¥
6. Stability effect  ¥
7. Visibility (firm size) effect  Not 
8a. Economic conditions and favourable results  Not 
8b. Economic conditions and unfavourable results  Not 
9a. Effect of new CEO  Not 
9b. Escalation of commitment (CEO tenure)  Not 
10. Large shareholders and self-serving biases  Not 
¥ Proposition is supported
Table 6.28 Discrete choice regression results and propositions 5 to 10 
In sum, we observed that a large part of the way managers explain 
organisational results in their letters to the shareholders depends upon the kind of 
performance they are able to report. That is, the chance of letters containing self-
enhancing or self-protecting attributional biases increases if company results have 
been favourable or unfavourable, respectively. Culture, as measured through two 
proxies, seems to work on a “secondary” level. Though we found differences in 
“self- or group interest” and “achievement orientation” to influence managers’ 
tendencies to engage in self-serving attributions, this effect was smaller than the 
performance effect. Our results seem to confirm the idea that the role of culture in 
shaping behaviour is indirect (Earley, 1989; Earley and Erez, 1997; Lonner and 
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Adamopoulos, 1997). Indeed, this “seems to be a fairly common position within 
Western psychology … [who, RH] treats culture as a mediator variable” (Lonner 
and Adamopoulus, 1997: 69). The idea of culture affecting behaviour—in our case 
the use of self-serving attributional biases—indirectly is also noticeable in 
Hofstede’s ideas regarding individualism and collectivism as well as Markus and 
Kitayama’s ideas concerning the construal of the self (Lonner and Adamopoulos, 
1997).
6.5 Other ways to impression manage with accounting narratives 
6.5.1 The accounting bias 
So far we have examined self-serving attributional biases in accounting narratives. 
We saw which factors either exacerbate or attenuate CEOs’ tendencies to show 
such biases in their explanations for organisational outcomes. These explanations, 
self-serving or not, are part of a wider range of impression management techniques 
available to managers when they present news with respect to organisational 
outcomes in the annual report. In the introduction to this study we saw that apart 
from self-serving explanations, managers also show biases in the kind of news 
they convey, make selective use of and manipulate graphs, and seem to vary the 
readability of reports depending on the valence of the news they have to address. 
Another way to selectively present organisational outcomes is the use of so-called 
“accounting explanations” by which managers try to avoid addressing who was 
responsible for the outcome (Aerts, 1994). As was briefly addressed in section 
2.4.2, accounting explanations “use the internal logic of the financial accounting 
model, relating (intermediary) accounting effects and categories, in order to 
explain financial actions and results” (Aerts, 1994: 339). Given their ambiguity it 
is possible to see such accounting explanations as a specific form of meta-accounts 
(Scott and Lyman, 1968). This ambiguity is clear in the following example of such 
accounting-technical explanation we encountered in Samas’ annual report: “The 
large improvement in net profit is a result of the substantial increase of operating 
profit in both the Division Office Furnishing as well as the Division Office 
Supplies” (annual report Samas Group 1999). Given accounting explanations’ 
ambiguity and managers’ self-interest, Aerts expected the accounting and causal, 
self-serving explanations to be complementary. While positive outcomes are stated 
in ordinary, causal explanations, where responsibility may be easily assigned, he 
suggested that negative outcomes are more likely to be explained in ambiguous, 
accounting language. Indeed, he even suggested the possibility of a so-called 
“accounting bias”, which “manifests itself as a tendency to explain negative 
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performance more in technical accounting terms, while positive performance are 
more accounted for in strict cause-effect terminology whereby responsibility 
becomes clear” (1994: 341). Though his results indicate that positive outcomes are 
predominantly explained in clear-cut language, he does not find his Belgian 
managers to address bad results in accounting-technical language. In this study we 
look at the accounting bias as well. The results are presented in table 6.29 below. 
Panel A contains frequency data (number in parentheses represents the standard 
deviation); Panel B presents the proportional measures.  
Language use (effects concern sales, profits, and costs)
Panel A – Frequency data 
Positive effects US  JP NL Total 
Number of positive 
effects 
1.35
(2.07) 
1.83
(2.58) 
3.59
(4.34) 
2.09
(3.09) 
Causally explained 
1.11
(1.72) 
1.38
(1.87) 
2.23
(2.65) 
1.49
(2.09) 
Technically explained
0.24
(0.73) 
0.45
(0.91) 
1.36
(2.15) 
0.60
(1.37) 
Negative effects US  JP NL Total 
Number of negative 
effects 
0.74
(1.38) 
1.62
(2.31) 
1.84
(2.92) 
1.35
(2.25) 
Causally explained 
0.64
(1.25) 
1.24
(1.89) 
1.16
(2.14) 
1.00
(1.77) 
Technically explained 
0.10
(0.36) 
0.38
(0.85) 
0.68
(1.20) 
0.35
(0.85) 
Panel B – Proportional data 
 Positive effects US JP NL Total 
% causally 
84.85 
(24.45) 
78.64 
(28.48) 
69.13 
(32.29) 
77.69 
(29.20) 
% technically 
15.15 
(24.45) 
21.36 
(28.48) 
30.87 
(32.29) 
22.61 
(29.20) 
 Negative effects US JP NL Total 
% causally 
86.71 
(29.42) 
78.16 
(35.61) 
61.11 
(37.19) 
75.79 
(35.58) 
% technically 
13.29 
(29.42) 
21.84 
(35.61) 
38.89 
(37.19) 
24.21 
(35.58) 
Table 6.29 Language use in letters to the shareholders 
The results in table 6.29 indicate that both positive and negative outcomes are 
predominantly explained for in clear-cut causal language. Somewhat more than 
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75% of both good and bad results are described in simple cause-effect 
terminology. However, Kruskal-Wallis tests with nation as grouping variable, 
reveal cultural differences in language use for both positive (Ȥ2 = 7.68; p-value = 
0.021) and negative outcomes (Ȥ2 = 13.70; p-value = 0.001). Further pair wise 
comparison (based on Mann-Whitney tests) show that the Dutch are solely 
responsible for the difference between the three countries. Relatively speaking 
they make the most elaborate use of accounting-technical terminology in their 
letters to the shareholders. Between Japanese and American managers we do not 
see any significant difference in language use. Table 6.30 presents the relative 
difference in language (analogous to the self-serving bias). The results suggest that 
only one side of the accounting bias is present: positive outcomes are mostly 
addressed in clear-cut causal language. However, we do not find a protecting 
tendency via the use of language, that is we fail to find that negative outcomes are 
accounted for in accounting-technical terms. On the contrary, we see arising 
significant negative differences implying that disappointing results are presented 
in clear cause-effect language as well. In sum, the results—corroborating Aerts’ 
(1994) findings—suggest that managers, irrespective of culture, do not try to 
obscure their responsibility for bad results by wrapping it in ambiguous 
accounting-technical terminology. 
The accounting bias
  US  JP  NL  Total  
Frequency 
0.87
(1.65)
*** 0.92 
(1.41)
*** 0.87 
(2.14)
*** 0.89 
(1.70) 
***
Positive 
effects 
(Cau–At ) Proportional 
69.70
(48.90)
*** 57.28 
(56.96)
*** 38.25 
(64.59)
*** 54.78 
(58.41) 
***
Frequency 
-0.55 
(1.22)
*** -0.88 
(1.82)
*** -0.47 
(1.88)
** -0.65 
(1.64) 
***
Negative 
effects 
(At–Cau) Proportional 
-73.41 
(58.83)
*** -56.27 
(71.21)
*** -22.22 
(74.37)
* -51.58 
(71.16) 
***
***
**
*
 Significant at 0.01 using a Wilcoxon signed rank test  
 Significant at 0.05 using a Wilcoxon signed rank test 
 Significant at 0.10 using a Wilcoxon signed rank test 
Table 6.30 The accounting bias 
6.5.2 The art of presenting news 
Apart from looking at the variation in language used to explain organisational 
outcomes, in this study we also look at the location of the news being conveyed. In 
one of the earlier studies looking at attributions in letters to the shareholders, Staw 
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et al. considered “the art of presenting good and bad news” (1983: 596). First of 
all, they found both high- and low-performing firms emphasising positive events, 
something Jones and Clathworthy (2000b) found as well in a more recent study of 
British companies. Apart from looking at the emphasis on type of news, Staw and 
colleagues also looked at the location of positive and negative information. The 
results they found are rather interesting. The high-performing companies in their 
sample tried to maintain a positive tone throughout the whole letter to the 
shareholders. The low-performing companies, however, also had to account for 
negative news. The results of Staw et al.’s study indicate that the low-performing 
firms prefer to address negative news “at the outset and to end their letters on an 
upbeat tone that is nearly as positive as the information presented by successful 
companies” (1983: 597).2 This finding is interesting in view of the so-called 
primacy and recency effects. Basically, the first suggests that the impressions 
people form of other persons are primarily based on the information they receive 
first. The recency effect, on the other hand, assumes that the information that is 
conveyed last, is the most important when people form their impressions of 
another person (Vonk, 1999; Pruyn and Wilke, 2001). According to Pruyn and 
Wilke (2001) there is no agreement among social psychological researchers about 
which effect is strongest, although researchers do agree that the information that is 
provided in the middle is remembered least. The findings of Staw et al. (1983) 
may indicate that managers, assuming that they are aware of the existence of such 
effects, think that readers of the letters to the shareholders base their judgement of 
management on the information that is provided at the end in the letter to the 
shareholders. Therefore, in this study we decided to look at the tone of the 
message contained in the first and last few lines of the letter to the shareholders. 
More specifically, we examine whether the tone at the outset and at the end is 
considered “negative”, “neutral”, or “positive.” For example, a statement such as 
“Once again Royal Ahold had an excellent year, achieving record performances in 
all trade areas” (annual report Royal Ahold 2000) is clearly positive. On the other 
hand an opening statement such as “In the fiscal year ended March 31, 1999, 
Tokyo Electron’s consolidated net sales decreased 31.1 percent year-on-year to 
¥313,820 million as unfavourable economic conditions in Asia and oversupply in 
the DRAM market depressed investment in equipment among semiconductor 
manufacturers worldwide” (annual report Tokyo Electron 1999) is clearly negative 
2 It is also possible that the credibility issue is at stake here. Usually speaking 
disappointing performance is not what investors expect and therefore is likely to attract 
extra attention. In order to remain a credible messenger this information has to be 
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of tone. Panel A of table 6.31 below indicates that especially managers from the 
Western cultures have strong tendencies to begin their letter positively and clearly 
want to avoid starting it with a message that has a negative tone. In only 15% and 
10% of the analysed U.S. and Dutch letters, respectively, the first line is evaluated 
negatively. The Japanese CEOs on the other hand are more balanced with respect 
to the tone of the first sentence. A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test, with nation 
as grouping variable, reveals a significant country-effect with respect to the tone of 
the opening sentence (Ȥ2 = 20.16; p-value = 0.000). Further pair wise comparison 
using Mann-Whitney tests indicates that the Japanese in larger extents start their 
message with negative news than either the American and Dutch managers do. 
Looking at the tone of the whole first section (see Panel B in Table 6.31) does not 
really alter the general tendency that the western managers prefer to start their 
message positively, while those from Japan do not seem to show such bias (Ȥ2 =
23.58; p-value = 0.000). It is possible that due to the Asia Crisis, managers from 
Japan did not see much reason to start their letters in an upbeat tone.  
Panel A – Tone opening sentence
US JP NL Total 
Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Negative 16 15.4 37 35.5 7 10.0 60 21.6 
Neutral 40 38.5 37 35.5 24 34.3 101 36.3 
Positive 48 46.2 30 29.0 39 55.7 117 42.1 
Total 104 100.0 104 100.0 70 100.0 278 100.0 
Panel B – Tone opening section 
Negative 21 20.2 39 37.5 13 18.6 73 26.3 
Neutral 21 20.2 36 34.6 15 21.4 72 25.9 
Positive 62 59.6 29 27.9 42 60.0 133 47.8 
Total 104 100.0 104 100.0 70 100.0 278 100.0 
Table 6.31 Cross tabulation tone opening sentence and section * country 
 We also looked at the tone of the closing section of the letter to the 
shareholders. Table 6.32 below displays the results. What stands out most is that, 
irrespective of culture, not one manager wants to end their letter with a negative 
message. This finding is line with Staw et al.’s (1983) result that CEOs tend to end 
their message on an upbeat tone. This seems to hold particularly for the CEOs of 
the Dutch and U.S. companies: their tendency to end the letter positively is 
presented first, before management can pay attention to more positive aspects of the past 
fiscal year. 
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significantly stronger than that of their Japanese colleagues (Ȥ2 = 26.83; p-value = 
0.000). The Japanese, on the other hand, end their letters in a neutral tone which 
seems to be in line with their tendency to be modest (Yoshida, Kojo and Kaku, 
1982; quoted in Markus and Kitayama, 1991). 
Tone closing section
US JP NL Total 
Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Negative 0 0.0 2 1.9 0 0.0 2 0.7 
Neutral 33 31.7 67 64.4 30 42.9 130 46.8 
Positive 71 68.3 35 33.7 40 57.1 146 52.5 
Total 104 100.0 104 100.0 70 100.0 278 100.0 
Table 6.32 Cross tabulation tone closing section * country 
 In order to investigate which factors influence the tone of the opening and 
closing sections we run ordered logistic regression with the dependent variables 
being the tone (it is “1” if tone is negative, “2” if neutral, and “3” if positive. The 
results of the regression models are presented in table 6.33 on the next page. 
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Tone first 
sentence 
Tone first  
section 
Tone closing 
section 
Perform 1.32 *** 1.66 *** 0.15  
ResultFirst 0.77 *** 0.36  —  
OutlookCls — —  2.25 *** 
Stable -0.03 -0.40  -0.41  
CeoNew 0.03 *** -0.55  -0.61  
CeoExp -0.98 -0.13  -0.02  
Size 0.02 0.11  0.11  
Econ -0.13 -0.13  0.28  
Block 0.54 0.02  0.86  
IDV 0.01 0.03 *** 0.05 *** 
MAS -0.01 ** -0.01  0.01 ** 
Thresholds       
Ĳ1 -0.62 2.33  1.03  
Ĳ2 1.39 3.76  6.29  
General       
-2lnLog 505.96  498.66  336.16  
G2 (10 df) 79.97  81.83  66.43  
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  
*** 
** 
*
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.01 level 
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.05 level 
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.10 level 
Table 6.33 Ordered logit regression results 
Again information about the coefficients does not tell us how those variables 
really affect Y. To do so we have to look at the discrete changes. These are 
provided in table 6.34 below. Panel A contains the discrete changes with respect to 
the tone of the opening line, Panel B those for the opening section, while Panel C 
displays them for the closing section. A few observations can be made from the 
table. First of all by looking at the absolute discrete change (provided in the 
column marked as “ ∆ ”) we observe that the type of performance a company is 
able to report has a strong influence on the tone of the opening sentence. If a 
company experienced a good year—and is able to report a performance 
improvement—it is 31% more likely that the letter begins with an opening 
sentence that is considered positive, than when the company has had a bad year. 
Furthermore, the discrete changes also indicate that if the first sentence contains a 
reference to the company result (designated by the variable “ResultFirst”), it is 
19% more likely that that sentence will be positive of tone than if the opening line 
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does not contain a reference to the company results. The result regarding the 
variable that measured whether a CEO is in his first year is rather surprising: if 
there is a CEO who is in his first term it will be about 22% less likely that the 
opening line is positive of tone. At the same time it is about 16% more likely that 
the opening line will contain some negative information. It may be possible—
though we did not specifically look at it—that a new CEO first presents some 
negative information regarding the results of his predecessor and subsequently 
provide an outline of how he is going to yield better performances. The influence 
of masculinity is in line with the difference in tone found as indicated in table 
6.31. If we turn our attention to the complete opening section, we see that only the 
variables “perform” and individualism exert significant influence on the tone of 
the message. The influence of individualism is the same as found in table 6.31. 
The results with respect to the closing section—indicating that the type of perform 
does not influence the tone of the last section—are completely in line with Staw et 
al.’s (1983) findings. His study indicated that all firms, irrespective of 
performance, prefer “to end their letters on an upbeat tone.” We also find that 
especially if firms decide to include a statement concerning future expectations in 
the closing section it is likely to be positive (as indicated by the variable 
“OutlkCls”). The results indicate that the probability of a closing section that has a 
positively toned message is 45% higher if the section present some future-oriented 
information compared to when such information is not presented in the last 
section. Furthermore, confirming the result found in table 6.32, we find that the 
western, individualistic managers more clearly prefer to end their letters in an 
upbeat tone than their eastern, collectivistic colleagues. 
 In sum, the results with respect to the tone at the outset and at the end of letters 
to the shareholders do not unequivocally favour either the primacy or the recency 
effect.3 However, the results do suggest a cultural difference in the presentation of 
news, which adds knowledge to the growing evidence provided by cross-cultural 
psychological research indicating a pervasive East-West difference (e.g. Fry and 
Ghosh, 1980; Miller, 1984; Kashima and Triandis, 1986; Morris and Peng, 1994; 
Markus et al., 1996; Meijer, 1996; Kitayama et al., 1997; Lee and Seligman, 1997; 
Semin and Zwier, 1997; Zwier, 1998; Choi et al., 1999; Menon et al., 1999). 
3 Given the strong effect of performance on tone of opening sentence provides support of 
the importance of credibility in presenting information in financial reports, including the 
CEO’s letter to the shareholders. 
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Panel A: Tone first sentence 
Variable Sig Change ∆
Y=1 
(Negative) 
Y=2 
(Neutral) 
Y=3 
(Positive) 
Perform *** 0ĺ1 0.21 -0.18 -0.13 0.31 
ResultFrst *** 0ĺ1 0.12 -0.10 -0.09 0.19 
Stable n.s. 0ĺ1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CeoNew *** 0ĺ1 0.15 0.16 0.06 -0.22 
CeoExp n.s. 0ĺ1 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Size n.s. ¨ range 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 
Econ n.s. 0ĺ1 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.04 
Block n.s. ¨ range 0.06 -0.05 -0.04 0.09 
IDV n.s. ¨ range 0.08 -0.07 -0.05 0.12 
MAS ** ¨ range 0.17 0.13 0.12 -0.25 
Panel B: Tone first section 
Variable Sig Change ∆
Y=1 
(Negative) 
Y=2 
(Neutral) 
Y=3 
(Positive) 
Perform *** 0ĺ1 0.26 -0.28 -0.12 0.40 
ResultFrst n.s. 0ĺ1 0.06 -0.06 -0.03 0.09 
Stable n.s. 0ĺ1 0.07 0.07 0.03 -0.10 
CeoNew n.s. 0ĺ1 0.09 0.10 0.03 -0.13 
CeoExp n.s. 0ĺ1 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.03 
Size n.s. ¨ range 0.17 0.07 0.03 -0.10 
Econ n.s. 0ĺ1 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.03 
Block n.s. ¨ range 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IDV *** ¨ range 0.20 -0.22 -0.09 0.31 
MAS n.s. ¨ range 0.12 0.12 0.07 -0.19 
Panel C: Tone closing section 
Variable Sig Change ∆
Y=1 
(Negative) 
Y=2 
(Neutral) 
Y=3 
(Positive) 
Perform n.s. 0ĺ1 0.03 -0.00 -0.04 0.04 
OutlkCls *** 0ĺ1 0.30 -0.01 -0.45 0.46 
Stable n.s. 0ĺ1 0.07 0.00 0.10 -0.10 
CeoNew n.s. 0ĺ1 0.10 0.00 0.15 -0.15 
CeoExp n.s. 0ĺ1 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
Size n.s. ¨ range 0.17 -0.01 -0.25 0.26 
Econ n.s. 0ĺ1 0.05 -0.00 -0.07 0.07 
Block n.s. ¨ range 0.10 -0.00 -0.14 0.14 
IDV *** ¨ range 0.32 -0.01 -0.47 0.48 
MAS *** ¨ range 0.19 -0.01 -0.29 0.30 
***
**
*
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.01 level 
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.05 level 
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.10 level
∆  Average absolute discrete change 
0ĺ1  Increase in P(Yi | xi) due to a change in xk, dummy from 0 to 1, c.p. 
¨ range  Increase in P(Yi | xi) due to a change in xk, continuous from xMIN to xMAX, c.p. 
Table 6.34 Discrete changes in tone of opening and closing 
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6.5.3 The inclusion of future expectations 
The presentation of future expectations forms another way by which the board of 
directors may try to manage people’s impressions. Forecasts of earnings play an 
important role in the pricing process on equity markets, as stock prices are said to 
reflect perceptions about future earnings (Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 1998). In 
most, if not all, developed countries, however, management is free to include such 
earnings forecasts in the annual report. For example, in a study of Canadian 
companies, Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1994) found a mere 36 percent 
disclosing forecast information in their annual report (a comparable US sample of 
100 firms led to a similar percentage of 33 percent). Their findings, however, do 
emphasise the importance of forecast information in the impression management 
process. Firstly, Clarkson et al. (1994) found their good news firms being more 
prepared to include a future outlook in the annual report. Secondly, it was found 
that “only 17.5 percent of the sample forecasts represent revisions downward 
relative to the previous year’s result” (1994: 425), while “the decision to forecast 
is not related to the firm’s forecast decision in the previous year” (1994: 433). If 
such future outlook was provided, in 50 percent of the Canadian (and 68 percent of 
the US) firms, the letter to the shareholders was the designated place. Given the 
possibilities to use information on future expectations to manage people’s 
impression, we investigated which factors determine both the decision to include 
this information in the letter to the shareholders, and additionally, if such 
information is included, which factors influence the tone of those expectations. 
Table 6.35 below displays the results regarding the inclusion of future statements 
in letters to the shareholders. 
Future expectations in letter to the shareholders
US JP NL Total 
Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Yes 40 38.5 34 32.7 51 72.9 125 45.0 
No 64 61.5 70 67.3 19 27.1 153 55.0 
Total 104 100.0 104 100.0 70 100.0 278 100.0 
Table 6.35 Cross tabulation inclusion future expectations * country 
 In table 6.35 we see that of the 278 letters we examined, only 45% contained 
expressions about next year’s results. Especially, among the Dutch this tendency is 
strong (and significantly different from the other two countries; Ȥ2 = 30.24; p-value 
= 0.000) which can be ascribed to the fact that in all management reports we 
studied such statement is required by law. If we omit these 36 reports, the 
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percentages are similar to the other two countries (and no longer significantly 
different). Therefore, in further analysis we do not take these reports into 
consideration. First we analyse which factors influence the decision to include 
future statements in the letters or not using logistic regression. Subsequently, we 
use ordered logistic regression to determine which factors influence the tone of the 
future expectations if included. Table 6.36 displays the results. Contrary to the 
findings of Clarkson et al. (1994) we do not see that the good news companies are 
more than the bad news companies inclined to include statements about future 
expectations in their letters to the shareholders. A possible explanation why we do 
not find such difference may be that, whereas Clarkson et al. (1994) looked at the 
entire financial report, we only looked at the letter to the shareholders. Our 
findings—when limiting us to the restricted set—indicates that culture does not 
influence the decision to include future expectations in the letter (which is in 
conformity with the figures in table 6.35 after omitting the 36 Dutch reports that 
do not contain a formal letter). We observe that the stable companies are more 
likely to include future-oriented statements in their letters to the shareholders. 
Indeed, the discrete change due to a shift from 0 to 1 in the dummy “stable” 
(where “1” indicates stable performance), while holding all other variables 
constant, shows an increase of 26% in the probability of including future 
statements. This finding seems logical, as for the unstable companies future 
performances are more difficult to predict and, consequently, their managers may 
find it safer not to include such information at all, than having to explain why 
performance—and especially if it stays behind expectations—deviated from their 
expectations. The result that large shareholders have a negative impact on the 
likelihood that future-oriented information is included in the letter, may be a result 
of their access to more information other than the letter to the shareholders. The 
negative impact of size (measured by the natural logarithm of total assets) is 
contrary to Clarkson et al. (1994) findings among Canadian firms. There is no real 
explanation for this result. 
191
 Outlook included Tone outlook 
Constant 5.44 *** —
Perform 0.06 -0.62
Stable 1.06 *** -0.71
CeoNew -0.70 -0.44
CeoExp -1.18 *** 0.38
Size -0.26 ** -0.17
Econ 0.41 1.39
Block -2.07 * -2.77
IDV -0.02 0.02
MAS -0.01  -0.00  
Thresholds     
Ĳ1 — -3.29
Ĳ2 — -2.77
General     
n 242  88  
-2lnLog 284.84  89.94  
G2 (9 df) 29.49  12.97  
p-value 0.001  0.164  
***
**
*
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.01 level 
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.05 level 
 Coefficient (β) is significant at the 0.10 level
Table 6.36 Ordered logit regression results 
The results in table 6.36 furthermore indicate that not one factor has a 
significant influence on the tone of future expectations. This result seems logical, 
given the overwhelming presence of positively toned expectations. Of the 88 letter 
that do say something about future performances, 82% was optimistic about the 
company’s near future. In only 13% managers warned the shareholders that next 
year’s performance is likely to stay behind this year’s results. The percentages are 
not in sharp contrast with Clarkson et al.’s observations. They found that 
somewhat less than two thirds of their forecasts were positive, while about 17% 
contained negative expectations. In section 2.4.2 we noted that self-handicapping 
implies that a person places “impediments or barriers in the face of success” 
(Rosenfeld et al., 1995: 88; see also Tice and Baumeister, 1990). Such a strategy 
has two consequences for the self-handicapper: If he succeeds the value of the 
success is heightened, if he fails, the negative impact will be weakened. To a 
certain extent such behaviour can also be expected in annual reports (Rosenfeld et 
al., 1995: 91). In these annual reports managers have to provide information on 
expectations on future profits, sales, etc.. Hence, it may be possible that 
management is very careful and even pessimistic about the future profits and sales, 
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although general economic conditions do not completely warrant such 
expectations. However, both our results as those of Clarkson et al. are in sharp 
contrast with Rosenfeld et al.’s (1995) observation. It seems that firms only 
include information about the future if they expect it to be positive. 
7  Concluding thoughts 
“Managerial work can be viewed as managing  
myths, images, symbols, and labels. The much 
touted “bottom line” of the organisation is a symbol,  
if not a myth. [...] Because managers traffic so often in 
images, the appropriate role for the manager may be  
evangelist rather than accountant” 
1
Previously we commented that an important role of managers is symbolic. For 
example, the well-known organisational behaviourialist Jeffrey Pfeffer comments 
that “symbolic management operates fundamentally on the principle of illusion, in 
that using […] language, settings, and ceremonies effectively elicits powerful 
emotions in people and these emotions interfere with or becloud rational analysis” 
(1992: 279). The CEO’s letter to shareholders forms an important element of this 
symbolism. They narrate the successes and failures of individuals (e.g. the CEOs), 
organisational subunits, and the entire company (Fiol, 1989) and have been the 
subject of this study. More specifically, in our study we have investigated whether 
CEOs’ explanations for company results in their letters to the shareholders are 
self-serving, implying that favourable outcomes are internalised whereas 
unfavourable ones are blamed on the environment. Furthermore, as recent social-
psychological research has revealed the existence of a pervasive cross-cultural 
difference in people’s attributions, we have examined whether eastern and western 
CEOs differ in their use of self-serving attributions to account for company results 
in their letters to the shareholders. In this concluding chapter we first summarise 
the study in section 7.1. Subsequently, we provide lessons for both scholars and 
CEOs in section 7.2. Limitations of the study are discussed in section 7.3. The 
study concludes with section 7.4, which provides some food for thought regarding 
possibilities for future research for both managerial and accounting as well as 
social-psychological and cross-cultural researchers. 
1 Karl Weick (1979: 42). 
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7.1 Summary and conclusions 
In this study we have looked at managers’ reconstruction of reality in CEOs’ 
letters to the shareholders. As its content is largely unregulated, management’s 
discretion is large and, hence, the letter forms an excellent opportunity to manage 
people’s impressions of the company (and of the CEO himself). Apart from 
making use of eye-catching pictures and charts, previous research has revealed 
that managers try to manage constituents’ impressions by, e.g. varying the 
readability of its content, conveying news in a biased way (towards the positive) 
and engaging in self-serving attributional biases when they explain the company 
results. The focus of this study has been on the latter. The self-serving attributional 
bias consists of on the one hand self-enhancement—a tendency to internalise good 
outcomes by ascribing them to internal causes such as company strategy and the 
introduction of new products—and self-protection on the other—the tendency to 
externalise bad outcomes by blaming them on external causes such as the weather 
and the Asia Crisis. A large number of studies indicate that people in general show 
self-serving attributional biases when they explain outcomes of their behaviour. It 
occurs not only in the classroom among students, but on the soccer pitch and the 
running track as well. Prior research has confirmed its presence in letters to the 
shareholders too (e.g. Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Aerts, 1994; Tsang, 2002). 
Indeed, such attempts to control the impressions others form of you seem to be a 
rather natural and universal phenomenon. It occurs among friends and colleagues, 
in the classroom, in the boardroom, in the press room, and so on. However, 
controlling impressions become more important when a person’s behaviour is 
public—such as a CEO or a football coach—and when there is a gap between how 
a person is perceived and how that person wants to be perceived. Corporate 
managers may particularly be likely to strategically use impression management 
techniques: some scholars have even suggested that part of management’s job is 
symbolic. By providing explanations, rationalisations, and legitimisation for the 
organisational activities management wants to create an image of being in control 
(Pfeffer, 1981, 1992; Meindl, 1990; Ginzel et al., 1993; Elsbach, 1994). 
Establishing such an image reassures investors so that they will continue to invest 
in the company. More strongly, such a way of presenting information seems to be 
in line with people’s general ideas of leaders. As is argued by Meindl and 
colleagues (1985, 1987, 1990) people, including the press (Hayward and 
Westphal, 2002), tend to have a “romanticized conception of leadership,” implying 
that they have a strong belief in the influence of leaders (CEOs) on organisational 
performance and, consequently, tend to overattribute organisational outcomes to 
leaders—and particularly when organisational performance is high (Shamir, 
195
1992). For example, the press seems to favour to interpret organisational outcomes 
in terms of leadership as well (Chen and Meindl, 1991; Hayward and Westphal, 
2002), which in turn could reinforce this leadership bias. Furthemore, the 
separation of ownership and control—which is typical for modern, quoted 
companies—enables managers to make effective use of this belief. 
Notwithstanding monitoring devices such as the publication of audited financial 
reports and the appointment of supervisory directors, due to uncertainty and 
unequally distributed information, managers are able to bias the information they 
provide in order to affect the perceptions of other people, notably the shareholders 
(Dassen, 1989; Bromwich, 1992; Abrahamson and Park, 1994; Hoogendoorn, 
1996; Beaver, 1998). Maybe, as suggested by Meindl (1990: 161) it is easier to 
believe in leadership than to prove it. Organisations, and especially their leaders, 
can make use of this belief in their reconstruction of organisational outcomes in 
annual reports.  
Although no one is completely free from trying to strategically convey certain 
impressions, for example by explaining organisational outcomes in a self-serving 
manner, there are, however, cultures in which its occurrence is less prevalent. 
Indeed, there is a growing number of studies which reveal that people from the 
East are very different from those from the West with respect to the way they 
explain achievement-related outcomes (e.g. Miller, 1984; Kashima and Triandis, 
1986; Morris and Peng, 1994; Markus et al., 1996; Meijer, 1996; Kitayama et al.,
1997; Lee and Seligman, 1997; Semin and Zwier, 1997; Choi et al., 1999). 
Together, these studies suggest that self-serving attributional biases—though still 
present—are less pervasive in the East than in the West. Many researchers have 
found that the Japanese—at least to a larger extent than their American 
counterparts—are inclined to take the situation into account (i.e. to externalise) 
when they are asked to explain successes they achieved and assume personal 
responsibility when they have failed. Of the dimensions on which cultures may 
vary, the one that relates to the importance of the individual as opposed to the 
group (i.e. Self-interest versus Group-interest) is most suitable to explain the East-
West difference. In their seminal work, Markus and Kitayama (1991) have argued 
that whereas in the West there is an independent construal of the self, in the East 
there is an interdependent construal of the self. While in the West the self is 
defined in terms of being an autonomous person where one’s unique attributes are 
important, in the East the self is defined in terms of relationships with other 
persons. In the social-psychological literature on the self, it is advanced that such 
differences in construal of the self have implications for people’s verbal 
behaviours and their definition of self-esteem. As the focus in the independent 
view of the self is on one’s own person it is logical that outcomes are explained in 
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dispositional terms (e.g. Miller; 1984; Cousins, 1989; Markus and Kitayama, 
1991; Al-Zahrani and Kaplowitz, 1993; Morris and Peng, 1994; Lee, Hallahan and 
Herzog, 1996; Heine and Lehman, 1997; Zwier, 1998). In addition, self-esteem in 
individualistic countries—where an independent construal of the self dominates—
requires that one’s uniqueness is emphasised and that inner attributes are 
expressed (Markus and Kitayama, 1991: 242). This will lead to self-serving 
behaviour. In collectivistic countries—where the interdependent construal of the 
self prevails—the focus is on the social context in which one is operating. 
Therefore, situational or contextual attributions are expected. In this study we 
explore whether managers with different cultural backgrounds show the same 
differences in self-serving attributional biases as found in previous social-
psychological research. It not only adds perspective to previous accounting and 
organisational research on this subject, additionally it provides input to standard 
setting bodies, and notably the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 
as it is considering setting up a project that will investigate whether accounting 
narratives should become subject of more international regulation.  
In order to explore such cultural difference we content analysed in total 278 
Dutch, Japanese, and American letters to the shareholders. The analysis focused 
on “causal statements” in which an organisational outcome (i.e. profits, sales, etc.) 
is connected with a cause or a reason for that outcome. The following is an 
example of a typical causal statement: “In 2000, this pricing strategy was very 
successful, with net revenue per barrel increasing 2.5%” (annual report Anheuser-
Busch 2000). The content analysis also encompassed so-called unexplained 
organisational results. These are similar to causal statements, except that the 
outcome is unexplained. We decided to include such statements, as it might be 
important from an impression management point of view. The causal statements 
had to be coded along a number of dimensions, such as valence of effect (positive, 
negative or uncodeable), direction of cause and effect (indicating whether cause 
and effect are stated in similar or in opposite directions), and locus of causality 
(internal or external cause, or uncodeable). The content analysis resulted in 914 
unexplained effects, 911 explained effects that were explained by 1,420 causes.  
Looking at the valence of both explained and unexplained effects, we find 
evidence of an East-West difference in letters to the shareholders. In line with 
prior research, we see that the large majority of outcomes addressed in Dutch and 
American letters have a positive valence from management’s point of view. The 
Japanese on the other hand show a more balanced coverage strategy in which bad 
news is addressed as well. We find, in line with Tsang’s (2002) recent study of 
Singapore letters to the shareholders, that about 35% of unexplained effects and 
45% of the explained effects in Japanese letters present negative information (in 
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the US and Dutch letters the percentages were considerably smaller with 
approximately 20% and 34%). There are two possible interpretations of this East-
West difference. The first relates to recent social-psychological evidence which 
indicates that the need for a positive self-regard is particularly strong in Western, 
individualistic cultures—cultures in which independence, success, and individual 
control are important (e.g. Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Hence following Heine et 
al. (1999: 775), the need to view oneself positively encourages people to “seek 
out, enhance and elaborate their positive characteristics.” Therefore, it is not 
surprising that individuals from western cultures perceive negative information as 
threatening to the self. However, in eastern cultures such as Japan negative 
information is not considered threatening. On the contrary, “information about 
where one has fallen short [...] is used to improve or perfect one’s actions and thus 
serves to affirm one’s belongingness to a certain social group” (Kitayama et al.,
1997: 1246). Another possible interpretation of our results regarding the East-West 
difference in coverage of news relates to the Asia Crisis which started around July 
1997. Obviously, the Asia Crisis comprised large part of the years from which the 
letters were selected. A consequence might be that, as a result, the Japanese 
companies simply just had to address more bad news as they were affected more 
severely than companies from the West (Harrigan, 2000). 
The pattern of attributions managers make for positive and negative results are 
generally speaking in line with previous accounting and managerial studies 
looking into self-serving attributional biases in letters to the shareholders. We find 
that managers from the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands claim 
responsibility for positive organisational outcomes by ascribing them in a larger 
extent to internal causes than to external causes. Furthermore, the tendency to 
blame bad organisational outcomes on the environment is significant for both the 
American and Japanese managers. Despite that managers in general engage in 
self-serving attributional biases when they explain company results, we do see 
cultural differences arising between the three countries. For example, we find self-
enhancement to be stronger among the American managers than among their 
Dutch and Japanese counterparts. This result is largely in line with the growing 
body of social-psychological studies of the past decade indicating that self-
enhancement is attenuated in Asian cultures (Kitayama et al., 1997; Semin and 
Zwier, 1997; Heine et al., 1999). The cultural comparison, however, also yielded 
two rather surprising results. 
First of all, Dutch managers are free from the self-protecting bias. Similar to 
their Belgian counterparts (Aerts, 1994) they make relatively speaking more 
internal than external attributions when addressing disappointing results. 
Furthermore, they showed, relatively speaking, the smallest degree of self-
198
enhancement (though not significantly smaller than the Japanese). This result 
suggests that even among Western cultures with an independent construal of the 
self, differences in the amount of self-enhancement may arise. Indeed, in one of 
the few studies comparing Western nations, Nurmi (1992) found the Dutch and 
Finnish participants to show smaller self-enhancing tendencies than their 
American counterparts. A possible explanation, as the countries are not different 
with respect to the construal of the self (hence, individualism), are found in 
differences in masculinity and femininity. Hence, it is possible that people’s 
attributions are different depending on their more masculine or feminine cultural 
background (de Mooij, 1998).  
A second surprising result concerns the strong tendency to externalise bad 
organisational outcomes among the Japanese managers. Relatively speaking they 
showed the strongest tendency to self-protect. This finding seems in sharp contrast 
with previous social-psychological findings, in which evidence of smaller amounts 
of self-protection and even self-deprecation was found. There are two possible 
interpretations of our results. The first involves the aforementioned Asia Crisis 
that affected the Japanese companies more severely than the companies in the 
Western nations (Harrigan, 2000). As part of our sample was drawn from years in 
which Southeast Asia was hit by the Crisis, the Crisis constituted a credible 
explanation why company results have been disappointing. An alternative 
explanation of our results relates to the sample. Previous social-psychological 
research has relied on undergraduates and it is possible that those findings are not 
generalizable across all groups within a culture. That is, it is possible that cultural 
differences in self-serving behaviour become less pronounced as people grow 
older and have more experience and that, consequently, managers do no longer 
show behaviours that are considered typical for the cultural-context in which they 
operate. Indeed, Heine et al. (1999: 787) leave room for that possibility. They 
comment that “it may be the case that in situations in which Japanese are in 
positions of leadership or near the top of a hierarchy they may self-enhance and be 
motivated to believe that they have the requisite skills and abilities to fulfil their 
roles and to take care of their subordinates. Thus, we might expect that seniors at 
schools would demonstrate more self-enhancement than freshmen, full professors 
more than assistant professors, and older sisters more than younger brothers. 
Likewise, we may find that there are phases in life in which one is more likely to 
be in positions higher in the hierarchy; namely, old age, and this period may be 
associated with more self-enhancement and less self-criticism.” Lee and Tiedens 
(2002: 51-52) advance a related argument. They argue that self-serving biases are 
“more prevalent among high power than low power individuals. People with high 
socioeconomic status generally have higher self-esteem and self-confidence than 
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people in low socioeconomic status. Also, people in high power positions are more 
likely to rate themselves as more competent, more likeable, more desirable, and 
better looking than people in lower power positions. When things go wrong, 
people in high power positions are less likely to take personal responsibility and 
blame themselves than people in lower power positions.”  
Apart from investigating the influence of culture on self-serving attributions in 
the context of letters to the shareholders—which constitutes the main part of this 
research—we also examined which other factors are likely to influence the 
pervasiveness of the bias. Using discrete choice models—namely count and 
ordered logit regression models—we find the type of performance (i.e. favourable 
or unfavourable) and stability of performance to influence the bias. Type of 
performance exerts the strongest influence on both the type of causal statements 
and bias present in letters to the shareholders. Our results suggest the presence of a 
significant performance effect and confirm the findings of Barlow (1996). She 
found a tendency to disclose information to shareholders that is based on the 
performance level of the company. That is, we as well find that self-enhancement 
is more prevalent in years in which the company achieved a performance 
improvement, while self-protection is more prevalent in years a company 
experienced a deterioration of performance. The results further indicate that the 
change in the number of negative statements (in absolute terms) is larger than the 
change in number of positive statements if we vary company performance. This 
result, at least partially, confirms the results of Abrahamson and Park (1994) and 
Aerts (2001), who found a “consistently high level of positive attributions and [a] 
non-responsiveness of this level to overall performance” (Aerts, 2001: 29) and 
corroborate Staw et al.’s (1983) findings that even if firms have been unsuccessful 
they still try to report positive news.  
Furthermore, we found weak support of the idea that managers of unstable 
companies—lacking real control over organisational outcomes—“strategically 
manipulate causal attributions to manage impressions of their control” (Barlow, 
1996: 31). This strategic manipulation implies that “managements [of unstable 
firms] claim responsibility for both positive and negative outcomes more than do 
the managements of firms with stable performance, and, contrary to psychological 
theories, seem reluctant to attribute poor performance to uncontrollable, 
environmental events” (Salancik and Meindl, 1984: 238). In line with Salancik and 
Meindl (1984) and Clapham and Schwenk (1991) we find that unstable firms 
make significantly less use of external-negative causal statements in their letters to 
the shareholders than do the stable firms. However, just like Clapham and 
Schwenk (1991), Aerts (1991), and Barlow (1996), we do not find support of the 
idea that managers of unstable firms claim successes and accept blame for failures 
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in larger extents than do managers of stable ones. Taken together these results 
provide only weak support of the idea that managers of unstable firms to greater 
extent strategically use causal statements in order to “convince constituents of 
their ability to direct the corporation more effectively” (Salancik and Meindl, 
1984: 252). Regarding the other factors, such as firm size, CEO-tenure, and the 
general economy, we fail to find evidence that they have a significant impact on 
self-serving attributional biases. 
7.2 Lessons learnt  
In the previous section we noted that although almost every person—whether 
being a student, teacher, coach, employee, manager, etc.—attempts to control the 
impressions other people form. However, we also remarked that for some types of 
persons controlling impressions might be particularly important. Leary (1996: 82), 
for example, observed that especially “leaders have recognised that their 
effectiveness and powers depends, in part, on their public images.” Indeed, the 
charismatic leadership theories “acknowledge the importance of symbolic 
behaviour and the role of the leader in making events meaningful for followers” 
(Yukl, 1999: 285-286; see also Conger and Kanungo, 1998; Fiol, Harris and 
House, 1999). The idea that leadership and charisma are “in the eye of the 
beholder” is clearly underscored in Conger and Kanungo’s (1987, 1998) 
attributional model of charisma. Their model “builds on the idea that charismatic 
leadership is an attribution based on followers’ perceptions of their leader’s 
behaviour” (Conger and Kanungo, 1998: 47). Therefore, it is not surprising to 
observe that impression management techniques are important to charismatic 
leaders or those who try to gain charisma (Leary, 1996; Gardner and Avolio, 1998; 
Awamleh and Gardner, 1999; Yukl, 1999). For example, Conger (1989: 92) 
remarked that “charismatic leaders are meaning makers. They pick and choose 
from the rough materials of reality to construct pictures of great possibilities. Their 
persuasion then is of the subtlest kind, for they interpret reality to offer us images 
of the future that are irresistible.” This fits ideas of social psychologists such as 
Goffman and Schlenker who “see nothing inherently superficial or deceitful about 
impression management—it simply involves the packaging of information in order 
to lead target audiences to desired conclusions” (Gardner and Avolio, 1998: 33). 
Furthermore, it seems that leaders have certain images in mind when they 
communicate with their “followers.” According to Leary (1996) and Gardner and 
Avolio (1998) images of trustworthy, credible, innovative, esteemed, and powerful 
are valued by all leaders and charismatic ones in particular. Previously we also 
saw that “credibility” is particularly important in a financial reporting context 
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(Gibbins et al., 1990; Ginzel et al., 1993; Aerts and Theunisse, 2000). Claiming an 
image to be what one is not, and then failing to match one’s words with deeds, not 
only will produce negative reactions in others and in oneself, but will also be at the 
expense of management’s credibility (Schlenker, 1980). These images require that 
leaders show through tangible results, or the appearance of such, that they can 
deliver (Gardner and Avolio, 1998: 40). The strong performance effect we found 
seems to confirm this: in line with prior research (Salancik and Meindl, 1984; 
Barlow, 1996) we found self-enhancing biases to be more profound if performance 
was good and the self-protecting biases to be more profound if performance was 
bad. That is, “the information basically fits the situation” (Barlow, 1996: 85). 
Furthermore, the use of such self-serving attributional biases suggests that CEOs 
want to influence followers’ perceptions of competence and power. According to 
Conger and Kanungo (1987, 1998) this involves the ability to show past successes 
and may include behaviour such as “exaggerating the leader’s positive 
achievements and taking unwarranted credit for achievements” (Yukl, 1999: 296). 
However, as Yukl (1999: 297) notes “charisma is transitory” and may be lost as a 
consequence of “leader’s decisions which results in obvious failure.” In order to 
help organisational audiences forming their perceptions of failures, a CEO may try 
to deflect responsibility away by blaming it on the external environment. That is, 
CEOs can use “facework [e.g. self-protecting attributions, RH] to help protect or 
repair their image” (Gardner and Avolio, 1998: 47), which may involve “covering 
up mistakes and failures” and “blaming others for the leader’s mistakes” (Yukl, 
1999: 296). Hence, the use of such self-serving attributions—the packaging of 
information—is aimed at guiding the audience to reach the conclusion that the 
CEO is still competent and credible.  
Jeffrey Pfeffer (1997: 130)—in line with the idea that cultural forces influence 
many aspects of the leadership phenomenon—believes that the degree to which 
people have a romanticised conception of leadership may vary across cultures and 
may be more relevant in individualistic, western societies. Furthermore, “cultural 
groups may vary in their conceptions of the most important characteristics of 
effective leadership” (Den Hartog et al., 1999: 225). Indeed, it has been suggested 
that management practices that work in one culture may be ineffective in another 
and, consequently, that “many aspects of organisational theories produced in one 
culture may be inadequate in other cultures” (Triandis, 1983: 139). What do our 
results indicate when we look at it from a cross-cultural perspective? Though we 
found cultural differences in the use of self-serving attributional biases in letters to 
the shareholders, we also concluded that culture seems to work on a “secondary” 
level. That is, though we find differences in “self-or group interest” and 
“achievement orientation” influencing managers’ tendencies to engage in self-
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serving attributions, the cultural effect is considerably smaller than the 
performance effect. This result confirms the idea that the role of culture in shaping 
behaviour is indirect (Earley, 1989; Earley and Erez, 1997; Lonner and 
Adamopoulos, 1997), which is “a fairly common position within Western 
psychology” (Lonner and Adamopoulus, 1997: 69). Furthermore, our findings are 
in line with recent research regarding the influence of culture on leadership 
conducted by the “Global Leadership and Organisational Effectiveness” (GLOBE) 
group. The main objective of the GLOBE project is to develop “an empirically 
based theory to describe, understand, and predict the impact of cultural variables 
on leadership and organisational processes and the effectiveness of these 
processes” (House et al., 1999: 2). One of the projects focuses on the influence of 
culture on charismatic leadership and investigates whether attributes that are seen 
as characteristic or prototypical for leaders strongly vary across cultures (Den 
Hartog et al., 1999). The results of Den Hartog’s et al. (1999) study indicate that 
certain images of leadership are universally endorsed, including: trustworthy, just, 
and honest (reflecting integrity), decisiveness and performance orientated. There 
are also some images that are universally seen as impediments to leadership, such 
as being nonexplicit and dictatorial.2 The results we find, and especially the 
“secondary” or “fine-tuning” role of culture in shaping CEOs’ attributions (which 
in most instances were in line with our propositions), indicate that maintaining an 
image of a credible messenger—fitting the universally endorsed image of 
integrity—is of utmost importance to all leaders. This may also explain why the 
cultural difference we found—and especially the East-West effect—was 
considerably smaller than the one typically found in prior cross-cultural and 
social-psychological research. They also shed another light on Heine et al.’s 
(1999: 787) suggestion that “it may be the case that in situations in which Japanese 
are in positions of leadership or near the top of a hierarchy they may self-enhance 
and be motivated to believe that they have the requisite skills and abilities to fulfil 
their roles and to take care of their subordinates.” 
This brings us to the managerial implications. Although the Global Village has 
remained a dream (Kanter, 1991), it is a fact that the world has become more 
integrated. Companies have become more globally oriented and “executives no 
longer question the increasing importance of global business” (Adler, 1997: 3). 
Furthermore, financial reporting practices are converging and expected to 
2 Apart from commonly shared leadership images, there are also leadership images that 
vary across cultures, such as independent, self-effacing and individualistic. However, as 
Den Hartog et al. (1999) do not provide information regarding (clusters of) cultures in 
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converge even more once listed companies have adopted the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by 2005. Such convergence or 
globalisation, however, “does not mean that cultural differences are disappearing 
or diminishing” (Javidan and House, 2001: 291). Our study has provided evidence 
of how culture subtly shapes CEOs’ reconstruction of reality in their letters to the 
shareholders. The main managerial implication of the study is that CEOs have to 
carefully frame the story behind the company results. Remaining credible should 
be the ultimate goal for all CEOs when drawing up their letter, mainly because 
“integrity” seems to be a universally endorsed and positively valued leadership 
image. Credibility, however, does not completely rule out the use of self-serving 
attributions and other forms of impression management. Using such techniques by 
CEOs—and other departments involved in drawing up the letter—would simply 
“involve the packaging of information in order to lead target audiences to desired 
conclusions” (Gardner and Avolio, 1998: 33). 
Indeed, making use of such impression management techniques is what 
readers—at least those in western cultures—of financial reports expect of CEOs. 
In a US-based study, Limacher (1997) discovered that management’s optimism or 
pessimism regarding the company’s business environment and future prospects in 
the letter to the shareholders influences investors’ perceptions of both firm 
performance and managers’ credibility. His findings, which are largely in line with 
previous social-psychological results (Schneider, 1981; Schlenker and Leary, 
1982; Robinson, Johnson and Shields, 1995), suggest that investors can be 
affected by the way managers present performance information in the letter to the 
shareholders. The main premise of Limacher’s study—again underlining the 
importance of credibility—is that unbridled optimism is not always an advisable 
tactic. If performance does not match the story in the letter to the shareholders, 
investors will make lower assessments of both firm performance and managers’ 
credibility. As Limacher’s findings have been obtained in an American context—a 
context where people are encouraged “to seek out, enhance and elaborate their 
positive characteristics” (Heine et al., 1999: 775)—the preference for adopting a 
mildly optimistic attitude in presenting information seems logical. In a more 
eastern context, however, it is questionable whether such attitude would work. In 
those cultures it is less likely that stressing the positive and neglecting negative 
information will be effective in influencing readers’ perceptions in a desired way. 
Such attitude would not fit the cultural values of modesty and self-criticism (Heine 
et al., 1999). Therefore, an advisable presentation tactic might be that CEOs “fine 
which such images are perceived positively or negatively we are not able to relate them to 
our findings. 
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tune” the way they present the company results depending on the composition of 
the target audience (and especially the composition of the group of main 
investors). If it is largely composed of people from western cultures, it would do 
no harm to follow a mildly optimistic attitude in which positive results are being 
stressed and self-enhancing attributions are used to account for those results. If, 
however, the target audience has mainly an eastern background a more moderate 
way—hence, also addressing negative outcomes and using self-serving biases in 
smaller amounts—may be the most effective way to affect readers’ perceptions. 
This, however, does not completely exclude the use of self-serving attributions. 
The fact that CEOs, irrespective of their cultural background, tend to explain 
organisational outcomes—at least to a certain extent—in a self-serving manner 
may cast doubts regarding the effectiveness of such behaviour. After all, if 
everybody else is doing it, how can it still be effective? Indeed, it has been 
suggested that letters to the shareholders “are notorious for adopting optimistic 
attitudes and presenting euphemistic descriptions of company’s results and 
prospects” (Bruce, 1987 as quoted in Limacher, 1997: 2). Consequently, it seems 
logical to assume that readers are aware that managers tend to adopt an optimistic 
attitude (Limacher, 1997). However, Limacher’s (1997) study as well as those of, 
e.g., Elsbach and Sutton (1992) and Rosenfeld et al. (1995) indicate that 
notwithstanding such awareness, the use of impression management techniques is 
still effective at influencing people’s perceptions of the organisation and its 
members. Therefore, the use of impression management techniques when 
presenting organisational results seems to be an important consideration within 
framing corporate communications. 
The suggestion that the way results are presented affects people’s perceptions 
may also have important policy implications. In the introduction to this study we 
already pointed that the IASB considers setting up a project that will investigate 
whether accounting narratives should become subject of more international 
regulation. More specifically, the IASB is considering to explore whether they 
should provide guidance on the presentation of information presented outside the 
financial statements in the form of management’s explanation of the enterprise’s 
financial condition, changes in financial condition, results of operations, and 
causes of changes in material line items. In view of our findings, as well as the fact 
that users of financial reports are more interested in the narrative sections of the 
financial report than in the pure financial data (e.g. Klaassen and Schreuder, 1980, 
1981; Epstein and Pava, 1993; Bartlett and Chandler, 1997; Hyland, 1998; Smith 
and Taffler, 2000), such regulation is desirable in this area. However, as the use of 
impression management may take very subtle forms in the financial reports, 
issuing guidelines may be problematic to practically implement. 
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7.3 Limitations of the study 
Like any other study, this study, too, has its limitations. Some relate to the 
methodology used, while others concern the data.  
 The first limitation of the study concerns the method used—content analysis. 
As we have described in section 5.2, content analysis is a rather subjective method 
which asks a lot of the coders engaged in the content analysis procedure. Though 
we have carefully designed our coding procedure, selected the coders with care, 
made sure that they received adequate training before the actual coding started, 
and the high kappa’s generally point that the content analysis yielded sufficiently 
reliable results, we cannot completely ignore the possibility that the outcomes 
reflect differences in familiarity with the concepts of interests. Both Staw et al.
(1983) and Clapham and Schwenk (1991) in their studies of US letters to the 
shareholders refer to such ambiguity problems attached to content analysis as well. 
Clapham and Schwenk (1991: 223), for example, comment that “one of the more 
difficult problems of content analysis is the identification of causal statements. 
Even though general rules for coding are developed, problems may result from the 
ambiguity of category definitions (Weber, 1990). In annual reports the problem is 
confounded further, because while some attributions are clearly and simply stated, 
they are more often imbedded in lengthy discussions where cause and effect may 
be separated by considerable text to support or explain the attribution.” Hence, it is 
possible that some statements have not been included in the analysis because the 
coders either did not identify them as such or failed to agree on phrases being a 
causal statement. Alternatively, it is also possible that statements have been 
included in the analysis that others would not have identified as “causal.”  
 Other limitations relate to the sample of letters to the shareholders that we 
content analysed. One main objective of the research is to determine whether there 
are cultural differences in the self-serving attributional bias in letters to the 
shareholders. Although we find some evidence supporting the idea of cultural 
variability between the East and the West, the research is limited to three 
countries. The basic reason why we have limited ourselves to analyse reports from 
Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States, involves the use of a research 
method that is rather labour intensive. We decided to align with previous research 
from the social-psychological field and to focus on (at least) the United States and 
Japan. It is possible—though previously not examined—that if we had included 
more countries in the study we would find other cultural dimensions to influence 
the pervasiveness of the bias as well. Another possible caveat relates to the period 
from which the sample has been drawn. It is possible that our surprising results 
with respect to the Japanese managers, who showed the greatest tendency to self-
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protect, is a product of the time period as it includes the Asia Crisis. Though we do 
not believe that this surprising result is merely an artifact of the period from which 
the letters were drawn—as in a related study using 1994 letters of Singapore 
companies Tsang (2002) finds similar results—we cannot completely exclude that 
possibility either. It would be interesting to see whether an alternative sample 
period, i.e. from which the Asia Crisis has been excluded, would yield similar 
results. A final limitation relating to the sample concerns that we have only looked 
at firms that are listed on the world major stock markets. This limitation was 
mostly driven by data availability. To get access to financial reports, which 
include letters to the shareholders as well, of unlisted Japanese companies is 
particularly tough. Indeed, Camfferman (1996) made a similar observation for 
Dutch firms. We cannot exclude the possibility that the culture within these 
firms—though we have selected them based on the cultural background of the 
CEO—does not fully reflect the culture of the country they should represent, and 
are more internationally oriented. Hence, we cannot completely ignore the 
possibility that if we focused on unlisted firms the results would provide stronger 
cultural differences and an extension of this study to the area of unlisted 
companies might be desirable. 
 Another limitation of the study involves our focus on letters to the 
shareholders to examine self-serving attributional biases in letters to the 
shareholders. Firstly, as briefly indicated in the introduction, the way managers 
explain organisational outcomes is just one way in which they may try to influence 
people’s perceptions of the organisation. Other possible ways include biases in the 
conveyance of news, graphically distortions in graphs, variations in readability, 
etcetera. It is possible that these other forms to manage people’s impressions work 
hand-in-hand with the use of self-serving attributional biases in the letters. 
Alternatively, it is possible that firms that do not show self-serving attributional 
bias, or only in limited amounts, make use of other forms in order to compensate 
it. It is interesting to examine which forms of impression management firms are 
using and in what manner. Our exploration of the use of accounting language 
(Aerts, 1994), positiveness of opening and closing sentence, and the way future 
expectations are addressed has provided some insight, but needs to be extended. 
Research by Barlow (1996), in which she considers various impression 
management techniques (e.g. attributional biases, the use of visionary language, 
etc.), forms a good starting point to achieve that. Another—related—limitation 
involves that we have looked only at the letters to the shareholders and ignored 
other elements of the financial report. We agree with Barlow (1996: 84) that the 
CEO’s letter is often read along with financial information. As this study only 
considered the, relatively speaking, unregulated letter to the shareholders, it is 
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unclear if the results would be different if we looked at other parts instead. That is, 
it may be possible that in other, more regulated parts, and the Management 
Discussion and Analysis section in particular, self-serving attributional biases are 
smaller.  
 A final possible caveat of the study concerns the language of the letters that we 
content analysed. As indicated in section 5.2, due to data availability, large part of 
the Japanese reports was read in English. Although the 15 letters that were read in 
Japanese did not yield significantly different sentences to be identified as causal 
attributions to be coded along a number of dimensions, it is possible that the 
influence of language was subtler than our content analysis was able to capture. It 
is possible that Japanese consider a causal statement like “We were able to achieve 
an outstanding result” already self-enhancing; though from a western point of view 
it is not considered self-enhancing at all. That is, the coders involved in the content 
analysis did not have an eastern mindset, and, consequently, such subtleties are 
likely to be ignored. Similar to Hofstede this study not only reflects the mindsets 
of the managers whose letters we have examined, but also those of the coders 
involved in the content analysis, and “between the lines also the values of the 
author” (1984: 287) 
7.4 Food for thought 
This study has provided some insight in the way managers reconstruct the 
organisation’s reality in the CEO’s letter to the shareholders and cultural 
differences therein. Many questions, however, remain unanswered and, 
additionally, the study and its results have also raised new ones. Below we present 
some food for thought for researchers from both the managerial and accounting 
domains as well as those from the social-psychological field. 
 The first avenue for future research involves how readers perceive the use of 
the various forms of impression management techniques, and whether there exist 
cultural differences in readers’ perceptions. Although Limacher’s study (1997) has 
provided evidence that the way in which managers present the company 
performance impinges on readers’ perceptions of firm performance and managers’ 
credibility, his findings have been obtained in the American context. Therefore, 
also in view of possible international regulation, it is interesting to extend his 
study to a cross-cultural context and see whether his results apply other countries 
as well. 
Another area where future research may be fruitful relates to Fiona Lee and 
colleagues’ (Lee and Robinson, 2000; Lee and Tiedens, 2001) findings which 
suggest that self-protecting attributions are not necessarily self-serving for 
208
individuals in high-status roles, like CEOs, or, instead, might actually be 
“disserving.” After all, the use of self-protecting attributions—blaming the 
environment for a negative outcome—suggests “that the attributor does not have 
control over critical outcomes, does not have the ability to affect and change the 
course of events, and appears dependent on others” (Lee and Tiedens, 2001: 257). 
Hence, it may evoke a perception of “powerlessness.” Furthermore, the admission 
of lack of power and control, which external attributions seem to imply, are also 
“contradicting others’ knowledge and expectations associated with the high-status 
role. As such, high-status individuals who make external attributions may come 
across as dishonest, lying, evasive or as having something to hide” (Lee and 
Tiedens, 2001: 258). This may lead to negative impressions and affect towards the 
attributor. In various experimental settings, Lee and colleagues found strong 
evidence that external attributions are indeed highly disserving for people in high-
status positions: audiences’ perceptions of managerial power and credibility were 
affected negatively. Hence, this strongly supports the idea that “passing the buck 
and pointing the finger elsewhere” (Meindl, 1990: 171) may not always be the best 
tactic for managers to use. Indeed, Salancik and Meindl (1984) suggested that 
managers will be less likely to lay blame than the social-psychological framework 
might imply. Although our results do not unequivocally support this suggestion it 
is possible that managers, when they have to address negative outcomes, try to 
create an image of a leader that is in control of the circumstances in an alternative 
way. It might be interesting to examine whether managers refer in larger amounts 
to corporate strategies when they have to account for unfavourable outcomes than 
when they are able to address successes. 
A third possible area for research relates to how leaders try to gain charisma. 
Though in the past decade a lot of empirical work on charisma has been published 
(see e.g. Conger and Kanungo, 1998 and Fiol et al., 1999 for overviews) and 
revealed that “the ability to articulate a compelling vision of a bright future is the 
sine qua non of charisma” (Emrich et al., 2001: 589), the role of financial reports 
in the charisma process has largely been ignored. Hence, it would not only be 
interesting whether CEOs use “imagery words”, words that evoke pictures, 
sounds, smells, tastes, and other sensations (Emrich et al., 2001), in the financial 
report, but also, if they do so, whether (a) such words do actually contribute to 
build an image of charisma, (b) whether the use differs depending on the 
performance CEOs are able to address, and (c) whether culture affects its use. 
More generally speaking, researchers could investigate which other impression 
management techniques, apart from self-serving attributions and future 
expectations, CEOs use in their letters to the shareholders to create an image of 
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being a charismatic, successful leader. An unpublished Ph.D.-thesis of Barlow 
(1996) provides a good starting point for achieving that. 
A final possibly rewarding avenue for future research for both managerial as 
well as social-psychological researchers, is to try to get more access to other 
subjects than “just” undergraduates when executing experiments and/or consider 
alternative research methods as well. Indeed, researchers as Harrington and Liu 
(2002) and Heine et al. (2000) recently have pointed to the possibility that the 
East-West difference social psychologists have found with respect to 
pervasiveness of the self-serving attributional biases may be typical for 
undergraduates they relied on, and may not be generalizable across all cultural 
groups. Indeed, our findings support the idea that cultural differences in self-
serving behaviour become less pronounced as people grow older and become more 
experienced and that managers no longer show behaviours that are considered 
typical for the cultural-context in which they operate (or at least in smaller 
amounts than do people of younger age). Though we acknowledge that the 
managerial elites are not easily accessible (Pettigrew, 1992), it may be rewarding 
indeed to extend ones efforts in order to see whether cultural differences typically 
found among undergraduates apply to managers as well. 
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Appendices 

I Company list  
JP US NL 
1 Ito-Yokado The Kroger  Ahold  
2 Jusco/Aeon Group Nash Finch  Laurus 
3 Mitsukoshi  JC Penney Vendex KBB  
4 Seiyu  Stein Mart  MacIntosh Retail Group  
5 Snow Brand Milk Product Conagra Foods Wessanen 
6 Ajinomoto Campbell Soup CSM 
7 Kirin Brewery Anheuser-Busch Heineken 
8 Sapporo Breweries  Adolp Coors Grolsch  
9 Sony Motorola Philips Electronics 
10 Nissei Sangyo Grainger Otra 
11 Sumitomo Electric Indus General Cable Draka Holding 
12 Alps Electric American Power Conversion Neways Electronics 
13 DDI Bellsouth KPN 
14 Japan Telecom Century Tel Libertel 
15 Meitec Peoplesoft  Ordina 
16 Canon Xerox  Oce 
17 Kokuyo Herman Miller Samas Groep 
18 Toppan Printing  Gannett  Wolters Kluwer 
19 Dai Nippon Printing Knight-Ridder VNU 
20 Japan Airlines Nortwest Airlines  KLM 
21 Nippon Express United Parcel Services TNT Postgroep 
22 Nippon Yusen Kabushiki  Alexander and Baldwin Vopak 
23 Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Tidewater Nedlloyd 
24 Seino  JB Hunt  Frans Maas Groep 
25 Bridgestone Goodyear Vredestein  
26 Oji Paper Boise Cascade Buhrmann 
27 Kubota Paul Mueller  Prolion  
28 Daiichi Jitsugyo (DJK)  Hughes Supply Geveke 
29 Shimizu  Halliburton HBG 
30 Kajima Centex Ballast Nedam 
31 NKK Corporation  US Steel Group (USX)  Hoogovens 
32 Sumitomo Chemical  DuPont Akzo Nobel  
33 Nippon Shokubai  Hercules DSM 
34 Tokuyama Chemfirst Norit  
35 Dai Nippon Pharmaceutic Perrigo  Numico 
36 Toyota General Motors  
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JP US NL 
37 Honda  Ford Motors  
38 Cosmo Oil Tosco   
39 Mitsubishi Heavy Indust Caterpillar  
40 Fuji Photo Film  Kodak Eastman  
41 Fujitsu  Compaq  
42 Nec Corporation  Hewlett Packard   
43 NTT Docomo ATandT  
44 Kyocera  Applied Materials   
45 All Nippon Airlines Continental Airways  
46 Bandai Mattel  
47 Yamanouchi  Pharmacia and Upjohn  
48 Japan Tobacco RJR Nabisco  
49 Mitsubishi Electric United Technologies Corp.  
50 Konami Intuit  
51 Tokyo Electron Kulicke and Soffa Industries  
52 Mitsubishii Rayon  Rohm and Haas  
II Coding instructions 
INTRODUCTION
These coding instructions contain a short outline of the content analysis to be 
performed on CEOs’ letters to the shareholders. The intention of the content 
analysis is to determine in what way managers explain organisational outcomes or 
results in the letter to the shareholders. Otherwise stated: the focus of this project 
will be managers’ causal attributions with respect to organisational outcomes. The 
key concepts used in this project are described first. Subsequently, attention is paid 
to the procedure to be followed. It ends with an outline of the coding dimensions 
used in this project.  
KEY CONCEPTS
Letter to the shareholders—The letter to the shareholders, also known as the 
management report or chairman’s statement, contains a narrative analysis of 
causes that influenced the organisation’s results in the preceding fiscal year. In 
addition, it usually contains management’s future expectations with respect to the 
organisational results as well. Generally speaking, a letter to the shareholders 
comprises two or three pages. 
Organisational result—In this project, the organisational results to be coded 
include “sales”, “profits”/”earnings”, “earnings before/after tax”, and other similar 
accounting concepts. Also included are statements with respect to market share 
and “shareholder value” (and similar concepts). These are what we refer to as the 
“outcome” or “effect.”  
Causal attribution—A causal attribution consists of one or more sentences (or 
parts thereof) in which an outcome (organisational result) is linked to one or more 
reasons or causes for that outcome. Often it is possible to identify a causal 
attribution by connective words or phrases. Examples of those connective words 
or phrases are “due to”, “caused by”, “attributed to”, “because of”, “resulted in”, 
“contributed to”, etc.. However, it is also possible that causal attributions are 
implicit –implying that such connective words or phrases are absent– because 
cause and effect can be reasonably linked to each other. In order to be a causal 
attribution, the cause-effect relationship needs to be clear. Usually, cause and 
effect are stated in each other’s proximity, for example, in one or two sentences, or 
in one paragraph. If an outcome (organisational result) is linked to two or more 
causes, whether or not in the same sentence, each of the cause-effect relationships 
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is treated as a separate causal attribution, also implying that each of them is coded 
individually on each of the dimensions. 
EXAMPLES
Examples of causal attributions as may be present in the letter to the shareholders 
are presented below.1
“Influenced by the Asia crisis our sales, compared to last year, decreased by 
30%.” 
“Notwithstanding the crisis in Latin America, the company succeeded in 
enlarging sales by 25%.” 
“The increase of profits by 20% can mainly be ascribed to a decrease in 
financial costs.” 
“Market prices of product X increased and sales for the year rose as well.” 
“The continuing increase in profits is a result of a clear strategy on the one 
hand and favourable economic conditions on the other.” 
PROCEDURE
When performing the content analysis on the letters to the shareholders the 
procedure described below is followed: 
Identification—Independently of each other, two coders read the letter to the 
shareholders and identify the causal attributions by marking it directly in the letter 
to the shareholders. The cause (code: A) and the effect (code: B) are given a 
logical and consecutive code as if they form an entity. If an outcome/effect 
(organisational result) is explained by more causes, each of the cause-effect 
relationships (forming a causal attribution) is given a separate code.2
1 The last excerpt is an example of an organisational outcome (effect) explained by more 
than one cause. Preceding that one, is an example of an implicit causal attribution. 
2 Example: “The continuing profit increase (A1) is the result of a good corporate strategy 
on the one hand (B1.1) and favourable economic conditions on the other (B1.2). […] The 
market prices of product X increased (B2) and sales for the year rose as well (A2)” (Etc.).
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Recording—Recording of the causal attributions as have been identified by the 
coders have to take place on the letters to the shareholders for each of the coders 
separately (for example by highlighting it in the letter to the shareholders). 
In addition, coders need to identify organisational results for which no cause has 
been stated in the letter to the shareholders. These are coded Z and are the so-
called “unexplained effects.” 
Reconciliation—Causal attributions and “unexplained effects” as have been 
identified by the two coders are then reconciled with each other in order to arrive 
at a common set of causal attributions and “unexplained effects.” In case of doubt, 
a third, the arbiter, decides. The agreed upon set is recorded (e.g. by underlining or 
highlighting with a marker) on a clean version of the letter to the shareholders –the 
so-called coding version. This coding version is used to code the causal 
attributions and “unexplained effects.” 
CODING THE ATTRIBUTIONS3
The causal attributions as have been agreed upon by the two coders are subjected 
to further coding along a number of dimensions, which are addressed in more 
detail below. Recording of the coding decisions is done on a coding sheet for each 
cause-effect relationship separately. Appendix II contains an example of a coding 
sheet. 
Identification—First of all, some general issues for identification purposes are 
recorded on the coding sheet. These concern name and initials of the coder, the 
name of the company, identification code (Ax.Bx), and page number. 
Furthermore, the first three and the last three words of the causal attribution are 
recorded (per cause-effect relationship). 
Length—A number of general characteristics with respect to the length of the 
causal attributions are determined and recorded on the coding sheet. These 
concern:4
− Number of lines: concerns the length of the causal attribution a measured in 
terms of number of lines, in annual report format. Round off in half lines 
(approximately). 
3 This step is only relevant for the “genuine” causal attributions, i.e. where both cause and 
effect are stated. In case of “unexplained effects”: see below. 
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− Number of standard lines: concerns the length of the causal attribution in 
terms of grid boxes. This number is determined by the use of the grid: an A4-
sheet divided into 400 boxes of equal size (see appendix 3). The number is 
determined by placing the transparent on the text and counting the number of 
boxes. A box is counted if the text of the causal attribution covers half or more 
of the box. Page margins are not counted. 
− Words: concerns the number of words the causal attribution consists of.  
Coding—Subsequently, the causal attributions are coded along a number of 
dimensions as will be addressed in section “Coding dimensions.”  
COVER SHEET AND CODING “UNEXPLAINED ORGANISATIONAL OUTCOMES”
For each of the letters to the shareholders that is coded, the coding sheets are 
joined together into one set and accompanied by a “cover sheet.” The letter to the 
shareholders is also included in this set. Appendix II contains an example of such a 
cover sheet.  
On the cover sheet the following is recorded: 
− Data with respect to the coder (name, initials, date, and time spent); 
− Data with respect to the annual report (name of company and fiscal year); 
− Data with respect to the letter to the shareholders (number of pages, number of 
columns, number of causal attributions, and number of “unexplained effects”). 
Additionally, the following issues are recorded on the cover sheet: 
− Information with respect to the opening sentence and –paragraph. More 
specifically, it concerns your perception whether the message contained in the 
opening paragraph is positive, neutral or negative. Furthermore, you have to 
indicate whether the opening (that is: first) sentence contains a reference to the 
result that has been obtained in the preceding fiscal year. 
− Information with respect to the closing paragraph. In this part of the cover 
sheet you record whether the management board addresses the expectations 
about the future and/or directs words of gratitude towards its employees, 
shareholders, and so on. In addition, you need to record your perception of the 
tone of the final paragraph: positive, negative, or neutral. 
4 In case of causal attributions where an effect is explained by several reasons (i.e. concern 
combinations as Ax-Bx.1, Ax-Bx.2, Ax-Bx.3 etc.), the length is determined for each of the 
cause-effect (i.e. Ax-Bx.1) separately. 
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− Future outlook: Here, you record whether the management board expresses his 
expectations about the future (for example, on a location other than the final 
paragraph). If so, record as well whether the expectations are positive, 
negative, or neutral. 
− Words of gratitude: lay down whether the management board directs his words 
of gratitude towards a specific interest group, as shareholders, employees, 
customers, society, or other (it is possible to cross mark more than one 
category). 
On the cover sheet the coding of the “unexplained effects” are recorded as well. 
The meaning of the dimensions is the same as is described below under 
“outcome/effect” in the section section. 
Appendix 4 contains an example of a letter to the shareholders that has been coded 
(including coding and cover sheets). 
CODING DIMENSIONS
The causal attributions as have been identified and agreed upon by the coders are 
coded on each of the dimensions described below. Only if you think that not one 
of the provided options (for a single dimension) is able to reflect the meaning of 
the cause or effect that is coded, you may use the option “Uncodeable on this 
dimension.” Below, we first address the dimensions concerning the outcome/effect 
(e.g., profit increase, sales decrease, etc.) (dimensions 01 to 05). Subsequently, we 
address the dimensions concerning the causes/reasons (dimensions 10 to 17). 
A. Outcome/effect
01. Nature of the effect 
1 Profits/net earnings/results 
2 Sales/revenues 
3 Costs 
4 Market share 
5 Shareholder value/earnings per share 
6 General/other 
9 More than one of those mentioned above 
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02. Valence of the effect  
1 Positive (e.g., sales increase, decrease of profits, record profits, etc.) 
2 Negative (e.g., earnings decrease, increasing losses, etc.) 
9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
When coding on valence of the effect, you need to evaluate the effect from 
management’s point of view in order to determine whether the effect is 
positive or negative. 
03. Time orientation of the effect
1 Past (effect concerns an event of preceding fiscal years) 
2 Present (effect concerns an event of the fiscal year under review) 
3 Future (effect concerns a future event) 
9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
The fiscal year that is reviewed in the letter to the shareholders is the point of 
reference for deciding on this dimension. 
04. Effect is quantitative and/or qualitative 
1 Quantitative 
2 Qualitative 
3 Both quantitative as well as qualitative 
9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
When coding on this dimension you decide whether the effect has been 
expressed in quantitative terms, with monetary values or percentages being 
mentioned (e.g., “sales increased by x%” or “Profits decreased to Y million”, 
etc.). Alternatively, it is also possible that only qualitative terms are used, with 
possibly adjectives being used (e.g., “The record performance can be attributed 
to …”, “The considerable improvement in sales can be explained by …”). 
Another possibility is that both qualitative and quantitative terms have been 
used.
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05. Level of effect 
1 Division/product/geographic segment 
2 Group level/company as whole 
9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
When coding on this dimension you determine whether the effect concerns the 
company as whole, or specifically addresses a division/product/segment of the 
company.  
B. Cause/reason
10. Explicitness of the cause-effect relationship 
1 Explicit  
2 Implicit 
9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
A cause-effect relationship is coded “explicit” if connective words or phrases 
as “because”, “influenced by”, “has resulted in”, “is attributable to”, etc. are 
present. A cause-effect relationship is implicit is no such connective words or 
phrases have been used, but a causal relationship can be easily identified from 
the text. 
11. Direction of cause-effect relationship 
   
1 Same direction 
2 Opposite direction 
9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
The direction concerns whether cause and effect have the same sign (e.g. both 
positive or negative). Examples of cause-effect relationships that have the 
same sign are: “The improvement in sales was the results of the marketing 
strategy we implemented last year” and “The record loss of 199x is the result 
of the increasing material prices.” Cause-effect relationships stated in opposite 
directions may frequently be recognised because connective words or phrases 
are used. Examples of such connective words or phrases are 
“notwithstanding”, “despite”, “although”, etc. (e.g., “Notwithstanding the Asia 
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crisis our company succeeded in achieving outstanding results for the fiscal 
year”). 
12. Time orientation of cause/reason 
   
1 Past (cause is situated in preceding fiscal year(s)) 
2 Present (cause is situation in fiscal year under review) 
3 Future (cause will occur in future fiscal years) 
9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
In coding this dimension the moment that the cause has occurred or will occur 
is the point of reference. In this context, the present refers to the fiscal year 
that is reviewed in the letter to the shareholders. 
13. Cause/reason is quantitative and/or qualitative 
   
1 Quantitative 
2 Qualitative 
3 Both quantitative and qualitative 
9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
When coding along this dimension you decide whether the cause has been 
expressed in quantitative terms, with monetary values or percentages being 
mentioned (e.g., “Profits decreased due to an increase in interest rates to 8%”). 
Alternatively, it is also possible that only qualitative terms are used, with 
possibly adjectives being used (e.g., “The decrease in profits may be explained 
by the increased interest rate compared to last year”). Another possibility is 
that both qualitative and quantitative terms have been used.  
14. Nature of cause/reason 
1 Causal explanation (“clear-cut, ordinary” language) 
2 Accounting-technical explanation 
9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
Causal explanations are explanations that have been stated in “clear-cut, 
ordinary” language, for example: “sales decreased as a result of a drop in 
demand in the Latin American region.” 
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In case of accounting-technical explanations, the causes or reasons are 
predominantly stated in accounting-technical terms. Examples of such 
explanations are: “The profit decline can be attributed to the increase in 
financial costs”, “An extraordinary benefit resulting from the sale of Division 
X has resulted in the outstanding profit level we obtained this year”, etc.. 
15. Locus of causality of cause/reason 
1 Internal cause, with explicit reference to management board/CEO 
2 Internal cause, with explicit reference to segments/divisions within the 
company 
3 Internal cause, with explicit reference to personnel 
4 Other internal causes 
5 External cause; cause is on sector- or industry level 
6 External cause; cause is on general economic level 
7 Other external causes 
9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
When coding on this dimension the origin of the cause is central. A 
cause/reason is coded “internal” if it refers to an action, policy, decision, etc. 
taken or executed by members of the company. Examples of internal causes 
are “corporate strategy”, “RandD efforts”, “marketing efforts”, “quality of 
personnel”, etc.. A cause is external if the origin of the cause lies outside the 
corporation, e.g., inflation, interest rates, market prices, competition, etc.. 
16. Stability of cause/reason
1 Stable 
2 Temporal 
9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
This dimension concerns whether the cause changes over time. A cause is 
coded stable if it would persist in the future and, more or less, would lead to 
the same outcome. Otherwise stated, stable causes are to a certain extent 
permanent and unchanging. Corporate strategy, the economic trend are 
examples of stable causes. Temporal causes, on the other hand, are less 
permanent. On the contrary, they are temporal and may change within the 
period of a year. It is very likely that such variable causes would lead to a 
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different outcome. One time divestment of a division, starting up costs, etc. are 
examples of variable causes. 
17. Controllability of cause/reason 
1 Controllable  
2 Uncontrollable 
9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
The issue whether management or the corporation is able to influence, i.e. to 
control, the cause is central when coding on this dimension. Examples of 
controllable causes are the corporate strategy, marketing efforts, decisions to 
buy or sell a company, etc.. In case of uncontrollable causes, management 
does not have the ability to control whether or not the cause will arise. 
Examples of uncontrollable causes include oil prices going up or down, 
inflation, governmental regulation or legislation, etc.. 
III Cover sheet 
Personal details 
Name Initials
Date 
Time spent 
Company 
Name  
Year 
Letter to the shareholders 
Length: 
 # Pages (round off in 
½ pages) 
 # Columns 1 2 3 4 > 4  
# Causal attributions  # Explained 
effects 
 # multiple 
attributions 
# Unexplained effects 
(Z) 
Opening sentence and –paragraph  
Opening sentence 
addresses the 
organisation’s results 
Yes No Mark/ 
circle your choice 
According to me the 
opening sentence is … 
Positive Negative Neutral 
Mark/circle your 
choice 
According to me the 
opening paragraph is … 
Positive Negative Neutral 
Mark/circle your 
choice 
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Closing paragraph 
The closing paragraph 
contains management’s 
future expectations 
Yes No Mark/circle your choice 
The closing paragraph 
contains a word of 
gratitude 
Yes No Mark/circle your choice 
   
According to me the 
closing paragraph is … 
Positive Negative Neutral 
Mark/circle your 
choice 
Future outlook 
The letter to the 
shareholders contains 
an expression of 
management about 
future expectations 
Yes No Mark/circle your choice 
If so,  
According to me the 
expectations 
management expressed 
are … 
Positive Negative Neutral 
Mark/circle your 
choice 
Words of gratitude 
In the letter to shareholders 
the following persons 
and/or groups are thanked 
for their contribution: 
- former CEO/board 
members 
Yes No Mark/circle your choice 
- shareholders Yes No 
- employees Yes No 
- partners Yes No 
- customers  Yes No 
- society Yes No 
- stakeholders (in general)) Yes No 
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UNEXPLAINED EFFECTS
(If necessary you can add an extra page containing coding information with respect to Z’s) 
Z1 Copy the first and last 
three words 
Nature 1 Profits/earnings/etc 4 Market share 
2 Sales/revenues 5 Shareholder 
value/e.p.s. 
3 Costs 6 General/other 9 More than one 
Valence 1 Positive 2 Negative 9 Uncodeable 
Quantitative
/qualitative 
1 Quantitative 2 Qualitative 3 Both 
9 Uncodeable 
Z2 Copy the first and last 
three words 
Nature 1 Profits/earnings/etc 4 Market share 
2 Sales/revenues 5 Shareholder 
value/e.p.s. 
3 Costs 6 General/other 9 More than one 
Valence 1 Positive 2 Negative 9 Uncodeable 
Quantitative
/qualitative 
1 Quantitative 2 Qualitative 3 Both 
9 Uncodeable 

IV Coding sheet 
For each of the causal attribution (i.e. cause-effect relationship) use a separate coding 
sheet. 
Identification 
Coder    Company 
Causal attribution 
Identification 
Page Id.number  .
Text effect (A) 
(copy first and last 
three words) 
Text cause (B)
(copy first and last 
three words) 
# Lines # Words 
Length 
# Grid boxes     
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OUTCOME/EFFECT (Mark/circle your choice) 
1 Profits/net income/etc. 5 Shareholder value/e.p.s. 
2 Sales/revenues 6 General/other 
3 Costs 
01 Nature 
4 Market share 
9 More than one of those 
mentioned above 
1 Positive 
02 Valence 
2 Negative 9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
1 Past 3 Future 03 Time 
orientation 2 Present  9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
1 Quantitative 3 Both quantitative and 
qualitative 
04 Quantitative/ 
qualitative 
2 Qualitative 9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
1 Division/product/etc. 
05 Level 
2 Group level 9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
CAUSE/REASON (Mark/circle your choice) 
1 Explicit 10 Explicitness 
relationship 2 Implicit 9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
1 Similar 11 Direction 
relationship 2 Opposite 9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
1 Past 3 Future 12 Time 
orientation 2 Present  9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
1 Quantitative 3 Both quantitative/qualitative 13 Quantitative/ 
qualitative  2 Qualitative 9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
1 Causal language 
14 Nature 
2 Accounting language 9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
1 Internal cause, with 
reference to 
management/CEO 
5 External cause; cause is on 
sector- or industry level 
2 Internal cause, with 
reference to company 
division  
6 External cause; cause is on 
general economic level 
3 Internal cause, with 
reference to personnel 
7 Other external causes 
15 Locus of 
causality 
4 Other internal causes 9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
1 Stable 
16 Stability 
2 Temporal 9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
1 Controllable 
17 Controllability 
2 Uncontrollable 9 Uncodeable on this dimension 
Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
Dit boek gaat over zelfpresentatie in jaarverslagen. Meer in het bijzonder hebben 
we onderzocht op welke wijze bestuursvoorzitters (CEOs) ondernemingsresultaten 
in hun “Bericht aan de aandeelhouders” verklaren. Daar de inhoud van dergelijke 
“Berichten” nauwelijks door wet- of regelgeving wordt beïnvloed, bieden ze 
bestuurders van ondernemingen de mogelijkheid om indrukken die mensen van de 
onderneming (en van de bestuursvoorzitter zelf) hebben te beïnvloeden. Eerder 
onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat impressie management—ook wel aangeduid als  
zelfpresentatie—veelvuldig in jaarverslagen voorkomt. Afgezien van het gebruik 
van in het oog springende plaatjes, passen bestuurders in jaarverslagen een 
variëteit aan zelfpresentatietechnieken toe. Hierbij kan worden gedacht aan het 
aanbrengen van variatie in de leesbaarheid van stukken, het presenteren van 
“gekleurde” informatie (waarbij vooral het positieve wordt benadrukt) en het 
verklaren van ondernemingsprestaties op een zelfdienende of zelfzuchtige manier 
(self-serving bias). Hierbij worden goede resultaten, als stijgende winsten, vooral 
aan het management toegeschreven (self-enhancement), terwijl de schuld van 
tegenvallende resultaten, zoals dalende winsten of groeiende verliezen, wordt 
gelegd bij factoren in de omgeving (self-protection).
In het onderzoek staan twee onderzoeksvragen centraal. De eerste 
onderzoeksvraag heeft tot doel vast te stellen in hoeverre bestuursvoorzitters de 
resultaten daadwerkelijk op een zelfdienende manier verklaren in hun “Bericht aan 
de aandeelhouders.” Eerder onderzoek, voornamelijk uit de Verenigde Staten, laat 
zien dat mensen in het algemeen, bestuurders inbegrepen, de neiging hebben om 
successen aan eigen kunnen toe te schrijven. Indien bijvoorbeeld een student voor 
een tentamen slaagt, zal hij dit in de meeste gevallen aan zichzelf toeschrijven (“Ik 
heb hard gestudeerd”). Evenzo zal een squashspeler die zijn partij wint dit 
toeschrijven aan bijvoorbeeld zijn talent of trainingsarbeid. Dezelfde persoon zal 
echter tegenvallende of teleurstellende prestaties aan de omgeving c.q. factoren die 
hij niet kan beïnvloeden toeschrijven. Indien de eerder genoemde student zakt 
voor een tentamen zal hij bijvoorbeeld de schuld geven aan de docent (“Hij kan 
niet lesgeven”, “De vragen sloten niet aan bij de stof”). Evenzo zal de 
squashspeler zijn verliespartij wijten aan bijvoorbeeld pech. Onderzoek van onder 
meer Bettman & Weitz (1983), Staw et al.(1983) en Clapham & Schwenk (1991) 
heeft aangetoond dat dit soort vertekeningen ook optreden in verklaringen die 
bestuursvoorzitters in hun “Bericht aan de aandeelhouders” voor 
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ondernemingsprestaties verstrekken. Meer recentelijk is er onderzoek geweest dat 
laat zien dat ook bestuurders uit België (Aerts, 1994, 2002) en Singapore (Tsang, 
2002) niet geheel vrij zijn van deze self-serving bias. In hoofdstuk 2 is uiteengezet 
dat dergelijk gedrag verklaard kan worden vanuit drie theoretische invalshoeken. 
In alle drie wordt benadrukt dat managers bepaalde indrukken in stand wensen te 
houden, hetgeen ertoe kan leiden dat ze de ondernemingsresultaten op een nogal 
vooringenomen manier verklaren. In de eerste invalshoek, gebaseerd op de 
sociaal-psychologische literatuur over impressie management, wordt de nadruk 
gelegd op de strategische aard van zelfpresentatie. Meer in het bijzonder wordt 
aangegeven wanneer mensen  juist geneigd zijn aan impressie management te 
doen. Dit blijkt het geval indien hun gedrag voor publiek waarneembaar is en 
indien de persoon van mening is dat er een kloof bestaat tussen de manier waarop 
hij gezien wil worden en de manier waarop hij momenteel wordt gezien. Het idee 
dat impressie management op een doelbewuste en –gerichte wijze wordt gebruikt 
sluit ook aan op de literatuur over symbolic management. Een belangrijke 
boodschap binnen deze managementstroom, met vertegenwoordigers als Jeffrey 
Pfeffer en James Meindl, is dat managers door het verschaffen van verklaringen en 
het legitimeren van ondernemingsactiviteiten de indruk willen wekken dat zij 
controle hebben over de omstandigheden. Het behoud van bestaande en 
aantrekken van nieuwe investeerders is de voornaamste reden waarom zij de 
indruk van het in control zijn in stand wensen te houden. In het tweede 
theoretische raamwerk, corporate communications, afkomstig uit de marketing 
literatuur, staan identiteit en imago/reputatie centraal. De eerste, identiteit, heeft 
hoofdzakelijk betrekking op de wijze waarop ondernemingen zich presenteren aan 
de omgeving (middels gedrag, communicatie en symboliek). Imago/reputatie 
daarentegen heeft betrekking op de wijze waarop buitenstaanders de onderneming 
percipiëren. Het centrale doel van corporate communications is het verbeteren of 
behouden van een bepaald, uiteraard positief, imago mede omdat een goed imago 
toegang tot de kapitaalmarkt vereenvoudigt en de onderneming in staat stelt 
hogere prijzen te rekenen voor zijn producten. De laatste invalshoek is de 
economisch-georienteerde agency theorie. In de agency literatuur wordt gewezen 
op de schadelijke effecten van de scheiding tussen leiding en eigendom die 
beursgenoteerde ondernemingen typeert. Niettegenstaande disciplinerings-
mechanismen als het instellen van een raad van commissarissen en de wettelijke 
plicht om, door accountants geverifieerde, jaarrekeningen op te stellen en te 
publiceren, hebben bestuurders, dankzij het bestaan van onzekerheid en hun 
informatievoorsprong, de mogelijkheid om de informatie die zij verschaffen te 
vertekenen.  
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De tweede onderzoeksvraag richt zich op mogelijke culturele verschillen in de 
mate waarin bestuursvoorzitters geneigd zijn de ondernemingsprestaties op een 
zelfdienende wijze te verklaren. Daartoe zijn in hoofdstuk 3 een aantal 
belanghebbende onderzoeken naar cross-culturele verschillen, van onder meer 
Hofstede (1980, 2001) en Schwartz (1994, 1999), besproken. De waarde van hun 
werk moet vooral worden gezocht in het feit dat ze hebben getracht cultuur te 
vatten in een beperkt aantal dimensies; dimensies die als het ware de essentie van 
verschillen tussen culturen weerspiegelen. Er blijkt grote mate van 
overeenstemming te bestaan over een aantal dimensies. De volgende vijf 
dimensies keren het meest terug: eigenbelang versus groepsbelang, macht versus 
gelijkheid, hoge versus lage mate van prestatiegerichtheid, korte versus lange 
termijn oriëntatie en hoge versus lage mate van onzekerheidsvermijding. In 
hoofdstuk 4 zien we hoe culturele verschillen van invloed zijn op de wijze waarop 
mensen uitkomsten van hun (en andermans) prestaties verklaren. In steeds grotere 
mate wordt binnen de cross-culturele en sociale psychologie aangetoond dat 
mensen uit Oosterse culturen—en Japan in het bijzonder—in veel geringere mate 
uitkomsten op een zelfdienende wijze verklaren dan mensen uit Westerse—lees: 
Amerikaanse—culturen geneigd zijn te doen. Enerzijds zijn mensen uit Oosterse 
culturen meer bereid hun successen ook aan de omgeving toe te schrijven, 
bijvoorbeeld aan de docent indien een student slaagt voor zijn tentamen. 
Anderzijds zijn ze in het geval van falen meer bereid (dan mensen uit Westerse 
culturen) om dit aan zichzelf te wijten. Bijvoorbeeld, daar waar een Amerikaanse 
student het zakken voor een tentamen aan de docent zou wijten, is een Japanse 
student meer bereid dit toe te schrijven aan zijn gebrekkige inspanning. De reden 
voor dit verschil in verklaringsgedrag wordt vooral gezocht in verschillen in de 
cultuurdimensie die gerelateerd is aan eigenbelang versus groepsbelang. In een nu 
al klassiek stuk wijzen Markus & Kitayama (1991) erop dat een verschil in 
eigenbelang versus groepsbelang van grote invloed is op wat zij de construal of 
the self noemen. In essentie onderscheiden zij de onafhankelijke en 
interdependente construal of the self. Daar waar de onafhankelijke construal
voornamelijk in het Westen voorkomt en nadruk legt op de persoon als 
onafhankelijk individu met eigen wensen en karakteristieken, laten Oosterse 
culturen zich typeren door een interdependente construal waarbij de persoon 
vooral gedefinieerd wordt in termen van relaties met anderen. Deze verschillen 
werken ook door in de manier waarop mensen eigenwaarde (self-esteem) trachten 
te behouden. In Westerse culturen, met de nadruk op de persoon als individu, 
vereist het verkrijgen dan wel behouden van eigenwaarde juist dat unieke 
persoonskenmerken en individuele prestaties worden benadrukt. Dit komt onder 
meer tot uitdrukking in de vorm van het zich voordoen van een zelfdienende 
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vertekening in het verklaringsgedrag. Voor mensen uit Oosterse culturen 
daarentegen staat het bewaren van harmonie binnen de groep juist centraal en zou 
het verklaren van eigen prestaties op een zelfdienende wijze juist averechts werken 
op de “eigenwaarde”. 
Teneinde antwoord te verkrijgen op deze twee onderzoeksvragen zijn in totaal 
278 “Berichten aan de aandeelhouders” van Amerikaanse, Japanse en Nederlandse 
ondernemingen onderworpen aan inhoudsanalyse. In het onderzoek, waarvan het 
ontwerp beschreven staat in hoofdstuk 5, hebben we ons gericht op zogeheten 
causale attributies. Dit zijn zinnen of zinsdelen waarin een oorzaak-gevolg relatie 
tot uitdrukking komt. Met andere woorden in een causale attributie worden 
ondernemingsresultaten gekoppeld aan verklaringen. Een voorbeeld van zo’n 
causale attributie is de volgende: “In 2000 bleek deze prijsstrategie erg succesvol, 
resulterend in een 2.5% stijging van de opbrengsten per vat” (uit verslag 
Anheuser-Busch 2000). Daarnaast hebben we in de inhoudsanalyse ook gekeken 
naar niet-verklaarde ondernemingsresultaten, omdat die vanuit oogpunt van 
zelfpresentatie belangrijk (kunnen) zijn. De causale attributies werden gecodeerd 
naar aard van de uitkomst (positief óf negatief óf niet ondubbelzinnig vast te 
stellen), de richting van relatie tussen oorzaak en gevolg (gelijke richting óf 
tegengestelde richting—bijvoorbeeld door gebruik van “ondanks”—óf niet 
ondubbelzinnig vast te stellen) en locus (interne óf externe oorzaak óf niet 
ondubbelzinnig vast te stellen). In totaal heeft de inhoudsanalyse geresulteerd in 
914 onverklaarde ondernemingsresultaten en 911 ondernemingsresultaten die door 
1420 verklaringen vergezeld werden. 
Hoofdstuk 6 bevat de onderzoeksresultaten. Wat allereerst opvalt is dat in de 
“Berichten” van de Westerse ondernemingen erg veel nadruk wordt gelegd op 
positieve uitkomsten. Dit contrasteert erg sterk met de Japanse “Berichten” waarin 
bestuursvoorzitters voor een meer uitgebalanceerde strategie lijken te kiezen. We 
vinden, in overeenstemming met Tsang’s onderzoek onder ondernemingen uit 
Singapore, dat 35% van de onverklaarde ondernemingsresultaten en 45% van de 
causale attributies in Japanse “Berichten” betrekking hebben op tegenvallende 
ondernemingsresultaten c.q. negatieve informatie presenteren. We zien twee 
mogelijke interpretaties voor dit Oost-West verschil. De eerste is gerelateerd aan 
recente sociaal-psychologische inzichten die benadrukken dat de behoefte om 
zichzelf in positieve termen uit te drukken vooral aanwezig is in Westerse 
culturen. Dientengevolge, zo is het argument, wordt ook negatieve informatie als 
een bedreiging voor de eigenwaarde gezien. In Oosterse culturen daarentegen 
wordt negatieve informatie helemaal niet als bedreigend ervaren. Integendeel, 
informatie over waar men tekort heeft geschoten wordt juist gebruikt om zichzelf 
te perfectioneren en is ook van belang bij het benadrukken van het feit dat iemand 
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tot een bepaalde groep behoort. Een andere mogelijke interpretatie is gerelateerd 
aan de Azië Crisis die om en nabij juli 1997 vat begon te krijgen op de 
economieën in het Verre Oosten. Daar een deel van de “Berichten” betrekking 
heeft op de periode waarin deze crisis zich voordeed, is het niet denkbeeldig dat de 
Japanse bestuursvoorzitters eenvoudig weg meer negatieve informatie te 
presenteren hadden dan hun Westerse collega-bestuurders. 
Voor wat betreft de vertekening in causale attributies (self-serving bias)
vinden we uitkomsten die grotendeels in lijn zijn met eerder onderzoek. We zien 
dat, ongeacht afkomst, bestuursvoorzitters krediet nemen voor goede 
ondernemingsresultaten door deze in grotere mate aan interne factoren—factoren 
die zij kunnen beïnvloeden—dan aan externe factoren toe te schrijven. Voorts zien 
we dat de Amerikaanse en Japanse bestuursvoorzitters weigeren schuld op zich te 
nemen voor tegenvallende resultaten door deze in grotere mate aan externe dan 
aan interne factoren toe te schrijven. Ondanks dat de self-serving bias zich in de 
drie onderzochte landen lijkt voor te doen, zien we ook duidelijke verschillen 
tussen de landen. Ten eerste blijken de Amerikaanse CEOs in sterkere mate dan 
hun Japanse en Nederlandse collega’s geneigd te zijn positieve uitkomsten aan 
eigen kunnen toe te schrijven. Dit resultaat bevestigt het Oost-West verschil zoals 
eerder gevonden is in de sociale en cross-culturele psychologie. Het vergelijken 
van de drie landen heeft echter ook een aantal opmerkelijke bevindingen 
opgeleverd. In de eerste plaats lijken de Nederlandse bestuursvoorzitters niet 
geneigd te zijn teleurstellende resultaten systematisch aan externe factoren te 
wijten. Net als hun Belgische collega’s (Aerts, 1994) schrijven zij slechte 
resultaten enigszins in grotere mate toe aan interne dan aan externe factoren. 
Voorts waren ze in veel geringere mate dan de Amerikanen geneigd om krediet te 
nemen voor gunstige uitkomsten. Dit laatste resultaat suggereert dat er zelfs tussen 
Westerse culturen zich verschillen in verklaringsgedrag voordoen; iets dat 
voorheen nog maar weinig aandacht heeft gekregen. Een mogelijke oorzaak voor 
dit verschil kan gelegen zijn in het verschil in prestatiegerichtheid—daar de landen 
niet verschillen voor wat betreft construal of the self. Terwijl in de Amerikaanse 
cultuur prestatiegerichtheid een erg belangrijke rol speelt, is zij in de Nederlandse 
cultuur van geringere betekenis (Hofstede, 2001). Een andere opvallende uitkomst 
heeft betrekking op de sterke mate waarin Japanse managers slechte 
ondernemingsprestaties aan de omgeving wijten. Deze bevinding staat in sterk 
contrast met eerder sociaal-psychologisch en cross-cultureel onderzoek. Daarin 
werd schuldbewustheid onder Japanners voor tegenvallende resultaten meermalen 
aangetoond. Er zijn twee mogelijke verklaringen voor dit verschil. De eerste heeft 
betrekking op de eerder geduide Azië Crisis, die een legitieme en geloofwaardige 
reden vormde om tegenvallende ondernemingsresultaten aan toe te schrijven. Een 
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andere, ook in de literatuur genoemde, reden heeft betrekking op de steekproef. 
Daar waar men in sociaal-psychologisch en cross-cultureel onderzoek 
voornamelijk onderzoek heeft gedaan onder studenten had ons onderzoek 
betrekking op bestuursvoorzitters. De mogelijkheid is dus aanwezig dat 
vertekeningen die over het algemeen onder studenten gevonden worden niet persé 
generaliseerbaar zijn naar alle groepen binnen een cultuur. Het is dus mogelijk dat 
vertekeningen die erg sterk onder studenten c.q. jonge mensen aanwezig zijn 
afzwakken naarmate men ouder en meer ervaren wordt. Zowel Heine et al. (1999) 
als Lee and Tiedens (2002) hebben expliciet op deze mogelijkheid gewezen. Ons 
onderzoek lijkt een en ander te bevestigen. 
Naast de invloed van cultuur op verklaringsgedrag hebben we ook gekeken 
naar de invloed van factoren als type prestatie (dat wil zeggen was het een goed of 
slecht jaar voor de onderneming qua prestaties), stabiliteit van de prestaties (is de 
onderneming in staat relatief gelijkmatige groei te tonen of is er sprake van sterk 
wisselende resultaten), of de bestuursvoorzitter net benoemd is, de invloed van de 
algemene economische toestand, etc.. De resultaten laten zien dat type prestatie 
het verklaringsgedrag erg sterk beïnvloedt en wijzen op het belang van 
geloofwaardigheid. Net als in eerder onderzoek in de Verenigde Staten van 
Barlow (1996) vinden ook wij dat bestuursvoorzitters de neiging hebben 
informatie in hun “Berichten” te presenteren die gebaseerd is op het 
prestatieniveau van de onderneming. Met andere woorden, het in grotere mate 
toeschrijven van goede uitkomsten aan interne factoren komt vooral voor indien de 
onderneming gunstige resultaten gerealiseerd had. Evenzo werden externe factoren 
voor slechte uitkomsten vooral aangedragen in jaren die vanuit 
ondernemingsprestaties als ongunstig moeten worden gezien. Wat wel opvalt is 
dat, indien we de ondernemingsprestaties variëren, de verandering in het aantal 
negatieve passages aanzienlijk groter is dan de verandering in het aantal positieve 
passages. Dit suggereert, in lijn met eerder onderzoek van bijvoorbeeld Aerts en 
Staw et al., dat zelfs indien ondernemingen relatief gesproken slecht presteerden 
zij toch nog trachtten positieve informatie te presenteren.  
De belangrijkste les die bestuursvoorzitters uit dit onderzoek kunnen trekken 
en die in het concluderende hoofdstuk 7 wordt benadrukt is de volgende. Ondanks 
dat de Global Village een droom is gebleven zien we wel dat de wereld meer en 
meer geïntegreerd is geraakt terwijl ondernemingen ook steeds globaler zijn gaan 
opereren. Ook op het gebied van de financiële verslaggeving is merkbaar dat 
convergentie van regelgeving en praktijk optreedt, hetgeen alleen maar versterkt 
wordt onder invoering van de International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
die vanaf 2005 verplicht zijn voor alle beursgenoteerde ondernemingen. Deze 
convergentie impliceert echter niet dat culturele verschillen in hun geheel zullen 
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gaan verdwijnen. Ons onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat cultuur op een nogal 
subtiele manier van invloed is op de wijze waarop bestuursvoorzitters 
ondernemingsresultaten presenteren in hun “Bericht aan de aandeelhouders”. 
Ondanks dat we cultureel bepaalde verschillen in  zelfzuchtig gedrag aan hebben 
getroffen, lijkt de invloed van cultuur van secundaire aard te zijn. Dat wil zeggen, 
ondanks dat we zagen dat verschillen qua eigenbelang versus groepsbelang en 
mate van prestatiegerichtheid—twee veel genoemde aspecten waarop culturen 
verschillen—invloed hadden op de mate waarin bestuursvoorzitters zelfzuchtig 
verklaringsgedrag aan de dag leggen, is ook gebleken dat dit cultuureffect 
aanzienlijk kleiner is dan het prestatie-effect. De sterke invloed die uitging van het 
type ondernemingsprestatie laat zien dat de informatie in het “Bericht” grotendeels 
in lijn is met de behaalde prestaties en onderstreept het belang van het behouden 
van geloofwaardigheid. Al met al kunnen we concluderen dat het behouden van 
het imago van een geloofwaardige boodschapper voor alle bestuurders, ongeacht 
hun culturele achtergrond, belangrijk is. Dit sluit aan op recent onderzoek van Den 
Hartog et al. (1999) dat laat zien dat “integriteit” in alle culturen wordt 
gewaardeerd als een positief leiderschapskenmerk. Dit kan ook verklaren waarom 
het culturele verschil dat wij vonden—en het Oost-West effect in het bijzonder—
aanzienlijk kleiner is geweest dan in eerder sociaal psychologisch en cross-
cultureel onderzoek. De voornaamste implicatie voor bestuurders is dat zij 
zorgvuldig het verhaal ten aanzien van de ondernemingsprestaties moeten 
vormgeven. Het behouden van geloofwaardigheid zou voor iedere 
bestuursvoorzitter de hoofddoelstelling moeten zijn bij het opstellen van het 
“Bericht aan de aandeelhouders”. Geloofwaardigheid sluit echter het gebruik van 
zelfpresentatietechnieken niet in zijn geheel uit. Het gebruik van dergelijke 
technieken houdt eenvoudig gezegd in dat men de informatie op een dusdanige 
wijze probeert te verpakken waardoor men alles het ware de lezer helpt bij het 
trekken van—uiteraard door de bestuursvoorzitter wenselijk geachte—conclusies. 
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The Construction of Reality: Cultural differences in
self-serving behaviour in accounting narratives
A number of prior studies have revealed that CEOs’ accounts of
company performance are self-serving. These studies, predominantly
conducted in the United States, show that CEOs are willing to take
credit for favourable outcomes, but are reluctant to assume
responsibility for unfavourable ones. Recent social-psychological
research, however, suggests that such self-serving biases are less
universal than they were previously thought to be and might be
more typical for western than for eastern societies. Therefore, we
examine whether such cultural differences are also present in
managers’ explanations for company results. Content analysing 278
letters to the shareholders of American, Dutch, and Japanese
companies we find that CEOs’ explanations do cross-culturally vary,
thereby complementing and extending previous work on self-
serving biases in accounting narratives.
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